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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam from 1988-2009. 
It examines the nature, motivation and impact of FDI upon the Vietnam economy and its 
contribution to the subsequent leap forward in economic growth. The focus is on developing 
'XQQLQJ¶Veclectic theory through case study analysis of Honda-Vietnam Motorbike Company 
and ANZ-Vietnam Bank. The prominent theories on FDI generally used in the thesis focus on 
9HUQRQ¶V 3URGXFW /LIH &\FOH 3/& PRGHO WKH 0DUNHW ,PSHUIHFWLRQ 7KHRU\ 0,7 WKH
Transaction Cost (TC) or internalisation DSSURDFKDQG'XQQLQJ¶V(FOHFWLc Theory. Dunning is 
the clearest methodology for understanding the Vietnamese case as its method is to take account 
of a countries particular FDI characteristics and their impact on economic growth. The addition 
of an emphasis on the impact of culture upon the development of FDI in Vietnam provides this 
thesis with evidence of its originality and legitimacy to the claim of filling a gap in the literature 
on FDI in developing countries and the advancement of economic theory. 
The main focus in the case studies is demonstrating how foreign invested enterprises altered 
production, management, service and marketing processes to adapt their traditional, 
organisational and locational advantages to suit the local environment, and give them both 
foreign and domestic comparative advantages, ensuring the maximum possible capital return on 
their investments. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
9LHWQDP¶VForeign Direct Investment (FDI) did not flourish until the decision in 1986 (Doi Moi) 
to move from a planned economy to a market economy. In the following three decades the 
GHYHORSPHQWRI)',KDVEHHQµVSHFWDFXODU¶ (Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007) with 
the poverty rate falling from 58.1 per cent in 1993 to 12 per cent in 2009 and GDP increasing 
from USD100 in 1990 to USD1010 in 2009. With an average growth rate from 1990 to 2010 of 
7 per cent and total gross domestic product rising from USD15 billion in 1990 to USD91.8 
billion in 2009 (World Bank, 2009) , the growth of FDI has reflected the movement of Vietnam 
into the global economy, and demonstrated that it is now a country to invest in. FDI has grown 
from USD213 million in 1991 to over USD10 billion in 2009 (Vietnam General Statistics Office 
2010).  
PriceWaterhouseCoopeUV  GHFODUHG 9LHWQDP WKH µmost attractive emerging market in 
PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQ WKHZRUOG¶ in 2007 (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2007) and among the top ten 
countries for FDI in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2009). 9LHWQDP¶V DFFHVVLRQ WR WKH :RUOG 7UDGH 
Organisation in 2007 has accelerated its economic growth and provided an ideal opportunity for 
\HW IXUWKHU µVSHFWDFXODU¶ JURZWK LQ )', ,W KDV OHG WR IXUWKHU UHGXFWLRQV LQ WKH UHVWULFWLRQV RQ
foreign investment and operation and is forecast to become one of the most attractive investment 
countries in Asia (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009).  
This thesis explores the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam from 1986-2009. 
It examines the nature, motivation and impact of FDI upon the Vietnam economy and its 
contribution to the subsequent leap forward in economic growth. 
The thesis begins with an analysis of the different theoretical approaches to understanding FDI 
DQG LWV DIIHFW XSRQ D GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWU\¶V HFRQRmy and ends with two in-depth case studies 
(Honda and ANZ Bank), which illustrate that political, legal and cultural factors were significant 
determinants of the success of their investment into Vietnam. 
Analysis of the existing literature on Vietnam FDI has shown that studies have mainly focused 
on either legal or political change as the main determinants of FDI, and subsequently 
demonstrated a gap in the literature based on an absence of a study that combined the unique 
impact of the Vietnam culture on the FDI growth and on the cultural implications to the 
political, economic and legal determinants. New research through elite interviewing and survey 
of investors, businessmen, politicians and legal experts in Vietnam is combined with analysis of 
the existing data and literature. 
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FDI development in Vietnam has taken the country from a position of minimal impact of foreign 
investment upon the economy to an impressive and constantly improving record that is a credit 
to the pro-active policies of the Vietnamese government. As -RYDQþHYLüand âHYLü (2006) note, 
µ$OO LQ DOO D JRYHUQPHQW¶V SUR-active behaviour is usually rewarded with an increase in FDI 
LQIORZV LQWR WKH FRXQWU\¶ (p.11). This thesis research examines how the political, legal and 
economic reforms of the Vietnamese government over a two decade period has helped 
strengthen economic development and contributed towards its growing strength as a South East 
$VLDQ µWLJHU HFRQRP\¶(Dapice, 2003; Iswaran, 2007; Dollar, 1999). This development has 
followed a furtKHUSRLQWRI-RYDQFHYLFDQG6HYLFLQWKDWµWKHSURPRWLRQRIDFRXQWU\DVDQ)',
destination is linked with both hardwork and luck. The analysis of its competitive position 
(competitive positioning), after careful painstaking research may provide the many sought after 
DQVZHUV¶ (2006, p.9).  
âHYLü and -RYDQþHYLü noted EHVLGHV D QHHG IRU DQ µHIIHFWLYH OHJDO V\VWHP DQG HIIHFWLve 
MXGLFLDU\¶ DQ HQYLURQPHQW FRQGXFLYH WR )', GHYHORSPHQW VKRXOG HQWDLO D FRXQWU\ KDYLQJ
stability and consistency in government policy (p.57). They go on to then highlight a possible 
SUREOHP IRU VXFFHVVIXO GHYHORSPHQW RI )', ZKHUH WKH µFOXPV\ UHDFWLRQV RI JRYHUQPHQW¶
DORQJVLGHµXQQHFHVVDU\FRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQV¶DQGDµWRXJKVWDQFH¶against FDI can lead to various 
negative impacts on the efforts to attract foreign investment. In the case of Vietnam, the 
government has constantly striven to be a positive force for change in the economic 
environment felt necessary to attract significant amounts of effective investment from around 
the globe (Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Seow and Ching, 2008). 
TKLVWKHVLVVKRZVKRZ9LHWQDP¶V)',UHFRUGDQGWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRILWVVXFFHVs have developed 
to a point where the country is moving through the stages of economic development and can 
become a major centre of trade and industry in South East Asia. The thesis follows the analysis 
of the theories of investment with an assessment of the impacts of that financial input into the 
developing economy of Vietnam and examines the overall relationship between investment and 
economic growth.  
 The chapter on FDI analyses the benefits to the host country, including: 
x An improved Balance of Payment for inward flow of foreign earnings;  
x A manufacturing base with low costs of production;  
x An assured domestic market;  
x Creation of a demand for export, where we also then have an export demand that can 
create jobs;  
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x Increased knowledge from operating in a foreign environment;  
x Benefits to the consumer through lower prices;  
x Savings in labour and resources for higher value added activities. 
7KHIDFWRUVGHWHUPLQLQJZKHUHWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWmultinational corporations (MNCs) invest are 
complex, reflecting the rising importance of intangible assets (UNCTAD, 2005). A report of 
UNTAD (2005) points out that although there must be a basic regime in place in countries that 
welcomes FDI, the existence of a pro-investment regime is now a given. The majority of 
countries have introduced measures to liberalise their FDI frameworks and have in this way 
opened the door for MNCs to an increasing degree. Factors beyond the existence of a pro-FDI 
regime, especially economic factors such as the existence of created assets, have become 
significant.  
There exists definite links between economic growth and foreign investment and whether FDI is 
a determinant for growth of the economy, especially in the host developing countries. 
Chakrabarti (2001), Asiedu (2002) and Zhao (2003) recognised that there was a correlation 
between improvements in economic growth and the attraction and success of foreign investment 
and that actually, success in FDI did match increases in growth. Moore (1993), Lucas (1993), 
and Cernat and Vranceanu (2002) looked at FDI flows as a consequence of improved economic 
growth and that this included the spillovers in such areas as acquiring advanced technology, 
which transferred from foreign invested ventures to domestic enterprises. However, overspill is 
still a contested idea in Vietnam, but this thesis will still argue that FDI has had a significant 
impact upon Vietnam, especially in contributing towards its successful transition and that the 
future of domestic and foreign enterprises is still very much inter-dependent and necessary for 
future development economic growth and the case studies here support the idea that foreign and 
domestic enterprises will eventually become more inter-linked (Le Quoc Hoi and Pomfret, 
2008).  
The neoclassical theory of economic growth has sought to provide an explanation on the 
consequences as well as the causes of the presence of FDI in developing countries. On the other 
hand, in the endogenous growth theories, the effect of FDI on economic growth is explained 
through knowledge externalities and the existence of human capital in host developing 
countries. 
Neoclassical growth and endogenous growth theories support the role of FDI in promoting 
economic growth in host countries. According to these theories, FDI is viewed as a way to 
transfer knowledge, promote learning by doing, and bring in technology spillovers and human 
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capital augmentation. Consequently, FDI stimulates economic growth in host countries. The 
Eclectic Theory of FDI, on the other hand, provides a tool to explain the influence of economic 
growth on FDI in host countries. Empirical studies have found two way linkages between FDI 
and economic growth in both developed and developing countries (Dunning, 1988; 2001).  
Very little empirical analysis of the issue has been carried out for Vietnam compared to other 
developing countries, especially in applying a simultaneous system of two equations to test the 
two way linkages between FDI and economic growth in Vietnam. However, studies of Greece 
(Stoian and Filippaius, 2008), Thailand (Minde, 2000; Siripoisalpipat, 2000), Jordan (Said and 
McDonald, 2002) and Sweden (Johanson and Weidersheim, 1974) were helpful in applying FDI 
theory to Vietnam.  
The Legal Framework for FDI in Vietnam chapter examines how the reform of the legal system 
has been driven by a need to make the country more attractive and suitable for foreign 
investment. Development of Vietnam Foreign Investment Law (FIL) can be divided into five 
periods: 
x 1988-1990: - The Vietnamese National Assembly approves the FIL. FIL was basic with 
many constraints and limitations to foreign firms to invest in Vietnam. Many articles did 
not comply with domestic situation, international rules and customs. The Law allowed 
foreign investors to establish a joint venture with state-owned or cooperative 
organisations but not in the private sector in Vietnam (Pham Duy Nghia, 1998; Chan and 
2¶'RQQHOO; Javasuruja, 1993; Bo Chinh Tri, 1988).  
x 1991-1995: The Law was revised twice, in the years 1990 and 1992 (SRV 1990, 1992). 
Revisions allowed private sector business cooperation with foreign organisations and 
individuals; expanded forms of joint veQWXUH FRPSDQLHV IURP µWZR-SDUW\¶ LQWR µWKUHH-
SDUW\¶; gave preferential tax rates for FDI in areas with given priority (e.g., FDI 
enterprises producing necessary goods for import substitution): corporate income tax of 
10 percent within 15 years of commencement of operation. FDI enterprises were allowed 
to rent land for operation while Vietnamese local government was responsible for 
compensation and site clearance for foreign-invested projects. The Government would 
guarantee foreign currency balance to FDI projects in infrastructure facilities and import 
substitution (Pham Duy Nghia, 2000; 2001; 2002; Hayward and Lay, 1997; Luu Van 
Dat, 1997). 
x 1996 -FDI enterprises were allowed to choose forms of investment, rate of capital 
contribution, investment location and Vietnamese partner; enterprises with export 
proportion of more than 80 per cent were given priority in granting license; FDI 
5 
 
enterprise in export-oriented and hi-tech industries were encouraged. Amendments and 
supplements to the FIL in 1996 reflected improvements in the legal framework for FDI 
in Vietnam. International assessments deemed WKDWµVietnamese authorities suddenly had 
second thoughts about the desirability of opening the economy and introduced various 
bureaucratic hurdles that blatantly discrimiQDWHG DJDLQVW IRUHLJQ LQWHUHVWV¶ (John 2006, 
p.87). Despite positive changes in the Law, bureaucratic graft and extortion topped the 
list of foreign-investor complaints in Vietnam. 
x 2000 ± 2005: The Government proposed numerous FDI legal reforms. The FIL was 
amended for the fourth time, in June 2000 (SRV 2000b), attached by series of decrees, 
decisions, and circulars, among of which was the Decree No.24/2000/ND-CP dated 31 
July 2000 of the Government, providing detailed regulations on implementation of the 
FIL (SRV 2000a).  
x 2005-2008: In July 2006, a new investment regime comprising a Unified Enterprise Law 
(UEL) for the management of both domestic and foreign enterprises, and a Common 
Investment Law (CIL), regarding both foreign and domestic investment activities, came 
into effect, granting a more level playing field than that found under the previous 
investment regime (Pham Duy Nghia, 2003; 2004; 2006; Seow and Ching, 2008). 
The chapter on Doi MoiZKLFKZDV D VORJDQSURPXOJDWHGE\9LHWQDP¶V&RPPXQLVW3Drty in 
PHDQLQJ µUHQRYDWLRQ¶, focuses on how the political changes of policy in Vietnam by the 
Communist Party helped establish better conditions for foreign investment, and it explores the 
rationale for Doi Moi9LHWQDP¶VHFRQRP\DWWKDWWLPHZDVFHQWUDOO\SODQQHGDQGthe system of 
government subsidies was considered ineffective and not fully utilizing economic potential. 
There was a gradual decrease of the support of economics and policy assistance from the 
socialist bloc. Modern science and technology developments created a new platform for a new 
economics (Do Le Chau, 1995; Chu Van Lam, 1987; Dang Duc Dam, 1997; Le Dang Doanh, 
2002). 
By 1976, after two decades of war with the US, Vietnam was one of the least developed 
countries in the world. Being a country under the strong Soviet connection and deeply 
influenced by Communist ideology, Vietnam had few opportunities to gain access to the world 
economy. Limited resources and there inefficient utilisation, undeveloped trade and investment 
increased Vietnam¶VSUREOHPV. A US Trade Embargo isolated Vietnam from the global market 
and by the middle of 1980s, the Soviet Union and Eastern European system started facing 
terminal difficulties and economic failure (Dang Duc Dam, 1997; Do Phu Tran Tinh, 2006; 
Fforde, 1996).  
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9LHWQDP¶V FHQWUDOO\ planned and heavily subsided demand-led economy resulted in backward 
infrastructure, and an inadequate production system. Despite the demands for capital and 
technology, Vietnam found it hard to access FDI to support the attraction of these vital needs. 
The weak legislation system was considered to be a high barrier for international economic 
integration, including FDI attraction. Successful economic and political reform in Russia and 
Eastern Europe, along with the renovation and achievements of China was a rejection of strict 
Communist economic planning and policies. The obvious benefits of a movement towards free 
market systems made a great impact on Vietnamese policy makers, leading to pressures to find a 
new way for the economy. Dramatic changes in the Vietnamese economy were initiated (Fforde, 
1996; Do Le Chau, 1995).  
These developments actually attracted specific new investors into Vietnam. Case studies on 
ANZ and Honda provide an evidence of the economic development of Vietnam and how these 
foreign investors (Western-ANZ-Australia/Asian-Honda-Japan) chose different ways to 
assimilate to the Vietnamese culture, whilst also tackling the problems of an under-developed 
economic legal system and the product of long years of economic decline that resulted in poor 
levels of skills in human resources and poorly developed international trading and finance 
systems. 
Vietnam is a unique case study as this was an economy originally supported by its French 
colonialists for nearly 150 years and then in the South of Vietnam by the Americans for nearly a 
further two decades. Rich in natural resources, with an industrious and intelligent work force, it 
was extremely unfortunate that a destructive and long-term war of independence first brought 
the country to the point of economic collapse and then to more than a decade of isolationism and 
failure made worse by political and economic dogma that ensured it was cut off from the 
industrialised world and regularly suffer periods of starvation and extreme poverty (Dang Xuan 
Ky, 2002).  
The successful institution of a new policy of open door free market economics has now reversed 
the decline and Vietnam demonstrates one of the fastest rates of growth in the world today. The 
success has been built up in less than three decades and this study will show how a country has 
managed to build its new vibrant economy through the attraction of FDI and do it in an 
amazingly short time, and from an extremely low baseline. Whilst the thesis does concentrate on 
the economic factors that have created this success, the influence of culture upon the process 
cannot be ignored. Political and economic reform has demonstrated dramatic changes in style 
and content, and yet the culture has remained conservatively constant, whilst actually 
contributing to the successful development of the investment environment. In the next section 
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we look at why that is the case (Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; Athukorala and 
Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
1.1 FDI development and the Vietnamese culture 
In the 1960s accepted thinking was that Western institutional forms, values and behavioral 
FRGHVZHUHµHVVHQWLDOHOHPHQWV¶ LQEULQJLQJDERXWHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWZKLOH$VLDQFXOWXUH
and values weUHDµKLQGUDQFH¶WRGHYHORSPHQW (Gong and Jang, 1998. p.2). 0D[:HEHU¶VZRUNV
were actively used to promote the idea that Confucianism and Asian cultures were a barrier to 
capitalism and its successful development in the East (Weber 1968, p.248). 
The subsequent economic growth of Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea proved 
this not to be the case. What is notable in the research here is that the success of these countries 
has predicated on their economies being focused on export-oriented policies, rather than import 
VXEVWLWXWLRQVWUDWHJLHVDQGLWLVFOHDUWKDWWKH9LHWQDP*RYHUQPHQW¶VDoi Moi policy was clearly 
IRFXVHGRQUHSOLFDWLQJLWVUHJLRQDOQHLJKERU¶VVXFFHVVHV (Gong and Jang, 1998). Gong and Jang 
(1998) note that a question still unanswered by economists is why both the authoritarian state 
model, ZKHUHWKH6WDWHµDFWLYHO\SDUWLFLSDWHGLQSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHVSKHUHVRIWKHHFRQRP\DQG
has in fact been the leading actor in the HFRQRPLFJURZWK¶Hamilton and Biggart, 1988, p.77) 
and the neo-Confucian theory cannot be offered as ideal explanations for why Asian 
development has progressed so well in some countries and not in others. 
+RZHYHU WKH &RQIXFLDQ HWKLFV RI µVHOI-confidence, social cohesion, subordination of the 
individual, educatioQIRUDFWLRQEXUHDXFUDWLFWUDGLWLRQDQGPRUDOL]LQJFHUWLWXGH¶DUHDOOHOHPHQWV
that have helped Vietnam see a long period of record high rates in economic growth since the 
introduction of Doi Moi $W WKH VDPH WLPH WKH µDXWKRULWDULDQ¶ PRGHO KDV KDG D VWHDGy and 
positive impact upon Vietnam, with the Government managing to overseer almost every aspect 
of the social, political and economic transition of the country from a Command economy to a 
market economy (Gong and Jang, 1998, p.82). 
Thus, although both the neo-Confucian and the revisionist authoritarian theories are often 
criticisHGIRUWKHLULQDGHTXDFLHVLQIXOO\H[SODLQLQJWKHUHDVRQVIRU9LHWQDP¶VGUDPDWLFOHYHOVRI
economic growth, there is strong evidence that both the culture and the dominance of an 
authoritarian state control system have contributed towards the sustained growth of the Vietnam 
economy and the increased levels of FDI in particular. However, this thesis will also point out 
that both the neo-Confucian/Marxist-Leninist based culture, and the centralised authoritarian 
management of the Vietnamese transition to a free market economy does present a few negative 
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LQIOXHQFHVRQWKHUDWHDQGGHSWKRIµUHQRYDWLRQ¶+RZHYHUWKHDQDO\VLVLQWKHIROORZLQJFKDSWHUV
will show that the stark economic data shows that the balance between the negative and positive 
impacts of these factors are firmly in favor of accepting an overall constructive contribution to 
progress from the culture of Vietnam (Benito et. al., 1992; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; 
Casson and Nicholas, 1989). However, as the thesis progresses, the analysis of the transition 
process as experienced by Honda and ANZ will demonstrate that future development may 
depend on what degree there remains room for both the culture and politics of Vietnam to 
continue to adapt and even substantially change in order to fully integrate into the global 
economic system (Gong and Jang, 1998) 
The integration of Vietnam into the global economy through its transition to a market economy 
model began with the introduction of the policy of Doi Moi, but the actual mechanisms of 
change required involved the movement of the legal and economic structures from a hybrid of 
Confucianism and Soviet style traditions that meant the culture of business and society needed 
to adapt towards a new global business model. This change was especially the case in the legal 
reforms required to support the new policy and this thesis clearly points to the need for 
understanding how cultural transition was as vital a factor to successful growth as the political 
and economic adjustments. The extent of the transformation needed was radical and the theme 
for the transition was clearly identified by the main policy being identified simply as Doi Moi, 
which literally translates as µchanging into something new¶, but is more commonly referred to as 
µUHQRYDWLRQ¶ Doi Moi involved a commitment to dismantling cooperatives and shifting 
SURGXFWLRQDZD\IURPDµKRXVHKROGHFRQRP\¶ WR WKHµSULYDWHVHFWRU¶ZKLOVWDOVR UHVWUXFWXULQJ
the state-owned sector to be more competitive (Salemink, 2003).  
Essential to this policy was Vietnam seeking a new globalised economic position that allowed it 
to firstly trade with its regional neighbors and later work within all international markets. 
However, the isolationism and strict Soviet style administration of the late 1970s and early 
V PHDQW WKDW D PDMRU VKLIW ZDV QHHGHG LQ WKH SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO µKDELWV¶ DQG
social norms of the nation. The law of Vietnam was the central mechanism for actually ordering 
the nHZVW\OHHFRQRPLFPRGHODQGEULQJLQJLQVRPHWKLQJµQHZ¶7KHQH[WVHFWLRQORRNVDWKRZ
that legal model of the isolationist years was itself a hybrid of socialism and Confucianism 
which has left the Vietnam system with a residue of habits and norms that cannot easily be 
eliminated and is likely to continue to constrain, or at least alter the mode of the determinants of 
FDI growth in Vietnam for many years to come (Dapice, 2003; Iswaran, 2007; Dollar, 1999, Bui 
Hai Thiem, 2009). 
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1.2 Confucianism, Socialism and the Vietnam legal framework 
The cultural context within which FDI operates in Vietnam is shaped by its historical legacy, 
which now involves a hybrid mixture of Confucianism inherited from over a 1,000 years of 
colonial occupation by China and Socialism as a result of the recent Communist governance of 
Vietnam. This can be seen in the way the Vietnamese legal framework has developed and 
impacts significantly not only upon the FDI sector, but also generally on the way business is 
conducted. In this section we look at how Confucianism and socialism are two influential factors 
on how business and the economy operate.  
Its further significance is that it is the Confucianism and socialist cultural frameworks of the 
Vietnam society (socially, economically and governmentally) shape the environment within 
which FDI is established and operate. This thesis argues that FDI needs to be understood within 
the particular cultural context of the host country and that this is vital to the development of how 
theories on FDI such as Dunning (1980, 2000 and 2001) can progress in order to improve levels 
of knowledge on how FDI ventures can operate successfully in a developing economy. 
Whilst the new economic and political ruleV RI 9LHWQDP UHTXLUHG D WUDQVLWLRQ IURP µVRFLDOLVW
legaOLW\¶ WKH DFWXDO VWUXFWXUHV RI 9LHWQDP VWLOO UHWDLQHG D GRPLQDQFH RI µVRFLDO QRUPV¶ WKDW
LQYROYHGDFRPELQDWLRQRI'DRLVP%XGGKLVPDQG&RQIXFLDQLVPDQGZKLOHµVRFLDOLVP¶PD\EH
swept away at some point in the near future, it is unlikely that the culture of Vietnam is going to 
transform to the same degree. Thus, FDI success in the past and in the future is reliant on 
reaching a compromise between the culture of Vietnam and the economic model of the West. To 
understand clearly how the determinants of FDI are shaped by the cultural framework of 
Vietnam the thesis addresses how culture actually impacts on the legal system (Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2002; 2003; 2006). 
,QWKHILUVWSODFHWKHµFROOHFWLYLVP¶RIWKH6RYLHWµEOXHSULQW¶of the period immediately following 
independence and unification was not merely a political ideology, but also a Confucian principle 
HQWLUHO\DWRGGVZLWKWKHLQGLYLGXDOLVPRI:HVWHUQFDSLWDOLVP,Q&RQIXFLDQVRFLHWLHVµ$KXPDQ
being is born to be member not only of the family, but a village and in a broader sense, a 
member of a country. He or she lives only in a natural connection with other members of the 
society, as an integrated part of one organiseGERG\«ZKHUHWKHFROOHFWLYHLQWHUHVWRIVRFLHW\LV
supreme over individual LQWHUHVWV¶ Pham Duy Nghia, 2008, p.80). In 9LHWQDPµkhon chet, dai 
FKHWELHW WKLVRQJ¶- µLI\RXDUH WRRFOHYHU\RXZLOOSHULVK LI\RXDUH WRR VWXSLG\RXZLOODOVR
SHULVKEXW LI \RXNQRZKRZ WR OLYH \RXZLOO VXUYLYH¶7KLVRYHUWO\DQWL-individualist and un-
ambitious mindset of the culture would not immediately appear compatible with the demands of 
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a capitalist system and not conform to the needs of the required determinants for FDI growth in 
Vietnam (Pham Duy Nghia, 2008). It did actually provide numerous difficulties in the process 
of reform, as while the law and political policy changed, the system itself was still run along the 
old Confucian and Marxist-Leninist values (it is clear to see that the collectivism and 
communitarianism of communism was in some ways compatible with Confucianism).  
In this context the reform of the economic system and the operation of the determinants of FDI 
JURZWK ZHUH DIIHFWHG E\ WKH FXOWXUH DQG WKLV LV FOHDU WR VHH LQ WKH µRSHUDWLRQ¶ RI WKH QHZ
economic laws, as set against the principles and requirements of the laws, such as the new laws 
on foreign investment. Previous laws were a reflection of the Marxist Leninist style that 
DWWHPSWHGWRUHSODFH&RQIXFLDQLVPDQGEULQJDERXWDµGLFWDWRUVKLSRIWKHSUROHWDULDW¶Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2008, p.82). The liberalisation of the economy was carried out enthusiastically, but 
importantly, the system of settling disputes, for example, remained exactly as before. As Pham 
Duy 1JKLDQRWHVµWKHSRZHUDQGGLVFUHWLRQRIWKHVWDWHDXWKRULWLHVWRLQWHUYHQHLQWKHactivities 
of contracting parties remained unconstrained. Business contracts, for example, may be declared 
void, often arbitrarily, based on outdated and conflicting regulations (Pham Duy Nghia, 2008, 
p.85).  
This methodology of opaque and nepotistic behavLRXURQWKHEHKDOIRIWKHµDXWKRULWLHV¶SUHVLGLQJ
over economic matters was as much a result of the Confucian culture as it was reflective of the 
µ6RYLHW¶DXWKRULWDULDQLVP7KHFRPSODLQWVDJDLQVWFRUUXSWLRQLQEXVLQHVVDQGSROLWLFVLQ9LHWQDP
have to be seWDJDLQVWD&RQIXFLDQFXOWXUHZKLFKLVE\LWVQDWXUHµODFNLQJLQFOHDUV\VWHPDWLFDQG
WUDQVSDUHQW UXOHV¶ :KDW LV VRPHWLPHV VHHQ DV FRUUXSW E\ :HVWHUQ EXVLQHVVPHQ FDQ MXVW DV
HDVLO\EHVHHQDVPHUHO\WKH9LHWQDPµway¶VXFKDVZLWKWKHJHQHUDOSUDFWLFHRIJLYLQJµJLIWV¶DW
business meetings and at the beginning or end of negotiations (Pham Duy Nghia, 2008).  
Importance KHUHLVWRH[SODLQIXUWKHUWKHLPSDFWRIµVRFLDOLVWOHJDOLW\¶DVDFRQFHSWWKDWVWLOOWRGD\
dominates the business setting. Traditional structures, economic practices, etc were replaced 
DIWHU ,QGHSHQGHQFH E\ WKH µUXOH¶ RI WKH 3HRSOH¶V &RPPLWWHH¶V DQG 3HRSOH¶V &RXQFLO¶V ZLWK D
centralisation of decision-making and a budget resource allocation that was decided through 
political ideology and community dominated ethics. Rather than the interests of the economic 
µLQGLYLGXDOorganisation¶ LWZDV µ7KH3HRSOH¶V¶ LQWHUHVW WKDWZHUHSODFHGSDUDPRXQW+RZHYHU
the law remained a hybrid compromise between tradition, culture and communism, if not in the 
letter of the law, then often in its practice. Thus, it can be seen that while the law has directly 
sought to promote further the positive reform of the determinants of foreign investment, the 
practice has sometimes countered this and brought barriers into bringing about the complete 
µRSHQQHVV¶RI WKH HFRQRP\7o hope that this can be solved by the introduction of µ:HVWHUQ¶
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style law would appear optimistic, as the Vietnamese culture is still likely to dominant economic 
practices. In fact, Pham Duy Nghia points out that replacement of the Confucius/Marxist-
/HQLQLVWµVW\OH¶LVDPLVWDNHDQGWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGUHDOO\EHDµFRQYHUJHQFH¶RI&RQIXFLDQYDOXHV
ZLWK WKH:HVWHUQGRFWULQHDQG WKLV WREULQJDERXWD µKDUPRQL]DWLRQ¶RI OHJDO standards (Pham 
Duy Nghia, 2003; 2006; 2008). 
This thesis examines the determinants of FDI in Vietnam and the economic and political factors 
involved in their development, with the view that they cannot be isolated from the cultural 
influences and are significantly affected by the VietnDPHVH µZD\¶ RI ZRUNLQJ DQG OLYLQJ
Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this thesis shows that despite any negative impacts of 
the Vietnamese culture, the determinants of FDI have been increasingly positive and in some 
ways, the culture has actually contributed to that record of success. The conclusion of this 
chapter examines how FDI has developed in Vietnam and provides analysis that appears to 
confirm thDW WKHUH LV DFWXDOO\ D µKDUPRQLVDWLRQ¶ RI WKH FXOWXUH SROLWLFV DQG HFRQRPLFV WR WKH
Western doctrines of business that clearly dominate the global economic economy. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
This thesis will examine the development of FDI in Vietnam through the perspective of two 
enterprises- Honda motorbike company and ANZ Bank. Honda first established its operations in 
Vietnam more than forty five years ago and since then have invested over USD500 million on 
three motorcycle producing plants with over two million bikes sold each year (Thang, 2012). 
ANZ Bank established operations in Vietnam in 1993 and now have eight branches throughout 
the country. The two case studies provide primary research for supporting the description of 
GHWHUPLQDQWVRI)', LQ9LHWQDP:KLOH IRFXVLQJRQ'XQQLQJ¶V(FOHFWLF WKHRU\ WKH WKHVLVDOVR
combines this with an examination of the impact of national culture and assimilation to that 
FXOWXUHE\WKHWZRIRUHLJQHQWHUSULVHV7KHGHYHORSPHQWRI'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFSDUDGLJPFRPHV
through the attention to the alignment of the competitive advantages of Honda and ANZ Bank 
with their own development of relational assets such as trust, cultural affinity and ethno-cultural 
understanding. With Vietnam, as with China, the need for an understanding of the impact of 
Confucian beliefs upon business behaviour has proven to be essential in any analysis of 
successful business activity in Asia. 
'XQQLQJ¶V HFOHFWLF WKHRU\ KDV GHYHORSHG D FODVVLFDO 2/, RZQHUVKLSORFDWLRQLQWHUQDOLVDWLRQ
paradigm that is driven by asset exploitation. At the outset, foreign investors face two major 
FKDOOHQJHVLQDµOLDELOLW\RIIRUHLJQQHVV¶WKURXJKµIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHULVNVDQGXQIDPLOLDULW\ZLWK
EXVLQHVV FRQGLWLRQVRI WKH IRUHLJQPDUNHW¶ )LOLSSRYDQG6DHEL S)RU'XQQLQJ WKH
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motivations for seeking to invest in a country like Vietnam are: a need for access to new 
supplies of natural resources (resource-seeking); a new market (market-seeking/horizontal FDI); 
seeking to transfer overseas parts of the value chain in order to rationalise production 
(efficiency-seeking/vertical FDI); and seeking to create new assets (asset-seeking). (Fillippov 
and Saebi, 2008) 
:LWK'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFWKHRU\DQGWKHDWWHQWLRQWR2/,DGYDQWDJHVWKHFDVHVWXGLHVRQ+RQGD
and ANZ Bank can be first assessed through the traditional framework of ownership, location 
and internalisation. However, the outcome lacks a thorough understanding of how and why both 
Honda and ANZ have become so successful in Vietnam, and the eclectic theory thus needs a 
more sophisticated understanding of the impact on business in Vietnam of Confucian values and 
norms. Nevertheless, Dunning provides a satisfactory framework to analyse the basic 
determinants of FDI, and in the case studies the data and information supplied provides a means 
to assess the competitive advantages of the two companies and their contribution to the success 
of the enterprises. Primary research focused on interviews provided a means to take the analysis 
further and see to what extent a willingness to understand and adapt to the local culture and 
environment also provided extra elements of advantage. 
)RU2ZQHUVKLSDGYDQWDJHV'XQQLQJ¶VWKHRU\SRLQWVWRZDUGVWKHRIIVHWRIWKHFRVWVRIRSHUDWLQJ
abroad through higher revenues and/or lower costs. In the case of both Honda and ANZ the 
costs incurred through initial lack of knowledge of local conditions and the increased costs of 
operating abroad were balanced by having monopolistic advantages, access to advanced 
technology and economies of scale not enjoyed by domestic competitors. 
In using Dunning as the basic framework for the thesis, there is at the outset a traditional focus 
on the configuration of three sets of forces: 
1. Competitive advantages of a foreign firm in a new location due to privileged 
ownership of income generating assets and the coordination of these assets across 
national boundaries. 
2. µ7KH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK ILUPV SHUFHLYH LW WR EH LQ WKHLU EHVW LQWHUHVW WR LQWHUQDOLVH WKH
markets for the generation and/or use of these assets and by doing so add value to 
WKHP¶'XQQLQJS 
3. The degree of commitment made to locating value-adding assets and activities to a 
location outside of their own national boundaries (Dunning, 2001, p.176). 
'XQQLQJ¶VVHDUFKIRU WKHYDULDEOHVGHWHUPLQLQJVXFFHVVIXO IRUHLJQRSHUDWLRQVDQG WKHGHSWKRI
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value adding activity is based on a generic model which has been criticised for not providing a 
IXOOH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHµNLQGVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOSURGXFWLRQ¶EXWLVGHIHQGHGE\'XQQLQJLQWKDWKH
seeks to identify a methodology that encompasses a generic set of variables (Dunning, 2001, 
p.177). However Dunning (2001) points briefly to his growing interest in the development of 
relational assets and the growth of the need to explore more their impact. This thesis provides a 
focus on the Honda motorcycle company and ANZ Bank strategies for not only coming to 
understand and use traditional location advantages, but also the importance of extending those 
advantages to include the development of relational assets, while also providing a reciprocal 
balance between the domestic environment and the foreign investor. However, Dunning (2001) 
GRHV SURYLGH RQO\ D QDUURZ GHILQLWLRQ RI UHODWLRQDO DVVHWV ZLWK LW FRQILQHG WR µEHQHILFLDO
UHODWLRQV¶ EHWZHHQ SHUVRQV ZLWKLQ D ILUP¶ DQG SHUVRQV µLQ RWKHU LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ 'XQQLQJ 
p.188). In the study here of the determinants of FDI in Vietnam there is an expansion of the 
concept of relational assets which involves an examination of the quest of the investor to 
develop an understanding and reciprocal relationship with the national culture in Vietnam, while 
designing a business model that works with, and helps develop, a mutually beneficial mode of 
operation that respects the norms and values of the ethno-cultural environment. In Chapter 
7KUHH0HWKRGRORJ\WKHWKHVLVSUHVHQWVDFOHDUHUOLQNDJHRI'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFSDUDGLJPWRDQ
understanding and empathy to the effects of Confucian dynamism. It is essential that the primary 
target of the thesis is to show how the FDI determinants in Vietnam are uniquely affected by the 
cultural environment and that the traditional asset exploitation of foreign investors is optimised 
through a development of reciprocal relationships that form the very basis of the norms and 
values of Asian societies who are culturally bound by the principles and behaviorial 
expectations of Confucian based traditions and cultures. This may appear an idiosyncrasy when 
one assumes that the advent of Communism and decades of its ideological rule would, of itself, 
displaced the religious adherence to Confucianism. However, the persistence within the culture 
of Vietnam of the values and norms of Confucianism while ruled under Communism 
demonstrates the culturally bound permanence of these beliefs and foreign investors should 
never underestimate their need to understand and accommodate these traditions and practices. 
7KHEDVLVRI'XQQLQJ¶V eclectic paradigm is the transaction cost theory. Transaction cost theory 
examines the absolute costs of a purchase, including all possible costs in time, effort and money 
to make a purchase and this is added to the actual cost of the product or service to assess the 
overall costs involved.  
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The term transaction costs is commonly associated with the work of Ronald Coase (1960) and 
was expanded on by Oliver E Williamson(1981) in "The Economics of Organization: The 
7UDQVDFWLRQ&RVW$SSURDFK´ 
In establishing the determinants of transaction costs, Williamson identifies them as arising from 
³IUHTXHQF\specificityXQFHUWDLQW\OLPLWHGUDWLRQDOLW\DQGRSSRUWXQLVWLFEHKDYLRU´(1960, p.3). 
Broadly speaking the transaction costs can be seen as all costs outside of those incurred 
LQWHUQDOO\E\DFRPSDQ\LQFRPSOHWLQJDµWUDQVDFWLRQ¶7KHJHQHUDOWKHRU\LQFOXGHVDFRQFHSWRI
bounded rationality which relates to the idea that structures, such as institutions, time limits, lack 
of information, etc. impact upon the freedom of any agency to  reach a rational outcome and 
decisions are far more complicated than merely the ability of an agency to reach a decision 
EDVHG XSRQ WKHLU RZQ µUDWLRQDOLW\¶ 7KDW UDWLRQDOLW\ LV µERXQGHG¶ IUDPHG DQG WR VRPH GHJUHH
determined by outside structures that either impede or facilitate particular courses of action. 
In foreign direct investment there are generally three modes of entry into a foreign market:  
OLFHQVLQJ H[SRUW RU IRUHLJQ GLUHFW LQYHVWPHQW :LWK 'XQQLQJ¶V HFOHFWLF SDUDGLJP ILUPV DUH
believed to calculate the relative advantages of each of these entry modes on the general basis of 
the transaction costs, and extend this analysis to the three further factors of ownership, location 
and internalisation advantages. Each advantage factor leads to the decision of how to enter a 
foreign market and the type of entry. For example, location advantage might be the presence of 
cheap raw materials in the targeted country, while ownership advantage might be the specific 
production technique of the investor firm and an internalization advantage would involve the 
core competencies of the investor firm and its wish to retain those competencies internally rather 
than share them through licensing or joint ventures (Dunning, 1981). 
There are various levels of costs involved in operating in a foreign country, such as a lack of 
knowledge and understanding of the foreign culture; the costs involved in an entirely different 
market and the obvious extra costs of communicating and operating at a long distance from a 
ILUP¶V KRPH EDVH 7KHVH ZLOO DOO LQFXU VRPH IRUP RI µFRVW¶ WR WKH ILUP ZKLFK WKHQ QHHGV
countermanding by some other advantage which leads to a net benefit. For example, the brand, 
image and technological advantages of the firm are its individual ownership advantages which 
FDQFHO RXW WKH µIRUHLJQ¶ FRVWV RI RSHUDWLRQ DQG OHDYH D QHW EHQHILW WR WKH SURVSHFWLYH IRUHLJQ
investor. The foreign investor is comparing its advantages and core competencies against those 
of its market competitors and believes that they provide either a higher marginal return or a 
lower marginal cost that can be enjoyed by their main competitors, thus providing rational 
reasons and better profits by expanding into a foreign country. 
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With location advantages a large part of the advantages are in the hands of the host country, 
where their political and economic policies can create the environment that is beneficial to the 
foreign investor, alongside the more general advantages of, for instance, cheap and educated 
labour, a large domestic market and easy access to raw materials. The factors involved in the 
location are divided into economic, political and social advantages that provide specific benefits. 
In the case of Vietnam the economic advantages include a very large domestic market, that in 
the case of both Honda and ANZ provided them with a substantial opportunity for selling their 
products and services, while the political advantages included a government that was 
increasingly promoting opportunities for foreign investors and actively introducing policies such 
as tax breaks and special subsidies to encourage foreign direct investment. Social advantages 
LQFOXGHG D JURZLQJ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR VHH µIRUHLJQHUV¶ DV ZHOFRPH DQG LPSRUWDQW µJXHVWV¶ ZKR
GHVHUYHGµVSHFLDO¶WUHDWPHQW 
$V'XQQLQJ¶VHDUOLHUZRUNVQRWHGLWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WKDWDIRUHLJQFRPSDQ\RSHUDWHDV
well or as profitable as its main native country company works, in order for it to find relative 
advantages in expanding to a foreign country. It can still be assessed as having sufficient 
advantages if it can operate at an advantage over the local domestic companies. For example, 
ANZ could see the benefits of operating in Vietnam as stemming from an ability to work at a 
higher margin or/and lower cost than the competing domestic Vietnamese banks. 
Dunning declares that the major influences on his work were Peter Buckley and Mark Casson 
(1976) in the Future of the Multinational Enterprise and J.C McManus (1972) in Multinational 
Firm and the Nation State 'XQQLQJ7KHSXUSRVHRI'XQQLQJ¶VZRUNZDVWRH[SODLQWKH
extent and pattern of international production. International production is seen as the activities 
of the Multi National Enterprise and its use of foreign direct investment to provide them with 
improvements in their production benefits. Important here is the value added activity produced 
by an MNE by expanding its operation and interests in foreign countries and diverting capital  
from its domestic basis into another country, using its core competencies and advantages to 
create increased value. The theory then is a means to provide explanations as to why a firm has 
acquired value added activity through foreign direct investment.  
Various variables can have endogenous and exogenous impacts upon FDI and are identified by 
Dunning as: Endogenous- strategic responses, technological or organisational innovations, 
changes in compositions of senior management, increases in labour productivity, mergers and 
acquisitions; Exogenous- population, raw materials prices, exchanges rates, national government 
policies (Dunning, 2001, p.179). 
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Important utility of OLI theory is its ability to help explain the Investment Development Path 
and the changing international position of a country as a possible investment destination in 
relative comparison to other developing countries. In this thesis the chapters on law and on Doi 
Moi provide an historical tracking of the changes the Vietnam government made to encourage 
the growth of foreign direct investment. These chapters indicate the positive trajectory of the 
Vietnam government in creating the right environment for FDI growth and help identify the 
factors that are important in creating the right structural environment to encourage investment. 
Dunning (2001) indicated the crucial role government plays in attracting foreign direct 
investment and this thesis has focused in a large part on how the Vietnam has structured its 
development path. The primary overriding framework for this was the introduction of Doi Moi, 
which initiated the vital movement away from ideologically bound control of the economy in a 
centrally planned market, towards a free market. This transformation cannot be under-estimated 
in its importance as a starting point for the beginning of a significant step forward in the 
development of Vietnam. The Doi Moi policy provided the strongest indication of a willingness 
of the Vietnam government to move the country into a new era of competitive advantages over 
its competitors for foreign investment. 
,QOLQHZLWK'XQQLQJ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVWKH2/,SDUDGLJPLVXWLOLVHGLQWKHFDVHVWXGLHVWRDOVR
show how these separate advantages are inter-related and have an impact on each other. The 
case studies of ANZ and Honda both examine how the Ownership advantages of these two 
MNEs were adjusted to enhance and benefit from for instance the increasing locational 
advantages provided by penetration into the Vietnam market. Dunning expresses a need to 
understand that there are continually related impacts of the three OLI advantages, and  Dunning 
illustrated this with the example of asset ownership and transaction ownership advantages where 
asset ownership involved the resources an MNE possessed in competition with other enterprises, 
ZKLOHLQWUDQVDFWLRQDGYDQWDJHVµPLUURUWKHFDSDFLW\RIPXOWLQDWLRQDOHQWHUSULVHVKLHUDUFKLHVYLV-
à-vis external markets, to recoup the transactional benefits (or lessen the transactional costs) of 
the common ownership of separate but inter-UHODWHG DFWLYLWLHV ORFDWHG LQ IRUHLJQ FRXQWULHV¶
(Dunning, 1988, p.13). OLI advantages are also to be seen as continually changing over time 
and the comparison between one period and another presents different levels of advantages in a 
particular MNE, while the merit of any country as a possible destination for investment by a 
company is also not static and is relative to the growth or decline in attractiveness of other FDI 
ORFDWLRQV 'XQQLQJ DOVR ZDUQV WKDW µDV NQRZOHGJH EHFRPHV PRUH LGLRV\QFUDWLF WDFLW Dnd 
noncodifiable, the market has proved an increasingly inappropriate modality for the organisation 
of cross-ERUGHUWUDQVDFWLRQV¶'XQQLQJDQG$UFKHUS,QH[DPLQLQJWKH2/,IDFWRUVLQ
Vietnam for ANZ Bank and Honda the advantages are also divided into firm-specific, industry-
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specific and country-VSHFLILFFDWHJRULHV)RUH[DPSOHLQOLQHZLWK'XQQLQJ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
we can see that Honda enjoyed both structural and strategic related firm specific advantages that 
meant it could compete successful with other motorcycle firms both in Vietnam and in other 
foreign countries. For Honda, the industry specific advantages related to the market structure, 
which on the point of penetration into Vietnam was at the beginning of a dramatic growth 
period. The country-specific advantages included a work force that was extremely low cost, but 
educated to a reasonable level and a succession of governments that focused on providing an 
increasingly attractive financial environment for FDI. 
Due to low wages and resource costs alongside political and economic reforms that are 
continually improving the investment climate in Vietnam, foreign companies did, and still do, 
FRQVLGHU9LHWQDPDGHVWLQDWLRQ IRU IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQWDV WKHLUFRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHV µVHFXUH
sufficient in order to cover the risks and costs that overseas operations entail (Fillipov and Saebi, 
2008, p.8). However, one cannot be too positive about the improvements that have been made in 
the Vietnam economy as there are numerous negative signs that still provide problems to 
investors. Child and Rodrigues (2005, p.288) described a number of problems that can be 
identified in developing economies. These include: 
x µUHJLRQDO SURWHFWLRQLVP OLPLWLQJ RSSRUWXQLWLHV DYDLODEOH RWKHUZLVH LQ D ODUJH GRPHVWLF
market to exploit economies of scale; 
x Restricted access to capital preventing investment in plants of optimal scale; 
x Underdeveloped international property rights (IPR) regime limiting access to 
sophisticated technologies; 
x Lack of skilled human resources; 
x Weak local infrastructure entailing rising transport costs.  
In the case of Vietnam there are a number of issues, such as the still much undeveloped human 
resource training system, which has led to an increasing lack of human resource quality and the 
lag in the developments of the transport systems. However, in general there are policies to at 
least try an improve the present situation. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The last two decades of FDI development in Vietnam have established the foundations for 
future success in attracting foreign investment, and this thesis highlights the positive and 
negative impacts that were inevitable when the process was begun by a paradigm RIµOHDUQLQJE\
GRLQJ¶+RZHYHULWKDVQRZHVWDEOLVKHGDSURYHQPRGHOIRUIXWXUHGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHRQVHWRI
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the financial crisis now means that countries around the world must compete for FDI in a highly 
competitive environment. Nguyen Mai (2009), chairman of the Vietnam State Commission for 
Cooperation and Investment and chief advisor on the State Panel for WTO entry believes that 
the experience of the past has enabled Vietnam to place itself as a highly attractive location for 
IXWXUHLQYHVWPHQWDWDWLPHZKHQPDQ\RIWKHZRUOG¶VGHYHORSHGHFRQRPLHVDUHUH-trenching and 
offering fewer opportunities for good returns on investment. Vietnam is also an oil exporting 
country and the rich returns that were accrued from the high price period of 2008 earned man y 
billions of dollars in profit (Vietnam Tonight, 2008). 
0DLEHOLHYHV WKDW WKHPHPRU\ RI WKLVSHULRGRI µULFKSLFNLQJV¶ ZLOO UHPDLQ LQPDQ\ LQYHVWRUV
minds and that both domestic and foreign investors will identify Vietnam as a future place to 
invest heavily. But Vietnam has also learned from its mistakes of the past two decades and can 
now make changes to the environment that will improve the FDI prospects. As Mai notes, the 
public are more discerning of the benefits of FDI and less willing to accept a policy of accepting 
any and all prospective FDI projects. The Government is also more careful and now asking 
whether or not an FDI project will be profitable, instead of just accepting the money.  
As one 0LQLVWU\RI3ODQQLQJDQG,QYHVWPHQW¶Vofficial, Nguyen Thu Quang saidµLQWKHODVWWHQ
years we tended to license an FDI project purely on the basis of whether the money was there or 
not. Now we tend to be more sophisticated and not just accept the money without first 
calculating whether it is likely to be a successful and profitable venture in the future, or 
beQHILFLDO WR WKH SXEOLF JRRG¶ (Interview: Nguyen Thu Quang, Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, 6 May 2009),  
This thesis is in itself an assessment of the success and failures of FDI in Vietnam over the 
recent years, and provides the academic analysis upon which the future FDI environment can be 
reformed. Vietnam is a late entry into the process of industrialisation and foreign investment 
now needs to be directed towards the areas and fields most likely to benefit from it and ensure 
that the future of the economy is based on policies that bring sustainable and environmentally 
friendly growth. 
This thesis will show that ANZ and Honda are examples of those investments that have become 
successful, yet they went through a process of learning by doing that was sometimes costly and 
demonstrated some of the failings of investors and the Vietnamese Government. As Mai warns, 
it is necessary to now be more careful of investment and ensure, for instance, that the foreign 
investor and the foreign invested projects are fully researched before being licensed. The 
process of refoUPDOVRQHHGV WRHQKDQFHDVSHFWV VXFKDV µWD[KROLGD\V¶DQG WKH UHIRUPVKRXOG
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DOVRSURYLGHQHZLQFHQWLYHV)RUH[DPSOHµ7KHREMHFWLYHVKRXOGEHWKDWZKHQDIWHUDSHULRGRI
time an FDI project fails to be implemented, there should be a better process of administration, 
ZKHUHOLFHQVHVDUHUHYRNHGLQRUGHUWRSXWWKHODQGEHLQJZLWKKHOGEDFNLQWRFLUFXODWLRQ¶(Pham 
Quang Ngoc, 2009,17). There is a need for µVWURQJ DQG FRQVLVWHQW UHIRUP¶ DQG IRU WKH
9LHWQDPHVH PDQDJHUV WR EH DEOH WR µWUDFN HFRQRPLF VZLQJV DQG have an ability to forecast 
WUHQGV«ZKHQ UHDVRQDEOH IRUHFDVWV FDQ EH PDGH DSSURSULDWH QHZ GHYHORSPHQW SODQV FDQ EH
made by central planners¶ Pham Quang Ngoc, 2009, p.17). If anyone knew beforehand, the 
after effects of the US financial crisis, which includes the global economic recession- many 
mistakes, could be avoided. The aim of this thesis is to provide that analysis of how, when and 
why FDI development took place in Vietnam and to fully understand the present environment. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to fill the gap in the literature and knowledge of FDI development 
in Vietnam and to use that analysis to help in shaping future policies. Theories used, such as 
'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFWKHRU\DOORZDIRFXVRQLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWVVXFKDVWKHORFDWLRQDGYDQWDJHV
which also then includes the impact of not only political and economic reform, but also allows 
the impact of the Vietnam culture to be assessed alongside the empirical data. By concentrating 
to some degree on the subjective analysis of the process and success of investing in Vietnam the 
thesis allows the empirical data to be better understood in the context of Vietnam.  
The Vietnam case study is a unique opportunity in the academic analysis of economic theory 
and practice, in that the country suffered decades of violent conflict that was followed by almost 
complete isolation from the world. Foreign investment was only provided by the Soviets and 
Chinese as an ideological obligation and a strategic political and military option that did not 
fully take into account the economic implications. As one senior former Communist Party cadre 
said µthe money was merely to keep us as friends and prop up the system, which, although we 
could enjoy political and military friendship, really left us economically more isolated and 
unable to develop. We became captive prisoners of the ideology and the payment we made was 
in poverty and starvation. We needed to reform and Doi Moi was a conversion as much of the 
ideology as it was the economy. We could now as a Party remains true to Communism (sic), but 
in a free market model. It was a compromise between our beliefs and the reality of the economic 
structures of the world¶,QWHUYLHZGHWDLOVUHPDLQDQRQ\PRXVDWWKHUHTXHVWRIWKHLQWHUYLHZHH
3 May 2009). He explained that the process of reform now does need to be analysed and for us 
to learn from our experiences. The thesis will point out the mistakes as well as the successes and 
in the process allow upcoming government decision-makers to plan better for the future. 
Thus, this thesis examines first the political policy changes and how these were enacted through 
the development of the legal system. But both were brought about in a unique political and 
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cultural environment that altered both the style and consequences of foreign investment into 
Vietnam. For this reason the thesis merges economic theory with socio-economic and cultural 
factors in order to take forward the discipline of economics and its theoretical base, with a view 
to both understanding and explaining how economic strategies in Vietnam have led to its 
successful development and venture that there is a link between successful foreign direct 
investment and economic growth. The FDI environment in Vietnam was both a cause and a 
consequence of its movement towards being an export oriented economy, and this thesis will 
show that the theories of economics needs to take a position where the links between FDI export 
orientation and economic growth are compatible factors that when linked result in successful 
development, which now leaves Vietnam on the verge of a movement from a less developed 
country to a developing country and hopefully soon a fully industrialised developed economy. 
In examining the link between political and economic factors to cultural and social influences, 
the research found that the links was not only proved successful when the factors were 
compatible, but that successful development cannot be brought about by isolating these factors 
from each other. Following the evidence presented through the case studies of ANZ and Honda, 
the conclusion of the thesis will discuss further the necessary links between these analytical 
tools. The national economic data has proved also to have a sometimes negative impact upon the 
research. This has been due to the organisational and structural problems in empirical data 
collection in Vietnam. Official sources of data are often untrustworthy and this leaves the 
researcher with the problem of actually finding reliable data. By concentrating on a narrow 
study of the experience of two foreign invested firms, the thesis allows the available national 
data to be assessed alongside that of the companies and for that to be re-enforced by the 
subjective recollections and analysis of the people involved in the historical development of 
their companies successful penetration of the Vietnam market. 
However, elements of the central control of both the economy and the politics of Vietnam are 
likely to remain in place for many years to come and the thesis thus suffers from a certain lack 
of trustworthy data and analysis and where many may have said more of what they think they 
should say, than what is actually the case. For example, corruption is still a problem in a few 
areas of the economy, yet its depth and impact is still very hard to assess and thus a major 
influence on the process of deciding whether to invest, and/or the costs and reasons for 
successful or failed investment is difficult to fully analyse. Nevertheless, the empirical data and 
evidence examined through this thesis does provide a clear indication that Vietnam has managed 
to become an extremely attractive and rewarding foreign investment location, which is also both 
a reason for, and a consequence of, joining the WTO as an internationally recognised member of 
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WKHJOREDO HFRQRPLFV\VWHP7KLV WKHVLV WKXVSUHVHQWVDQDQDO\VLV WKDW IXOILOV3URIHVVRU0DL¶V
call for a full examination of why foreign investment in Vietnam has been successful and how 
IXWXUH UHIRUP FDQ EH GLUHFWHG WR LPSURYH WKH HQYLURQPHQW IRU DWWUDFWLQJ PRUH RI WKH ZRUOG¶V
IRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWFDSLWDODQGWKHµVSLOORYHU¶HIIHFWRIWKDWLQLPSURYLQJKXPDQUHVRXUFHVNLOOV
the levels of advanced technology and the productivity and efficiency of the Vietnamese 
economy. 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 provides a broad over view of FDI and its determinants in Vietnam. While justifying 
the decision to use Dunning¶s eclectic theory as the basic methodology, the thesis then 
introduces a second force (the impact of culture on FDI) for in depth analysis, and tenders that 
the development of relational assets through cultural assimimlation, provided an added value to 
the investor in Vietnam. The development of FDI in Vietnam is linked with its economic growth 
and two case studies, Honda and ANZ bank are presented as good examples of where foreign 
investors have altered products, services and management styles to accommodate the cultural 
peculiarities of Vietnam. The basic hypothesis is that traditional FDI determinants are sufficient 
to develop a generic model of understanding of FDI investment, but a more sophisticated 
approach that considers the impact of Confucian dynamism is needed to adequately explain why 
some foreign investors have been so successful in Vietnam. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In Chapter 2 the literature on the patterns and determinants of FDI is analysed. Although a 
YDULHW\RIWKHRULHVRQ)',DUHFRQVLGHUHGLWLV'XQQLQJ¶Vwork that is given the greatest focus 
and attention. The FDI determinants are examined and assessed for relevance in the Vietnam 
investment market and linkages between economic growth and FDI are made. Extensive 
literature is reviewed in regard to the movement of Vietnam from a centrally planned system to 
a transition economy, whilst still remaining ideological communist and the impact of FDI in this 
dramatic reform of the economy is analysed. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
The Methodology chapter moves towards expODLQLQJ ZK\ 'XQQLQJ¶V HFOHFWLF SDUDGLJP LV
selected as the main approach of the thesis and introduces and in-depth analysis of why 
Confucian dynamism and relational asset development are two central concepts that bneed to be 
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added to the Dunning paradigm in order for one to get a fuller understanding of the determinants 
of FDI in Vietnam. The methodological framework is explained and the validation of using 
Honda and ANZ Bank as ideal case studies for acquiring primary research on the subject is 
given. 
Chapter 4: 'RL0RLDQG9LHWQDP¶V)',3ROLFLHV 
Chapter Four establishes the background for introduction of the Doi Moi policy in Vietnam in 
the late 1980s when market reforms dramatically improved Vietnam's business climate. The 
developments in FDI government policy and legal systems and the international and national 
contexts to FDI policy in Vietnam are examined, and this provides the framework for policy 
improvements and changes, the development of laws on foreign investment in Vietnam, 
elements of the Enterprise Law and other government policy initiatives that facilitate FDI in 
Vietnam such as land and technology (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; Chu Van Lam, 
1987). There is an overview of FDI implementation in Vietnam, general FDI facts and figures, 
inflows of FDI into the country, the common forms of FDI that foreign investors take, and the 
FDI structural composition. )LQDOO\ WKH LPSDFWV RI )', RQ 9LHWQDP¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK
SDUWLFXODUO\RQWKHFRXQWU\¶VH[SRUWDQGHPSOR\PHQWDUHH[DPLQHG 
Chapter 5: The Legal Framework for FDI in Vietnam 
Chapter 5 examines the vital changes made in the legal framework in order to facilitate the 
grwoth of foreign direct investment in Vietnam since the introduction of Doi Moi. Comparisons 
are made between the changes in FDI law in Vietnam and a number of other countries. The most 
notable reforms such as the Investment Law are analysed and a critical approach is made to the 
continued shortcomings of the present system. This mainly focuses on the need for an 
acceleration speed of law reform and greater emphasis placed on developing the capacities in 
the system to support rapid and efficient change. 
Chapter 6: ANZ Bank 
The case study on ANZ Bank provides the first opportunity to fully present the outcomes of the 
primary research. The chapter examines the establishment and development of ANZ Banks and 
demonstrates how the core competitive advantages of ANZ were added to by a conscious 
strategy of assimilating its products and services to fit the Vietnam culture. The ANZ Bank was 
a particularly relevant example of cultural assimilation as the culture of the Vietnamese people 
was originally quite adverse to the idea of even opening personal bank accounts. By coming to 
understand the cultural resistances to traditional banking services and carefully shaping its 
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strategies to slowly alter the general mindset of Vietnamese towards banking, ANZ grew rapidly 
to 8 branches throughout the country and actually contributed to the changes in the culture of the 
people. These changes were further made possible by direct cooperation between the 
government and the banks, such as the legal reform that directed all government civil servants 
payments of salary to be made only through bank accounts. One of the primary objectives of this 
thesis is to show that economic development cannot be isolated from its surrounding cultural 
climate and that penetration of Vietnam requires investors to combine its global financial 
VWUDWHJLHVWRFXOWXUDOVHQVLWLYLW\WR WKH9LHWQDPµZD\¶RI OLYLQJDQGKRZWKDWDOWHUVµKRZWRGR
EXVLQHVV¶LQ9LHWQDP 
Chapter 7: Honda 
The case study of Honda in Vietnam in chapter concentrates on an examination of the cultural 
specLILF YDULDEOHV HYLGHQW LQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ 'XQQLQJ¶V HFOHFWLF SDUDGLJP DQG WKH LPSDFW RI
LQWHUQDOLVDWLRQWKHRU\$VHDUO\DV'XQQLQJDQG%DQVDOUHDOLVHGWKDWLWZDVµDQRSSRUWXQH
time for more in-GHSWK UHVHDUFK¶ RQ µFXOWXUDO VSHFLILF YDULDEOHV¶ LQ )', Yentures (p.12). The 
chapter here forms a study of the application of the eclectic paradigm to Honda-Vietnam by 
examining how its entry mode and subsequent management system of operation provides clear 
indication that a culturally specific strategy for FDI is the optimum method of ensuring the 
maximum capital return on any foreign investment. 
Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter 8 provides a final analysis that points to clear evidence from the two case studies of 
Honda and ANZ of a need for including and understanding of local culture and developing 
strategies for growth of relational assets are essential in successfully investing in Vietnam. 
While the traditional determinants of FDI are assessed and shown to point to clear reasons why 
Vietnam has become a focus of many foreign investors attention, the benefits of also addressing 
the cultural dimensions in the business environment are also proven to be vital to optimising any 
foreign investment in Vietnam. In the case of Honda this has involved the investment of more 
than USD500 over a 45 year period and the building of three prodcution plants, whilst also 
UDGLFDOO\ WUDQVIRUPLQJ WKH FXOWXUHRI9LHWQDPHVH WKURXJK WKH LPSURYHGPRELOLW\ WKDW+RQGD¶V
motorbikes help develop. Both Honda and ANZ accepted from the outset that their investment 
required a culturally bound approach to its products, services and management systems. That 
willingness to adapt and change based on ethno-cultural pressures allowed both companies to 
develop as long term and successful investors in the Vietnamese economy. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
High economic growth and swift reduction in the levels of poverty has followed the introduction 
of the Doi Moi process in Vietnam. The positive inflows of foreign capital and resources into the 
country have been as a result of pro-active government policies towards FDI. Foreign 
investment contributes significantly towards gross investment, aggregate export expansion and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while aiding the expansion of the MNE sector.It is the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSURPRWLRQDQGVXSSRUWRI)',WKDWKDVOHGWRDKHDOWK\DQGYLEUDWHDWWUDFWLRQRI
foreign investment and maintained its positive affect upon the economy. The recent accession to 
the WTO requires the government to further expand is positive FDI policies, including the 
privatisation of SOEs, the reform of legislation on FDI, the general rules on business ownership, 
property rights and the way that government insitutions deal with foreign enterprises entering 
the Vietnam market (Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; 
Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; Dapice, 2003). 
This chapter will examine the literature on the patterns and determinants of FDI in both 
developed and developing countries. Although the literature on FDI in Vietnam is developing 
(Baban, 2002; Do Phu Tran Tinh, 2006) there is still significant room for a full review of its 
impact on the Vietnam economy and this thesis will carry forward the growing interest in how 
FDI has developed in Vietnam. Many of the previous studies have concentrated on using macro 
data to analyse patterns of FDI in Vietnam and more recent material has focused on 
WHFKQRORJLFDO VSLOORYHUV LQ WKH SURGXFWLYLW\ RI 9LHWQDP¶V PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWULHV Le Thanh 
Thuy 2005; Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et.al. 2006; Le Quoc Hoi, 2006). Less work has examined 
how FDI affects economic growth patterns, especially in the context of Doi Moi, and on how the 
inputs of FDI has helped re-structure the economy in a period of rapid transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market oriented. This study will provide a new level of analysis that 
examines the direct and indirect effects of FDI in the background of Doi Moi. 
The economic development of Vietnam has seen FDI play a a significant role and witnessed 
growth to a point where FDI contributed14 per cent to GDP in 2003 (General Statistics Office, 
2004). By 2009 the contribution had risen to 18.33 per cent and Foreign Invested Enterprises 
provided 10.52 per cent of the State budget (VietnamNet, 2010). In 2010, Foreign Invested 
Enterprises continued too disburse US$3.1 billions to the State budget, which was 26 per cent 
increase against 2009 (Ngoc Linh, 2011). FDI has provided jobs, increased trade and 
encouraged the import of advanced technology, with the subsequent improvement in 
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management skills and learning. Economic re-structuring, domestic enterprise reform, 
diversification and the introduction of high quality, low price goods and services have provided 
customers with new choices, through the introduction of Foreign Invested Enterprises and the 
liberalisation of trade and investment. 
$V GLVFXVVHG LQ &KDSWHU 2QH WKH WKHVLV LV IRFXVHG RQ 'XQQLQJ¶V  HFOHFWLF SDUDGLJP
model and uses the theory to assess the OLI- Ownership specific, Location and Internalisation 
advantages, whilst also developing the model of analysis by addressing the more specific 
location advantages through the need for an understanding and use of ethno-cultural strategies.  
In looking at the work of Dunning (1988; 1993; 2001) and at location specific advantages, 
'XQQLQJ SURPRWHV DQDO\VLV RI FRXQWU\¶V GLIIHUHQW VWUXctures; addressing such factors as the 
different income levels, the market variables such as size and composition and the influence of 
different governments upon the political climate and financial frameworks, Dunning points to 
these factors in the context of how they affect for example, production costs. The Dunning 
model identifies the variance in location advantages caused by local languages and cultures, 
alongside the pyschic distance between the foreign investor and the environment of their 
domestic location (Dunning, 2001). This links into the transaction cost theory and the economic 
rationale of entry mode selection determined by least-cost factors (Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986). However, Tse et.al (1997) indicates again the need for further concentration on not only 
firm-specific variables, but also their impact on, and reaction to, locational differences. 
'XQQLQJ¶V 2/,PRGHOJLYHV WKH OHDG LQDGGUHVVLQJ ORFDWLRQDOYDULDEOHV DQG WKLV WKHVLV
takes that awareness deeper into the analysis by focusing to some extent on culture as a major 
variable. Dunning (1988) indicates that firm-specific and market-specific factors influence a 
foreign investors ability to control returns, risks and resources. Whilst the eclectic theory and 
OLI model provides core access to understanding the optimal use of assets, and the development 
of new assets, it is the reciprocal impact of local conditions and the factors influencing that 
environment that needs further attention. It is clear that foreign market entry modes need to be 
based upon calculation and positive balancing of risks against returns. In the case of Honda, a 45 
year investment of over USD500 million has proved financially sound and the Honda (Japan) 
decision to develop a bespoke model of Honda (Vietnam) has enabled it to accommodate 
cultural change and relational asset development. An equally clear strategy of accommodating 
the local culture is seen with ANZ Bank. With Dunning (1988), the assessment of transaction 
costs is relative to the locational advantages. The assets of the companies into spearate 
categories with the first being the asset advantages the foreign investor brings to the new 
market, such as higher levels of technology, stable financial capital and superior management 
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skills, whilst the second is the more intangible advantages of effective communication between 
WKHLQYHVWRUDQGµRWKHUV¶LQWKHORFDOHQYLURQPHQW7KHODWHULVVHHQDVDWUDQVDFWLRQVSHFLILFDVVHW
(Heledd, 2006). 
With the case studies of Honda and ANZ Bank we can clearly see the development of intangible 
advantages borne from strong efforts to become a positive communal partner, bringing 
reciprocal benefits and developing mutual understanding. The thesis now considers the basic 
structures and processes of FDI and considers the theories, while demonstrating also why the 
SUHIHUHGPHWKRGRORJ\KHUHLVEDVHGRQ'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFSDUDGLJP 
2.2 The basic concepts of FDI 
Foreign investment (international investment or capital export) is the capital investment by 
foreign enterprises that is used in production and aims to gain capital expansion and provide 
numerous socio-economic benefits. FDI is the movement of capital over borders (IMF Balance 
of Payments Compilation Guide, 2009)  
Under the definition and classification of international accounts presented by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5) (IMF, 1993) foreign investment is 
classified into the following types:  
(i) direct investment; 
(ii) portfolio investment; 
(iii) other investment.  
What is essential is that the foreign investor gains a certain degree of control over their 
investment in the host country (IMF, 1993). In Krugman and Obstfeld (1997) the international 
capital flows of FDI involves the creation of new enterprises or the introduction of subsidiaries 
of existing ones, where the financial obligations of the subsidiary are combined with being part 
of the organisational structure of the parent company. 
 µDirect investment is the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a 
resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another 
economy¶ (BPM5, 1993, p.86). A resident entity is defined as foreign investors including 
individuals, private or public enterprises, governments and other organisations which have direct 
investment enterprises.  
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A direct investment enterprise or a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) can be an incorporated or 
unincorporated firm in which a foreign investor owns a part or whole of the ordinary shares or 
voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise. 
The IMF (1993) gives two options for distinguishing domestic enterprises and FIEs.  
1. 10 per cent of ordinary shares. 
2.  Voting power (the influence of the direct investor on management of the FIE).  
The recognition of the influence of the foreign investor can be expressed in a number of ways 
including representative roles on the Board of Directors, a direct role in formulating business 
policy, the transactions involving inter-company transfer of materials including the provision of 
management personnel, technology and long term capital (OECD, 2008). 
The forms of direct investor classified as FDI include  
(1) equity capital,  
(2) the reinvestment of earnings and  
(3) the provision of long- and short-term intra-company loans, i.e. between the parent and 
subsidiaries (Duce, 2005; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008).  
The production of goods and services in the host country are the result of foreign direct 
investment providing the capital or other resources to make their provision possible.This should 
be contrasted with foreign portfolio, which provides an interest only in share speculation and has 
no influence over the production of goods or services (Goldstein and Razin, 2005).  
The definition of FDI does not require that the investor be domiciled in one country of 
investment, and can include the participation of the domestic company in the multinational 
network of the investing company. The source of funding for FDI can be transferred from a 
parent company to a new subsidiary or affiliate, or can be capital from the foreign country or 
host country lenders under the parent company (Goldstein and Razin, 2005, p1-3). There is not a 
need for the investor to be sourcing the capital from both the same country as the source of 
origin.  
7KH,0)DQGWKH2(&'¶V%HQFKPDUN'HILQLWLRQRI)RUHLgn Direct Investment (OECD, 2008) 
categorise FDI as international investment being transferred from one country to another to 
achieve a lasting interest in the host country. . A lasting interest is seen as the establishment of a 
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long-term relationship of the investor in the new enterprise and the maintenance of a significant 
level of control over the business by the investor (IMF, 1993). 
7KHGLUHFW LQYHVWRUFDQ LQFOXGH µLQGLYLGXDOV LQFRUSRUDWHGRUXQLQFRUSRUDWHGSULYDWHRUSXEOLF
enterprises; associated groups of individuals or enterprises; governments or government 
agencies; or estates, trusts, or other organisations that own direct investment enterprises in 
HFRQRPLHV RWKHU WKDQ WKRVH LQ ZKLFK WKH GLUHFW LQYHVWRUV UHVLGH¶ +RZHYHU WKDW LQYHVWPHQW
should account for at least 10 per cent or more of the enterprises and include significant levels 
over control of the business of that enterprise (IMF, 1993). The ownership of 10 per cent of 
ordinary shares or voting power is the criterion for determining the existence of a direc t 
investment relationship (IMF, 1993; OECD, 2008). 
Direct investment capital is: 
(i) capital provided by a direct investor to a direct investment enterprise or  
(ii) capital received from a direct investment enterprise by a direct investor. 
 However, this excludes funds gain by the investor through merely the negotiation work of the 
investor of for instance loans, but concerns itself particular with capital or resources directly 
provided by the foreign investor (IMF, 1993; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008; 
Duce, 2005). 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in its World 
Investment Reports defines the relationships of FDI as those formed between the parent 
enterprise and its foreign affiliate and must involve the parent company acquiring significant 
control over the new company, which includes both actual ownership of greater than or equal to 
10 per cent and effective access to voting rights. In the incorporated form the growth of FDI 
depends on the MNE having effective control over such areas as the management of the 
business of the company. Any ownership shares falling below this definition is merely defined 
as foreign investment portfolio ownership and is not categorised as FDI (UNCTAD, 2008).  
Thus, merely the presence of transactions between the direct investor and the host country do 
not rate the definition as FDI, for the investment must involve capital transactions that lead to 
significant business control (IMF, 1993). This control on the other hand, has to demonstrate that 
the investor is making a commitment to long term involvement in the business in the host 
country, and that itself should be demonstrated by the foreign investor display the patience and 
capacity to work through the initial barriers and problems associated with developing a business 
in a foreign country.The path from an interest in investing in a foreign country to actually 
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becoming operational involves a number of often difficult steps that can only be successfully 
negotiated through a strong commitment on the part of the investor and a realistic understanding 
of the problems involved, such as being in line with the different legislative responsibilities 
found in a foreign country and the different cultures of business, the challenges of a new market 
for goods or services and the weaknesses that may be found, such as in the under-development 
of human resources (Dapice, 2003; Iswaran, 2007; Dollar, 1999). 
The definition of FDI in Vietnam is in line with this understanding (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; 
2003; 2006) and according to the 2005 Investment Law, FDI means the transfer of lawful capital 
in cash or other assets of a foreign investor into Vietnam in order to carry out the investment 
activity, whereby the investor participates in the management of the investment activity. 
2.3 The classifications of the Foreign Direct Investment  
Foreign direct investment may be classified as inward or outward. While inward investment is 
foreign capital investment into local resources, outward investment is referred to as direct 
investment abroad. Foreign Direct Investment may be further classified by the entry modes of 
investment, the enterprise format and the motivations behind the foreign interest (Dinh Van An 
and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008; Gates and Truong, 1994). 
2.3.1 Classification of FDI through Entry modes 
There are two different ways of FDI entry modes including, green-field investment or the 
acquisition or merger with an existing enterprise in the host country. FDI in green field 
LQYHVWPHQW UHTXLUHV WKH EXLOGLQJ XS RI QHZ FDSDFLWLHV LQ WKH KRVW FRXQWU\¶V SURGXFWLRQ RU WKH
improvement of the company¶s existing production facilities. This capacity development brings 
numerous advantages to the host country, including the development of human resources, the 
creation of jobs and improvements in levels of research and development. Obviously, there are 
the negative aspects of repatriation of profits, the subsequent impact upon capital accumulation 
in the host country and the contraction of the market for host country¶s domestic companies 
(Roots, 1994; Tse, et.al 1997). 
The acquiring of proprietary assets underpins FDI accumulation, and although M&A is often 
restricted in host countries, the development of green field FDI is a principal form of entry into 
developing countries (UNCTAD, 2000). The 82 per cent increase in world FDI inflows from 
USD150 billion in 1990 to a record USD1.1 trillion in the year 2000 was chiefly fuelled by the 
prominent role that cross border M&A has played in expanding the global FDI flows 
(UNCTAD, 2002; Mueller, 2001; Eicher and Kang, 2004).  
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Horizontal M&As with the merger being between competitors in the same industry and, vertical 
M&A as enterprises either bringing producers and distributors into a partnership in forward 
mergers, or backward with the mergingof producers and suppliers or in same value change 
mergers, or conglomerate mergers between enterprises in different industry sectors ar e all forms 
of FDI penetration (UNCTAD, 2001). 
2.3.2 The Different Types of FDI enterprises 
There are different types of investment classifications which are used in national laws regulating 
FDI in Vietnam (e.g. the Law on Investment of Vietnam, 2005). The different forms of FDI 
enterprises include: 
Cooperation under BCC (Business co-operation contract): An investment form signed 
between two or more foreign and local parties that are cooperating in business and sharing the 
profits or products without creating a new legal identity. 
Joint venture enterprise: A Joint Venture is an enterprise involving a joint venture contract 
signed by two or more parties established in a single host country.  
Wholly foreign owned enterprise (or 100 per cent foreign owned enterprises): Where the 
foreign company is the sole investor providing 100 per cent of the enterprises capital needs and 
owners 100 per cent of its enterprise in the host country.  
Alternative forms of public-private partnership are: 
x Build ± Operate ± Transfer (BOT) Contract: Which is an investment between a 
competent State body and an investor formed with the intention of constructing and 
operating commercially an infrastructure facility for a fixed period and upon reaching 
the end of that period the investor freely agrees to transfer that facility to the host 
country with no charges or fees payable.  
x Build ± Transfer- Operate (BTO) Contract: In contrast to the BOT, the BTO involves an 
agreement between a competent State body and an investor, where on completion of an 
infrastructure facility the State will grant the investor the right to commercially operate 
the facilitate for a fixed period of time with a view to recovering the invested capital and 
eventually make a profit.  
x Build ± Transfer (BT) Contract: With the BT the investor and the competent State body 
agree to complete the construction of the facility with an understanding that on 
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completion the investor will transfer that structure to the State, but be allowed to attempt 
recovery of the invested capital and make a profit, through the building of another 
facility or be compensated by the State body (Pham Duy Nghia, 2000; 2003; 2006) 
2.3.3 'XQQLQJ¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQRI)',  
FDI can fall into one of the four categories (Dunning, 1988; 2000): 
x Market-seeking FDI: This is where the investor wishes to take advantage of economies 
of scale in production or where the foreign investor is faced with barriers to exporting 
from the home country. The access to economies of scale are achieved through opening 
up of local or adjacent markets, but these markets should involve large scale populations 
and the ability to support the increased levels of demand with a reasonable period of 
WLPH (LFKHU DQG .DQJ¶V  PDNH WKLV SRLQW FOHDU ZKHQ WKH\ FRPSared the 
opportunities in small or large countries. 
x Resource-seeking FDI: Resource seeking FDIs are undertaken with the intention of 
taking advantage of the availability of natural resources or mineral commodities which 
DUHVFDUFHLQ WKHLQYHVWRUV¶KRPHFRuntry. There is rarely a need in this FDI enterprise 
for high capital expenditure or high adding activities involved in operating a plant or its 
equipment. The MNEs avoid investment in internalisation of raw material markets and 
their resource seeking activities often mean low-added value activity and low capital 
expenditure. 
x Efficiency seeking FDI: These FDI ventures are focusing on gaining economies of scale 
or lower production costs. The efficiency seeking investments take advantage of cross-
border specialisation situations and the uneven distribution of immobile created assets. 
Particular characteristics of the efficiency seeking investment are the domination by 
firms with integrated global networks that are highly dependent on cost minimization 
through its global access. Their cost competitiveness is achieved by their control over the 
value chain and the location of production in places that provide the lowest levels of 
overall costs. 
x Asset seeking FDI: Asset seeking FDI enterprises seek to acquire new assets or develop 
a local partnership that enables the investor to meet domestic needs through improved 
distribution channels. The enterprises are usually associated with middle-income and 
industrialised countries. Nunnenkamp (2003) considers these entry modes and 
recognises that South East Asia is a prime destination now for new investors, although 
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they are still competing for FDI with developed countries (Dunning and Bansal, 1997; 
Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Richard and Young, 2007). 
2.4 Theories of FDI 
In this part of the thesis we examine the different theories on foreign direct investment. 
2.4.1 FDI and the Market Imperfection Theory 
A significant contribution made to the literature on FDI was made by Steven Hymer (1960) and 
Charles Kindleburger (1969) when they developed the market imperfection theory that 
considered where enterprises developed coherent strategies for companies to expand their 
businesses through capitalising on their clear advantages over the local firms. Such overseas 
operations require more care, time and effort but local advantages enable the enterprises to 
maximise the financial returns. Kindleberger (1969) proposed that it was market imperfections 
in the host country that provide the opportunities for FDI. Rather than searching for perfect 
competition sites, the investor takes advantage of product differentiation, economies of scale, 
advanced skills in marketing, high technology access, better management skills, positive 
government policies and their improved access to capital to take advantage of the host countries 
imperfections in the market. Although the investor inherits the problems of operating in a new 
environment, these are counterbalanced by their advantages in competing. 
2.4.2 FDI in the Context of the Internalisation Theory 
McManus (1972) and Buckley and Casson (1976) considered the FDI development in the 
context of the internalisation theory, especially in transactions arising in the presence of market 
imperfections or failures. The MNEs foster efficiency strategies and through the internalisation 
of markets across national boundaries they achieve greater business success. Buckley and 
Casson (1976) identified that the creation of internal markets allowed them to assign intellectual 
property rights to these enterprises and take advantage of the markets imperfections (see also: 
Rugman, 1982; Parry, 1985). 
The basis of the internalisation theory is transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1985), 
where there is the existence of factors that incentivise opportunistic behaviour between trade 
partners and the higher transaction costs incurred protect the enterprise against opportunism. In 
such cases the internalisation companies tend to seek high levels of control through common 
ownership and control of the markets activities. Rather than export or licensing strategies the 
enterprises carry out internalisation of international activities.  
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Through this theory we can develop further the understanding of location advantages and assess 
them through a concentration on efficiency factors. The latest impact of this theory is the 
concentration on the decision-making process and its taking into account such issues as the 
industry-specific factors which are concerned with the nature of the product and market, the 
structure of the market, etc and region-specific factors that are concerned with the impact of 
geographical distances, cultural differences, etc. There are nation-specific factors such as 
politics and fiscal influence and firm-specific factors, such as the expertise in management and 
the organisational structures and processes. In Vietnam these factors are influential and their 
importance increased by the restrictions on the movements of funds and the inefficiency of the 
financial markets but countered by the low labour and resource costs (Dunning, 1988; 2000; 
2001). Pham Huong Mai (2003) has concentrated much of his work on examining how 
internalisation has impacted significantly RQ9LHWQDP¶V)', record. 
2.4.3 FDI and the Eclectic Theory  
The eclectic theory (Dunning, 1980; 1988; 2000; 2001) has become a popular analytical 
framework for understanding FDI success by combining the understanding of determinants of 
FDI with other theories such as organisational theory, location theory and market imperfections 
approaches. The basis of the eclectic theory is the OLI conditions: Ownership specific 
advantages (µwhy¶ the firm operates in a foreign country?), Location advantages (µwhere the 
firm produces in a particular host country?), and IQWHUQDWLRQDO DGYDQWDJHV¶ µhow¶ they are to 
compete in the domestic market of the host country?). The conglomeration of effects of these 
inter-related pathways are seen as defining the patterns and extent of FDI success. The theory 
helps analyse why, where and how FDI enterprises operate in host countries (Dunning, 1988). 
With Ownership-specific advantages, the higher net O advantages of other nationalities, the 
more incentive they have to exploit investment opportunities abroad and thus engage in FDI 
(Dunning, 1988). The form of intangible assets or the common governance advantages provide 
the overall positive advantages of the FDI enterprise and factors such as unlicensed secret 
technology, management knowledge advantages, and access to foreign markets enable the FDI 
to enjoy profitable benefits over their competitors (Zhao and Decker, 2007; Nguyen Thi Van 
Anh, 1995). 
The MNE use their advantages in internalisation incentives to maximise their ownership specific 
advantages across borders, while maintaining the advantages within their own organisation.The 
preference is for internalising their advantages rather than take the risks of licensing them. The I 
factor is a result of the market imperfections and mainly concerned with the interrelation 
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between ownership and internalisation advantages. Internalisation enables the enterprise to 
acquire further ownership advantages such as the increase of their assets (Dunning, 2001; 1988; 
Dunning and Bansal, 1997). 
A main condition for the advancement of MNEs is the location specific advantages. The MNE 
combine their ownership specific advantages with the positive factors of the host country in 
areas such as larger markets, population growth, etc, combined with infrastructure advantages, 
political stability and positive factors such as stable interest rates, beneficial tax tariffs and the 
balance of trade (Rugman, 1982). Thus, the macro-levels of the economy help determine the 
location, size and type of FDI. 
This, thus, points to the eclectic theory as having a number of positive aspects for studying FDI 
development in Vietnam, where the transition provides additional factors from the host 
FRXQWU\¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFV7KHHFOHFWLF WKHRU\ HQFRXUDJHVD IRFXVRQDQDO\VLQJ WKH LPSDFWRI D
KRVW FRXQWU\¶V SDUWLFXODU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG WKH DIIHFW WKHVH KDYH RQ )', GHYHORSPHQW 7KH
theory points out that µcountries with low labour costs and/or natural resources tend to have an 
above average inward investment because of their locational attractions, while rich 
industrialised countries have an above average outward direct investment, because their factor 
endowments favor mobile ownership advantages¶ (Dunning, 1981, p.50). 
Le Viet Anh (2004) reviews FDI and sees the locational advantages as the chie focus of his 
study of Vietnam, with economic size, the lower labour costs, the fiscal incentives and the 
markets openness. The swift and impressive rise in FDI in Vietnam can thus be best studied 
through a combination of the Market Imperfection Theory and the Eclectic Theory with a close 
attention also to how culture impacts on FDI outcomes.  
2.5 The Complex Factors influencing FDI 
The increases in capital flows, advanced technology, human resources skills and market know-
how are some of the major benefits accrued from the development of FDI and are the reasons 
why nearly all countries are actively seeking to attract FDI. In the next paragraphs the thesis 
examines the theories of international investment in the context of trying to attract foreign 
investment. 
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Table 2.1 : Host Country determinants of FDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 1998.  
  Host country determinants 
 
I. Policy framework for FDI 
x Economic, political and 
social stability 
x Rules regarding entry and 
operations 
x Standards of treatment of 
foreign affiliates 
x Policies on functioning and 
structure of markets 
(especially competition and 
M&A policies) 
x International trade and FDI 
agreements 
x Privatization policy 
x Trade policy (tariffs and 
NTBs) and coherence of 
FDI and trade policies 
x Tax policy 
II. Economic determinants 
 
III. Business facilitation 
x Investment promotion 
x Investment incentives 
x Hassle costs or red tape 
(corruption, administrative 
efficiency, etc.) 
x Social amenities (quality 
of life, bilingual schools, 
etc.) 
x Goog infrastructure and 
support services (banking, 
legal accountancy 
service,etc.) 
x Social capital, attitude to 
work 
 
Type of FDI 
by motives of 
TNCs 
Principal economic 
determinants in host countries 
 
 
 
A. Market ± 
seeking 
 
 
 
B. Resource ±
seeking 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Efficiency- 
seeking 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Strategic 
asset - 
seeking 
x Market size and per capita 
income 
x Market growth 
x Access to regional and global 
market 
x Country specific consumer 
preferences 
x Structure of markets 
x Availability of raw materials 
and natural resources (e.g. for 
tourism) 
x Cost of raw materials 
x Physical infrastructure (ports, 
roads, railways, power, telecom) 
x Availability & cost of skilled 
labour 
x Low-cost unskilled labour or 
skilled labour 
x Cost of resources and labour 
adjusted for productivity 
x Other input costs, e.g. transport 
and communication costs to and 
from and within host economy 
x Regional integration agreements 
(inter-country division of labour) 
x Note: this type of FDI takes 
place through cross-border M&As 
for a variety of strategic reasons 
x Availability of firm-specific 
assets: technology, innovatory, 
marketing, brand names, etc. 
x Buying market power or new 
markets, spreading risks, lowering 
transaction costs. 
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There are a number of complex factors sought by Transnational Corporations, especially in the 
importance of intangible assets. These factors encourage the TNCs to invest in foreign countries. 
A major factor, pointed out in a UNCTAD report of 2005 was the need for the host country to 
the FDI to have policies of a pro-active nature towards FDI and for the government to welcome 
its impact on their economies. Within the last two decades the majority of countries have opened 
their doors to FDI and pursued pro-active policies in its development.Thus, the investors are 
offered a number of alternatives in their search for a suitable target for their capital and the 
H[LVWHQFHRIJRYHUQPHQWV¶ VLPSO\HQFRXUDJLQJ LQYHVWPHQW LV QRW HQRXJKRI DQ DWWUDFWLRQ7KH
FDI investor is searching for instance, for the existence of created assets (Minde, 2000; 
Siripousalpipat, 2000; Dunning and Wymbs, 2001). 
2.5.1 Laws and Government Policies Affecting FDI 
Direct government policies supporting FDI are the µinner ring¶ of government activities, such as 
the regulations governing how investors operate, the environment they are expected to invest in 
and the protection of their investment following the initial entry and on-going operation. The 
policies supporting this inner ring include market supervision and competition controls (Pham 
Duy Nghia, 2002; 2004; 2006; Seow and Ching, 2008). 
The core FDI policies are intended as mechanisms to either reduce or to increase FDI, and focus 
on the specific contributions targeted from the investment and its sectoral composition and 
geographic origin. Despite these central policies to attract FDI into a host country and take 
advantage of the economic determinants, their impact depends on the presence of intelligent 
market supervision and a competitive market structure. Alongside the need for entry 
encouragement policies, the correct policies to sustain that investment, including the standards 
of treatment of the investment and its protection, there is also a need for liberal investment 
promotion policies and other measures to attract and facilitate the development of FDI (Seow 
and Ching, 2008; Dapice, 2003; Iswaran, 2007).  
As the global FDI market becomes more selective and competitive there is a need for strong and 
direct influence on both inner and outer ring policies, with a realisation that although the core 
policies are vital, the supporting environment of additional facors can be equally as important to 
the success of the development of FDI (UNCTAD 1998). 
Macro-economic policies such as sound monetary control and the strategies for supporting 
secure price stability, clearly impact on the costs involved in capital investment, and are now 
seen as just as important as the traditional core policies promoting a host country¶s development 
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of FDI. The pro investment fiscal policies, such as exchange rate policies for the transfer of 
profits are essential elements in developing the locational advantages of a host country. The host 
country¶s trade and privatisation policies are also major influences, alongside international 
agreements, such as bi-lateral investment treaties (BITs). Corporate organisational issues 
become vital factors as the global market for competing for FDI grows and develops. It should 
be recognised that FDI is part of the globalisation of the world economy and that FDI 
development is essential for the growth of any economy (Javasuruja, 1993; Luu Van Dat, 1997; 
Pham Duy Nghia, 2000; 2001). 
The simplicity of decision-making over the targeting of locations for FDI has become both far 
more sophisticated and intense and a multitude of factors are taken in to consideration when FDI 
investors are searching for a suitable host country. For example, as technology and rapid 
advancements are made in the advantages accrued from technological innovation, the policies of 
host country toward technological development become vital factors in the FDI decision-making 
process and the government policy approach takes on wider and more influential affects upon a 
host country¶s successful attraction of FDI investors. Such issues as telecommunications 
privatisation or tax credits for technology research, or provision of programmes to facilitate 
technological partnerships between domestic and foreign firms either attract or deter the capital  
investment from foreigners needed for the survival of many developing economies (Le Quoc 
Hoi and Pomfret, 2008). The aim by host country¶s is to develop a good FDI climate and this 
provides governments with strong challenges to introduce and support sound investment policies 
in an era of competition for FDI among countries. 
The emergence of new areas of policy seen as impacting upon FDI development, such as in the 
production of created assets through such elements as the development of human capital or the 
establishment of new innovations in technology are seen as essential parts of building the right 
framework for FDI. In this respect it becomes important for governments to understand why and 
how TNCs make the decisions they do in locating and sustaining their FDI strategies. The 
national policy framework determines to a large extent the capacity of a host country to develop 
its record in successful management of its FDI performance (Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Athukorala 
and Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008)  
Host country governments are only able to compete in the increasingly more competitive FDI 
market by being pro-active in promoting FDI and this means they must display the right 
µDWWLWXGH¶ WRZDUGV WKH IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRU DV IRU LQVWDQFH LQ WKHLU DFWLYH GHPRQVWUDWLRQ RI DQWL-
corruption policies, the reduction of red tape involved in business and the provision of services 
that aid foreign investors operate in the host country. These policies need to be more liberal 
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based and they are to be expected by the investor, meaning that governments are obligated to 
ensure their existence if they want to attract a significant share of the global FDI market. Le Viet 
Anh (2004) identifies how the Vietnam Government has focused on maintaining an environment 
of political and economic stability alongside numerous changes in the legal framework. 
However, Le Viet Anh has also recognised that although their remains positive competitive 
signs in the costs of labour, in contrast, the poor quality and lack of training of that labour are 
likely to be one of the most important outer ring challenges to its future success in attracting 
FDI. 
Culture, history and numerous current events have a significant impact on how countries 
develop and nurture their trade and investment outcomes.Vital to this is how open a country is to 
trade and investment, with many taking a global view rather than a more nationalistic view 
where the country sees FDI penetration as a threat, as in for example, the competition the FDI 
ventures provide to their previously protected domestic industries. How receptive a country is to 
FDI is reflected in the amount of barriers and restrictions they provide to foreign capital 
investors. The more open and attractive the legal framework is the more likely a country is to 
attract FDI and provide new opportunities in exports, imports and investment (Pham Duy Nghia, 
2002; 2003; 2006). 
In the case of Vietnam there is the classic and daunting problem of it attracting FDI while also 
in the process of transition from a command economy to a market economy. This gigantic task 
involving wholesale reforms in the legal system is likely to make FDI attraction a delicate 
balance between change and stability. The process of change, while maintaining stability is 
taking place in a situation where a high cost and wasteful system of communism is being 
transformed by the competitiveness and challenges of the market system, requiring increases in 
productivity and efficiency at the same time as coping with a culture of inefficiency and low 
productivity, aggravated by a lack of market competitiveness. . These factors were focused on 
by Itoga (1992) for WKHFRXQWULHVRIµ,QGRFKLQD¶DQGODWHUGHYHORSHGby Le Dang Doanh (2002). 
The legal framework is challenged by a need to move towards new levels of transparency and 
requires a fostering of certainty and efficiency in investment. A point reviewed by Pham Duy 
Nghia (2000; 2001; 2003; 2004) in his focus upon the direct impact on commercial companies.  
(TXDOO\ LPSRUWDQW LV WKH FKDOOHQJH RI SROLWLFDO ULVN ZKHUH JRYHUQPHQWV¶ SROLWLFDO FKDQJHV DUH
likely to have a significant impact upon the business environment. Political decision-making has 
D GLUHFW LPSDFW XSRQ VXFK IDFWRUV DV WKH H[SRUWHUV PDUNHW WKH PDQXIDFWXUHUV¶ SURGXFWLRQ
facilities and the transference of profits to home countries. However, in Vietnam the political 
situation is complicated and contradictory. On the one hand, while the communist system and its 
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strict maintenance by the Party creates a certain level of positive stability in the political system, 
LWVVORZDQGUHVLVWDQWFKDQJHLQPDQ\DUHDVVXFKDVWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIVXSSRUWIRUµSURWHFWHG¶
industries such as insurance and banking, provides numerous negative aspects for prospective 
investors. This is aggravated by the dated and often confusing laws remaining from a still 
operating communist system intent on controlling all aspects of society. For instance, an 
investment in something as simple as a café or bar is beset by problems in license application, 
fire licenses, licenses for painting and decorating, etc, made even more difficult by the almost 
instutionalised levels of corruption where investors feel forced to make pay-offs, rather than 
face what is a series of difficult, expensive and bureaucratic systems of multiple licensing needs 
(Desai, 1997). 
2.5.2 The Economic Determinants of FDI 
3.1.2.1. FDI and the Importance of Natural Resources 
A vital and historically important determinant of FDI is the availability of natural resources in 
the host country (WIR, 1998). In the 19th Century, much of the FDI by European, American and 
Japanese firms need to secure cheap and reliable access to minerals and other primary products 
essential to the growth of their industries in their home countries. By World War II, 60 per cent 
of the world FDI stock was in natural resources (Cherunilam, 2007). However, over the last few 
decades the importance of natural resources as a major determinant of FDI has declined. This 
has been a result of the increasing focus away from the primary sector and towards the 
production and distribution of raw or processed products by often large state-owned enterprises 
with the required capital and skills, although the presence of rich sources of natural resources 
still does remain an attraction to foreign investors (Cherunilam, 2007; Solatanov, 2006; Green 
and McNaughton, 1995). 
Although the relative, but not absolute importance of natural resources has occurred, they still 
remain a primary attraction for many firms. They are a major factor, for example, in FDI flows 
to much of Africa, to Australia, to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. 
However, regardless of their availability, it still requires the presence of a welcoming system to 
foreign investors where the access to permits, licences, etc is quick, easy and low cost processes 
(Lipsey, 2001; Salarakos, 2006).  
3.1.2.2. Market Size and Market Growth as Influences on FDI 
Market size and market growth remain key economic determinants of FDI with many TNCs 
motivated by a need to access new markets and to increasing their share in existing markets in 
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order for them to remain competitive. The FDI investor will consider the size of the market, 
especially in relation to the population as measured by total and per capita income (Rasciute and 
Pentecost, 2008).  
There is a need to define the prospects offered by that domestic market and to calculate the 
levels of domestic demand, with the development speed, the scale of the market, the 
consumption index and the competitive merchandising opportunities factors taken into 
consideration. A vital factor in the decision-making processes of foreign investors is the levels 
of access to the customer base offered by the domestic market (Vallejo, 2006; Rasciute and 
Pentecost, 2008). 
The size and levels of growth of the domestic markets, alongside their geographic proximity and 
likely access to other key potential markets form an essential part of decision-making of major 
foreign investors, Natural resources and the national market size are traditional economic 
determinants and play an essential role in attracting FDI. The economic determinants related to 
large markets, trade barriers and non-tradable services still account for a large share of 
worldwide FDI flows (Phu My Yen, 1997; Le Dang Doanh, 2002; Nunnenkamp, 2003).  
3.1.2.3. The Impact of the Labour Market on FDI 
Low labour costs and the quality of the human resources are still an indispensable factor in the 
attraction of FDI, coupled with the need for a system that allows easy recruitment of that labour 
and the opportunity to improve the technical skills of the labour force (Bui Anh Tuan, 1991). 
TNCs are attracted by countries that concentrate on development their human resources. This 
has become a high priority issue in Vietnam where the skills levels and productivity of the 
labour force need a lot of improvement. Nevertheless, the Government is trying to overcome 
these problems. For example, a MOLISA policy document (Paper No.18- MOLISA- µ/DEour 
and Social Issues Emerging from Vietnam WTO Entry) notes how FDI Law has consistently 
developed to encourage a favourable labour market climate for investors. 
3.1.2.4. Created Assets and the Success of FDI 
Alongside the importance of traditional determinants of FDI and the locational advantages 
available, the investor is constantly searching for other competitiveness enhancing factors (Le 
Dang Doanh, 2002; Nguyen Thi Van Anh, 1995; Brouthers, et.al, 1996; Zhao and Decker, 
2007). The existence of created assets is now seen as a major determinant of FDI and for the 
attraction of foreign investment in flows, as the TNCs seek a number of created assets as other 
means of providing incentives for investment besides the traditional determinants such as 
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natural resources or large domestic markets. UNCTAD (2007) shows, for example, that Costa 
Rica created the conditions and human capital that were needed to attract a USD500 million 
investment project from the Intel Corporation in 1997 (UNCTAD, 2007).  
3.1.2.5. FDI and the Costs of Infrastructure and Transactions 
The fundamental basis for investment decision is whether the investment environment facilitates 
IRUHLJQ LQYHVWHG HQWHUSULVHV¶ DFWLYLWLHV 7KH LQYHVWPHQW HQYLURQPHQW FDQ EH KLJKO\ UDWHG LI LW
provides for the infrastructure that supports economic activities such as harbours, roads, 
communications, electricity, and water systems. The more under-developed economy a country 
LV WKHOHVVSHUIRUPLQJWKHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLVDQGVXEVHTXHQWO\WKHUHLVDµNQRFNRQ¶DIIHFW WR WKH
success of attracting FDI. The absence of a good infrastructure and the subsequent increases in 
costs either deter the initial investment or negatively affect future profits. 
2.5.3 Government Facilitation of Investment 
The liberalisation of core national FDI policies is increasingly complemented by proactive 
measures by host-country governments, aimed at facilitating FDI and the business that foreign 
investors undertake in a host country. With more and more countries adopting open FDI policies 
and actively seeking FDI to supplement their domestic resources and capabilities, such measures 
have become increasingly routine, pervasive and sophisticated (Pham Duy Nghia, 2000; Dapice, 
2003). 
These include measures relates to FDI promotion, the provision of incentives to foreign 
investors, the reduction of the µhassle costs¶ of doing business in a host country, and the 
provision of amenities that contribute to the quality of life of expatriate personnel in host 
countries.  
3.1.2.6. Investment Promotion Strategies 
One important category of business facilitating measures relates to FDI promotion, which 
includes a range of programmes and actions, typically undertaken by investment promotion 
agencies (IPAs) established (or transformed from earlier screening and monitoring agencies) for 
the purpose. The key functions of FDI promotion at present include image-building, investment 
generation and targeting, investment facilitation, after-care servicing, and policy advocacy with 
respect to FDI (Lim, 2001; Thomas, 2009).  
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Historically, the need for promotional action and measures arose when countries changed their 
attitudes and policies towards the role of FDI in their economies from negative stance to positive 
promotion, but investors responded more weakly than desired. As that experience and others 
have made clear, when making investment decisions, TNCs do not have perfect ± or sometimes 
even adequate ± information about all host countries or locations; moreover, they dislike risk 
and prefer known locations and may even be biased and subjective. At the same time, when 
designing policies, governments need an understanding of what TNCs need or more generally, is 
investor-friendly. Investment promotion activities can address both these shortcomings. Over 
time, promotional activity has become more important and expanded its scope. The scope of 
investment promotion policy has grown from a first generation approach of simply liberalising 
FDI policies to a second-generation one including marketing of countries as locations and 
setting up IPAs and most recently, to a third-generation one targeting foreign investors, 
marketing sub-QDWLRQDOUHJLRQVDQGPDWFKLQJORFDWLRQDGYDQWDJHVZLWKIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV¶QHHGV
(Thomas, 2009). In an increasinigly competitive maUNHW IRU IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQW JRYHUQPHQWV¶
can no longer wait for the investor to come to them, but instead must go out and actively 
promote their country as an investment opportunity. 
3.1.2.7.  Incentives for Attracting FDI  
Incentives are measurable economic advantages afforded to specific enterprises or categories of 
enterprises by (or at the direction of) governments (national, regional or local) in order to 
encourage them to behave in a certain manner (UNCTAD 1998, p.102). Governments use 
incentives to attract FDI to their respective countries, regions or localities (locational 
incentives), or to steer it into favoured industries or activities or to make foreign affiliates 
undertake functions such as training, local sourcing or R&D that it regards as desirable 
(behavioural incentives).  
The main types of investment incentives used by governments are financial incentives (e.g. 
outright grants and loans at concessional interest rates); fiscal incentives (e.g. tax holidays and 
reduced tax rates); and other incentives such as subsidised infrastructure or services, market 
preferences, and regulatory concessions, including exemptions from labour or environmental 
laws. The effectiveness of financial incentives in attracting FDI is analysed by Easson (2004), 
who sees the impact on cost effectiveness of FDI ventures as vital to their success. 
The main rationale for providing incentives to attract FDI to a location (or an industry or activity 
therein) is the need to correct the failure of markets to capture the wider benefits arising from 
externalities in production that may arise from economies of scale, diffusion of knowledge, or 
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upgrading of skills. To the extent that such externalities exist in a host economy, they justify 
offering incentives to the point that the private returns equal social returns, although the latter 
may be difficult to calculate.  
It is generally agreed that incentives are rarely the main determinant of investment location 
decisions by TNCs. But where all else is equal, they can tilt the balance in favour of a particular 
location. However, although incentives may assist in attracting FDI flows to a location and may 
in principle be justified on the grounds mentioned above, they can involve significant costs for 
host governments and ensuring that the costs do not exceed the benefits involved is not easy. 
Location incentives can be economically inefficient if they divert investment from other 
locations that would have been selected on economic grounds (Le Viet Anh, 2004). 
More importantly, if the offer of incentives by one country leads to a bidding war for FDI, host 
countries lose to the TNC (or its home country, if it can tax away the concessions). If incentives 
are used to address market failures, the best policy may often be to correct the failure rather than 
to compensate for it. For these and other reasons, there is a widespread view that countries 
should try to attract FDI not so much by offering incentives as by building genuine economic 
advantages and a favourable investment climate. Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) believe financial 
investment incentives are actually not an efficient way of attracting FDI, or of improving the 
JHQHUDOVWDWHRIWKHKRVWHFRQRP\DVORFDOILUPVUDUHO\GRH[SHULHQFHDQ\VLJQLILFDQWµVSLOORYHU¶
of the funding. 
2.6 The Impact of FDI on a Host Country 
Since the end of the Second World War, one significant phenomenon in the world economy is 
the rapid growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the wake of the rapid expansion of TNCs. 
Although FDI growth slowed or even dropped occasionally, it has been maintaining an overall 
trend of growth. With the growth of FDI, there have been many significant changes in the world 
economy and politics, such as the growth and liberalisation of international trade, the formation 
of regional trading groups, the rapid expansion of many industrialised countries, etc. Thus, FDI 
has been playing an increasingly important role in international business and globalization over 
the years (Aldana-Benetez and Posadas, 1994; Greer and Singh, 2000) 
FDI plays an extraordinary and growing role in global business. It can provide a firm with new 
markets and marketing channels, cheaper production facilities, access to new technology, 
products, skills and financing. For a host country or the foreign firm which receives the 
investment, it can provide a source of new technologies, capital, processes, products, 
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organisational technologies and management skills, and as such can provide a strong impetus to 
economic development (Alburquerque, 2000). 
The overwhelming majority of foreign direct investment is made in the form of fixtures, 
maFKLQHU\HTXLSPHQWDQGEXLOGLQJVLQRWKHUZRUGVµUHDODVVHWV¶7KLVLQYHVWPHQWLVDFKLHYHG
or accomplished mostly via mergers & acquisitions. In the case of traditional manufacturing, 
this has been the primary mechanism for investment and has been very efficient. Within the past 
decade there has been a dramatic increase in the number of technology startups and this, 
together with the rise in prominence of Internet usage, which has fostered increasing changes in 
foreign investment patterns. Many of these high tech startups are very small companies that 
have grown out of research & development projects often affiliated with major universities and 
with some government sponsorship. Unlike traditional manufacturers, many of these companies 
do not require huge manufacturing plants and immense warehouses to store inventory. Another 
factor to consider is the number of companies whose primary product is an intellectual property 
right such as a software program or a software-based technology or process. Companies such as 
these can be housed almost anywhere and therefore making a capital investment in them does 
not require huge outlays for fixtures, machinery and plants (Dunning and Bansal, 1997; Dapice, 
2003, Richard and Yang, 2007; Le Quoc Hoi and Pomfret, 2008). 
The most profound effect has been seen in developing countries, where yearly foreign direct 
investment flows have increased from an average of less than USD10 billion in the 1970s to a 
yearly average of less than USD20 billion in the 1980s, to explode in the 1990s from 
USD26.7billion in 1990 to USD179 billion in 1998 and USD208 billion in 1999 and now 
comprise a large portion of global FDI. Driven by mergers and acquisitions and 
internationalization of production in a range of industries, FDI into developed countries rose to 
USD636 billion, from USD481 billion in 1998 (data by UNCTAD, as cited in Graham and 
Spaulding, 2005). 
Proponents of foreign investment point out that the exchange of investment flows benefits both 
the home country from which the investment originates and the host country, the destination of 
the investment. Opponents of FDI note that multinational conglomerates are able to wield great 
power over smaller and weaker economies and can drive out much local competition. The truth 
lies somewhere in the middle (Singh, 2001; 2003). 
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2.6.1 Benefits to the Host Country of Foreign Investment  
FDI is now an essential part of the modern global economy. In less developed countries, FDI 
has become an important source of capital, technology, know-how and other valuable resources 
that otherwise would be unavailable. To the transition economies, whose internal sources of 
finance dried up due to economic recessions and collapse of government budgets, FDI too 
becomes a fundamental factor in their modernisation. FDI may greatly assist economic 
development by spurring domestic competition and thereby resulting eventually in higher 
productivity, lower prices and more efficient resource allocation. Thus, FDI is a valuable 
contribution to economic and social development (UNCTAD, 1999). 
Aside from increasing outputs and incomes, potential benefits to host countries from FDI flows 
include the following: 
x Creating jobs, the most common benefit associated with FDI is increased and protected 
employment. Together with new employment, additional income and spending power for 
local residents will come. 
x Generating revenue)',ZLOOZLGHQWKHORFDOWD[EDVHDQGFRQWULEXWHWR*RYHUQPHQW¶V
revenue. Even if foreign investors are exempted wholly from corporate income tax, the 
Government can generate revenue from personal income tax and other indirect taxes. 
x Foreign firms bring superior technology. The extent of benefits to host countries 
depends on whether the technology spills over to domestic and other foreign-invested 
firms. 
x Foreign investment increases competition in the host country. The entry of a new firm in 
a non-tradable sector increases industry output and may thereby reduce domestic price, 
leading to a net improvement in welfare. 
x Foreign investment gives advantages in terms of export market access arising either 
IRUPIRUHLJQILUPV¶HFRQRPLHVRI scale in marketing or from their ability to gain market 
access abroad. Besides their contributions through joint ventures, foreign firms can 
serve as catalysts for other domestic exporters. In an empirical analysis, the probability 
that a domestic plant will export was found to be positively correlated with proximity to 
multi-national firms. One implication is that government may encourage potential 
exporters to locate near each other by (i) creating special economic zones or export 
processing zones, or promoting clusters, or by (ii) conferring special benefits, such as 
duty-free imports or inputs, subsidised infrastructure, or tax holidays, to help reduce 
costs for domestic forms in breaking into foreign markets. 
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x Foreign investment can aid in bridging a hoVWFRXQWU\¶VIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHJDS. Two gaps 
may exist in the economy: insufficient savings to support capital accumulation to 
achieve a given growth target, and insufficient foreign exchange to purchase imports. 
Often investment requires imported inputs. If domestic savings are insufficient, or face 
barriers in being converted to foreign exchange to acquire imports, they may be 
insufficient to guarantee growth. Capital inflows help ensure that foreign exchange will 
be available to purchase imports for investment (Brooks, 2003). 
2.6.2 FDI Home Country Benefits 
FDI is considered a major instrument through which the home country could maintain or 
increase its relative position in world markets. In other words, FDI is recognised as an effective 
way to securing key raw materials, maintaining market position, and as a tool of diplomacy 
(Desai, 1997; Taylor and Thrift, 1982). Hence, potential benefits to home countries from FDI 
flows include the following: 
x Improve Balance of Payment for inward flow of foreign earnings. Same as host 
countries, home countries need a healthy balance of payment as well, while the multiple 
effects of outward direct investment also involve some individual effects which result 
respectively in benefits. 
x Assure of manufacturing base with low costs of production,WLVWKHFDVHWKDWHQWHUSULVHV¶
investment aimed at making use of low cost labour and cheap raw material, thus, 
reducing costs of production to increase their competitiveness. This form is very 
effective with industries that are labour intensive. Countries having an abundant labour 
force with low costs became countries to be invested in. In the future, investment in 
foreign countries shall spread out to other countries. 
x Assure domestic market. This is the case of selling products at the producing country; it 
meant that investment aimed at domestic demand. Countries with high population and 
forecasted to be developed in respect of market scale became that to be invested in 
(Krugman and Helpman, 1989; Feenstra, 2004). 
2.6.3 The Linkages Between Economic Growth and FDI  
Economic growth relies on investment and the subsequent capital inflows and the additional 
investments from TNCs affect the volume and characteristics of the overall inputs of FDI. The 
outcome is that there are direct linkages between economic growth and the impact of FDI, 
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although there are still questions from some economists on whether we can make a direct causal 
link between FDI and economic growth of a host country (Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006).  
In the neoclassical theory of economic growth the linkage is made between the saving-
investment gap, the foreign exchange gap and the fiscal gap, where economic growth is seen as 
RFFXUULQJLQµVWDJHV¶WKDWUHIOHFWWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHSUHVHQFHRI)',5RVWRZ)',
inflows provide both capital and the benefits of transfers of new technologies in transitional 
economies (Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006 ,Q 6RORZ¶V QHRFODVVLFDO JURZWK PRGHO  6RORZ
focused on how the growth outputs caused increases in the quality and number of the labour, 
chiefly through a direct influence on population growth, the development of education, the 
inputs of foreign capital and the technological advantages brought to the host country (Nguyen 
Phi Lan, 2006) (QGRJHQRXV JURZWK WKHRULHV H[SODLQ WKDW )', GHYHORSPHQW QHHGV µNQRZQ
externalities¶DQGWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIKLJKOHYHOVRIµKXPDQFDSLWDO¶ 
Balasubramanyam et. al. (1996) showed that growth is driven through the presence of FDI while 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) concentrated on the benefits multi-national corporations (MNCs) 
have in their possessions of modern technologies which enable them to be highly competitive 
against both other MNCs and local companies. Such competition forces the local firms to 
imitate the foreign competition in order to remain competitive and profitable.  
In the endogenous growth theory, the economic growth of the host developing country is 
directly linked to the influence of FDI through the subsequent inputs gained in the development 
of managerial capacities and the growth of a research and development culture. The MNCs 
bring with them a host of human resource developments including the training of local workers 
to meet international standards and the eventual attainment of higher skill levels in technology 
and management. Developing countries often suffer from a low level of skills and incentives for 
research and development, but FDI inevitably brings pressure on the host country to develop 
these areas and create longer term growth plans that provide greater stability to the host 
FRXQWU\¶V HFRQRP\ %ORPVWURP DQG .RNko, 1998; Balasubramanyam et. al. 1996). In the 
Eclectic Theory of FDI a different causal linkage is made between economic growth and FDI, 
where the location advantages are emphasised and seen as a major determinant of FDI. 
Chakrabarti (2001), Asiedu (2002) and Zhao (2003) point out that it is the advantages of the host 
country that actualy attracts the FDI and we have a situation where economic growth attracts 
FDI as the main determinant, rather than seeing economic growth as the consequence of FDI 
(Moore, 1993; Lucas, 1993; Cernat and Vranceanu, 2002). 
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In the case of Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan (1992), a single equation estimation method using 
data from 1960-1985 for 78 developing countries found that a case could be made for seeing 
FDI as a positive influence upon economic growth and these findings were re-enforced by 
Borensztein et. al.  ZKHUH WKH LQIOXHQFH RI µWHFKQRORJLFDO GLIIXVLRQV¶ RI )', LQ 
developing countries over two periods, 1970-1979 and 1980-1989 clearly showed a direct link 
between FDI and economic growth. In addition, there was evidence of clear linkages between 
foreign and domestic investment. However, Bengoa and Sancher-Robles (2003) emphasised that 
this causality UHVWHGRQWKHKRVWFRXQWU\KDYLQJµDGHTXDWHKXPDQFDSLWDOHFRQRPLF stability, and 
liberaliseGPDUNHWV¶Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006). Wang and Wong (2004), in a study of 84 countries 
also pointed to the dominance of human capital as a determinant of FDI, and indicated that the 
development of the manufacturing sector through FDI was a vital influence on economic growth 
when there existed sufficient levels of human capital (Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006). However, the 
impact on non-manufacturing sectors of FDI was not seen as significant. For Alfaro et al (2002), 
the linkage between economic growth and FDI was also determined by the levels of 
development of the host countries financial markets, a view also supported by Hermes and 
Lensink (2003) whose study of 67 developing countries from 1970-1995 and Aghion et. al. 
(2006) study of FRXQWULHVIURPWRFRQILUPHG$OIDUR¶VK\SRWKHVLVWKDWILQDQFLDO
markets significantly influenced both the economic growth and the development of FDI.  
Jackson and Markowski (1995) and Balasubramanyam et. al. (1996) demonstrated that it was 
economic growth that influenced strongly the record of developing countries attraction of FDI, 
while Basu et. al. (2003), in a study of 23 countries from 1978 to 1996 demonstrated a direct 
link between GDP and FDI. Despite this, Ekanayake et. al. (2003) used a vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model and error correction techniques to illustrate how the linkages between output 
growth, the development of the export sector and the growth of FDI were clearly linked to the 
growth of economies in both developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, it was easier to 
find direct causal links between the development of a host countries export sector and economic 
growth, than it was to prove a connection between economic growth and FDI. Tsai (1994) in a 
study of 62 countries from 1975 to 1978 and 51 countries from 1983 to 1986 believed there was 
a direct connection between the growth of the economy and FDI. These studies showed that 
economic growth was directly linked to having an impact on FDI, but the relationship was also 
chiefly determined by the levels and quality of human capital (Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006). Saha 
(2005) focused on a simultaneous system of equations to prove the linkage between economic 
growth and FDI in 20 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean and found that the 
influence of both upon each other was positive and significant. 
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In both the neoclassical growth theories and the endogenous growth theories there have been 
numerous valid studies to show the positive causal linkages between FDI and economic growth. 
The savings-investment, foreign exchange and fiscal gaps are solved in neoclassical growth 
theories by the inflows of FDI, whereas in the endogenous growth theories there is the idea that 
FDI affects economic growth positively by its ability to bring in new and advanced economic 
activities, such as in technological developments, which then positively influence economic 
growth (Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006). The inputs of human resource development, technological 
innovations and educational advantages are seen as direct linkages to the growth of the host 
FRXQWU\¶VHFRQRP\'HPHDQG*UDGG\3DUHQWH 
In the Eclectic Theory of FDI the influence of economic growth on developed and developing 
countries FDI is clearly demonstrated. But, in the case of Vietnam, the studies of FDI and 
economic growth are yet to be fully developed and much research needs to be carried out. This 
thesis will overcome some of the gaps in knowledge of the development of FDI and economic 
growth in Vietnam, and show that Vietnam is an ideal location in which to study the relationship 
between FDI and economic growth (Dunning, 1988). 
2.7 Development of FDI Ventures in Transition Economies  
2.7.1 The Movement from Centrally-planned Economy to a Transition Economy  
An essential aspect of the study of Vietnam and its FDI is the fact that, like the transformation of 
the Soviet-bloc countries, Vietnam is moving from a centrally planned economy to a market 
oriented. Although one must never forget that the system in Vietnam still rests firmly on a basis 
of communist ideology and that while the movement to a market oriented economy is taking 
place, the political movement towards a democratic system is still staunchly resisted, and 
without that basis of democracy the liberalisation of the economy is likely to always be only 
relative to the lack of progress in the political system. The reform of the Soviet-bloc and 
Vietnam economies have both been on a long term basis and involved the movement of state 
owned enterprises to private ownership, which has entailed the withdrawal of sizable amounts of 
state subsidies and the promotion of the competitive spirit in business (Estrin, 2002). Whole 
industries were re-structured and resources were re-allocated according to the competitive 
principles where formerly, industries had relied on the support of the state for both capital and 
labour. Essential here was reform of the ownership model and the new imperative of focusing 
on productivity, which required massive changes in the skills and practices of management and 
the down-sizing of labour forces to create a market friendly model that based its strategies on 
productivity, efficiency and profitability. The additional challenges were to adopt new 
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technologies and focus in the present and future on the level of customer demands for products 
and services (Blanchard, 1997).  
However, it is hard to see the continued success of Vietnam strategies unless the political 
situation also moves towards increasing reform. In a centrally-planned economy, government 
bodies allocate resources and the centrally controlled decision-making is based on quantity-
based planning. In the centrally planned economy the firms are either state owned or are 
collectives. The incidence of private ownership is rare and weak and has little affect on the gross 
output structure. All enterprises are chiefly focused on factor or product markets driven by 
mechanisms subverted by the negative and inefficient decision-making processes of the 
centrally planned economy. Sales and pricing are determined by the government and the 
consumers have little influence, aggravated by the poor connection between the consumer and 
supply markets. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the clear connection between 
that and the poor economic strategies of the centrally planned economy meant that only through 
privatisation and movement away from State control of industry could economies escape 
stagnation and possible collapse.  
The market mechanism, privatisation and production efficiency are the three main platforms of 
transition for formerly centrally planned economies (Lin, 2006). Nevertheless, such dramatic 
reforms are always likely to meet strong resistance, especially from the SOEs as it is clear they 
are likely to become the victims of reform with bankruptcy threatening any of those who cannot 
access the necessary capital or unable to provide the necessary skills, technologies and know-
how to underpin the process of reform.  
Any reform on this scale is likely to meet resistance. Especially as its initial impact is likely to 
be a rise in unemployment and a loss of outputs and there is likely to be a general downturn in 
the economy. In the case of Vietnam, they also experienced a downturn in the economy with the 
introduction of Doi Moi, but eventually experienced a movement to a more highly skilled and 
competitive economy. 
2.7.2 MNE and the Process of Privatisation 
The privatisation of the state owned sector is vital in the reform of a country from a centrally 
planned economy to a market oriented economy (Estrin, 2002). The government should no 
longer be solely concerned with employment rates and the importance of political relationships 
with business and instead focus on productivity, efficiency and profitability as the guiding rules 
of economic reform (Maw 2002; Guo and Yao 2005). 
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The transition to a market economy requires the government to allow the market to be driven by 
the supply-demand relationship and for that to be the basis of returning the economy to the 
private sector and ending the dominance of the system by SOEs (Nguyen Phi Lan, 2006). 
However, the government still needs to help by taking on the burdens of debt incurred in the 
reform of the SOEs and maintaining social and political stability. The centrally controlled period 
saw firms depend for their survival on the political favouritism of the government and now need 
to be subject only to the forces of demand, productivity and competition. However, we should 
note that the continued existence of communism as the single party governance of Vietnam 
means that the return to productivity, competition and profitability as the guiding foundations of 
the economy and business can never be totally completed, and the influence of political 
favouritism and Party relationships is likely to remain a major factor in the success of many 
businesses in Vietnam (Hoi Dong Bo Truong, 1989). 
Corruption, poor management and inefficiency remain in many businesses that are SOEs or 
former SOEs, and who survive through continued relationships of favouritism with the 
government. For example, major electricity distributors rely on a fixed price they pay to 
producers, which is set by the government. Their management of distribution is poor and the 
control of supply sees waste, numerous power cuts, areas still not developed and a general low 
performance. Meanwhile, producers are finding that they must pay a fixed price that is actually 
more than it costs them to produce electricity, and many diversify into other industries in order 
to gain some profit and deterred from making the investment to improve and expand their 
capacities for the production of electricity (Hoi Dong Bo Truong, 1989). 
The diversification of ownership in the transition process re-structures the economy and 
introduces competition as the guiding logic of business success, which is essential for any long 
term growth of the economy. However, that introduction of open markets and competition 
requires all agencies within the economy to reform, and this includes existing SOEs who must 
contribute to the improvement of efficiency in all aspects. This includes eventually being able to 
compete in the international market and at this point the important of FDI becomes a crucial 
factor in the continued success of reform (Dapice, 2003; Seow and Ching, 2008; Iswaran, 2007). 
The choice for governments becomes whether they remain protective of certain firms, both 
SOEs and particular private entities, a decision which leaves the barriers to foreign firms in 
place, Or, they can open up fully and welcome the competition of the foreign firms and the 
challenges it presents to the SOEs and domestic private firms. This expands in influence as 
foreign firms actually purchase domestic entities (Maw, 2002). They bring modern technology, 
advanced levels of skills in management and experience of working in a truly competitive 
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environment. However, the reform of Vietnam still remains in a situation where many barriers 
remain to foreign firms and numerous private agencies that were former SOEs alongside 
existing SOEs remain in privileged positions, distorting the efforts to transfer the economy over 
to the market oriented style and eliminating the inefficiencies and corruption of the centrally 
planned economy (Estrin et.al 1997). In Vietnam, where even after over twenty years of reform, 
the government stills retains numerous constraints and restrictions on foreign entry into many 
sectors of the economy, such as in insurance, banking and private security. 
In studies by Konings (1997), it was shown that de novo private firms performance outstripped 
that of SOEs in the transition process, while Li (1999) showed that reform did improved their 
own performance. The emergence of non-state owned enterprises fuels the process of transition 
and this is compounded by the introduction of MNCs and their affiliates. Li (1999) demonstrates 
that the transition process, in for example China and movement toward the market oriented 
model actually causes reform and improvement in many of the state owned enterprises. That 
shows that transition and economic reform to a market oriented economy has positive impacts 
on the performance of many state owned enterprises and that the evidence of this can be found 
in the development of reform in China. However, this is not seen as a totally voluntary and 
many state owned enterprises are forced by the pressures of competition to reform and 
eventually compelled to become privately owned. 
2.7.3 The Impact of FDI on Transition Economies  
The evidence for understanding and analysing the process of reform in developing countries is 
impressive, but in the last few decades, following the end of the Cold War the literature on FDI 
in transition economies has grown extensively. Comparative studies have centred on the 
transition economies in Europe, for instance Konings (1997; 2001) and Angelucci et. al. (2002) 
use data from three countries whereas Damijan et. al. (2003) compare the FDI effect in the top 
ten transition economies. In Kinoshita (2000), Djiankov and Hoekman (2000) they use country 
specific studies, exploring the firm-level data for manufacturing in the Czech Republic. The 
transition in China has resulted in a number of empirical studies. For instance, Xiaodong Wu 
(2001b), Haishun Sun (2001), Liu and Wang (2003) and Lai et. al. (2006) covered the impact of 
FDI on the performance of exports, total factor productivity and on economic growth.  
Further studies have focused on FDI spillovers in transition economies such as with Damijan et. 
al. (2003) where static and dynamic panel data techniques were studied in ten countries to 
further investigate the impact of backward and horizontal spillovers. The studies of the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia revealed horizontal spillovers, while the Czech 
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Republic, Poland and Slovenia demonstrated backward spillovers. Both Kinoshita (2000) and 
Djiankov and Hoekman (2000) investigate the Czech data in two consecutive periods, 1992-
1996 and 1995-1998. Very little differences were found between the two periods. In a study by 
Kinoshita (2000) no productivity spillovers were found as a result of the entrance of MNE FDI 
or from their affiliates and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) come up with a negative FDI effect on 
local firm productivity. What was discovered was that technology spillovers are often more 
evident in liberalised transition economies that allow the presence of foreign involvement in the 
process of privatisation (Konings 2001; Damijan et. al. 2003). 
Smarzynska 2002b and Damijan et. al., (2003), focused on vertical spillovers and found that in 
the measurement of horizontal and vertical spillovers could be lessened due to the effects of 
export and import activities in FIEs. Using input coefficients at a two digit level, the calculation 
of the influence of spillovers varying over industry classification were found to often be 
inaccurate and suspect (Le Quoc Hoi and Pomfret, 2008). 
Kinoshita (2000) and Damijan et. al. (2003) studied the European transition economies 
mechanisms for research and development and technology spillovers brought through FDI 
operations and found some degree of spillover. Kinoshita (2000) concentrated on manufacturing 
firms in the Czech Republic and found that the research and development coefficient was very 
positive and extensive, with a significant impact on production and productivity. The interaction 
between research and development and technology spillovers recorded results that showed the 
absorptive capacity was more important that the record as a renovation tool. Damijan et. al. 
(2003) however, did not discover either an innovative or absorptive capacity for research and 
development in the period of transition economics for any of the ten Eastern European Countries 
they studied. In fact, in the case of Hungary, Latvia and Estonia they found that research and 
development record was actually a barrier to the promotion of FDI spillovers.  
The reasons for this may be that the OLS estimates were used in the studies were used in the 
Damijan et. al.study through the two-step Heckman procedure while Kinoshita used panel data 
techniques. However, there may also be a correlation between expenditure on research and 
development and foreign investment, where FIEs are more likely to invest heavily in research 
and development than local firms (Kinoshita, 2000). 
There is significant evidence that FDI contributes to the improvement of corporate governance 
in private firms in transition economies. The inputs of capital to joint ventures with SOEs means 
the new companies are less reliant on financial support form either the banks or the government 
and that this inevitably leads to greater restraint in the board room on the management of 
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budgets. Konings (2001) studied the effects of FDI on horizontal spillovers and on the impact 
these had on different ownership types, comparing the results with OLS and the dynamic 
estimation method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The dynamic estimate shows 
privatised firms do not perform better than SOEs, which is surprising as the levels of activity 
were more active and productive in the local private sector than in the state-owned sector. 
Konings (2001), in studies of Bulgaria, Romania and Poland the indirect effect was that negative 
coefficients for spillovers in Bulgaria and Romania were found. Thus, in less open economies, 
or in the first stage of transition, spillovers are negative due to domination of the competition 
effect that forces less efficient firms to exit. Also, in the long term spillovers might occur when 
the absorptive capacity of the local firms has developed.  
Firm level data was used by Angelucci et. al. (2002) to investigate the impact of both 
international and domestic competition and on how the development of a competitive 
environment affected productivity performance. By focusing on the augmented production 
function they were able to assess the value added impacts of foreign capital against that of local 
capital and investigated how additional factors such as employment and import penetration 
affected the outcomes. Three different econometric methods were used, but confusing results 
were found. However, it did find that there were positive effects from the introduction of both 
local and foreign ownership in Poland and Bulgaria, while the impact on Romania was less 
clear. The inclusion of the interaction between private share and the Herfindahl index, 
demonstrated that the effects of private local ownership were diminished and that privatisation 
process needs to be encouraged through the introduction of greater levels of competition.  
What is clear is that the introduction of the privatisation model with differentiated private 
owners involved in the privatisation of state owned firms increased incentives to focus on 
exports. Foreign shareholders have high expectations that efficiency will be the guiding policy 
of any enterprise and will lead to greater levels of export, whereas domestic investors, especially 
those involved in the management structure are focused more on protecting their position and 
raising their stake in the enterprise, rather than improving the firms performance, which often 
leads to restrictions on the firms capacity for exports. However, there is further pressure here on 
restriction of exports from SOES, for the danger is that the government is focused on macro 
economic objects such as employment and inflation, rather than export led growth strategies, 
and that influence will be reflected in the strategies of the SOE.  
Buck et. al. (2000) studied Russia, Belarus and Ukraine through firm level data and aimed at 
analysing what the export propensity determinants were for local firms, and concentrated to 
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some degree on the levels of managerial stakes in the firms, finding that the more ownership 
stakes the managers possessed, the lower the levels of incentives to export.  
Mickiewicz et. al. (2000) and Radosevic et. al. (2003) concentrated on the effects of FDI on 
employment in Eastern European transition economies. Mickiewicz et. al. (2000) analysed the 
extent to which FDI created new jobs in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and 
Estonia. They found that generally there was an increase in unemployment in total 
manufacturing, as well as some significant drops in employment in specific industries. However, 
this was counter-balanced by the employment creation activities of FIEs. Significant here also 
was the record in Hungary where it was shown that FIEs had contributed highly to the 
improvement of employment figures. Overall, Mickiewicz et. al. (2000) believed that the 
contribution of FDI was supplementary to the existing system rather than an employment 
substitute agency in transition economies.  
2.8 Empirical studies Examining the Impact of FDI in Vietnam 
The initial opening up of the VietQDP¶VHFRQRP\WRWKHJOREDOV\VWHPUHVWHGRQ  
x International trading liberalisation 
x Removal of many export taxes 
x Removal of many non-tariff barriers 
x The reduction in tariff levels and bands- with the maximum tariff reduced to 120 per cent 
from 200 per cent and the number of bands reduced to 15 
x The creation of new economic opportunities through international agreements such as 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
x The promotion of import and export duty rebates and the establishment of export 
processing zones (Jenkins, 2006, 120) 
The introduction of Doi Moi provided a significant boost to the process and speed of economic 
reform, which inevitably meant moving forward on a continuous process of elimination of 
barriers to FDI. This should be understood against a background where in Vietnam, by 1986 the 
economy was on the point of total collapse and only widespread, dramatic and deep levels of 
policy reform could bring about any form of recovery. By the 1980s the choice was to open up 
to the global market and actively welcomes foreign investment and support, or see the total 
economic collapse of the economy and possibly return to the years of famine and economic 
disaster seen at such times as in 1945-1946. Doi Moi PDUNHG WKH WXUQLQJ SRLQW LQ 9LHWQDP¶V
economy and the reforms have been dramatic with an average growth of 8 per cent in gross 
domestic product from 1990 to 1997 and 6.5 per cent from 1998 to 2003. Foreign trade and FDI 
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improved to nearly USD 18 billion by 2007 and agricultural production doubled from 1990 to 
2005, while exports reached USD49 billion per year by 2007. The per capita income rose from 
USD220 in 1994 to USD832 by 2007 and industrial production went from 27 per cent of GDP 
in 1985 to 41 per cent in 2007. Many industries reached impressive rates of growth, such as in 
the production of oil which went from 40,000 tons in 1986 to 7.6 million tons in 1990 and 12.5 
million tons in 1998 (Tran Thi Ben, 1999). The inflation rate dropped from an alarming 774 per 
cent in 1986 to a more normal 7.5 per cent by 2006, while the poverty rate was reduced from 
58.1 per cent in 1993 to 22 per cent in 2005. By 2007 there were 7067 FDI projects with a 
capital of USD63.5billion (Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007). 
Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang (2007) gave the following reasons for the dramatic 
success as: 
x Strategic location 
x Stable economic and political environment 
x Large natural mineral resources 
x A young and well-educated workforce 
x The ability to be an export platform for US and EU markets 
x Liberal investment environment and a commitment by the Government to economic 
reform. 
The rapid economic growth of Vietnam began with the introduction of the Doi Moi policy and 
the FDI reforms begun in 1987. Even the Asian economic crisis of 1997/1998 failed to seriously 
LPSDFWRQ9LHWQDP¶VUHFRYHU\DOWKRXJK)',IORZVZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\FXWDQGDWRQHSRLQWZHUH
only one fifth of the figures for 1996. But prospects of entry to the WTO brought about renewed 
confidence and Vietnam is witnessing long term and significant growth again in its FDI record.  
The expansion of FDI has seen the records in agriculture and the service sectors begin to reach 
record heights as they too join the manufacturing sector for competitive signs of success in 
attracting foreign investment. Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang (2007) identified that in 
the early years of opening up the market, the industrial zones and real estate sectors showed low 
levels of interest from foreign investors, but these are potentially very rich areas for 
development. However, the real estate market still remains one of the most protected areas of 
government policy, with extremely restrictive laws on ownership and a bureaucratic nightmare 
to be negotiated for even the simplest land purchase. This is also aggravated by the early focus 
of investors on only targeting HCMC and Hanoi, leaving vast areas of the country untouched, 
yet containing a rich potential for investment, such as Hai Phong and Da Nang (Fforde, 1997; 
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Dollar, 1999). 
The Government has been pro-active in attracting foreign investment by offering tax incentives, 
making a number of regulatory changes such as simplification of the licensing systems and in 
promoting the transfers of high technology. However, there is a long way to go before the 
system becomes fully open to foreign investment and the overly burdensome administration of 
business still remains in many areas, aggravated by some levels of corruption in the existing 
government systems. Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang  XVH 'XQQLQJ¶V HFOHFWLF
theory to examine the levels of success and focus on the OLI (ownership, location and 
internalisation) framework.  
Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang (2007) point to the importance of exports and the impact 
of FDI on them, quoting Nguyen Thanh Xuan and Xing (2008), who believe that USD2.5 of 
FDI will generate USD1 of export. They also venture that FDI spillovers will occur as the 
domestic firms are forced to imitate and innovate in the light of the increased efficiency and 
LQQRYDWLRQRIWKH)',IRUPV+RZHYHUFDUHVKRXOGEHWDNHQLQORRNLQJDW9LHWQDP¶VVXFFHVVDV
some concerning data shows alarming threats to the future, as with, for instance the fact the each 
FDI in Thailand generates 3,370 jobs per project, and 2,699 in Malaysia, while Vietnam records 
a pitiful 86 per project. Vu Bang Tam (2008) declared that foreign investment does have 
positive and high levels of impact upon the growth of economy¶s but this should also be 
recognised as mainly occurring in the manufacturing sectors. They also are concerned about the 
FRUUXSWLRQHVSHFLDOO\DW WKHPLGGOHUDQNLQJJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOV¶ OHYHODQG WKHUH LVQRGRXEW
that despite some figures showing a decline in the corruption, the general feeling is in business, 
corruption still makes a significant impact on the system.  
6LQJHUSURSRVHGWKDW)',ZLOODFWXDOO\µFURZGRXW¶WKHLQYHVWPHQWRIGRPHVWLFLQYHVWRUV
as the international investor has far higher levels of access to the capital markets and thus enjoys 
significantly higher levels of opportunities to acquire cheaper credit terms and can use that 
capital advantage to drive out the domestic investor, a factor made even more serious by the 
international investor have advantages of being able to invest in larger projects and enjoy 
advantages in comparative costs and market conditions.  
Findlay (1978) examined the possibility of negative impacts from the attraction of foreign 
investment, venturing that the dependency on foreign capital was likely to outweigh the benefits 
of high technologies. Vu Bang Tam (2008, p.7) in looking at whether the benefits of FDI and its 
GHWHUPLQDQWVKDYHKHOSHG9LHWQDP¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWKH[DPLQHG WKHHFRQRPLFHTXDWLRQV WKDW
µWDNH WKH ORJV DQG WLPH GHULYDWLYHV RI WKH H[SODQDWRU\ YDULDEOHV¶ DQG ILQGV WKDW µLW \LHOGV DQ
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equation in growth rates for all variables with a Solow residue measuring total factor 
SURGXFWLYLW\ 7)3JURZWK¶)RUVu Bang Tam the point to make is that the varied impact of 
both positive and negative returns for FDI affects on economic growth depends often on 
whether the host country is an export promoting country like Vietnam or an import substituting 
economies as is found in many countries in Africa where FDI has shown no real positive impact 
on growth. 
Vu Bang Tam (2007) demonstrates his hypothesis through the accurate calculations and 
assessment of FDI, and examines its impact on economic growth, but ventures that his final 
analysis is compromised by a lack of reliable data where accurate reporting continues to be a 
major problem. Vu Bang Tam concludes that FDI does have a significant and positive effect on 
economic growth in Vietnam, but that foreign investment growth should be applied though an 
interaction with labour. 
The success of Vietnam in attracting foreign investment has only occurred through wholesale 
changes in legal and governmental policies and that taking place in an era of globalisation, 
where FDI inevitably has lead to significant economic growth (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, et. al, 
2006). The link for the mutual benefits between FDI and economic growth are: 
x FDI inflows help to increase the surplus of capital accounts, improve the balance of 
payments and the macroeconomic stability of the country. 
x The poor countries usually have low rates of capital accumulation and thus, FDI is 
regarded as a vital supplementary source of capital to support domestic investment, in 
order to achieve economic growth. 
x FDI provides the poor countries with better access to modern technology, easier 
technology transfer, promotion of knowledge diffusion, while also improving managerial 
and labour skills (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al., 2006). 
The Vietnam Government has had to accept that economic growth and the attraction of foreign 
investment are two essentially interlinked factors and the increasing levels of competition in 
global trade means that the government has no choice but to introduce and sustain political, 
economic and ideological reform (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al, 2006, p.180). The mobilisation of 
capital, technology, organisational and managerial skills depends in the modern economy on 
being able to attract sustainable FDI inputs and the Communist Party has had to undertake 
radical reforms in policies that separate the economic sector to some degree from the political 
ideology of communism and submerge the Vietnam market for FDI into the global network of 
competitive economics.  
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However, the reforms cannot be seen as sufficient as there are numerous weakness that remain, 
such as in the problems in acquiring land use rights, the difficulties in foreign exchange and the 
barriers to international trade such as profit transference restrictions (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et.al, 
2006, p.23). These problems are increased by the poor record on law enforcement in business 
transactions and the foreign investor feeling that many corrupt practices are not diligently 
investigated and eliminated by the authorities. 
A further area of concern is in the disbursement of FDI wherein 2008, although there was 
USD31.6 billion of FDI registered, only USD5 billion was actually disbursed. In 2000-2005 
disbursement fluctuated between 50 to 80 per cent of newly registered capital, falling to less 
than 40 per cent in 2006 and 38 per cent in 2007 (Yao, 2008). Such low levels of disbursement 
DQGDWDGHFOLQLQJUDWH OHDGVRQHWRTXHVWLRQMXVWKRZHIIHFWLYHLVIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWDVµSRRU
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHVKRUWDJHRIHOHFWULFLW\DQGVNLOOHGSHUVRQQHO¶DUHFLWHGDVSULPDU\REVWDFOHV to the 
efficient use of FDI (Yao, 2008, p.1). 
Pham Thi Huyen (2006FRQVLGHUVWKHVHSUREOHPVDVKHILQGVWKDWµWKHVXFFHVVIXOVRXUFLQJRI
)',LWLVQHFHVVDU\WRILQGWKHLUVSHFLILFQHHGVGHVLUHVDQGJRDOV¶DQGDQHHGWRLPSURYHµSODFH
PDUNHWLQJ¶ SRWHQWLDO RI 9LHWQDP DQG GHYHORS VWUDWHJLHV WKDW DUH LQWerlinked and focused on 
improving the attraction of Vietnam as an investment destination (2009, p.23). This includes 
x Changes in the form, formality and awareness of government institutions 
x Financial incentives 
x Organisational changes. 
 
The government in Vietnam has attempted to improve the investment environment through 
commitment to change in business, government and society, but their remains significant 
problems pointed out by Pham Thi Huyen in the apparent inability to sufficiently convert 
registered capital into actual investment (Pham Thi Huyen, 2006 p.32). With Pham Thi Huyen 
claiming that failure to convert promised capital into actual projects is costing the Vietnamese 
government more than USD 5 billion a year, the problem is obviously of a serious nature. 
Pham Thi Huyen (2006) concentrates on the capital, Hanoi, and found that the inefficient and 
overly bureaucratic administrative mechanism and the poor regulatory systems and policies 
convert into high costs for any investment and lead to excessive levels of un-coordination of 
projects and investment. However, to counter-balance this there is the hard-working labour 
force, immense potential in the market of 88 million people and a high degree of stability in the 
political system, but again, one could point to the levels of corruption, the lack of transparency 
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and hidden costs in all projects. Hidden costs that if not seen as corrupt by government officials 
who demand payment to ensure smoothly running processes of licensing, regulation, etc are 
obviously seen by many foreign investors as coming close to being unnecessary and verging on 
illegal barriers to good business. There are very few foreign invested firms that are enjoying 
smoothly operated and profitable investments that would not point to certain payments that they 
see as suspect and not required in their home countries. 
Since Doi Moi was initiated the reform of the economy has accelerated and the record of foreign 
investment is impressive, with new reforms continuing the process, opening up fresh 
opportunities for improvement and establishing even better conditions for successful foreign 
investment in the Vietnamese economy. The improvements include opening up new sectors for 
investment by foreigners, and policies that include moving responsibility equally for investment 
start-up costs to the Vietnamese side as well as the foreigner, such as in the switch in cost 
burdens for land clearance projects in the development of building projects. These were 
formerly always transferred to the foreign investor but are more likely now to be met by the 
Vietnamese side (Schaumburg-Müller, 2002). This was demonstrating new levels of concern for 
the foreign investor being displayed by the Vietnam government. The result is increasing 
opportunities for the foreigner to capitalise on their investment, with increasing new rights in 
acquiring land and mortgages, a relaxation of restrictions on currency transfers and capital 
transactions and the new rights to alter or re-arrange investment to take account of changing 
circumstances.  
The Vietnam government has contributed further to this improvement in the investment 
environment by improving the training and investment in human resources and reductions in the 
cost and time taken for administration of the investment. These infra-structural reforms have 
seen a continual development of systems and human resources, thus reducing the costs to the 
investor of delays, red tape and inefficiency (Jenkins, 2006). As Red8 Executive, Andrew 
Goddard explaiQHG µ:KHQ ZH RULJLQDOO\ GHFLGHG WR SHQHWUDWH WKH 9LHWQDP PDUNHW WKH LQLWLDO
stages were a nightmare with a turnstile bureaucracy and meant visits to a multitude of offices, 
filling in a library of forms and never really knowing if you were in the right office or not. Now 
WKH QHZ µRQH GRRU¶ SROLF\ LV GHVLJQHG WR UH-organise the bureaucracy of license applications, 
business permissions, etc. Now the different functions are being merged and often the process 
can be completed through one visit to one office and dealing with one more simple process. This 
helps limit costs of investment aQG PD[LPLVH SURILWV¶ ,QWHUYLHZ Andrew Goddard, CEO of 
Red8 Consulting Services, 15 June 2009). 
The development of FDI has seen the government opening up new sectors and encouraged a 
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new focus on investment areas such as on a movement away from, for instance, the over-
concentration on the oil and gas sector and a transfer to the manufacturing sector. The new 
direction of investment has also seen a shift from the emphasis on domestic oriented markets for 
the manufacturing sector to a new focus on export oriented markets. Nevertheless, some 
QHJDWLYHDVSHFWVUHPDLQDV-HQNLQVSQRWHVµWKHLPSDFWRQHPSOR\PHQWKDVQRWEHHQ
very substantial, but the indirect effects have aOVREHHQPLQLPDODQGSRVVLEO\HYHQQHJDWLYH¶ 
Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et.al (2006) is one author who has identified the levels of success in 
spillover from FDI improvement, with an analysis of 66 foreign invested enterprises compared 
to the performance of 33 domestic firms. He found that foreign investment actually provides 
µLQYHVWPHQWIXQGVDQGLQFUHDVHVLQFDSLWDOVWRFNEXWDOVRLPSURYHVWKHLQYHVWPHQWHIILFLHQF\RI
WKH ZKROH HFRQRP\¶  S :LWK WKH IRUHLJQ LQYHVWHG ILUPV SRVVHVVLQJ QXPHURXV
advantages over the domestic firms, there was evidence that a foreign project had on average 
over 18 times larger stock capital and enjoyed far higher levels of use of advanced technology. 
Despite the FDI enterprises being far less labour intensive, the human resources they had were 
more efficient and productive than the labour in domestic companies (Jenkins, 2006, p.52). 
However, the evidence for transfer over of this human resource advantages was very low and it 
appears that very few FDI trained and highly skilled ZRUNHUVµVSLOORYHU¶LQWRGRPHVWLFYHQWXUHV
In fact, the skilled worker are far more likely to move from one FDI project to another and in 
some economic sectors such as in textiles and electronics the spillover to domestic firms from 
FDI ones was found to be virtually zero (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al.,2006, p.53). Domestic 
firms cannot, or they are unwilling, to compete with foreign firms in paying high salaries and 
other benefits or provide meaningful free training. In addition, the foreign firms often have more 
modern machinery, better working conditions and more highly skilled managers. Unless drastic 
action is taken on the part of domestic firms to improve salaries and working conditions against 
the standards being set by foreign investment ventures, the gap between the skills and quality of 
human resources is likely to reach critical levels and provide a significant problem for the future 
of the economy. 
The lack of micro and macro data on FDI means that there is a shortage of studies on the 
economic effects of FDI in Vietnam. The two important studies were undertaken by the General 
Statistics Office (GSO) (Nguyen Thi Phuong Hoa 2003; Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. 2006). The 
studies use the new endogenous growth theory but are methodologically different with Nguyen 
Thi Phuong Hoa using provincial level data for 1995-1999 to analyse the impact of foreign 
investment on GP growth, while Nguyen Thi Tue Anh uses a time series analysis in which the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of quarterly real GDP per capita.  
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Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. (2006) examined the impact of FDI through proxy variables for 
human capital. These were: the proportion of working people who finished primary school, the 
proportion that finished secondary school, and the rate of literacy for the total population. He 
found that in all specifications, FDI is not clearly showing a positive impact on growth despite 
its interaction with human capital where FDI shows a clear sign of providing positive affects 
upon the growth and quality of human capital. FDI was shown to have a complementary effect 
on domestic investment and foreign investment was clearly also more efficiently used than 
domestic investment as the coefficients of FDI is greater than that of gross investment. 
However, Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. (2006) used a growth model and did not sufficiently 
consider the fundamental impact of FDI upon the labour force, the trade policy regime and a 
wider series of investment forms. A growth model used by Nguyen Thi Phuong Hoa (2003) 
overcame some of the difficulties of analysis by including more exogenous variables such as 
public investment, the growth rate of the workforce and population, inflation, education and the 
levels of skilled workers. The outcome was a clearer picture of positive effects on economic 
growth by foreign investment and a more distinct interaction between FDI and the improvement 
of human capital.  
The interaction between foreign investment and trade has been extensively analysed by Nguyen 
Nhu Binh and Haughton (2002), Pham Hoang Mai (2001), Phan Minh Ngoc and Ramstetter 
(2004), and MPI and USAID (2005). The causal link between international trade and FDI has 
been of concern for over a decade, especially in the light of the impact of such agreements as the 
US-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement (BTA) and its affects on FDI, trade performance and 
economic growth. There are a further two studies on the relationship between foreign 
investment and export performance and in the first, by Pham Hoang Mai (2001), MPI data is 
used to identify the determinants of FIE export probability in both the primary and 
manufacturing sectors. Pham Hoang Mai (2001) is limited in her conclusions as not all FIE data 
was available at the time and several variables, such as capital intensity, the size of firms, the 
orientation of export were omitted. The different effects of FDI were considered and based on 
the experience of Vietnam, using a simple linear regression method, but the interpretation of the 
data still leaves many questions unanswered.  
Phan Minh Ngoc and Ramstetter (2004) looked at the development of the relationship between 
export propensity and foreign ownership, carrying out a focused study by the comparison of FIE 
export behaviour divided by groups of two digit Vietnamese Standard of Industrial 
Classification (VSIC) sectors while also conducting a comparison between enterprises chiefly 
owned by foreign investors against those owned on the large part by domestic investors. A Tobit 
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estimate, using data from 2000/1 and 2001/2 years and relying on signs and significance of 
effects on the industrial sector and weighted non-weighted models, showed that export 
propensity was far higher in firms mainly financed through foreign capital compared to 
enterprises that were only partially owned by foreigners. However, a problem was a 
fundamental limitation created by the use of unbalanced data samples for the regression and 
they do not seem to have been controlled or tested for the lack of variables concerned directly 
with FDI determinants, such as the policies on trade and industry. Despite this there are still a 
lack of studies on the market access affects of FDI or on the different behaviour towards 
international trade of FIEs and domestic firms, including on the export performance of domestic 
enterprises.  
Kokko et. al. (2003) studied the FDI determinants rather than focus on the role of foreign 
investment between 1988 and 2000, using the data to demonstrate how many unsuccessful FDI 
projects there were. Kokko et. al. (2003) was interested in investment failure and used a Probit 
model focusing on the probability of failure of an investment brought about by difficulties in 
firm size, the project location, the type of project, the source of investment, local poverty levels 
and the effective rate of protection. Through the transaction cost approach the study showed 
how the characterisitcs of difference ventures impacted upon them and therefore led to project 
failure. However, the study lacks a number of determinants, especially in looking at the host 
country policies towards the investment and the external circumstances, thus making an accurate 
analysis of why projects fail suspect.  
Three studies have examined the indirect effects of FDI and (Le Thanh Thuy 2005; Nguyen Thi 
Tue Anh et. al. 2006; Le Quoc Hoi 2006) scrutinised the productivity spillovers, with a focus on 
labour productivity using the endogenous growth method. Le Thanh Thuy (2005) used a log 
linear labour productivity model and estimated the equation conditioning by three different 
aspects: capital intensity spillovers, spillovers with technology gap and spillovers within the 
domestic private sector. Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. and Le Quoc Hoi take a different approach 
and examined how spillovers can be assessed through diverse approaches which not only 
consider spillover differentiation through the domestic firms capacity for absorptiveness, but 
also consider the impact spillovers have on the particular industries, on the types of ownership 
and the geographical locations. However, there still may remain problems with the definitions 
for technology gaps at the industry level when the impact of foreign sector productivity is 
weighted in a wider industry sector (Le Thanh Thuy, 2005).  
Le Thanh Thuy (2005) investigated the primary and manufacturing sectors in 29 different 
countries and focused on a seven year period from 1995 to 2002. However, she sub-divided the 
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seven year period into two separate periods of 1995 to 1999 and 2000 to 2002, running both 
periods through separate regressions of the data composition, although one might see more 
problems with the use of aggregated data with mis-specification of the model used. What was 
clear was that there were high levels of variation between two VSIC industries, and yet the 
empirical model may also have been faulty due to the poor quality of the data sources utilised. 
Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. (2006) and Le Quoc Hoi (2006) on the other hand relied on the data 
from the GSO and acquired more accurate material for a firm level research made during the 
2000-2004 period. The GSO, itself, carried out many reforms over the last decade and its is 
more probable that the data in Nguyen Thi Tue Anh and Le Quoc Hoi¶V VWXG\ LV IDU PRUH
reliable than that used by Le Thanh Thuy.They were also more specific in the data required, 
using a common theoretical model where the productivity of labour was controlled by more 
relative factors such as the capital intensity, the size of the different firms studied, the economies 
of scale acquired and characterisitics more specific to the industry. Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. 
(2006) and Le Quoc Hoi (2006) also consider the degree to which geographical flows of foreign 
investment affect spillovers in different ways and are also concerned with the variables of labour 
productivity and how foreign investment may affect this as an exogenous variable. Nevertheless, 
both Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. (2006) and Le Quoc Hoi (2006) used simple OLS techniques 
which may have overestimated the results and did not identify any long term variations in FDI 
spillovers.  
Both Le Thanh Thuy (2005) and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et. al. (2006) demonstrated that there 
were a number of positive effects resulting from the inputs of FDI, while Le Quoc Hoi (2006) 
concentrated more on the negative impacts of horizontal spillovers. Le Thanh Thuy (2005) did 
reveal a marked difference in the positive impacts of spillovers in capital intensive industries 
compared to the impacts found in labour intensive industries. Equally concerning was that wide 
technology gaps produced negative impacts upon the success of FDI spillovers, but these were 
found only in the second period of study. Despite this Le Thanh Thuy (2005) discovered that in 
the period following 2000, when more reforms were taking effect and the economy was more 
firmly on the road to liberalisation, the private sector was playing a far more positive roll in 
improving the impacts of FDI spillovers, and that this demonstrated the highly effective 
influence of improvement of the economy that privatisation was playing, re-enforcing the belief 
that movement towards greater openness of the market and promotion of the private sector were 
the right policies for bringer growth to the Vietnam economy. What the studies also showed was 
that despite the continued support of government preferences and subsidies to the remaining 
SOEs, these enterprises were still performing at far lower rates of efficiency and productivity 
than the MNEs, further demonstrating that the old centrally controlled methods were far less 
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effective than industries operating under the pressures of productivity and profit and subject to 
the demands of the markets, rather than the levels of support of the government. All of the 
studies showed that the centrally planned economy was the source of problems in the economy 
and that despite the varied levels of success of foreign invested enterprises, their overall record 
was always more positive and effective, while also promising a better future record, than the 
prospects of the domestic enterprises still operating separate from the competition of the foreign 
invested enterprises and to some extent still be supported by the government. We can safely 
assume that the difficulties many domestic firms suffer are more likely to be a result from the 
still existing levels of government support and that regardless of the difficulties found in foreign 
invested enterprises, the domestic firms performance is likely to only improve adequately when 
they copy the foreign firms and let competitiveness and market oriented influences be the main 
influences on their business decision-making. All studies showed that FDI has impacted upon 
the performance of the Vietnam economy, and those impacts, on the whole have been 
immensely beneficial.  
From the above studies we can show that Le Quoc Hoi (2006) showed a negative effect for 
horizontal spillovers and only small positive impacts from vertical spillovers. This may have 
been due to the focus on only panel data at firm levels, the over use of an OLS method and the 
lack of differences in defining spillover variables. Le Thanh Thuy (2005) used the two-digit data 
method and her spillover variables may not have been totally accurate, while Nguyen Thi Tue 
Anh et. al. (2006) and Le Quoc Hoi (2006) calculated horizontal spillovers at the 4-digit VSIC 
level, but there use of a Vietnam Input-Output table which combines vertical linkages and 
imported goods data could have produced a large number of errors in measurement. However, 
despite the methodological problems in collection of data and in its analysis, the studies, as 
previously said, all show some support for seeing foreign investment as not only beneficial to 
the Vietnam economy, but probably also essential. 
2.9 Conclusion  
The Second Chapter of this thesis has examined the existing literature on foreign investment 
generally and in specifically in Vietnam. Although the general influences on FDI have also been 
examined the chapter also illustrated how this was qualitatively different when looking at an 
economy moving from the centrally planned model to the market oriented model. The 
transitions in the former Soviet bloc countries and in China were helpful in providing historical 
cases to compare Vietnam with, and similar to China, it is worth noting that although the 
economic system is in transition, the movement towards a liberalised political model is not 
evident, and this will obviously have an impact on the future path that FDI takes in Vietnam. 
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The chapter also supported the basic proposition of the thesis, that there exist gaps in the 
literature, with many Vietnam studies for instance relying on unreliable data and producing 
suspect findings. Something this thesis has been able to overcome by accessing more reliable 
sources of data. Numerous determinants were examined and the finidings were that many of the 
analyse are impaired by a lack of attention to certain conditions in the country such as the firms 
capacities and sizes, the low levels of advanced technology, the quality and training of labour 
and the general; economic conditions supporting investment. In the next chapter we examine the 
methodology of the thesis. 
,Q ORRNLQJ DW WKH PHWKRGRORJ\ DSSURDFK RI WKH WKHVLV WKHUH LV D IRFXV RQ 'XQQLQJ¶V HFOHFWLF
theory and the utility of examining location, ownership and internalisation advantages. The 
variables involved allow the determinants of FDI in Vietnam to be examined against a criteria 
that balances risks against returns, and focusing on the generic impact of transaction costs. 
However, the case studies of Honda and ANZ bank also provided the opportunity to assess the 
more qualitiative and subjective influences of developing relational assets that provided 
maximum impact of the investment of the two MNEs. To understand clearer the need for 
synergy between the OLI advantages and the immersion into a Confucian culture that provided 
the dynamism for its development, the next chapter examines how the methodology marries 
these theories into an analytical framework for guaging the levels of reciprocity. Honda and 
ANZ Bank not only assessed the need for complicity with local conditions but also developed 
strategies and systems for optimising their own impact upon the culture and environment. The 
changing of management systems for instance in Honda, developed mutually beneficial modes 
of operation that allowed the parent company to reach financial and growth targets, while also 
learning to change and alter products and services to suit the immediate the customer market.  
Generally the focus on Honda and ANZ concerns itself more with locational advantages and the 
development of these to even reach a point where Honda has not only reached an accomodation 
with the local culture, but has actually become a part of the culture; with its product, motorbikes, 
dramatically changing the culture of Vietnam life and these specific products seen as 
µ9LHWQDPHVH¶ UDWKHU WKDQ ³-DSDQHVH¶ $V RQH LQWHUYLHZHH GHFODUHG µ+RQGD LV 9LHWQDP DQG LWV
SURGXFWVOLNHµWKH:DYH¶DQGWKHµ'UHDP¶DUHVHHQDVVSHFLILFDOO\9LHWQDPHVH¶ 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
The definitions of FDI are varied and this thesis relies on an accumulation of classifications 
accrued from such sources as the IMF, the United Nations, UNCTAD and authors such as Gillis 
et al (1992), Hogendorn (1992), Thirwall (1994) and Myer and Qu (1995). The prominent 
WKHRULHVRQ)',JHQHUDOO\XVHGLQWKHWKHVLVIRFXVRQ9HUQRQ¶V3URGXFW/LIH&\FOH3/&PRGHO
the Market Imperfection Theory (MIT), the Transaction Cost (TC) or internalization approach 
DQG 'XQQLQJ¶V (FOHFWLc Theory. Dunning is the clearest methodology for understanding the 
Vietnamese case, as its method takes into account a countries particular FDI characteristics and 
their impact on economic growth. The addition of an emphasis on the impact of culture upon the 
development of FDI in Vietnam provides this thesis with evidence of its originality and 
legitimacy to the claim of filling a gap in the literature on FDI and developing countries 
(Dunning and Bansal, 1997; Dunning, 1980; 1988; 2000; 2001; Dunning and Wymbs, 2001). 
,Q 9HUQRQ¶V 3URGXFW /LIH &\FOH D WKUHH SKDVH PRGHO H[SODLQV WKH HYROXWLRQ RI D SURGXFW LQ
international trade, including how the export product is produced out of the inward investment. 
In the early or development phase there is little initial demand and concentration is on skilled 
production methods, producing a small output for the host country. In the growth phase, the 
demand for the product in home and international markets is expanded. Production techniques 
become standardised and tend to move towards a large scale production model with long term 
FRPPLWPHQWV WR WKH KRVW HFRQRP\ 2QFH WKH SURFHVV PRYHV WRZDUGV WKH µPDWXUH¶ SKDVH DQG
demand in the innovating market is fully met, then production and technology are further 
standardised and overseas investment is likely to reach its peak (Vernon, 1974). 
In the Market Imperfection Theory (Steven Hymer, 1960), later developed by Charles 
Kindleberger (1969), the analysis of FDI achieves ground-breaking proportions, with a fully 
coherent approach to understanding its impact on an economy. In Hymer (1979), for a firm to 
expand its operations abroad, it is essential that they possess advantages over the local firms. 
7KHVHDGYDQWDJHVFRXOGEHWKHILUPV¶PDUNHWSRVLWLRQSDWHQWVDFFHVVWRH[SHUWPDUNHWVand to 
credit sources and the technological advantages. 
With the Transaction cost theory the explanation of FDI is carried out through the analysis of 
the response to market imperfections. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) minimise their 
transaction costs caused by market imperfections by internalizing their economic activities. 
Through FDI, structural market imperfections such as tariffs or subsidies, import restrictions, 
income taxes, foreign exchange controls and other regulatory restrictions can be internalised by 
the MNC. Market imperfections can impose transaction costs on the transfer of intangible assets, 
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such as technology. To overcome these problems, the MNCs invest in overseas markets instead 
of selling or licensing their technology or patents (Rugman, 1986; Caves, 1982). 
3.1 Methodological Framework 
'XQQLQJ¶V(FOHFWLF7KHRU\(7LVDV\QWKHVLVRI WKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHRQWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI
FDI, and combines many elements of the PLC, MIT and TC models and gives close attention to 
location aspects (Country Specific Advantages - CSA). Vietnam offers political, economic and 
socio-cultural advantages for foreign investors. Vietnam culture has often been used as an 
explanation for the faults and barriers to successful development of FDI in Vietnam, especially 
as an explanation for over bureaucratic administration, problems with labour productivity and 
general work practices. A foreign executive VDLGµZKHQHYHU\RXDUHFULWLFLVLQJWKHZRUNIRUFH
or the official process, the first excuse is almost always ± LWLVWKHFXOWXUH¶ (Interview: Thomas 
Leonard, Managing Director of Red8 Insurance Services, 15 September 2009). Despite this, the 
executives of Honda and ANZ identified the general advantages of employing the Vietnamese 
as a work force that was quick to learn, intelligent and through their cultural tendency towards 
the family, the society, the country rather than towards themselves as individuals (Ministry of 
Industry, 2007). Mr Pham Van Nang, Deputy Director, Automobile Division of Honda Vietnam 
&R/WGQRWHG µZRUNHUV OHDYHZKHQ WKH MRE LVGRQH- rather than when the time clock says the 
VKLIWLVHQGHG¶(Interview: Pham Van Nang, Honda Vietnam Company, 30 January 2009). 
The hypothesis of the eclectic theory is that the firm can take advantage of the OLI factors. OLI 
is the Ownership, Location and International advantages and a country progresses through five 
phases of investment development focused on outcomes concerning the three OLI factors 
(Brouthers, et.al, 1996; Zhao and Decker, 2007; Vernon, 1974). 
Stage 1: The local specific advantages of a country are deemed to be insufficient to attract a 
foreign firm. This excludes the possession of natural resources, but concerns the presence of low 
per capita income, a poor economic environment, often aggravated by poor political policy-
making, an inadequate infrastructure and the lack of a skilled and mobile labour force. It is 
assumed that these conditions will mean that foreign investment will be very low and the 
economy unattractive to future outside investors. (Dunning and Narula, 1996) 
Stage 2: At this stage there is an increase in direct investment, although outward investment 
remains low. The country involved must display some degree of locative advantages, such as a 
good infrastructure and skilled or low cost human resources. A large domestic market is an 
attractive feature and the high population of Vietnam (now over 88 million in 2009) has always 
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been a good incentive for foreign investors. By the end of stage 2 there is evidence of an 
increase in outward investment, but at quite low levels and the country is still dominated by a 
demand for increased inward investment. 
Stage 3: The third stage is one marked by increases in both inward and outward investment and 
the attractiveness of the domestic market is enhanced by the increase in wages and income per 
capita. With improvements in the domestic innovatory capacity the prospect for increasing 
foreign investment is enhanced. Foreign investment is often concentrated on efficiency seeking 
operations. 
Stage 4: Outward direct investment equals or exceeds the inward investment and the growth rate 
of outward flows is still rising faster than that of the inward ones. The domestic firms can 
compete effectively with foreign firms and penetrate foreign markets. 
Stage 5: The net outward investment first falls and then later fluctuates around the zero level. 
Both inward and outward direct investment is likely to increase. This is the position at which 
industrialised countries are believed to operate. There is increased propensity for cross border 
transactions to be conducted within MNCs and as the countries converge in the structure of their 
location-bound assets their international direct investment positions are likely to become evenly 
balanced (Dunning and Narula, 1996).  
With an economy in transition, the study of Vietnam shows that with low labour costs and rich 
natural resources the economy has above average inward investment because of location 
advantages, while industrialised countries have an above average outward direct investment, 
because their factor endowments favour mobile ownership advantages (Dunning, 1981). MNEs 
doing business in Vietnam have their own ownership-specific advantages such as better 
infrastructure and technology, better knowledge and skill levels, better business practices and 
management skills, and so. MNEs invest to take advantage of the opening market, supported by 
low labour costs and rich natural resources (Richard and Yang, 2007). 
,QXVLQJ'XQQLQJ¶VPRGHOWRexamine determinants of foreign direct investment in Vietnam, the 
thesis adopts also an analysis of Confucian dynamism to better understand and expand on 
locational advantages and their impact as a determinant. Hofstede (1980, 2001) examined 
extensively the need for successful economic activity to result from an understanding of the 
contrasting impacts of Confucian dynamism and Western-style individualism. Finding cross 
cultural balance includes mitigating the possiuble differences in needs, values and aspirations. 
$OWKRXJK 'XQQLQJ¶V WKHRU\ LV DQ DSW WRRO IRU DFFHSWLQJ D FXOWXUDO LPSDFW XSRQ 2/, WKH
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application of this in Asian cultures requires a need to first understand Confucian dynamism, 
which is basically the major under-pinning identifier of the cultures and even survived decades 
RI LGHRORJLFDO µUH-WUDLQLQJ¶ EURXJKW LQ WKURXJK RQH-Party rule and communism. As Kejun Xu 
 S VWURQJO\ DUJXHV µD IXOO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI HWKLFDO GLIIHUHQFHV RI PXOWLSOH FXOWXUHV LV
indispensable for enterprises to survivHDQGXOWLPDWHO\WKULYHLQDIRUHLJQPDUNHW¶,QWKLVWKHVLV
it is proposed that Confucian thought and the understanding of its influence upon the 
HQYLURQPHQW LQ9LHWQDPLVFUXFLDO WRVKRZLQJWKURXJK'XQQLQJ¶VDSSURDFK WKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
culture learning aVD)',GHWHUPLQDQW.HMXQ;XFOHDUO\VXSSRUWV WKHLGHDWKDWµDJRRG
understanding of the target market, especially its culture, ethics, and the way people 
FRPPXQLFDWH LVHVVHQWLDO LQDFKLHYLQJEXVLQHVVVXFFHVV¶$JDLQ LW LV.HMXQ;XZKRSRLQWVRXW
WKDW HYHQ &KDLUPDQ 0DR =HGRQJ¶V µ&XOWXUDO 5HYROXWLRQ¶ FRXOG QRW HOLPLQDWH WKH DJH ROG
traditions of Confucianism and in Vietnam, the Communist system and ideology has equally 
IDLOHG WR HUDGLFDWH WKH LQIOXHQFHRI&RQIXFLDQLVPXSRQ LWV RZQ VRFLHW\ DQG LW¶V Whe Confucius 
social and moral values that still remain the cornerstone of the social and business communities 
behaviour. The business effect of Confucian dynamism in Vietnam is that it proviudes the 
framework of values that structure the conduct of economic activity. Essential elements are: 
µUHYHUHQFH¶ DQG LV PRVW HDVLO\ XQGHUVWRRG DV D WRWDO DYHUVLRQ WR FDXVLQJ D SHUVRQ RU HQWLW\ WR
µORVHIDFH¶ µUHODWLRQVKLS¶DVDQHVVHQWLDOPHDQVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQG WKHQHHG WREXLOGFORVH
and developing contacts on the EDVLV RI PXWXDO EHQHILWV UHVSHFW DQG SDWLHQFH µORFDOLVDWLRQ¶
ZKHUH WKH µIRUHLJQHU¶ PDNHV FRQVWDQW HIIRUWV WR PHUJH ZLWK WKH ORFDO
companies/people/organisations; and finally ± provide positive benefits and support for the 
communities the foreign investor locate in (Kejun Xu, 2006). 
7KXV LW DJDLQ GHPRQVWUDWHV WKDW FXOWXUH DQG EXVLQHVV DUH µLQH[WULFDEO\ OLQNHG¶ DQG WKDW
'XQQLQJ¶V PRGHO FDQ GHYHORS D JUHDWHU IRFXV RQ H[DPLQLQJ WKH LQIOXHQFH PRUH FORVHO\ RI
culture on the understanding of ownership, location and internalisation advantages and 
subsequently, better understand the determinants of FDI (Kejun Xu, 2006, p.14) 
7KH OLQNDJHEHWZHHQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH LPSDFWRIFXOWXUHXSRQ)',DQG WKHXVHRI'XQQLQJ¶V
locational theories is concentrated on by Erdener and Shapiro (2005). In a study of Chinese 
Family Enterprises (CFE) the cultural and economic factors are examined through the Dunning 
SDUDGLJP%\DOLJQLQJ'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHWLFSDUDGLJPRIPXOWLQDWLRQDOHQWHUSULVHV01(VZLWKWKH
conceptual dimensions of Chinese family businesses, the analytical framework can focus on the 
influence of Confucian values and morals upon business relationships. The tendency for 
Vietnam businesses to mirror the Chinese family business style in many respects is reflective of 
a common adherence to Confucian thought, especially in the importance given to building 
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mutually beneficial relationships and alliances. 
Erdener and Shapiro (2005) focus on the relational assets and identify these as trust, culture, 
networks, contacts and reciprocity, and examine these through their ethno-cultural origins. Just 
as they promote further research, so does this thesis examine the growth of relational asset 
building of MNEs in Vietnam. The eclectic paradigm does not presently clearly incorporate 
relational (ethno-cultural) aspects essential to achieve a more full analysis of the determinants of 
FDI in Vietnam. The thesis moves on in the later chapters to examine the existing business 
environment in Vietnam whilst also seeing how Honda and ANZ Bank created an ability to 
change that environment to owns own benefit through its core competitive advantages.   
 7KHUHKDYHEHHQDQXPEHURIDWWHPSWVWRDGYDQFH'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFWKHRU\DVZLWK0DUNXVHQV
(1991) Multinational Enterprise Theory, where there is the development of the theory that 
instead of markets being purely served by exports or products and services from local 
companies, the multinational possess knowledge based firm specific (FSAs) assets. These are 
firm based assets such as human capital skills of their employees or brand reputation, and 
EHFDXVH WKHVH DVVHWV DUH HDVLO\ µH[SRUWDEOH¶ ILUPV GHFLGH WR FDUU\ RXW IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQW
strategies. In addition the assets are able to be transferred at lost costs to bases in foreign 
countries and this further encourages them to carry out FDI strategies. In the Multinational 
Enterprise Theory, the companies have three motives for investment: 
1. Market oriented direct investment 
2. Raw material based investment 
3. Cost reducing investment 
Market oriented direct investment is obviously applicable to Vietnam where the market of over 
88 million people, with growing evidence of rising expendable income is a justifiable reason for 
investment, alongside the rapidly growing economy. The raw materials oriented investment is of 
course linked to colonial patterns of exploitation and now is still mire likely to involve the 
extraction of raw materials from former colonized, less developed countries into the developed 
world. However, rather than crude exploitation, the pattern of this form of investment is now 
more likely to involve new institutional arrangements, such as partnerships between developed 
FRXQWU\¶V FRPSDQLHV DQG OHVV GHYHORSHG FRXQWU\¶V GRPHVWLF FRPSDQLHV :LWK FRVW UHGXFLQJ
investment is a popular reason for FDI in Vietnam, where the availability of low labour costs is 
a prime attraction (Markusen, 1991).  
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In looking at the theories that are used to explain why firms involve themselves in FDI we can 
identify the main factors as proportion hypothesis, the technology ladder hypothesis and the FDI 
dynamics or industrial cluster hypothesis (Sosukpaibul, 2007). The factor proportion hypothesis 
concerns itself with capital and labour factors and their relationship to production and trade 
according the Hechsher-Ohlin theory, while the technology ladder hypothesis concerns itself 
with the production pattern and whether a country can acquire the improved necessary skills and 
technology to move towards the production of more complicated goods. The FDI dynamics or 
industrial cluster hypothesis concerns its with the theory that industrialisation stems from 
whether there is an accumulation of a critical mass of FDI. 
While Dunning has provided us with a focused theory to examine foreign direction investment 
WKH PDLQVWUHDP YLHZ DGDSWV WKLV WR IRFXV RQ µFODVVLFDO HFRQRPLF WKHRU\ DQG HPSKDVL]HV WKH
connection between FDI and economic growth, capital accumulation, promoting free-market 
and laissez-faire economics, free trade policies, open markets and individual decision-PDNLQJ¶
(Pham, 2004). The focus is on primary production inputs, and concerns a movement from 
µFRXQWULHVZLWKORZPDUJLQDOSURGXFWLYLW\¶DQGDEXQGDQWFDSLWDOWRµFRXQWULHVZLWKKLJKPDUJLQDO
SURGXFWLYLW\¶EXWDVFDUFLW\RIFDSLWDO3KDPS7). Through FDI the developing country is 
able to overcome the problems of the savings-investment gap, foreign exchange gap, 
technological gap and the fiscal gap. It should be remembered that mainstream theories on FDI 
SURYLGH WKDW µ)', GULYHQ KLJK HFRQRPLc growth, changing economic structures and 
industrialisation also provide backward and forward effects that alleviate poverty and income 
inequality in developing countries (Pham, 2004, p.10).  
However, in returning to Dunning we have an eclectic paradigm that helps explain why two 
MNEs, Honda and ANZ Bank chose not only to carry out FDI ventures, but chose to situate 
these in Vietnam. In updates by Dunning (2000) of his theory there is a concentration on the 
DGYDQWDJHVGHPRQVWUDWLQJWKDWµUHODWLYHWRWKRVHRIRWKHUILUPV¶WKHLQYHVWLQJILUPKDVRZQHUVKLS
advantages which encourages it to carry out FDI ventures. As Dunning notes, the means to 
SHQHWUDWLRQ RI WKH IRUHLJQ PDUNHW WKDW WDNH PDQ\ IRUPV ZLWK µEX\LQJ DQG VHOOLQJ JRRGV DQG
services in the open markets, through a variety of inter-firm non-equity agreements, to the 
LQWHJUDWLRQRILQWHUPHGLDWHSURGXFWPDUNHWVDQGWKHRXWULJKWSXUFKDVHRIDIRUHLJQFRUSRUDWLRQ¶
(Dunning, 2000, p.164). However, even in Dunning updates his focus for locational advantages 
still chiefly focuses on the impact of political and economic factors and remains short on 
attention to the impact of social and cultural factors. Dunning does not under-estimate the 
LPSRUWDQFHRI ORFDWLRQDO IDFWRUV DQGHYHQJRHV DV IDU DV WR FDOO LW WKH µNHy determinant of the 
IRUHLJQ SURGXFWLRQ RI FRPSDQLHV¶ DQG OLQNHG WKLV WR µFRQWH[W-specific theories of the 
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JHRJUDSKLFDO GLVWULEXWLRQ RI )',¶ 'XQQLQJ  S  'XQQLQJ GRHV DVN UHVHDUFKHUV WR
consider the importance of inter-country cultural differences, but the term is generic and little  
research is done on defining and assessing the impact of these cultural differences (Dunning, 
2000, p.176).  
7KXV ZLWK H[DPLQLQJ WKHRULHV RI )', ZH FDQ VHH WKDW 'XQQLQJ¶V (FOHFWLF 3DUDGLJP DQG LWV
focus on ownership, internalisation and location advantages provides a means to analyse the 
determinants of FDI in Vietnam. The present studies of the theories also identify locational 
advantages as a key factor, yet, there remains more work to be done in actually defining the 
cultural and social factors that help structure the success of a foreign venture. This thesis 
attempts to better define the impact of these factors by applying the concepts to the case studies 
of Honda and ANZ Bank in Vietnam, and in the process expanGRQ'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFSDUDGLJP
and its focus on OLI advantages. 
3.2 Research methods 
Western FDI is a topical issue in Vietnam in terms of the impact on theory and practice. 
9LHWQDP¶V )', SROLF\ PDNLQJ DQG LWV FKDQJHV LV LQGLFDWLYH RI ZKDW NLQG RI WKHRU\ WKH 
government is adopting towards foreign investment and its impact on FDI practice. This study 
FRYHUVWKHWKHRUHWLFDODQGSUDFWLFDODQDO\VLVRI9LHWQDP¶V)', The research methods applied to 
this study include a review of published materials, mail survey, face-to-face interviews, and case 
studies of ANZ and Honda. A review of published materials helped build up a general picture of 
the Western FDI theory and practice, including the theoretical explanation and practice, and also 
embracing FDI policies and changes of the Vietnamese government.  
To analyse FDI practice in Vietnam an investigation and field study had to be carried out. The 
result of this research provides researchers and practitioners with first-hand data and evidence.  It 
also enables the author to supplement quantitative analysis and supports answers to the research 
questions raised by the author.  
The research methods selected and applied were: mail survey, face-to-face interviews, and case 
studies.  
x Mail survey is an efficient and economical way to support observations and provides 
good coverage (Emory, 1985); but, unlike interviews, it is difficult to probe for 
additional information or clarification of an answer (Zikmund, 1997). 
x Face-to-face interviews enable the interviewer to obtain valuable first hand data and 
trace the answer to questions (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The disadvantages of the 
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interview are that: (a) It is more expensive than mail surveys (Zikmund, 1997) and (b) 
Face-to-face interviews are more difficult to conduct than mail surveys, as willingness to 
participate in a face-to-face interview is influenced by cultures (Zikmund, 1997). Also, 
the different business and political culture of Vietnam sometimes made interview 
answers a little difficult to understand 
x The case studies selected by the author reflect many of the representative problems 
existing between different companies and different regions. 
5HYLHZLQJSXEOLVKHGPDWHULDOVKHOSHGWKHDXWKRUWRGUDZDQRYHUDOOSLFWXUHRI9LHWQDP¶V)',LQ
terms of its theory and practice, while field work enabled the author to gain updated first-hand 
data and to explore some questions other researchers have yet to consider. This is because 
differences in culture, languages and political beliefs between Western countries and Vietnam 
means that it is difficult for Western researchers to fully understand the impact on business of 
the culture and political system.  
In contrast, because the author is a Vietnamese national, it was easier to gain access and answers 
to interviews in one-party Communist regime and a partly closed society with all traditional 
HOHPHQWV RI WKDW PHDQLQJ µRXWVLGHU¶ µIRUHLJQHU¶ DUH VWLOO WUHDWHG ZLWK VRPH VXVSLFLRXV DQG
µLQIRUPDWLRQ¶LVRIWHQNHSWµVHFUHW¶. 7KLVLVRIWHQIRUQRSDUWLFXODUµSROLWLFDO¶UHDVRQEXWPRUHD
conVHTXHQFHRIDµ6RYLHW¶VW\OHEXUHDXFUDWLFµPLQGVHW¶ 
The specific characteristics of the research methods used in carrying out the research are 
explained below.  
3.2.1 Desk Research 
Published materials included academic articles, research reports, statistical figures, 
documentation materials, company leaflets, newspaper articles, etc. The research included both 
English and Vietnamese language resources. Often, the viewpoints from Vietnamese 
SXEOLFDWLRQVDUHLQOLQHZLWKWKHFRXQWU\¶VVRFLDOLVWSULQFLSOHVDQGWKLV ideological slant can cause 
many issues in FDI to be viewed from a biased perspective. This also led to problems in the 
availability and reliability of the materials sourced as a consequence of various media controls 
and censorship.  
In general publicatioQVLQ9LHWQDPHVHUHVRXUFHVZHUHJHQHUDOO\VXSSRUWLYHRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
position. Articles written by government officials or official researchers tended to focus on 
always giving a positive viewpoint on political and economic issues in Vietnam and constantly 
avoid any constructive criticism, however warranted that criticism is. Thus, authors may feel 
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they are not allowed to go as far as challenging the government position, and primarily support 
the government policy and follow official rationale.  
One couOG DOVR IHDU WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V LGHRORJLFDO DSSURDFK PLJKW OHDG LW WR UHOHDVH IDOVH
data and information in order to protect its image and power. As most figures relating to local 
and national economy were published by government bodies, rather than by independent 
organisations, it is possible that many of them can be called into question. For example, some 
local governments tend to give inflated FDI figures to Hanoi, especially when they had 
difficulty in attracting the planned target number of FDI, thus avoiding censorship or criticism. 
In order to resolve the problems of censorship, availability and reliability of Vietnam published 
materials, the author sought numerous alternatives which included: (1) review of overseas 
related publications; (2) use of WKH DXWKRU¶V FRQWDFWV LQ 9LHWQDP DQG REWDLQLQJ PDQ\
unpublished documents as µinternal¶ references. 
While Vietnamese published materials usually adopted a positive approach towards reporting 
FDI matters in order to protect the government policy and position, overseas publications about 
9LHWQDP¶V)',WHQGHGWRLGHQWLI\DQGDQDO\VHWKHYDULRXVSUREOHPV 
7KHDXWKRUKDVDQXPEHURIXVHIXOFRQWDFWVLQ9LHWQDP¶VORFDODQGFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWERGLHV
research institutions, and foreign investing companies after having worked there for many years. 
This enabled the author to gain valuable publications and resources, while also able to verify or 
question some of the published forms of information and data. These included internal FDI news 
and reports, FDI problems and DQDO\VLVRIWKHPWKHGHEDWHVDERXW9LHWQDP¶VJRYHUQPHQW)',
policy and position, and actual and verifiable FDI figures.  
The availability and reliability of Vietnamese publications has been improving in recent years, 
IROORZLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VRSHQLQJRILWV doors through Doi Moi to the outside world.  
For instance, statistical data published by the State Statistics Office and various Ministries is 
regarded as increasingly trustful and reliable by western researchers and international bodies, 
and widely used by them as sources of information.  
3.2.2 Mail survey  
Research data through questionnaire is primary data, and therefore primary data collection 
methods are required to be employed. In the case of the study (business research), surveying and 
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interviewing are more appropriate and popular methods employed in business research 
(Zikmund, 1997). 
Surveying was carried out by designing a questionnaire and sending it by mail. Research 
questions included were relatively general and basic and were designed to have adequate 
coverage of the topic.  
 Main features  
x Advantages:  As mentioned earlier, surveys are more efficient than observation and 
more economical than interview. The on-going study needs to be completed in a limited 
time. Mail-survey makes information possible to be gathered by a few well-chosen 
questions which would take much more time and effort to gather by observation. In 
addition, using the mail as a medium of communication, it can expand geographic 
coverage at a typically lower cost than interview.  
x Disadvantages: There are two major weaknesses of mail survey. One is the difficulty of 
securing the quality of information; the other is the poor percentage of mail return 
(Emory, 1985). 
 Survey design 
Some measures were taken in order to improve the quality of information and mail-survey 
returns 
The mail questionnaire was designed and revised several times in order to make it as simple, 
clear, and easy to answer as possible, as it is generally believed that respondents are unlikely to 
co-operate with a long and / or complex mail questionnaire. In the questionnaire, the 
respondents needed to tick an appropriate answer(s). If they wished, they had the opportunity to 
add some comments to offer more detailed information. 
Some incentive was provided to the respondents in order to raise the mail return percentage: (1) 
Postage-paid self-addressed envelopes were enclosed with the original questionnaire; (2) A 
special way to send and collect the questionnaire. Because the study was carried out by the 
author based in the UK, while the survey was conducted in Vietnam, it would have been 
extremely expensive sending and returning the questionnaire internationally, as international 
postage is very expensive. Also, it is difficult for people in Vietnam to return post to a Western 
country. Thus, the sending and receiving the questionnaire was done in Vietnam and by doing so 
WKHFRVWRI WKHSRVWDJHZDV ODUJHO\ UHGXFHGDV9LHWQDP¶V ORFDOSRVWDJH LVYHU\FKHDSDQG WKH
author reviewed the results of the questionnaire in Vietnam when visiting. However, there may 
have been some reticence on the part of respondents to truly answer all the questions.  
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Special access to respondents was undertaken since it is extremely important to seek assistance 
and get things done in Vietnam by having special relationships with business people and 
governmental contacts. Therefore, most questionnaires were sent to contacts which the author 
had previous relationships with 
The questionnaires mainly related to the background information about the case studies. 
'LIILFXOW TXHVWLRQV UHODWLQJ WR 9LHWQDP¶V SROLWLFDO SROLF\ LVVXHV ZHUH DYRLGHG VLQFH SROLWLFDO
trouble could have been caused to the respondents if they answered the questions as such. 
Therefore, all the questions were carefully-planned, but relevant to the research questions. 
3.2.3 Interviewing 
Following the questionnaire survey, a face-to-face interview was carried out. The author 
obtained more detailed information from each interviewee. Interviewing was considered as the 
second stage of data collection, following up the results of the mail survey, in order to deepen 
the research. More detailed and specific questions were discussed at interview. However, one 
problem was that many interviewed for the case studies specifically asked to keep their identity 
anonymous. This may reflect the fear found in many former communist and existing communist 
VRFLHWLHVRIµRIILFDOGRP¶DQGWKHWHQGHQF\IRUPDQ\RIWKHSHRSOHWRUHPDLQVLOHQWHYHQZKHQ
subject being studied is quite apolitical. 
Two methods were employed in the interview. One was semi-structured (questions asked 
referred to the essential information about the company), the other was unstructured (open-
ended discussions with the companies interviewed about FDI related policies). In general, each 
interview took an hour. In the first half an hour, for the semi-structured interview, the questions 
asked were based on the questionnaire, in the second half hour, the author tried to let the 
interviewees give information and their own viewpoints and comments on Vietnam FDI and 
WKHLU RZQ FRPSDQ\¶V PDQDJHPHQW RI WKH YHQWXUHV LQ 9LHWQDP 7KH HYLGHQFH DQG H[DPSOHV
given by company managers and directors strongly supported some points the author made in 
the work. 
From the interviews, various printed materials were also provided by the interviewees, including 
DQQXDO UHSRUWV RI +RQGD¶V DQG $1= )', SHUIRUPDQFH JRYHUQPHQW UHSRUWV DQG DUWLFOHV DQG
research papers written by interviewees and Vietnamese business analysts. 
Following in-depth analysis of the surveys, interviews and published resources, it was clear that 
'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFWKHRU\HVSHFLDOO\ZLWKLWVIRFXVRQDGMXVWLQJWKHNQRZOHGJHJDLQHGRQ)',
to assess the cultural impact upon outcomes was the correct theory to use in examining the 
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context within which investment determinants operated. A number of other theoretical 
approaches were also helpful in strengthening the analysis.  
3.2.4 Case Study 
The selection of two case studies in this thesis was based on the need fRU³DIOH[LEOH UHVHDUFK
approach that are suited to a range of different types of research questions (Ghauri, 2004, p,127). 
$V*KDXULUHFRPPHQGV WKHQHHGIRUFDVHVWXGLHVWRXQGHUSLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDµKRZ¶DQG
µZK\¶RIDK\SRWKHVLVZKLOHYDOLGDWLQJWKe basic premise of the theory is essential. In the theiss a 
major premise is that the culture has a significant impact on the optimum success or not of a 
foreign investment. The focus on in-depth interviews allows the researcher to balance the theory 
to be tested against the reality and a multitude of meetings with Vietnamese government 
officials and leading business entrepreneurs, alongside senior and middle management personnel 
of both Honda and ANZ Bank produced results that can be interpreted as primary evidence of 
cultures impact upon foreign investments (Ghauri, 2004, p.111). As Ghauri (2004) notes, case 
studies are a qualitative means to study a research phenomenon that allow us to take a 
longitudinal approach, help formulate the right contextuality, provide depth that not only tests 
theory but is also a theory builder and is holistic in that the research can be approached from a 
number of angles. 
In selecting Honda motorcycle company and ANZ Bank the criteria for justifying their inclusion 
included the liklihood and initial evidence of national culture based upon a Confucian dynamism 
having a significant impact upon the success or failure of a foreign investment in the 
Vietnamese environment. Additional personal advantages were often practical benefits to the 
quality of the research as the ability of the interviewer to speak the same language help facilitate 
the benefits of the interviews, whilst also helping the interviewee to understand the nuances of 
language that are often lost in translation. In addition, the presence of a network of former 
relationships made access to essential decision-makers and relevant government officials easier 
and the understanding of the national culture from the native perspective, borner from birth, 
education and work in the home country prior to the start of the thesis helped this author to 
comprehend better the outcomes of the research. 
As the research progressed, the Honda and ANZ Bank case studies provided the deductive 
means to further deepen the basic hypothesis. However, a constant difficulty was the tendency 
LQ 9LHWQDP RI LQWHUYLHZHHV WR µIHDU¶ RSHQ YRLFLQJ RI RSLQLRQV RU FULWLFLVPV :LWK VRPH
government officials, for example, the main concern was whether comment fell inside or outside 
of the often vague censorship constraints and regulations, and an even greater fear of the 
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possible consequences. This phenomena also extended to interviews with Honda and ANZ 
personnel. Although it can be surmised that these concerns were often more a consequence of 
national culture, than of any internal restrictions on openness to criticism or freedom of speech 
operated by Honda and ANZ management. It is worth remarking at this point that the author of 
this thesis feels the reluctance of interviewees to speak openly and the fear of voicing strong 
criticism are further examples of how culture strongly affects the mode of business a foreign 
company adopts in Vietnam. For example, in Vietnam it is believed to be insulting and 
disrespectful to openly criticise a person and this often translates into a reluctance to offer any 
critical comment in interviews on all levels of work, from the levels of productivity of workers 
to the financial performance of the company. It is worth noting here that the advent and 
embedding into society of the communist ideology has only strengthened this aversion to 
openness. Politically, open criticism is avoided and in communism all aspects of life can 
EHFRPHVHHQDVµSROLWLFDO¶IURPWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHXVHIXOQHVVRUQRWRILWV
regulations or to criticism of the levels of skills of Vietnamese business managers.  All can be 
VHHQDVHLWKHUµQRQ-SDWULRWLF¶RUµGDQJHURXV¶QHJDWLYHFRPPHQWVLQDSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WZKLOHWKH
FRQIXFLDQFXOWXUH WHQGV WRZDUGVVHHLQJVXFKµQHJDWLYH¶FRPPHQWVDVGHVWUXFWLve influences on 
the status quo, rather than as constructive means to overcome difficulties in for instance, 
management systems.  
The solution for this thesis was to guarantee certain interviewees most concerned with 
µUHWULEXWLRQ¶RUµFHQVRUVKLS¶WRWDODQRnymity, while generally allowing all interviewees various 
PHDQV WR µFHQVRU¶ WKHLU RZQ FRPPHQWV EHIRUH LQFOXVLRQ LQWR WKH WKHVLV7KLV QHHG IRU D TXLWH
extensive principal of anonymity in personal interviews opens the research to a degree of 
questioning of its validity, but was necessary in order to guarantee access to some of the most 
important findings of the research. 
The factual data produced from the case studies, through such elements as access to company 
reports, also helped validate national data and statistics claiming significant foreign investment 
and sustaining that investment over long periods. 
Overall, the two case studies demonstrated a common systemic pattern of foreign investors and 
companies finding that practical and conscious efforts to assimilate to the national culture, even 
to a point of altering the products (example is Honda development of versions of the Wave  and 
Dream bikes made suitable for Vietnam) and service (ANZ style of customer/staff interaction). 
$V3DXZHOVDQG0DWWK\VVHQVSGHPRQVWUDWHFDVHVWXGLHVSURYLGHVDµFRQWH[W-bound 
LQWHUVXEMHFWLYHUHDOLW\¶ ,Q WKLV WKHVLV WKHFDVHVWXGLHVVKRZDFRQVFLRXVHIIRUW WRPD[LPLVH WKH
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returns on foreign investment by assimilating the Honda and ANZ Bank products, services and 
management systems to the Vietnam culture. The case studies provided subjective validity to the 
cause/effect relationship that the thesis claims for the linkage between FDI success and cultural 
assimilation. That causality found ZLWK µORFDO HPSKDLV FDXVDO FRPSOH[LW\ WHPSRUDOLW\
UHWURVSHFWLRQ DQG FRQWH[WXDOLVDWLRQ¶ 3DXZHOV DQG 0DWWK\VVHQV  S SURYLGHG FOHDU
evidence of direct links between the business strategies of Honda and ANZ Bank and there 
efforts to re-design their operations according to the local conditions. 
In order to produce effective research from personal interviews in the case studies Pauwels and 
Matthyssens (2004) four reading styles (varidical reading; experiential reading; symptomatic 
reading and consequential reading) were taken into consideration in the construction of the 
questions and in the data, such as company statistics, requested from the interviewees at the 
meetings. Parameters were defined and analytical questions formulated. 
As identified by Napier et.al (2004), the research met specific problems with the location of case 
studies in Vietnam. Research as a specific skill and valued element in justifying or formulating 
an hypothesis is challenged by an over concentration of the Vietnamese on itVµVROXWLRQ-oriented 
EDVLV¶/LWWOH HIIRUW LVJLYHQ LQ9LHWQDP WR µWKHRU\-EXLOGLQJRU LWV WHVWLQJ¶$QH[DPSOHRI WKLV
was evident in the case studies interviews where interviewees were generally concerned about 
tape-recording or taking notes of conversations. Many felt uncomfortable in an interview 
situation, believing that recording of the interview was unnecessary and questions that were 
hypothetical or required analytical reasoning or justification were superfluous, with more than 
one interviewee replyiQJµLWLVEHFDXVHLWLV¶. 
3.3 Conclusion 
7KHPHWKRGRORJ\RI WKLV WKHVLVEHJDQZLWK WKHEDVLFK\SRWKHVLV WKDW DOWKRXJK'XQQLQJ¶V2/,
model provided a framework for analysing the general determinants of FDI in Vietnam and 
validating the claim that foreign investment and impressive economic growth over the last two 
decades were linked and mutually benefical to each other, the full understanding of why 
particular foreign investments were significantly improved by adoption of a management style 
and strategy of cultural assimilation needed more focus in the study on location advantages and 
relational asset development. The study of each example (Honda and ANZ Bank), provided 
qualitative evidence of linkages between a consciously planned strategy for creating images of 
the two companies as having deep respect for the culture and participants in the local 
communities as socially conscious business entities. This development could clearly be seen as 
an awareness of the improtance of confucian dynamism on the social and business environment 
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and an acceptance that the companies opportunities for maximum returns on their investments 
relied more on their acceptance of the cultural restraints, rather than a determination to transfer  
its own cultural beliefs and values to the new environment. 
With both Honda and ANZ, traditional determinants, such as the ability to access cheap 
educated labour and the presence of government initiatives that directly supported foreign 
investment were examined and found to show a high level of advantages for the two companies. 
However, the ability of the companies to maximise the benefits of these determinants required a 
more subjective approach that delved into the way that culturally bound behaviour and systems 
provided either facilitators or constraints to the investors opportunities for success. Ownership 
and internalisation factors assessed, but the location advantages were examined more closely 
and analysed for the degree to which there were reciprocal elements present. For example, 
Honda provided standard company training courses for its employees in order to transfer the 
regular patterns of management Honda (Japan) style, but also understood that regulation of the 
management of employees required a human resource strategy that avoided any open criticism 
of workers performance, as this directly offended the Confucian aversion to criticism that made 
DSHUVRQ µORVH IDFH¶7KH  WKH&RPSDQ\¶VZRUNHUVGLVFLSOLQH V\VWHPVZHUH DGDSWHG WR ILW WKH
local environment and impacted upon workers productivity and efficiency through a culturally 
sensitive method. 
The template for the research was founded first on an examination of the general environment, 
examining first the most significant change in the political and economic structure of Vietnam- 
the movement from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. This dramatic shift in 
JRYHUQPHQWSROLF\ZDVEURXJKWDERXWE\WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµ'RL0RL¶ which was based on the 
renovation and reform of the whole Vietnamese economy. However, the economic 
transformation was not matched by a equally dramatic conversion from the basic political 
ideology of communism. Whilst open markets, the introduction of competition and principles of 
capitalism were introduced, the basic tenets of communist ideology were retained and continued 
to shape how the economic sector operated in an ideology based upon a Marxist confrontation to 
capitalism. There is a identified a need here for future researchers to study this transformation in 
Vietnam politics and ideology and bring greater understanding to the knowledge of how two 
confrontational forces, communist political ideology and liberal free market principles can 
operate in synthesis with each other. The lack of present knowledge in academia on how these 
two forces in Vietnam are either compatible or confrontational was a difficulty in this thesis. For 
example, In the operation of any foreign or domestic firm the tax authorities require taxes, such 
as Foreign Corporate tax, to be paid before even the start of production or even any sign of 
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income. Businesses generally, even if exempt from taxes are required to actually pay the tax 
then claim it back at a future date. It is difficult to discern whether this is a result of a communist 
EDVHGPLVWUXVWRI WKHµEXVLQHVVPDQ¶WKHERXUJHRLVLHDQGPDQLIHVWVDVDSD\ILUVWDQGUetrieve 
ODWHUSROLF\RULVDUHVXOWRIDFRQIXFLDQFXOWXUHRIµULJKWHRXVQHVV¶VRFLDOHWKLFVDQGVHHVLWDVD
SULQFLSOHRIµWUXVW¶DQGLQFRQWUDVWWRµEHQHILW¶SHUVRQDOPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWV=KXDQG<DR 
For over half a century, the Vietnamese system has been shaped and directed through 
communist ideology and Ho Chi Minh social values and morals. However, more than a 1000 
years of Confucianism remains a major influence upon the culture. Now this mix of cultural 
influences are being transformed again by liberalism and an opening up to the global economy 
and Vietnam culture is in a mode of cultural transformation, especially evident in a new young 
ULVLQJHQWUHSUHQHXULDOPLGGOHFODVVPDQ\ZKRDUHDOUHDG\EUHDNLQJIURPµIDPLO\WUDGLWLRQV¶DQG
also largHO\IUHHRIµROG¶FRPPXQLVWEDVHGµUHHGXFDWLRQ¶ 
However, the case studies and research showed that Confucian dynamism remains a major 
influence on the Vietnamese business sectors and that its own particular form in Vietnam culture 
remains a major structuring force on how business is conducted in Vietnam. The methodology 
ZDV VXFFHVVIXO LQ HQDEOLQJ WKH WKHVLV WR IRFXV RQ 'XQQLQJ¶V SDUDGLJP LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH
advantages that a foreign investor utilised for gaining and sustaining successful investment 
opportunities, while the application of an understanding of Confucian dynamics and their 
cultural influence on business practices enabled the thesis to maintain the basic tenets of the 
hypothesis (that an understanding and concern to cultural, relational asset development and 
locational advantages are essential to optimising foreign direct investment returns).  
The thesis now moves into studying the impact of Doi Moi and then into the development of the 
legal framework for foreign direct investment before applying it to the two case studies of 
Honda and ANZ Bank.  
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CHAPTER 4: '2,02,$1'9,(71$0¶6)',32/,&,(6 
4.1 Introduction 
At the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnam had little economic co-operation with 
countries outside the Soviet bloc. In the 1980s, however, the country opened its doors to the 
world and embarked on reforms that would create investment opportunities for potential foreign 
investors. In 1986, Vietnam launched the Doi Moi, or renovation policy, a governmental 
initiative aimed at developing a market-oriented economy (Dang Xuan Ky, 2000; Dang Phong, 
1995). 
In 1986, it was concluded by a group of more radical party leaders (led by the General Secretary 
of the Communist Party Nguyen Van Linh) that reforms which consisted of six major economic 
policy changes (Doi Moi) could help Vietnam grow out of its economic crisis. The Doi Moi 
policy package focused on the decentralisation of state economic management providing 
autonomy to state owned enterprises, the development of the private sector as an engine of 
economic growth, more flexibility in the management of external economic relations, exchange 
rates and interest rates, agricultural policies allowing for long term and use rights, and freer 
national and international trade flows (Murray, 1997; Dang Xuan Ky, 2000). 
Gradually, Vietnam managed to attract significant inflows of FDI. The impact of investment has 
been significant and foreign investors have been a major force in the economic transformation 
during its integration into the world economy. While FDI inflows have been notable so far, 
Vietnam has considerable potential to attract significantly more foreign investment, which could 
further boost the economy and reduce poverty. The Government has pursued a strong agenda of 
reforms in recent years, which made accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
possible, sealing the integration of Vietnam into the world economy.  
Chapter Four sets out the background for Doi Moi policy in Vietnam in the late 1980s when 
market reforms dramatically improved Vietnam's business climate. The chapter discusses the 
developments in FDI government policy and legal systems and the international and national 
contexts to FDI policy in Vietnam, which serve as the background for policy improvements and 
changes, the development of laws on foreign investment in Vietnam, elements of the Enterprise 
Law and other government policy initiatives that facilitate FDI in Vietnam such as land and 
technology (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; Chu Van Lam, 1987). There is an overview 
of FDI implementation in Vietnam, general FDI facts and figures, inflows of FDI into the 
country, the common forms of FDI that foreign investors take, and the FDI structural 
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composition. Finally, WKH LPSDFWV RI )', RQ 9LHWQDP¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK SDUWLFXODUO\ RQ WKH
FRXQWU\¶s export and employment are examined.  
4.2 9LHWQDP¶VDoi Moi Policy  
4.2.1 Background context  
Economic stagnation marked the period after reunification from 1975 to 1985. In 1986, the 
Sixth Party Congress approved a broad economic reform package called µDoi Moi¶ (renovation) 
that introduced market reforms and dramatically improved Vietnam's business climate. Vietnam 
became one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, averaging around 8 per cent annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 1990 to 1997 and 6.5 per cent from 1998-2003. 
From 2004 to 2007, GDP grew over 8 per cent annually. Foreign trade and foreign direct  
investment have improved significantly. Average annual foreign investment commitment has 
risen sharply since foreign investment was authorised in 1988, and in 2007 Vietnam licensed 
USD17.86 billion in foreign direct investment (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; 
Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
The Doi Moi policy package came out of changes LQ WKH ZD\ RI WKLQNLQJ RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V
leadership in the late 1970s and 1980s (Dang Phong, 2008). This incremental process started on 
small scales at municipal levels ± fence-breaking experiments ± and proceeded to national scale 
by the late 1980s with macro policy anti-inflation measures, trade liberalisation and extensive 
international economic integration (Vo Dai Luoc, 2007). 
International and national forces both played important roles in this process. Internationally, the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union and socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
the end of the Cold War placed Vietnam in a totally new situation. In economic terms, aids from 
the former Soviet Union and China declined precipitously, having totaled an estimated USD 1.5 
billion by the end of the 1980s; trade between Vietnam and this block of countries also declined 
extensively (Arkadie, 1993). At the end of the Cold War Vietnam did not have either the 
economic assistance or the political support it needed for its economic development.  
Because of the US Trade embargo Vietnam could not access to production resources from 
America, US allies in the West, or international financial institutions. Economic and political 
reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, along with initial renovation and achievements 
of China made an impact on Vietnamese policy makers, leading to strong pressures for 
developing a new way for the economy (Fforde, 1996). 
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Vietnam was confronted with high inflation and wide-spread poverty. In 1986 the failure of the 
price-wage-money reform package caused the retail price index to be nearly six hundred times 
of that of 1985 (Dang Phong, 2008). Production in all sectors stagnated. Generally, the centrally 
planned, heavily subsidised and demand economy resulted in a poorly developed infrastructure, 
and stagnation of the economy. International trade partners were limited to the former Soviet 
bloc and Central and Eastern Europe. Domestic trade was ineffectively prohibited. 
The weak legal system was another issue for Vietnam before the Doi Moi policy package. No 
fundamental laws governing trade and investment were enacted in Vietnam before 1990. One of 
the greatest hindrances that law makers faced in the process of promulgation of legislation was 
the failure to develop laws in line with international standards and best practices (Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2000; 2002; 2003; 2006).  
The importance of legal reform is highlighted by Greic and Babic (2003, p.1) as one of 
'XQQLQJ¶VFRQFHUQVLQSURPRWLQJWKHULJKWHQYLURQPHQWIRU2/,DGYDQWDJHVWR WDNHHIIHFWDQd 
YLWDO IRU SURPRWLQJ WKH µDWWUDFWLYHQHVV RI LQGLYLGXDO WUDQVLWLRQDO FRXQWULHV IRU SRWHQWLDO
LQYHVWPHQW¶$V*UHLFDQG%DELFSQRWHWKHWZRLQGLFDWRUVIRUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH
FRUUHFWOHJDOHQYLURQPHQWIRU)',DUHµOHJDOH[WHQVLYHQHVV¶DQGµOHJDOHIIHFWLYHQHVV¶. 
4.2.2 Doi Moi policy process since 1986 
The renovation policy started with the 6th Congress of the Communist Party (Chu Van Lam, 
1987; Communist Party of Vietnam, 1987). Its fundamental viewpoints were: developing a 
multi-sectoral economy, shifting the economy from the bureaucratic planned centralised and 
State-subsidised mechanism to the socialist-oriented market economy under State management; 
opening the diversified and multilateral economy as well as enhancing foreign economic 
efficiency on the basis of expanding economic co-operation to the countries in the region and all 
over the world; democratising all fields of the socio-economic life, implementing administration 
reforms and building a state governed by law (Fforde, 1997; Ha Thiet Tung, 1989). 
The main driving force behind the first five-year plan (1986-1990) was to renovate the 
administration mechanism. Many resolutions and decisions were issued by the government and 
ruling party in an attempt to improve economic management, monetary and agricultural policies 
(Hoang Ngoc Nguyen, 1991). During these early years of this five- year plan, however, the fact 
that the old mechanism did not yet disappear and the new one did not prominently emerge made 
reform ineffective. GDP increased by 3.9 per cent on average in five years only (General 
Statistics Office, 2000). 
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In 1988, Vietnam put forward the µKhoan¶ regulation fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household, assigning land to farmers and considering each household as one economic unit. As 
a result, instead of having to import 450,000 tons of food as it did in 1988, Vietnam became one 
of the main rice exporting countries (nearly one million tons) in 1989 and third biggest exporter 
of rice in 1990 with 1.5 million tons. Other key industries such as electricity, laminated steel, 
cement and crude oil attained fairly good growth. An average import- export value increased by 
28 per cent, which gradually reducing trade deficit (Do Phu Tran Tinh, 2006; Danh Son, 1993; 
Le Dang Doanh, 2002; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009). The ratio of export to import in 1986-1990 period 
was 1 to 1.8 in comparison with 1 to 4 in 1976-1980 periods. Another great success was that 
inflation had been controlled and driven back from 774.7 per cent in 1986 to 223.1 per cent in 
1987, 34.7 per cent in 1989 and 67.4 per cent in 1990 (Tran Vo Hung Son and Chau Van Thanh, 
1998). 
The successes of renovation in the 1986-1990 periods were production recovery, a growing 
economy and a rolling back of inflation. The more important aspect was the fundamental shift to 
a new management mechanism. These successes make more sense as the reform process had 
been implemented before East- European countries and the former Soviet Union got into total 
recession. However, it took Vietnam five more 5 years in order to eliminate the social-economic 
crisis (Dang Duc Dam, 1997; Chu Van Lam, 1987; Nguyen Ngoc Tuan, 1995; Le Dang Doanh, 
2002). 
In June, 1991 the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam initiated the µStabilizing 
and developing the socio-economic situation to the year 2000¶ strategy, putting forth the 
orientation and tasks for the 1991-1995 five-year plan (Dang Quoc Tien, 1996). The major 
obstacle then was the long-lasting economic embargo together with economic blockade imposed 
by the United States. 7KHJURZLQJFULVLVLQWKH6RYLHW8QLRQPHDQWWUDGHWXUQRYHULQWKHµUoXEOH¶
areas sharply decreased in 1991 accounting for only 15.1 per cent of that in 1990 (Fforde, 1997; 
Dang Phong, 2008).  
There were several outstanding achievements during the 1991-1995 periods: 
There were fundamental changes in the economic management mechanism. There were 
dramatic changes in many sectors, namely: state-run, state capital, private capital, co-operative, 
individual. The non state-run sector accounted for 60 per cent GDP. The state run sector, 
however, was still given special attention to help it play the decisive role in the economy. 
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World leading economic growth rate attained. In 1991-1995 period, GDP on average increased 
by 8.2 per cent, reaching 9.5 per cent in 1996. The agricultural field, especially food production 
firmly developed, adding to the yield, one million tons every year. Industrial production, 
adapted step by step to the new mechanism, increased on average 13.5 per cent per year (the 
highest level ever expected before). Domestic production began accumulating, ensuring more 
than 90 per cent of annual accumulation and consumption funds. 
Economic branches structure moved round to raising the proportions of service and industry 
areas, steadily reducing that of fishing, forestry, and agriculture. Economic areas structures  also 
began to shift towards establishing essential areas, central industrial zones, and export 
processing zones as well as areas specialising in growing industrial plants and producing food.  
Due to production development, convenient commodities circulation and anti-inflation 
experiences from several years before, prices were gradually stabili sed. Prices for goods and 
services increased by 67.5 per cent in 1991, by 5.2 per cent in 1993, and only by 4.5 per cent in 
1996 (Danh Son, 1993; Dang Xuan Ky, 2000; Nguyen Cuc, 2000).  
By the end of 1996, Vietnam had official economic-commercial relations with more than 120 
countries, foreign trade turnover rapidly increased by more than 20 per cent a year. Vietnam was 
granted non-refund aids and loans for social-economic development investment by many 
countries and international organisations. The total ODA loans received by Vietnam from 1994 
to 1997 were USD8.53 billion. There were 1,868 licensed investment projects with total capital 
of USD 26,976 million from 1988 to 1996 (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, et. al. 2006; Dollar and 
Litvack, 1998).  
Since 2001, GDP growth recovered on a year-on-year basis, reaching 6.9 per cent, 7 per cent, 
7.3 per cent and 7.7 per cent for 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively. The figure for 2007 
was 8.4 per cent. Vietnam has now succeeded in gradually replacing the centrally-planned 
economy, bureaucracy and a subsidy mechanism by a socialist-oriented market economy with 
growing dynamism. The GDP growth rate of 7 to 8 per cent has been sustained, along with 
stronger industrialisation and expanded integration with the world and regional economy. 
Vietnam has enjoyed a sharp rise in trade volume, especially exports, and an increase of foreign 
investment and income. The proportion of trade volumes in the industry and construction sectors 
rose from 38.13 per cent in 2001 to 41.03 per cent in 2005; the service from 36.63 per cent up to 
38.08 per cent; and the agriculture, forestry and fishery from 23.24 per cent (Bui Hai Thiem, 
2009).  
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The economy is on the road to a multi-sector model operating according to a market mechanism 
and state regulations. In the 2000-2004 periods, 73,000 private enterprises were registered, up 
by 3.75 times against the period 1991-1999. By 2004, the total number of private enterprises 
operating under the Enterprise Law amounted to 150,000 with the total capital of VND 182 
ELOOLRQ)URPWRWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU¶VVKDUHLQ*'3ZDVXSIURPSHUFHQWWR
per cent; other non-state sectors increased from 4.4 per cent to 4.5 per cent; and foreign-invested 
sector from 6.4 per cent to 14 per cent; and the household sector were down from 35.9 per cent 
to 31.2 per cent. By 2008 there were 1,171 FDI projects with a registered capital of over USD 
64,000 million (General Statistics Office, 2008).  
Table 4.1: FDI projects licensed in period between 1988 and 2010 
 Number of 
Project 
Total Registered Capital     
(USD Million) 
Implementation Capital   
(USD Million) 
Total 13,812 214,315.6 77,945.5 
1988 37 341.7 n/a 
1989 67 525.5 n/a 
1990 107 735.0 n/a 
1991 152 1,291.5 328.8 
1992 196 2,208.5 574.9 
1993 274 3,037.4 1,017.5 
1994 372 4,188.4 2,040.6 
1995 415 6,937.2 2,556.0 
1996 372 10,164.1 2,714.0 
1997 349 5,590.7 3,115.0 
1998 285 5,099.9 2,367.4 
1999 327 2,565.4 2,334.9 
2000 391 2,838.9 2,413.5 
2001 555 3,142.8 2,450.5 
2002 808 2,998.8 2,591.0 
2003 791 3,191.2 2,650.0 
2004 811 4,547.6 2,852.5 
2005 970 6,839.8 3,308.8 
2006 987 12,004.0 4,100.1 
2007 1,544 21,347.8 8,030.0 
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2008 1,557 71,726.0 11,500.0 
2009 1,208 23,107.3 10,000.0 
2010 1,237 19,886.1 11,000.0 
Source: General Statistics Office, 2010. 
With a view to raising the productivity of the state-owned sector, policies were formulated with 
concrete measures to adjust and reorganise SOEs. The proportion of SOEs in GDP decreased 
from 40.1 per cent in 1991 to 38.3 per cent in 2003. In 2002 and 2003, 1,655 SOEs were listed 
for re-organisation and reform. The figure for 2004 and 2005 were 882 and 413 respectively 
(General Statistics Office, 2008).  
Economic prosperity is spreading throughout the economy. The Human Development Index of 
Vietnam increased from 0.583 in 1994 with a rank of 120/174 to 0.725 in 2009 with a rank of 
116/182. The average life expectancy was raised from around 50 in the 1960s to 73 in 2009 
(Klugman, 2009). The poor household ratio dropped from 70 per cent in 1980 to below 7 per 
cent in 2005 (Bui Hai Thiem, 2009). By 2008 GDP purchasing power parity stood at USD242.3 
billion with GDP growth a 6.2 per cent (General Statistics Office, 2008) 
4.2.3 Doi Moi SROLF\DQG9LHWQDP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQWHJUDWLRQ 
In the early 1980s, Vietnam began the first steps in the international economic integration. With 
policies aiming at multinational diplomatic and economic relation diversification and finding a 
way to overcome the problems of the US blockade and embargo, Vietnam gradually established 
diplomatic and economic relations with many bilateral and multinational partners (Phan Minh 
Ngoc and Ramstetter, 2004; Irvin, 1995).  
Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995. In addition to the founding members of 1967 (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), ASEAN includes Brunei Darussalam 
(1984), VietnDP  WKH /DR3HRSOH¶V'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLF  0\DQPDU  DQG
Cambodia (1999). The overarching purposes of ASEAN are to accelerate economic growth, 
social progress and cultural development, and to promote regional peace and stability (Nguyen 
Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002). 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is only one component of a wider project of 
establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community, which aims to create a single market and 
production base with free flow of goods, services and investment. Although it seeks the 
complete elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers among member countries, that goal has not 
90 
 
been achieved yet. The five founding members and Brunei Darussalam have reduced their intra-
ASEAN tariffs on goods on the Inclusion List to less than 5 per cent, with more than 60 per cent 
of these goods subject to zero tariffs (Tran Quang Lam and Nguyen Khac Than, 1999; Sandhu 
et.al 2003).  
The other members were given more time to reduce tariffs on goods on the Inclusion List to a 0±
5 per cent range. Viet Nam was given until 2006 to do so. The elimination and reduction of 
intra-ASEAN tariffs are also constrained by the Highly Sensitive List and General Exception 
List, to which commitments to liberalisation do not apply (Sandhu, et.al 2003). 
APEC started in 1989 and its objective was µfree and open trade and investment in the Asia±
Pacific by 2010 for developed economies and 2020 for developing economies¶, set out in the 
APEC OHDGHUV¶ GHFODUDWLRQ RI %RJRU (1994). APEC operates as a cooperative multilateral 
economic and trade forum, and it seeks to advance its objectives of free trade and investment 
without requiring its members to agree to legally binding obligations. The policy agenda is 
DGYDQFHGWKURXJKDQQXDOOHDGHUV¶PHHWLQJVLQDGGLWLRQWRPLQLVWHULDOPHHWLQJVDQGWKHZRUNRI
VSHFLDO FRPPLWWHHV DQG ZRUNLQJ JURXSV 7KH WK OHDGHUV¶ PHHWLQJ ZDV KHOG LQ +DQRL LQ
November 2006 (Nguyen Hoang, 2007). 
Vietnam became a member of the WTO in January 2007. It is a signatory to the General 
$JUHHPHQW RQ 7UDGH DQG 6HUYLFHV *$76 :72¶V 7UDGH-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreements. 
VietnDPGLGQRWVLJQXSWR:72¶V optional Agreement on Government Procurement. 
In bilateral relations, Vietnam has set up cooperative relation for trade and investment with such 
major partners as the USA, Japan, China, etc (Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008, p.1-20). One major 
achievement in Vietnam¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQWHJUDWLRQ LV WKH %LODWHUDO 7UDGH $JUHHPHQW %7$
between Vietnam and the US. The BTA to which the United States is a party differs slightly 
from those of other countries in that they seek not only to create protection for enterprises, bu t 
also seek to create free access for investments in the economy of the other contracting party. By 
entering into a BTA with Vietnam, the United States hoped to promote far-reaching changes in 
the Vietnamese economy. Specifically, as a result of this BTA, the Vietnamese government has 
agreed to protect intellectual property rights, to positively accept foreign investment, and, as far 
as is possible for a communist dictatorship, to introduce new economic and commercial 
transparency (Bui Hai Thiem, 2009).  
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The central purpose of the BTA between Vietnam and the United States is to increase trade 
between the two countries through the attraction of access to their markets. The BTA intends 
lowering both tariff and non-tariff barriers in the Vietnamese economy. Tariffs on exports are 
reduced from 40 per cent to 3 per cent and the target is reducing all barriers to the market for US 
investment. Some analysts hypothesise that this reduction could double the already USD600 
million of exports to the United States (Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Bui Hai Thiem, 
2009; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008). The result of this BTA should yield an influx of investment 
into the Vietnamese economy and cause a spill-over effect through the accompanying increase 
in employment, housing purchases, and the purchasing of other durable and non-durable goods. 
With little doubt, this BTA is a key element in creating a more secure and attractive market for 
FDI (Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; UNCTAD, 2008). 
4.3 FDI mainstream policy  
The adoption of market-oriented institutions and open door policy has opened Vietnam to the 
world economy which has brought in a lot of structural transformations. Together with exports, 
FDI has been considered as a substantial factor contributing to the recent speediness of 
9LHWQDPHVHHFRQRP\¶VGHYHORSPHQWThe Law on Foreign Investment (1987) institutionalised 
the policies to attract FDI. The Law on Foreign Investment has been amended numerous times 
with the aim of creating an economy conducive to attracting more FDI to Vietnam. Vietnam is 
increasing the rights of foreign investors and narrowing the policy gap between foreign and 
domestic investor (Le The Gioi, 2004). 
This section of the chapter discusses the international and national contexts to FDI policy in 
Vietnam which serve as the background for policy improvements and changes. It then focuses 
on the development of laws on foreign investment in Vietnam. It proceeds to discussing 
elements of the Enterprise Law. It then goes on to introduce other government policy initiatives 
that facilitate FDI in Vietnam such as land and technology. 
4.3.1 International and national contexts to FDI policy 
Internationally, the internationalisation of the world economy helps attract FDI to Vietnam. The 
process lessens the investment barriers among countries and helps develop a swift and 
convenient investment framework. Internationalisation forces countries to modify the policies to 
be more open and liberal, which improves the operation of the FDI trade. 9LHWQDP¶VHQWU\LQWR
APEC, AFTA, WTO and numerous bilateral commercial agreements indicates the JRYHUQPHQW¶V
commitment to development of investment policies (Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Dapice, 2003). 
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By 2005, Vietnam had signed bilateral trade agreements with over 160 countries and territories. 
Notable international agreements and forums include: i) Framework Agreement on the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA); ii) Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) with the action 
plan to liberalise investment in the region; iii) Asia ± European Summit, which includes the 
implementation of Investment Promotion Action Plan IPAP (William, 2005). In 2008, the 
official entry of Vietnam into the WTO marked an international acceptance of the success of the 
country in merging with the global economy and becoming a free market economy in line with 
universal standards of economics. Vietnam has become an official member of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) since November, 7th, 2007 and this marked a milestone in the development 
process of Vietnam (Iswaran, 2007).  
Vietnam is gradually recognised as one of the most attractive locations for FDI (Athukorala and 
Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008; 
Do Phu Tran Tinh, 2006).  
Table 4.2: Large investors in Vietnam by 2008 
 Number of projects Registered capital (Mill. USD)  
Total 10,981 163,607.2 
India 31 190.5 
Austria 13 25.4 
Belize 6 44.1 
Belgium 34 85.0 
Bulgaria 5 17.2 
Canada 100 4,892.4 
F.R Germany 132 746.3 
China, PR 711 2,188.3 
Czech Rep.of 18 61.9 
Hong Kong SAR (China) 671 7,416.7 
Taiwan 2,135 20,951.9 
Denmark 69 280.6 
Netherlands 115 3,018.8 
Korea Rep. of 2,153 16,666.3 
United States 493 5,029.0 
Indonesia 28 307.0 
Italy 43 176.7 
Israel 8 11.6 
Fed. Russian 105 1,935.4 
Malaysia 340 18,005.6 
Mauritius 31 224.4 
Japan 1,102 17,362.2 
New Zealand 26 93.3 
Australia 236 1,811.2 
France 296 3,216.2 
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The Philippines 50 395.6 
Cayman Islands 33 4,352.2 
British Virgin Islands 438 13,824.1 
Thailand 256 6,121.6 
Turkey 7 41.4 
Sweden 22 415.6 
Switzerland 71 1,693.1 
United Kingdom 134 2,711.1 
Samoa 62 1,549.1 
Singapore 733 17,071.0 
Source: General Statistics Office, 2008.  
7KHGHJUHHRI DFFHSWDQFHRI 9LHWQDP DV D µJRRG¶GHVWLQDWLRQ IRU )', LV FOHDUO\ VHHQDV µROG¶
enemies like France, Japan, China and the USA show increasing levels of interest in Vietnam. 
The policy of Vietnam has been under-pinned by a quest to become µthe friend of everyone and 
the enemy of no one¶ (Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008; Le Dang Doanh, 2002). 
Thus, when the diplomatic relationship between Japan and China became strained in the late 
1990s and 2000s, Japanese investors switched Sino- investment into ASEAN countries which 
included Vietnam (Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Lee, 2004; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008, Onho, 2003). 
The stability of countries after the Asian financial fostered the implementation of FDI projects 
in Vietnam. Vietnam was stable politically and economically and this was seen as a positive 
sign of its attractiveness as an investment destination (Doan Phuong Lan, 2001). 
Nationally, the attempt of Vietnam Government and Party to create a fair and comfortable 
environment for FDI attraction underpins government policy initiatives in FDI policy 
framework. The Resolution adopted by the Ninth Party Congress has confirmed the attempt to 
continue renovating, improve industrialisation, modernisation and positive investment policies 
in a developing economy. 
Vietnam has maintained a stable political economy, which is a very important condition for 
attracting FDI, and makes investors feel safe for long term investment, and this is supported by 
the present Vietnamese legal system (Pham Duy Nghia, 2003; 2004; 2006; Tran Quang Tien, 
2009).  
Vietnam continues to develop their foreign relations with a focus on attracting investors (Bui 
Hai Thiem, 2009; Tran Quang Tien, 2009). New policies for encouraging investment are 
actually working and attracting foreign interest into the economy. The US and Vietnam bilateral 
agreement made a significant impact with FDI enterprises in Vietnam able to expand production 
in order to export into the US market (Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
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Regulatory barriers to FDI attraction still remain and although there have been numerous 
legislative reforms; foreign investors still find restrictions in some industries. For example, the 
domestic division import services sector still requires the approval of the Prime Minister for any 
acceptance of foreign investment, while in some sensitive industries such as communications or 
advertising, investors can choose only BCC (Business Co-operation Contracts), not wholly 
foreign-owned capital enterprises (Seow and Ching, 2008; Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
Infrastructural problems in commerce still remain, such as the government administration and 
licensing systems, and thus, still make it difficult to implement FDI projects and bureaucratic 
costs are still high (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). Mr Chiu, a representative of Hong Kong 
Enterprises Association, announced that the main concern when investing in Vietnam was the 
high operating costs. Operating costs here includes land rent, personal income tax, production 
cost and other activities such as electricity, telecommunication and airline (Tran Quang Tien, 
2009). 
4.3.2 Laws on foreign investment 
During the period before Doi Moi 1986 the State of Vietnam published some several legal 
regulations on FDI (for example-Decree 115-CP on April, 18th, 1977 consisting of 27 articles). 
However, the regulations were unpopular with investors (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; 2003; Tran 
Quang Tien, 2009; Do Phu Tran Tinh, 2006). In 1984, the Politburo issued Resolution 19 based 
on the economic relationship between Vietnam and other countries and declared that to 
encourage corporation with the non-communist countries the regulations on investment needed 
to be drastically reformed. 6LQFHWKHQ9LHWQDP¶V)',OHJislation has been issued and revised a 
number of times (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; 2004; 2006; Le Dang Doanh, 
2002; Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002). From the first Law on FDI in 1987, amendments 
to FDI legislation has been seeking to minimise much of the red tape that burdens enterprises, 
such as governmental restrictions and procedures that are more burdensome in Vietnam than in 
other foreign investment areas (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
4.3.3 Law on FDI 1987  
The Law on FDI 1987 had 42 DUWLFOHVFKDSWHUVZKLFKFRQWULEXWHGWR9LHWQDP¶VUHJLRQDODQG
global integration in the legal sector on FDI (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
A legal framework on Foreign Investment in Vietnam was established and protected the position 
of Vietnam enterprises in business. According to the Law, foreign investors were obliged to 
µHQVXUH UHVSHFW IRU 9LHWQDP¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG ULJKWV WKH XQLW\ DQG WKH ZKROH WHUULWRU\ RI
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Vietnam, and WKHKRVW¶VODZV¶. The Law on FDI 1987 restricted foreign investors to cooperation 
only with SOEs. The Law was amended and supplemented in 1990 and 1992 (Pham Duy Nghia, 
2003; 2004; 2006). The amended Law on FDI in 1990 now permitted private enterprises to 
partner with foreign investors. The amendment in 1992, opened investment up to all economic 
sectors and allowed co-operation with foreign enterprises. The Law on FDI still retained some 
limits on contents and legislation skills¶, so on November, 12th, 1996; the National Assembly 
passed a µ1HZ Law on FDI¶ in Vietnam (Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Tran Quang Tien, 2009; 
Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007). 
4.3.4 Law on FDI in Vietnam in 1996 
The amended Law on FDI in Vietnam concentrated on simplifying administrative procedures. 
The new Law provided supplementary modes of entry: the BTO, BT and legislated investing 
mode in Industrial Zones. The focus of the law was on FDI control, financial activities, license 
granting and complaints (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; 
Nguyen Thu Thuy, 1999). 
About FDI control: 
The Law on FDI 1996 centralised state management of foreign investment in Vietnam and sited 
license regulation in the Ministry of Planning and Investing (MPI); with some degree of 
decentralisation of the process to provinces and cities under the central government. MPI was 
made the lead Ministry in charge of foreign investment. 
Financial activities and investment licensing 
The licensing procedure was made quicker and more convenient (maximum time for assessing 
licensing is 60 days upon receipt of documents). Ministries, and equivalent agencies, offices 
XQGHUWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWORFDOSHRSOH¶VFRPPLWWHHwere made responsible for undertaking 
procedures for implementing investing projects within 30 days upon the receipt of legal 
documents (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Nguyen Nhu Phat, 1997). 
Complaints:  
The rights to complain, sue for difficulties and obstruction from staff of government agency 
involved in investment were increased. Foreign invested enterprises could also appeal to either 
the central or local government offices (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002).  
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The Law on FDI 1996 aimed at calling for more FDI and established higher quality systems that 
improved processes and helped transform the economic-structure of investment which was seen 
as improving export and technology and enhancing productivity (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
4.3.5 Law on FDI in Vietnam in 2000 (revised) 
During 1997-2000, Asia experienced a financial crisis, which decreased FDI in Vietnam. With 
FDI rates recovering in June 2000, the Law on FDI was once again revised with higher 
attractiveness and correspondence to the circumstances (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; 2004). The 
new Law supplemented 2 provisions and revised 20 provisions of the old Law (1996), which 
consisted of 3 groups: 
x Group 1: regulations reduce the difficulties and risk in foreign invested businesses 
including opening foreign bank accounts, the rights to land use and compensation and 
clearance of the ground. 
x Group 2: Regulations on extending self-control in business administration in foreign 
invested enterprises. Eradicate the unnecessary interference of the Government in the 
operations of domestic and foreign enterprises. 
x Group 3: Regulations on correcting the import tax exemption, tax on profit transfer 
abroad and loss transfer (Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
4.3.6 Law on investment (2005) 
The Law on Investment 2005 comprised 10 chapters and 89 articles, stipulating investing mode 
and open investment related to trade (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; 
Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009). The law gave parity between domestic and foreign 
investors and ensured that foreign entities could operate with the same advantages and 
disadvantages as domestic enterprises (Tran Quang Tien, 2009, p.70). Table 4.3 shows FDI 
policies in each revised Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of changes in FDI legislations 
Policy areas Revised Law in 1992 Revised Law in 1996 Revised Law in 200 
Registration 
procedures 
+ FDI license shall be granted within 45 days 
+ After being licensed, FDI enterprises still 
have to register their business 
+ FDI enterprises are allowed to choose 
forms of investment, rate of capital 
contribution, investment location and 
Vietnamese partner 
+ Enterprises with export proportion of more 
than 80 per cent are given priority in granting 
license 
+ Publishing the list of FDI 
enterprises which are permitted 
to make business registration, 
without FDI license. 
+Removing registration related 
fees  
Decentralising 
registration/licensing 
process Areas 
+ Encouraging joint venture with domestic 
enterprises; restriction of enterprises with 100 
per cent foreign-owned capital  
 
+ Encouraging FDI enterprise with export-
oriented and hi-tech industries 
 
+ Publishing the list of projects 
calling for foreign investment in 
the period 2001-2005+ 
Expanding areas for foreign 
investment, allow FDI in 
housing construction;  
+ Diversifying the investment 
form;  
+Allowing foreigner to buy 
stock of domestic enterprises 
Land + Vietnam is responsible for compensation, /RFDO3HRSOH¶V&RPPLWWHHVKDOOKHOS + May use the construction 
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site clearance for foreign-invested projects 
+ FDI projects may rent land for operation, 
but are not permitted to re-renting land  
foreign enterprise to clear the site when the 
project is approved; The enterprises shall 
make payment for site clearance to the 
3HRSOH¶V&RPPLWWHH 
+ The FDI enterprises may rent out the land 
in industrial zones, export processing zones 
to other firms 
attached to land and value of 
land use right as collateral for 
borrowing loan 
 
Capital requirement + Legal capital must not be smaller than 30 
per cent of total investment capital 
  
Policies on Exchange 
rate, foreign currency 
+ the Government shall guarantee foreign 
currency balance to FDI projects in 
infrastructure facilities and import 
substitution  
+ FDI enterprises in other areas shall have to 
arrange foreign exchange balance 
themselves; the State shall not be responsible 
for foreign exchange balance in such 
projects. 
 
+ Self guarantee of foreign currency balance 
+ Apply the restriction of international 
remittance (80 per cent) due to regional 
crisis, and then gradually release this rate. 
+ The enterprises may purchase foreign 
currency from commercial banks with the 
permission from the State Bank 
+ May purchase foreign currency 
from commercial banks to meet 
transaction demand, in 
accordance with the law; 
+ Not requiring approval on 
capital transfer; Reducing the fee 
on profit remittance abroad. 
+ Reducing the rate of 
international remittance from 80 
per cent to 50 per cent, 30 per 
cent and 0 per cent 
Policies on import, 
export 
+ Foreign firms must ensure export 
proportion as declared in investment license; 
+ Entirely removing the regulation that the 
export plan of enterprise must approved by 
+ Reducing number of areas with 
require for export proportion of 
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+ The products of FDI enterprises must not 
be sold in Vietnam via dealers 
+ FDI enterprises must not act as dealers for 
imports ± exports 
authorities; 
+ Improving import-export procedures with 
regard to certification of origins 
80 per cent; 
+ FDI enterprises may act as 
dealers for imports ± export 
services 
Tax policies + Preferential tax for FDI in areas with given 
priority: corporate income tax of 10 per cent 
within 15 years of commencement of 
operation; 
+ The regulation on the income tax on whole 
foreign enterprise does not allow the 
deduction of profit in later years to 
compensate for the loss in previous years; 
+ The FDI enterprises must exclude some 
cost items from production costs; 
+ Import duties are calculated based on the 
low import price applied for calculating tax; 
+ Exemption of import duties on machinery, 
equipment, specialised means of transports, 
raw materials, etc. for production and 
business of FDI enterprises; 
+Exemption of import duties for projects in 
prioritised industries, regions within 5 years 
of commencement of operation; 
+ FDI enterprise those have export can get 
tax exemption while import raw materials for 
their production; 
+ The firms supplying inputs to export 
enterprises are exempted from import tax on 
raw materials, intermediate goods with 
corresponding proportions; 
+ Removing regulation that the 
FDI enterprise has to allocate 
their certain profit proportion to 
reserve fund; 
+ Further reform the tax system; 
gradually reduce the tax gap 
between domestic and foreign 
investment 
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4.3.7 The Enterprise Law 
The Enterprise Law was passed on January 1, 2000. The Enterprise Law allows businesses to 
register without waiting for government approval. During the four months following the 
(QWHUSULVH/DZ¶VHQDFWPHQWUHJLVWUDWLRQVIRUSULYDWHILUPVPRUHWKDQGRXEOHGFRPSDUHGWRWKH
same period in 1999. This increase in registration stemmed from the reduced cost of registering 
a new business from ten to thirty million Vietnamese Dong (VND) (approximately between 
USD 900 to USD 2,000 at official exchange rate in 1999) to only VND 100,000 (Tran Quang 
Tien, 2009). The registration process was shortened from six months to one week. 
Thus, the Enterprise Law was a major step in streamlining the investment process, but most 
foreign investors still thought the law was inadequate (Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Tran Quang 
Tien, 2009). For example, while eighty-four licenses restrictions were removed, 300 such 
barriers still remained. Thus, most foreign enterprises still believed that bureaucracy and over-
regulation was a barrier that limited the returns on investment and made new projects difficult to 
implement (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2009). 
4.4 Vietnam Government policies facilitating FDI  
The following sections examine the policies that the Vietnam Government have introduced to 
support FDI. Although the record of policy development has always been to facilitate FDI in 
Vietnam, the actual performance in properly structuring the governmental and legal framework 
has been a little slow at times and not always effective. However, it can be seen that this is a 
result of a lack of fully understanding the needs of the FDI sector and a poor level of 
administrative and governmental capacities. 
In the course of the authors research and analysis of FDI in Vietnam it was soon clear that the 
levels of ability in the Vietnam civil service are generally very low, with low pay and a failure to 
attract the very best personnel meaning that even the most effective policy for supporting FDI is 
often not administrated very well. Although the Government is moving more to supporting a 
research capability in Universities and think tanks, the poor financial support and the lack of 
experience and knowledge in economic research and analysis still leads to problems in 
ormulating effective advise to governmental decision-makers. 
This inevitably means that FDI support by the Government is often poorly informed and 
sometimes out of date. An example of this is the accession of Vietnam to the WTO, where the 
legal and governmental regulatory system is still failing to overcome problems in actually 
adapting to the obligations of the WTO regulations and commitments. 
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This is further complicated by a dilemma for the Government in that it wants to quickly abide by 
its WTO commitments, but it also wants to protect to protect small and medium enterprises from 
stronger foreign competition. In a review of the last three years of Vietnam regulations the 
general view of the Vietnam Government is that they are committed and supportive of foreign 
LQYHVWPHQWEXWµLQspite of these efforts, however, the reforms are not comprehensive enough to 
avoid inconsistency and legal uncertainty in the course of implementation, interpretation and 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHFRPPLWPHQWV¶7XUNVHQ and Nguyen Mai Phuong, 2010). 
The problems include an overlapping and conflicting regulatory system which is causing a 
VLJQLILFDQWOHYHORIµFKDRV¶LQWKHUHJXODWLRQRIIRUHLJQGLUHFWLQYHVWPHQW$ODFNRIWUDQVSDUHQF\
and explicit instructions for market access, made worse by a concentration on an unnecessary 
amount of official form filling and long delays in an otherwise quick process. There is a 
transposition timing mismatch between the actual implementation of international commitments 
and the changing of the domestic law to enforce those obligations. The present government 
reforms supported by various international development funds are aimed at improving the 
administrative and technological capacities of the government, but the reality is that they will 
still take time and the above problems will continue at present to impact negatively upon the 
foreign direct investment sector (Turksen and Nguyen Mai Phuong, 2010). 
4.4.1 Land lease 
For foreign investors with long-term projects the major concern is the regulations on 
µSRVVHVVLRQ¶RI ODQG7KH WHUPXVHGKHUH LV µSRVVHVVLRQ¶UDWKHU WKDQµRZQHUVKLS¶DVDOO ODQG LQ
Vietnam LVWKHµSHRSOHV¶heritage DQGµRZQHG¶ in their name by the Government. The only way a 
foreigner can than have legal title of the land is through leasehold which is restricted up to a 
maximum of 70 years. This was and still remains a serious limit on foreign investment and a 
major negative determinant. Investors, especially American investors fear that the Government 
ownership of the land is a constant future threat of foreclosure by them on the grounds of 
political reasoning, rather than any economic reasons. However, the new regulations did try to 
close the gap between the lower price domestic investors paid for leaseholds and the price which 
foreigners paid which was usually 20 per cent more (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Pham Duy Nghia, 
2006; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009) 
In 1993, the Land Law was amended, eradicating the subsidy on households, and paving the 
way for establishing and developing the real estate market, thus mobilising a huge national asset 
(Tran Quang Tien, 2009). Under the FDI Law of 2000, a positive move was to switch the 
responsibility for site clearance onto the Vietnamese, including payment of compensation. The 
102 
 
capital contribution of Vietnam mainly comes from the value of land using rights and real estate 
(which was estimated to be 3 billion USD in 2003). Today, in those joint ventures where the 
µVietnamese party contributes capital in the form of the value of the land-use right, the 
Vietnamese party shall be responsible for site clearance, compensation and completion of 
procedures to obtain the land-use right¶Tran Quang Tien, 2009 p.34). In cases where the state 
leases out land, these responsibilities fall to the provincial Peoples Committee wherever the 
investment project is located. Previously, the foreign investor had sole responsibility. Decree 
24/2000/ND-CP regulated that foreign investors were not allowed to sub-let the land. Foreign 
investors had the mortgage rights on land and assets on land if payments are made for all the 
hiring period or 5 years in advance (Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
As Land Law reform continues the real estate market is developing as one of the prime targets 
for foreign investors, yet restrictions still make foreign investors wary of investing into 
something they still do not have complete ownership of.  
4.4.2 Technology 
According to the Ministry of Industry, nearly  SHU FHQW RI DOO 9LHWQDP¶V HQWHUSULVHV XVH
advanced technology. Another 38 per cent use mid-level technology. Its use among the 
remainder is poor. The rate of technological renewal is just 10 per cent and of this, the figure 
among foreign-owned businesses is higher than with domestic enterprises (Nguyen Quan, 2009).  
Over the past few years, the Government has issued policies encouraging businesses and 
individuals to invest in researching and developing science and technology. The portfolio in 
these policies includes: science and technology services, business investment, business 
administration, intellectual property protection, transfer of technology, training engineering 
staff, and enhancement of business administration. The most outstanding feature in this sector is 
the continuous encouragement of the Government to renovate technology in the business, 
especially in foreign invested enterprises. The priorities in the land lease fee, credit, import 
duties give the proof of the special treatment of the Government to hi-tech projects. The Civil 
Code of Vietnam and other related documents have regulated industrial property rights of goods 
and scientific and technological services such as: creation, useful solutions, industrial design, 
brand, original name of goods, business secrets (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). With a view to 
improve intellectual property rights, Vietnam has joined the WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
Organisation) and also signed international agreements throughout the 1990s and 2000s like: the 
Paris Convention on Intellectual Property, Patent Cooperation Treaty ± PCT (signed May, 
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2006), the Berne Convention (signed 2004), The ASEAN Frame Agreement on Intellectual 
Property (1995) and the Madrid Protocol on Trademarks (2006).  
Vietnam also pays attention to technology transfer. The regulations related to technology 
mentioned in Law on FDI in Vietnam 1987, Technology Transfer Ordinance 1988 and 
regulations about technology transfer in the Civil Law 1995 focused on performing the 
following aims: i) encourage organisations and foreign businesses invest and transfer new and 
advanced technology in order to enhance competitive competence in global market; ii) support 
domestic organisations in receiving and controlling technology. However, one concern is that 
even recent studies fail to see a significant spillover of technology from foreign enterprises to 
domestic firms (Le Quoc Hoi and Pomfret, 2008)  
4.4.3 Special Economic Zones 
Vietnam created different types of industrial zones that offered special investment conditions for 
enterprises.  
(1) Export Processing Zones (EPZ).  
(2) Industrial Zones (IZ). 
(3) Hi-Tech Zones.  
The first regulation on EPZs was issued by the Government in 1991. An EPZ specialises in the 
production of goods for export and in the provision of services for the production of export 
goods and export activities. It had specific geographic boundaries and was open for both foreign 
and domestic investors. Enterprises operating within EPZs enjoyed a profit tax rate of 10 per 
cent and 15 per cent in respect of production and service enterprises. 
IZs have been established since 1994. An IZ is a concentrated zone specializing in the 
production of industrial goods and services for industrial goods production. Enterprises 
operating within IZs enjoyed profit tax rates of 18 per cent in respect of production, 12 per cent 
if exporting at least 80 per cent of its products, and 22 per cent in respect of service enterprises. 
From 1997, these rates were 15, 10 and 20 per cent respectively (Nguyen Ngoc Anh and 
Nguyen Thang, 2007; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009).  
A Hi-tech zone is a zone where hi-technology industrial enterprises and units providing hi-
technology development services, including scientific technological research and development, 
training, and other related services, are concentrated. There may be an EPZ in a hi-tech zone. 
The profit tax rate applied to enterprises operating in the hi-tech zone is 10 per cent after an 
104 
 
eight-year tax holiday starting from the first year in which the company is profitable (Le Quoc 
Hoi and Pomfret, 2008). 
4.4.4 The Labour Regulatory Framework 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, all foreign-invested enterprises had to recruit their workforce 
through labour supplying centers. In the late 1990s, although the procedures for recruiting 
employees had been simplified, the stipulation for recruiting employees through labour 
supplying centers still created disadvantages for foreign-invested enterprises. From 2003, 
foreign invested enterprises have been entitled to recruit their employees directly (Tran Quang 
Tien, 2009; Pham Xuan Kien, 2008).  
The development and adjustment of the labour regulatory framework of Vietnam started as far 
back as the early 1990s. The 1995 Labour Code of Vietnam and the 2002 Revised Labour Code 
received technical contributions from International Labour Organisation experts (Pham Xuan 
Kien, 2008)9LHWQDP¶VODERur law is now focused on a market-based labour relations regulatory 
framework which is in line with WTO principles. The relationship between successful foreign 
investment and good labour relations is a very important factor (Baban, 2002, Friedman et.al, 
1998; Keith and Will, 2001; Pham Xuan Kien, 2008). Although labour is not an item in the 
WTO agenda, it is a factor of evaluation to determine whether a country has a market or non-
market economy. 
In May 1992, a minimum wage was instituted for workers in foreign-invested enterprises. Under 
the new Labour Code, all employers of 10 or more workers are required to pay the minimum 
wage, though for domestic enterprises a lower rate applies. The minimum wage rates are 
periodically revised by the Ministry of Labour-Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA). As of 
mid-1995, the domestic minimum was Dong 120 000 (approximately USD10.90) per month. At 
this level, the minimum wage does not appear to pose a serious disincentive to hiring new 
workers (at least in the major urban centers) since, in 1994, the average wage for an unskilled 
worker was about USD34 per month, almost three times the minimum (Planning Department, 
SPC, 1995). The minimum wage for workers in foreign-invested enterprises is several times 
higher: on 1 July 1996, it was raised from USD35 to USD45 per month in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City and from USD30 to USD40 per month in medium-size cities. At that rate, it is much 
closer to the average wage in foreign-owned enterprises. For example, one large foreign 
enterprise based in Ho Chi Minh City reports paying an average wage of USD50 per month to 
its 1,000 unskilled workers, or only one-fourth more than the new minimum (Pham Xuan Kien, 
2008). 
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Since 2009, the minimum wage levels were divided into 4 regions, based on economic growth, 
price index, poor household ratio. While region 1 comprises Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city, 
region 2 include provinces in focal economic zones and those with large number of FIEs such as 
Binh Duong, Baria-Vung Tau and Dongnai. The minimum monthly wage in the domestic sector 
was set at USD 89 (region 1), USD 80 (region 2), USD74 (region 3) and USD 66.3 (region 4). 
In FDI sectors, this number was USD 122, USD 108, USD 94.5, USD 91 respectively. With the 
division of 4 regions, the minimum wages was expected to be closer to the actual wage as well 
as living standards in each region. 
To attract highly trained personnel, the government provided an enhanced wage schedule, and 
SOEs were forced to increase wage scales. In 1993, the government modified the public sector 
pay scale: whereas previously the ratio of the salaries of the highest paid workers to those of the 
lowest paid workers had been 3.5:1, it was raised to 13:1 (ILO, 1994). The changing labour 
market conditions are reflected in average wages for skilled and unskilled workers across 
enterprise type. A survey of some 200 enterprises, public and private, in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City found the following: in 1991, the average wage paid to skilled workers was about 50 
per cent higher than that paid to unskilled workers; in 1994, the skilled wage was 70 per cent 
higher than the unskilled wage (Planning Department, SPC, 1995; Pham Xuan Kien, 2008). 
4.4.5 Tax policy for FDI enterprises  
The general policy of facilitating FDI activities with the aim to attracting FDI into Vietnam, 
through the tax policies is one of the most important factors in attracting FDI. In Vietnam 
corporate income tax and the remittance tax that are applicable to FDI enterprises have been 
adjusted favorably for FDI enterprises (Pursuant to the Vietnam Law on Corporate Income Tax 
Regulation 09-2003-QH11).  
Generally, the corporate income taxes remained unchanged at 25 per cent during the whole 
period from 1987 to 2009 for FDI enterprises. From 1987, the enterprises with foreign invested 
capital and foreign partners, operating under business co-operation contracts, were liable to pay 
a corporate income tax ranging from 15 to 25 per cent of earned profits (Pham Duy Nghia, 
2006). From 1996, these enterprises were subject to corporate income tax at 25 per cent on the 
profit earned. If the investment was located in priority areas, this rate was 20 per cent. If the 
investment satisfied certain investment promotion criteria, the rate was 15 per cent, and if the 
investment was strongly encouraged, the rate was 10 per cent. FDI enterprises were exempted 
from corporate income tax for a maximum period of two years, commencing from the first 
profit-making year, and were entitled to a 50 per cent reduction of corporate income tax for a 
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maximum period of two successive years. Since 1996, in cases where investment is strongly 
encouraged, exemption from corporate income tax had been allowed for a maximum period of 
eight years (Pursuant to the Law on Corporate Income Tax 09-2003-QH11).  
In 2007, new investment projects, including FDI projects and FDI enterprises were given tax 
incentives to promote business entry. Greenfield projects could be exempted from corporate 
income taxes from two to four years, and could get preferential treatment of reduced tax rates, 
10, 15, or 20 per cent from two to nine years, subject to the fields and areas of investment. The 
total duration of preferential income tax rates cannot be over 15 years (Pursuant to the Vietnam 
Law on Corporate Income Tax 09-2003-QH11).  
Since 1999 there have been attempts to develop the tax regime on income in Vietnam and costs 
such as contingencies and unemployment benefits are taken into account. In the area of 
concessions the limit set, for example, on the brand name advertisement cost was increased from 
5 per cent of total cost to 5 to 7 per cent and to 10 per cent in 2007 (Yui, 2009).  
The Enterprise Law and the Investment Law 2006 concentrated on eliminating any distinction 
between foreign direct invested enterprises and local enterprises. The latest legislation, the 2009 
Corporate Income Tax also reflects the government policy of FDI attraction. Discussion is 
underway within the Government as to whether limits pre-fixed on certain costs such as 
advertisement and promotion costs can be removed (Yui, 2009; Ministry of Finance of Vietnam, 
2009). 
In a similar track, the tax on remittances of investment-earned profits abroad was constantly 
changed. When transferring profits abroad, a foreign investor had to pay an amount of tax equal 
to 3, 5 or 7 per cent of the profits that were to be transferred and this imposition was lower than 
the rates of 5, 7 and 10 per cent payable under the 1996 law and lower again than the rates of 
from 5 to 10 per cent under the law of 1987. This tax was totally eliminated in 2004 (Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2006; Yui, 2009; Tran, 2008). A second major transformation 
ZDV WKH HQGLQJ RI µVSOLWWLQJ VHFWRUs¶ where different rates were applied to different economic 
sectors (Pham Xuan Kien, 2008, p.6). 
4.5 FDI - from policy to implementation  
An overview of FDI implementation in Vietnam, i.e. general FDI figures, inflows of FDI into 
the country, the common forms of FDI that foreign investors take, and the FDI structural 
composition, is presented in this chapter (Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Nguyen Ngoc 
Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007;  Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008).  
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Since 1987, Vietnam has attracted increasingly impressive levels of FDI. The FDI has been a 
PDMRU IDFWRU LQ 9LHWQDP¶V economic transition, business liberalisation and macro-economic 
growth story in Vietnam over the last two decades (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). The presence of 
FDI was seen as an LPSRUWHGµSULYDWHVHFWRU¶IRUDFRXQWU\whose own private sector was almost 
non-existent at the beginning of the 1990s. In the late 1990s, although foreign-invested 
companies employed less than 1 per cent of the total workforce in Vietnam, they cumulatively 
DFFRXQWHGIRUDURXQGSHUFHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VQRQ-RLOH[SRUWVSHUFHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V
total industrial output; tKH\FRQVWLWXWHGDOPRVWSHUFHQWRI9LHWQDP¶V*'3DQGFRQWULEXWHG
around 25 per cent of total tax revenues (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Nguyen 
Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007). In the period from 2001-2005, the FDI sector contributed 
to almost 15.5 per cent GDP, 35 per cent of the country (non-oil) export turnover (if crude oil 
export included, the ratio came up to 56 per cent). The sector accounted for 100 per cent output 
of oil exploitation, car production, office equipment production, etc. The FDI sector provided 60 
per cent steel output, 28 per cent cement output and 76 per cent output of the medical equipment 
industry (MPI, 2008). 
Despite the importance and growth of FDI inflows in Vietnam the record since the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 has been mixed, with new inflow pledges sometimes below 
government targets (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). It was felt that despite reforms of the legal system 
and incentives to attract investment, the actual levels of FDI were below what could be 
expected. Even at present, Government concern is that the levels of FDI potential are higher 
than the actual achievement levels (Tran Quang Tien, 2009, p.14). Thus, Vietnam needs to re-
visit their FDI policies and correct some of the negative approaches towards foreign investment, 
IRUH[DPSOHE\LQWURGXFLQJµIUHHKROG¶SXUFKDVHRIUHDOHVWDWH$WWKHVDPHWLPHVWXGLHVVXFKDV
this thesis can point to lessons learned in the successful growth of investment from Honda and 
ANZ. The case studies here provide an analysis that can help re-invigorate the government 
policies on FDI in Vietnam. 
4.5.1 FDI flows 
FDI data in Vietnam shows significant differences between the data sets published by 
Vietnamese government agencies and those by international organisations. For example, the 
Table below compares FDI inflows from three different sources: the MPI, UNCTAD and the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam. The MPI is a legal administrative body for managing FDI 
and Official Development Aid (ODA). MPI defines µFDI as total investment in foreign invested 
firms¶. (FIEs) and calculates shares of capital from both domestic and foreign partners (Tran 
Quang Tien, 2009, p.12). Changes in the FIE capital stock as a result of earnings invested is also 
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regarded as a change in FDI. International organisations define FDI into Greenfield investment 
measured by the actual capital inflows from multinational enterprises (MNEs) or cross-border 
M&A activity (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). Further differences are due to the capacities of the 
Vietnam statistical agencies which suffer to some degree from a lack of qualified staff to 
properly analyse data. Capable individuals are far more likely to be attracted by the significantly 
higher salaries and better conditions of the private sector.  
The Table below demonstrates the type of discrepancies in data reported by the two government 
agencies, and demonstrates how prevalent the mistakes were in the early years of reform. The 
figures are further distorted by the exclusion of FDI originating from Vietnamese people who 
are citizens of overseas countries (Viet kieu), which is usually classed as domestic investment as 
most Viet kieu channel their investment through resident relatives.  
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Table 4.4: Registered and implemented FDI flows to Vietnam by sources of data (USDmil.) 
Year FDI flows, MPI source Actual FDI 
flows, 
UNCTAD 
source 
(mil.USD) 
FDI flows, General Statistics Office source 
Number of 
licensed 
projects 
Registered 
capital (mil. 
USD) 
Implemented 
capital 
(mil.USD) 
Number of 
licensed 
projects 
Registered 
capital 
(mil.USD) 
Implemented 
capital (mil.USD) 
1988 38 322 N/A 8 38 322 N/A 
1989 68 526 N/A 4 68 526 N/A 
1990 108 735 N/A 180 108 735 N/A 
1991 151 1,284 428 375 151 1292 329 
1992 197 2,077 575 474 197 2,209 575 
1993 274 2,829 1,118 926 274 3,347 1,018 
1994 367 4,262 2,241 1,945 367 4,535 2,041 
1995 408 7,925 2,792 1,780 408 7,699 2,556 
1996 365 9,429 2,923 1,803 387 9,735 2,714 
1997 348 5,822 3,218 2,587 358 6,055 3,115 
1998 275 4,781 2,375 1,700 285 4,877 2,367 
1999 311 2,197 2,537 1,484 311 2,264 2,335 
2000 379 2,494 2,420 1,289 389 2,696 2,414 
2001 550 3,236 2,430 1,300 550 3,230 2,451 
2002 802 2,805 2,591 1,200 802 2,963 2,591 
2003 772 3,128 2,650 1,450 791 3,146 2,650 
2004 723 4,222 2,860 1,610 811 4,222 2,852 
2005 922 6,339 3,300 2,020 970 6,839 3,308 
2006 800 10,200 N/A N/A 987 12,004 4,100 
2007 N/A 21,300 8,030 N/A 1544 21,347 8,030 
2008 1,557 71,726 11,500 N/A 1,171 64,011 11,600 
2009 2,090 22,616 10,000 7,600 1,208 23,107 10,000 
2010 1,238 18,590 11,000 8,173 1,237 19,886 11,000 
Source: Combined sources from General Statistics Office website, MPI database and UNCTAD.  
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Significant levels of FDI inflows began in the last half of the 1990s which reached a peak in 
1996 with registered and implemented capital at USD8.2 and USD2.9 billion, respectively (FDI 
data on the MPI website 2006). FDI inflow then slowed as a result of the Asian financial crisis 
until 2000. FDI inflow recovered in 2001, although only slowly as foreign investors took a 
cautious approach (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh and 
Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008). Thus, we can see that the recovery period for FDI began post-2000 
and has gradually built up since then, with the latest figures showing impressive improvements. 
The UNCTAD data including only new FDI projects shows the recession episode ended in 2002 
(Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
9LHWQDP¶V early hesitation on reform meant they suffered a comparative disadvantage and only 
the advent of a far more committed policy to Doi Moi, brought about improvements. The long-
lasting effect of the Asian crisis in Vietnam compared with the other nations was also a factor 
and contributed towards the slow change in policy to overcome negative externalities (Tran 
Quang Tien, 2009;  Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi 
Tue Anh, 2008). After the crisis, many ASEAN countries introduced additional incentives and 
more aggressive investment promotion programmes (JICA 2003), whereas the fundamental 
policy changes in Vietnam have occurred only from about 2000. Joint ventures and fully-owned 
FIEs have been the two most popular foreign investments. Apart from these entry modes, other 
nations have received more capital from encouraging M&A and any other forms of investment, 
so that the total capital going to these countries is more volatile than that going to Vietnam 
(McGrath, 1995; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008; Vu Bang Tam, 2008).  
In the 1986-1994, there were low levels of domestic investment, while foreign direct investment 
showed improvement and reached 30.4 per cent in 1994. But from 1995 to 2005 the levels of 
foreign investment fell relative to domestic investment, reaching only 18 per cent (Tran Quang 
Tien, 2009). Domestic private investment also declined in the period 1985-1994. The reasons 
for the declines were structural as the economic system was previously dominated by 
µFROOHFWLYHV¶ ZKLFK Iormed a component of non-state investment) and they played an 
imperative role in the economy, especially in rural areas. The policy of Doi Moi involved direct 
UHIRUPRIWKHµFROOHFWLYH¶V\VWHPDQGWKHPRYHPHQWWRZDUGVDPDUNHW-oriented economy, which 
forced closure of most agricultural collectives or their transformation into corporate entiti es (Ha 
Thiet Tung, 1989; Chu Van Lam, 1987; Dang Duc Dam, 1993; Le Dang Doanh, 2002; Bui Hai 
Thiem, 2009; Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
111 
 
Table 4.5: Total Investment for Development: Composition and Growth, 1985-2008 
Year 
Composition ( per cent) Growth index (1994=100), at 1994 price 
FDI 
Domestic 
private 
State-
owned 
FDI 
Domestic 
private 
State-
owned 
Total 
1985  0.0 28.5 71.5 0.0 25.3 52.0 27.8 
1986  0.0 40.2 59.8 0.0 34.0 41.2 26.4 
1987  0.0 47.2 52.8 0.0 38.0 34.8 25.3 
1988  2.5 44.2 53.3 2.4 40.4 39.9 28.6 
1989  13.6 40.9 45.5 14.4 42.1 38.4 32.3 
1990  13.1 46.7 40.2 17.5 61.0 42.9 40.8 
1991  14.3 47.7 38.0 22.8 73.8 48.0 48.4 
1992  21.0 43.9 35.1 51.1 103.8 67.9 74.0 
1993  25.2 30.8 44.0 83.7 99.4 116.0 101.0 
1994  30.4 31.3 38.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1995  30.4 27.6 42.0 119.0 105.0 130.7 119.1 
1996  26.0 24.9 49.1 117.0 109.0 175.4 136.9 
1997  28.0 22.6 49.4 150.1 117.8 210.6 163.2 
1998  20.7 23.7 55.5 114.4 127.0 242.8 167.5 
1999  17.3 24.0 58.7 104.6 141.2 281.7 183.9 
2000  18.0 22.9 59.1 125.4 154.9 327.3 212.0 
2001  17.6 22.6 59.8 138.1 172.0 372.3 238.4 
2002  17.5 26.2 56.4 156.6 228.0 401.4 272.7 
2003  16.3 29.7 54.0 165.4 291.7 434.4 308.0 
2004  15.5 30.9 53.6 175.1 338.8 481.2 343.6 
2005 15.7 32.1 52.2 201.2 400.0 532.8 390.5 
2006 16.2 38.1 45.7 122.0 116.0 109.9 113.7 
2007 24.3 38.5 37.2 193.4 126.9 104.2 127.0 
2008 31.4 40.0 28.6 134.6 113.0 83.6 106.4 
2009 25.6 33.9 40.5 91.4 103.9 134.6 111.4 
2010 25.8 36.1 38.1 107.0 115.9 103.9 107.8 
Source: C.E.I.C Asia Database, 2009  
State-owned or public investment still dominated during this period and showed the highest 
growth index (532.8), followed by the domestic private (400.0) and foreign-owned sectors 
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(201.2) (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). The dominant public investment was for state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and reflected their leading role in the economy. The data shows that the 
public sector still retained government led advantages over the private sector. Table 4.6 FDI 
flows for the type of investment projects and the share of Vietnamese partners in total 
investment. A number of projects expanded their capital base through additional funds from 
parent companies or profits from previous investments in Vietnam (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
The expansion investment inflows in 2004 and 2005 indicated a fresh confidence in the 
investment climate in Vietnam and offered hope for attracting new FDI (Tran Quang Tien, 
2009; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 2008; Pham Xuan Kien, 2008).  
After the Asian financial crisis, the expired investment ratio and FDI inflows increased during 
the post financial crisis period (1998-2003). A major proportion of the expired investment was 
from approved projects not yet started. Kokko et. al. (2003) investigated the determinants of the 
likelihood of failed projects and found that most failed FDI projects were approved in the early 
1990s in the form of joint ventures and located in remote areas. The high expired/FDI inflow 
ratio was a result of the slow and complicated procedures in project licensing and assessments. 
With the exception of 2005, domestic partners contributed a small proportion of total 
LQYHVWPHQW DSSUR[LPDWHO\  SHU FHQW µ$OO GRPHVWLF-partner contributions were in joint 
ventures. As a result, the share of domestic partners in total implemented capital decreased over 
time because the share of joint ventures in total investment declined relative to fully-owned 
),(V¶Tran Quang Tien, 2009, p.31).  
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Table 4.6: FDI inflows decomposed by situation of operation 
Indicatos\year FDI projects New registered 
projects 
Capital 
increased 
projects 
Registered 
capital inflows 
(mill. USD) 
New 
projects 
(mill. USD) 
Expansion 
(mill. USD) 
Implemented 
capital inflows 
(mill. USD) 
1988-1990  214 1 1,582 1,582 0.3  
1991  151 9 1,284 1,275 9 428 
1992  197 13 2,077 2,027 50 575 
1993  274 60 2,829 2,589 240 1,118 
1994  367 84 4,262 3,746 516 2,241 
1995  408 151 7,925 6,607 1,318 2,792 
1996  365 162 9,429 8,64 788 2,923 
1997  348 164 5,822 4,649 1,173 3,218 
1998  275 162 4,781 3,897 884 2,375 
1999  311 163 2,197 1,568 629 2,537 
2000  379 174 2,494 2,018 476 2,420 
2001  550 241 3,236 2,604 632 2,430 
2002  802 366 2,805 1,669 1,136 2,591 
2003  772 416 3,128 1,993 1,135 2,650 
2004  723 497 4,222 2,222 2,000 2,860 
2005  922 607 6,339 4,268 2,070 3,300 
2006  797 439 9,622 7,500 2,122 4,100 
2007  1,406 361 20,250 17,600 2,650 4,600 
2008  1,557 397 71,726 66,500 5,226 11,500 
2009  839 215 21,482 16,345 5,226 10,000 
Source: MPI, 2009. 
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4.5.2 Common FDI forms in Vietnam  
The stock value of FDI decomposed by form of investment showed fully-owned FIEs 
dominating with 74.7 per cent of total projects and 51.0 per cent of total registered capital (Tran 
Quang Tien, 2009, p.22). Joint ventures stand second in terms of amount of registered capital 
but are first on implemented capital. However, it must also be remembered that many FDI 
ventures gained further benefits from transfer of technology, management skills and know-how, 
ZKLOH 9LHWQDPHVH FRXQWHUSDUWV µFRQWULEXWH OHJDO NQRZOHGJH WUDGHPDUNV DQG LQIUDVWUXFWXUH LQ
WHUPVRIPRVWO\ ODQGDQGVSDFH¶Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue 
Anh, 2008; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008). Research shows that joint ventures are generally larger 
than fully-owned FIEs in capital stock as the JV normally involved partnerships between the 
FDIs and large SOEs (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009). Other entry modes, like 
BCC and BOT, are concentrated in some highly protected industries. New forms of investment 
include shareholding companies and capital holding companies, which were now legal options 
due to a policy change allowing the purchase of equity shares from domestic enterprises by 
foreign investors. 
Table 4.7: FDI by forms of investment (stock value, million USD), December 2005 
FDI forms Project 
numbers 
Registered 
capital 
Realised 
capital 
Per 
cent of 
projects 
per cent of 
Registered 
capital 
Realised/ 
Registered 
( per cent) 
Fully- owned 
FIEs 
4,504 26,041 9,884 74.7 51.0 38.0 
Joint-ventures 1,327 19,181 11,146 22.0 37.6 58.1 
BCC 184 4,171 6,053 3.1 8.2 145.1 
BOT 6 1,370 727 0.1 2.7 53.1 
Shareholding 
company 
8 199 170 0.1 0.4 85.4 
Capital holding 
company 
1 56 6 0.0 0.1 10.8 
Total 6,030 51,018 27,986 100 100 54.9 
Source: MPI, 2008. 
In 1988-1990, cooperation with SOEs (joint ventures) were the most popular entry mode for 
foreign investors and benefited from privileged access to government and advantages in 
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accessing credit, land ownership and other administrative procedures (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; 
Pham Duy Nghia, 2006). 
In 1991-1995, forms of investment became more equal with a significant increase in fully-
owned FIEs. Joint ventures still dominated but foreign investors could also now enter into many 
IRUPHUO\µSURWHFWHGLQGXVWULHV¶Tran Quang Tien, 2009). However, joint ventures are declining 
in their relative position in regard to share of total registered capital and share in number of 
projects.  
In 2001-2005 there was a diversification of forms of investment as more FDI was entering 
through either shareholding companies or capital holding companies), while the number of 
fully-owned FIEs numbers exceeded joint ventures and other entry modes for the first time 
(Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 
2007). Tran Quang Tien SEHOLHYHVWKDWµSROLF\UHIRUPKDGVLJQLILFDQWO\LPSURYHGWKH
investment climate and foreign investors were now allowed to set up any form of investment in 
most industries and services. They followed the trend in preferring to form fully-owned 
HQWHUSULVHVSUREDEO\LQRUGHUWRDYRLGEHQHILWFRQIOLFWDQGPDNHEXVLQHVVGHFLVLRQVHDVLO\¶ 
4.5.3 Source country composition  
In the period from 1988 to 2009 there has been 12,275 FDI projects with a registered capital of 
USD194,429 million and Implementation capital of USD66,945 million. Investment came from 
75 different countries and territories. The top ten sources of FDI comprised seven Asian and 
three European nations.  
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Table 4.8: Top ten source countries of FDI as at December 2005 (stock value) 
Countries/ 
territories 
Project 
numbers 
Registered 
Capital 
(million 
USD) 
Implemented 
capital 
(million 
USD) 
Realised/ 
registered 
per cent 
of total 
registered 
per cent 
of total 
Projects 
Taiwan  1,422 7,769 2,831 36.4 15.2 23.6 
Singapore  403 7,611 3,621 47.6 14.9 6.7 
Japan  600 6,290 4,669 74.2 12.3 10.0 
Korea  1,064 5,338 2,591 48.5 10.5 17.6 
Hong Kong  360 3,728 1,986 53.3 7.3 6.0 
British Virgin 
Islands  
251 2,693 1,240 46.1 5.3 4.2 
France  164 2,171 1,188 54.7 4.3 2.7 
Netherlands  62 1,996 1,924 96.4 3.9 1.0 
Malaysia  184 1,571 840 53.5 3.1 3.1 
Thailand  130 1,456 804 55.2 2.9 2.2 
Subtotal  4,640 40,622 21,694 53.4 79.6 76.9 
Total  6,030 51,018 27,986 54.9 100.0 100.0 
Source: MPI, 2008.  
Ten nations contributed about 80 per cent of total registered capital and 77 per cent of total 
projects. Taiwan surpassed Singapore as the leading country in FDI flows to Vietnam. Japan 
was the largest contributor in terms of implemented capital, followed by Singapore. In terms of 
investment performance measured by the ratio between implemented and registered capital (in 
Vietnam a number of promised (registered) FDI investments registered capital fail to actually 
become fully realised implemented projects for a variety of reasons, such as not gaining a 
license, foreign investors withdrawing pledges of FDI, etc), the Netherlands stood first followed 
by Japan. The performance indicator of these two countries was much higher than for any other 
countries. Although Taiwan was the largest investor in Vietnam, its performance level was the 
lowest amongst the 10 leading investors. 
117 
 
Table 4.9: Registered FDI by source country (million USD) 
Country group 1996-2000 2001-2005 1988-2005 
Total 
investment 
per 
cent 
Total 
investment 
per 
cent 
Total 
investment 
per 
cent 
OECD Countries  5,391.4 26.4 5,155.6 35.0 16,443.8 32.2 
UK  1,255.1 6.1 77.8 0.5 1,248.3 2.4 
France  1,197.6 5.9 455.5 3.1 2,171.2 4.3 
Australia  144.3 0.7 294.8 2.0 664.8 1.3 
Switzerland  111.6 0.5 28.3 0.2 686.4 1.3 
Belgium  30.6 0.1 5.4 0.0 74.7 0.1 
Germany  188.2 0.9 46.6 0.3 344.4 0.7 
Italy  39.1 0.2 26.7 0.2 54.9 0.1 
Netherlands  123.5 0.6 787.8 5.3 1,996.0 3.9 
United State  581.2 2.8 721.9 4.9 1,455.1 2.9 
Japan  1,550.3 7.6 1,555.4 10.5 6,289.7 12.3 
Canada  64.6 0.3 231.0 1.6 276.1 0.5 
Other  105.3 0.5 924.4 6.3 1,182.0 2.3 
Transition/Centrally 
planned economies  
1,426.4 7.0 96.1 0.7 571.2 1.1 
Russian  1,391.2 6.8 81.7 0.6 277.9 0.5 
Ukraine  4.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 24.0 0.0 
Other  31.2 0.2 9.5 0.1 269.3 0.5 
Developing Asia  11,606.6 56.8 7,572.5 51.4 28,755.1 56.4 
China  97.4 0.5 488.2 3.3 739.2 1.4 
Thailand  586.3 2.9 247.6 1.7 1,456.1 2.9 
Philippines  39.1 0.2 12.2 0.1 234.5 0.5 
Malaysia  446.1 2.2 537.9 3.6 1,571.1 3.1 
Taiwan  1,744.8 8.5 2,358.1 16.0 7,769.0 15.2 
Singapore  4,324.7 21.2 739.1 5.0 7,610.7 14.9 
South Korea  1,790.3 8.8 1,986.7 13.5 5,337.9 10.5 
Hong Kong  1,776.1 8.7 1,129.7 7.7 3,727.9 7.3 
Indonesia  198.3 1.0 15.4 0.1 130.1 0.3 
Other  603.5 3.0 57.6 0.4 178.7 0.4 
Tax-haven Islands  1,118.1 5.5 1,066.2 7.2 3,895.9 7.6 
British Virgin Islands  742.4 3.6 901.9 6.1 2,692.7 5.3 
Bermuda  142.0 0.7 - 0.0 260.3 0.5 
Channel Islands  141.9 0.7 0.5 0.0 84.9 0.2 
Other  91.8 0.4 163.8 1.1 857.9 1.7 
Other countries  887.2 4.3 855.8 5.8 1,352.0 2.7 
Total  20,429.7 100.0 14,746.2 100.0 51,017.9 100.0 
Source: C.E.I.C Asian database (for sub periods) and MPI website for the whole period 1988-
2005. The data of MPI covers only effective projects.  
4.5.4 Sectoral composition  
Table 3.11 provides data on accumulative FDI during 1988-2005 disaggregated by the main 
economic sectors. As of December 2005, half of the registered capital and over 60 per cent of 
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total FDI projects were allocated in manufacturing industry. Within this sector, most foreign 
capital was invested in heavy industry (26.5 per cent), followed by light industry (16.6 per cent). 
The FDI composition of food processing and seafood) was negligible. Construction investment 
accounted for about 23 per cent of total investment and 7.5 per cent of total projects. Most of 
this investment was in building new residential apartments and offices. The service sector 
attracted about 17 per cent of total registered investment as well as FDI projects, with the 
concentration of FDI in transportation and telecommunication services (5.7 per cent) the same 
as in hotel and tourist services (5.6 per cent). In terms of FDI disbursement, the primary sector 
had the best performance with a realised/registered FDI ratio of 134.4 per cent (Tran Quang 
Tien, 2009).  
The most striking feature in contemporary FDI inflows is that it has increased significantly in 
manufacturing relative to other sectors. In the early 1990s, FDI flowed mostly into mining, 
quarrying and services (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). The service sector was stable except 
immediately following the Asian crisis.  
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Table 4.10: Sectoral compositions of FDI stock in 1988-2005 
Sector Number of 
Projects 
Registered 
capital (million 
USD) 
Implemented capital 
(million USD) 
per cent of 
projects 
Per cent of 
Registered 
capital 
Realised/ 
Registered 
capital 
Primary production 702 5,357 7,202 11.6 10.5 134.4 
Crude oil 27 1,891 5,542 0.4 3.7 293.0 
Agriculture and forestry 675 3,466 1,661 11.2 6.8 47.9 
Manufacturing 3,824 25,447 11,736 63.4 49.9 46.1 
Light industry 1,693 8,471 3,143 28.1 16.6 37.1 
Heavy industry 1,754 13,528 6,543 29.1 26.5 48.4 
Foodstuff 263 3,139 1,895 4.4 6.2 60.4 
Seafood 114 309 155 1.9 0.6 50.3 
Construction 453 11,526 4,684 7.5 22.6 40.6 
New resident Park 316 4,011 2,326 5.2 7.9 58.0 
New cities 4 2,552 51 0.1 5.0 2.0 
Office-building 112 3,937 1,780 1.9 7.7 45.2 
EPZ&IZ, infrastructure 
construction 21 1,026 527 0.3 2.0 51.3 
Service 1,051 8,688 4,364 17.4 17.0 50.2 
Transportation & 
telecommunication 166 2,924 741 2.8 5.7 25.3 
Hotel, Tourism 164 2,864 2,342 2.7 5.6 81.8 
Finance-Banking 60 788 643 1.0 1.5 81.6 
Cultural-Health-Education 205 908 284 3.4 1.8 31.3 
Others 456 1,203 354 7.6 2.4 29.5 
Total 6,030 51,018 27,986 100.0 100.0 54.9 
 
Source: FDI database on website of MPI, 2008.  
Notes: Data are for effective projects only. 
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Table 4.11: Sectoral composition of implemented FDI flows to Vietnam (percentage of total) 
Sector\year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Agriculture  9.8 5.2 6.0 3.0 5.6 5.0 8.4 5.2 9.1 9.1 7.6 3.2 10.4 17.3 3.2 
Agriculture-Forestry  4.6 3.6 5.4 2.7 5.0 4.5 7.8 5.0 8.6 8.0 7.3 2.0 7.8 16.8 2.8 
Fishing  5.2 1.6 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.3 1.1 2.6 0.5 0.4 
Industry  66.5 49.4 66.3 66.9 55.9 62.2 65.3 63.5 61.1 68.3 79.1 76.0 62.6 60.6 60.3 
Mining and Quarrying  53.2 32.3 23.1 32.0 20.6 13.2 8.3 13.9 12.3 11.9 33.8 2.2 1.1 0.6 0.5 
Manufacturing  13.3 17.2 40.7 31.9 34.6 47.7 55.2 48.0 47.5 54.4 44.8 73.8 61.6 60.0 59.7 
Electricity, Gas and 
Water Supply  
0.0 0.0 2.5 3.0 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.3 2.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Construction  0.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 2.5 4.8 4.4 2.1 2.8 0.9 0.6 5.7 15.1 7.8 9.3 
Service  23.7 44.5 26.9 29.1 36.1 28.1 21.9 29.1 27.0 21.7 12.7 15.1 11.9 14.4 27.2 
Wholesale and Retail 
trade/service  
0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.5 1.4 2.0 1.3 2.5 
Hotels and Restaurants  6.7 11.6 11.0 12.6 11.1 9.9 7.3 10.2 6.0 7.7 2.0 10.4 7.0 10.2 1.0 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication  
8.8 7.9 3.5 3.8 9.5 4.1 3.5 3.3 5.0 1.2 2.8 1.3 0.9 1.6 17.7 
Financial 
Intermediation  
2.3 19.7 5.0 2.3 3.8 2.8 0.2 1.0 1.2 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Renting business 
activity and Consulting  
5.5 4.2 4.7 6.8 10.5 9.5 9.8 13.3 12.9 9.4 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cultural-Health and 
Education  
0.3 1.1 2.7 3.6 1.0 1.8 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 6.0 
TOTAL (million USD)  427 558 1,117 2,238 2,794 2,901 3,156 2,440 2,240 2,301 2,018 1,333 1,513 2,054 3,811 
Source: General Statistics Office, 2005. 
121 
 
4.5.5 Provincial distribution of FDI 
Despite government policies to increase regional diversity the distribution of FDI still remained 
in certain provinces and regions. As of December 2005, about two-thirds of FDI projects 
associated with over 60 per cent of total registered FDI were invested in the South East area of 
Vietnam (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). The Red River delta and the South East area accounted for 
about 90 per cent of total FDI. Thus, the situating of FDI still relies on conventional factors like 
geographical conditions (transportation costs), population density (market size), labour supply 
and the competition level (Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Dinh Van An and Nguyen Thi Tue Anh, 
2008; Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
The implemented FDI flows divided into four periods in Table 3.14 and help explain more 
clearly the geographical allocation of foreign capital. In the first period (1988-1990), only five 
of six regions received FDI and there was an extremely high concentration in the South East 
area (72.4 per cent of total). In the following two periods (1991-1995 and 1996-2000), FDI 
seemed more evenly distributed in all six regions with significant increases for the Red River 
Delta and the Central Coast. The period 2001-2005 was associated with a small increase in FDI 
for the North Mountainous area, while the South East remained dominant (Tran Quang Tien, 
2009). Thus, although FDI was originally concentrated in the main urban areas it can now be 
VHHQWKDWDQµRYHUVSLOO¶LVRFFXUULQJ and the benefits of FDI are reaching a far wider area. 
4.5.6 FDI in special economic zones  
:RUOG%DQNSGHILQHG([SRUW3URFHVVLQJ=RQH(3=DVµDIHQFHG-in area of 10 to 300 
hectares, that specialised in manufacturing for export. It offers firms free trade conditions and 
OLEHUDO UHJXODWRU\ HQYLURQPHQWV¶ 7KH SULPDU\ SXUSRVHV RI Hstablishing EPZs are mainly 
provision of foreign exchange earning by promoting non-traditional exports, easing 
unemployment situation of the host country, attracting more FDI as well as technological 
transfer (Madani, 1999). The main GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ µExport Processing Zones (EPZ) and 
Industrial Zones (IZ) is that the former specialises in the production of exported goods and the 
SURYLVLRQ RI VHUYLFHV IRU WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI H[SRUWV DQG H[SRUW DFWLYLWLHV¶ (Tran Quang Tien, 
2009, p.15). EPZs have the benefit exceptional regulations and incentives from the government. 
However, many of these advantages will have to disappear as the full entry into WTO and 
subsequent restrictions on tariff and non-tariff barriers curb the use of special rules and 
incentives for EPZs (Ministry of Industry, 2007%UXQW91(37KHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
emphasis has shifted from EPZs to IZs in order to redress inequality in regional development. 
This has also narrowed the differences between EPZs and IZs in terms of investment incentives. 
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The first EPZ was established in 1991; 12 IZs/EPZs were set up before legal regulation for 
development of IZs/EPZs was adopted in 1996. Under this regulation, 100 IZs/EPZs were 
planned to be set up by 2010. In the 1996-2000 periods, there were actually 44 new IZs/EPZs 
established. As of 2003, 149 IZs/EPZs were approved by the government and 96 are operating, 
although only five are EPZs (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). Geographically, nearly half of the total 
number of IZs is located in the South East of Vietnam. IZs/EPZs are difficult to set up in the 
Highlands and Northern Mountain areas. 
Despite of the fact that more than 80 per cent of total exporting merchandise come from EPZs 
(Tyler and Negrete, 2009),  EPZ represents no substitute for good economic policies. An overall 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V SROLFLHV FRQGXFLYH IRU JURZWK DQG GHYHORSPHQW LV VWLll regarded as essential. 
Heike Baumuller (2009) also pointed out that not all EPZs would necessarily be effective mean 
in attracting FDI as eight out of ten EPZs performed poorly due to either their remote locations 
or shortage of labour, or due to implementation difficulties. 
4.5.7 FDI and employment 
The role of FIEs in creating new jobs has been discussed in some previous studies. For example, 
Nguyen Tuan Dung (1999) and Le Dang Doanh (2002) found the number of new jobs produced 
by FIEs was lower than expectations when compared with the important share of FDI in total 
investment. From 2000 onward, foreign investment shifted from IS production to export-
oriented production. Foreign share of total employment increased by only 0.5 per cent over the 
period 1993-2000 and one per cent during 2000-2005. By 2005, the foreign-owned sector 
accounted for the smallest share of working population (about 1,030,000 people or 2.3 per cent). 
This number of workers employed by FIEs in 2010 was 1.72 million people (General Statistics 
Office, 2005; 2010). Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) are mostly concentrated in 
manufacturing and it has resulted in notable gains in jobs created. The role of FIEs in creating 
new jobs has been discussed in Nguyen Tuan Dung (1999) and Le Dang Doanh (2002), who 
claimed the number of new jobs produced by FIEs was lower than expectations when compared 
with the important share of FDI in total investment (Tran Quang Tien, 2009). The total foreign 
share of employment increased by only 0.5 per cent over the period 1993-2000 and then only 
one per cent during the period 2000-2005.  
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Table 4.12: General situation of FDI in Vietnam from 1988 to 2000 
No. Categories Period 1988-1990 Period 1991-1995 Period 1996-2000 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1. Total registered capital projects 37 67 107 152 196 274 372 415 372 349 285 327 391 
Capital- increased projects   1 9 13 60 84 151 162 164 162 163 174 
2. Total registered capital 
(Mil. USD) 342 526 735 1,284 2,077 2,829 4,262 7,925 9,635 5,955 4,873 2,282 2,762 
Registered capital inflows 342 529 735 1,275 2,027 2,589 3,746 6,607 8,842 4,782 3,929 1,609 2,166 
Expanded capital   0.3 9 50 240 16 1,318 793 1,173 944 673 596 
3. Implemented capital inflows (Mil. USD)    428 575 1,118 2,241 2,792 2,938 3,277 2,372 2,528 2,398 
Capital inflows from foreign partners    375 492 931 1,946 2,343 2,549 2,911 2,209 2,244 2,166 
Capital inflows from Vietnamese partners    53 83 187 295 449 389 366 163 284 232 
4. Contribution of FDI sector to GDP (per cent)     2.00 3.60 6.10 6.30 7.39 9.07 9.80 11.75 13.28 
National GDP growth rate        9.83 8.80 7.41 5.08 2.30 5.32 
GPD growth rate of FDI sector        14.98 19.42 20.75 19.10 17.60 11.44 
Growth rate of national industrial sector         14.20 13.80 12.10 11.60 17.50 
Growth rate of FDI in industrial sector         21.70 23.20 23.30 21.00 21.80 
Proportion of FDI in industrial sector         26.50 29.00 33.20 38.10 41.30 
5. Contribution to State Budget  
(Mil. USD)       128 195 263 315 317 271 324 
6. Labour force in FDI sector (thousand)        210 220 250 270 296 407 
Source: MPI, 2010 
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Table 4.13: General situation of FDI in Vietnam from 2001 to 2010 
No. Categories Period 2001-2005 Period 2006-2010 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1. Total registered capital projects 555 808 791 811 970 987 1,544 1,171 1,208 969 
Capital- increased projects 241 366 416 497 640 570 420 311 355 269 
2. Total registered capital 
(Mil. USD) 3,265 2,993 3,172 4,534 6,840 12,004 21,348 71,726 23,107 18,595 
Registered capital inflows 2,633 1,857 2,037 2,482 4,705 9,096 18,718 66,500 17,236 17,229 
Expanded capital 632 1,136 1,135 2,052 2,135 2,906 2,629 5,226 5,871 1,366 
3. Implemented capital inflows (Mil. USD) 2,394 2,978 2,791 2,860 3,300 4,100 8,034 11,500 10,000 11,000 
Capital inflows from foreign partners 2,040 2,634 2,623 2,565 2,825 3,500 6,700 9,000 7,300 8,000 
Capital inflows from Vietnamese partners 185 250 100 143 475 600 1,334 2,500 2,700 3,000 
4. Contribution of FDI sector to GDP (per cent) 13.76 13.76 14.47 15.13 15.99 16.98 17.96 18.43 18.33 n/a 
National GDP growth rate 6.10 6.54 7.26 7.79 8.48 8.29 8.68 6.18 5.32 6.25 
GPD growth rate of FDI sector 7.21 7.16 10.52 11.51 13.22 14.33 13.04 8.10 4.81 n/a 
Growth rate of national industrial sector 14.60 14.80 16.80 16.60 17.10 16.80 16.70 13.90 7.60 13.80 
Growth rate of FDI in industrial sector 12.60 15.20 18.00 17.40 21.20 19.90 19.70 17.50 9.20 17.40 
Proportion of FDI in industrial sector 41.60 41.60 43.10 43.70 43.70 44.20 44.60 44.40 n/a n/a 
5. Contribution to State Budget  
(Mil. USD) 373 459 628 916 1,297 1,472 1,576 1,982 2,470 2,050 
6. Labour force in FDI sector (thousand) 489 691 860 950 1,030 1,129 1,265 1,467 1,850 1,900 
Source: MPI, 2010
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4.5.8 FDI in 2008 
Vietnam saw a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment to Vietnam from 2006 to 2008 
(confirmed figures for 2009 are still only provisional estimates). The Foreign Investment 
Agency under the Ministry of Planning and Investment, reported that 1,059 FDI projects with a 
total registered capital of USD59 billion were licensed in 2007, and in 2008 there was over 
USD65 billion of investment. This was six times the 2006 figure. 
The implemented foreign direct investment capital has also grown sharply compared to previous 
years, at USD11.5 billion, up 1.5 times compared to 2007. A substantial increase was seen of 
foreign investors from Canada, the US, India, and the Middle East (General Statistics Office - 
Vietnam) and although Vietnam faced a number of problems in 2008 which was compounded in 
E\WKHJOREDOILQDQFLDOFULVLVµIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV«VWLOOEHOLHYHGLQWKHPHGLXPDQGORQJ-
WHUPLQYHVWPHQWRXWORRNLQ9LHWQDP¶(Ha Anh, 2009).  
A major contribution to this success was the attraction of large-scale industrial FDI projects 
such as the Nghi Son oil refinery project in Thanh Hoa, the steel project in Ha Tinh province, 
and other projects to build new urban centres, international university township or international 
airports (Ha Anh, 2009).  
7KH VXFFHVV LQGLFDWHG WKDW 9LHWQDP¶V SROLFLHV WRZDUGV IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRUV DQG WKH RYHUDOO
GHYHORSPHQWRI9LHWQDPKDGZRUNHGDQGWKDWLWVµFRQFHQWUDWLRQRQWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRISROLWLFDO
stability and security, the improvement of investment environment, and particularly the 
perfection of economic regulations and the door opening of the economy according to WTO 
FRPPLWPHQWV¶ZHUHD µUHFLSH¶ IRU IXWXUH VXFFHVV +D Anh, 2009; Athukorala and Tran Quang 
Tien, 2009; Pham Xuan Kien, 2008).  
Of the total 9,700 valid projects with a total registered capital of over USD145 billion, over 
4,000 foreign invested enterprises are operational, contributing over 40.7 per cent of the 
country's total industrial production value (the figure is over 35 per cent if oil and gas 
production excluded). The foreign invested sector also contributes 55 per cent of the country's 
total export turnover (the figure is 38.4 per cent if crude oil export excluded). Currently, over 
1.45 million workers are working for foreign-invested enterprises. 
However, there are still weaknesses in the domestic economy, especially in infrastructure 
structure and the limited access high quality human resources. There is also a need to re-exert 
µQDWLRQDO¶ FRQWURO RYHU )', DV WKH WHQGHQF\ IRU ORFDOLWLHV WR µSURPRWH LQYHVWPHQW DQG JUDQW
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investment licenses to some projects based on their local benefits without taking full account of 
WKHJHQHUDOEHQHILWVRIWKHFRXQWU\DQGWKHZKROHHFRQRP\¶LVFDXVLQJSUREOHPVDQGOLPLWLQJWKH
benefits to individual areas rather than the country as a whole (Ha Anh, 2009).  
The ratio of investment in manufacturing, hi-tech and export industries is still low while foreign 
investors are also beginning to over-concentrate on real estate. A major problem is that the 
infrastructure of Vietnam is still weak and projects such as roads and electric power plants still 
find severe difficulties in attracting suitable and substantial investors. Ha Anh (2009) found that 
post-licensed investment procedures, especially procedures for land clearance, were still in need 
of substantial improvements and in some localities the poor performance of authorities was 
actually hindering the progress of existing projects.  
The problems are thus direct influences on Vietnam business confidence and the :RUOG¶YHVW
Base Inc (WVB) index of business confidence declared in 2009 that business enterprises in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 indicated a reduction to 93 points compared to 100 points in the third 
quarter (WVB, 2010). 
With this in mind it is vital that confidence be re-built and that in the face of the financial crisis 
Vietnam learn from its mistakes. However, it is equally important that Vietnam learn from its 
successes and in the two case studies of this thesis it will be shown that FDI investments can 
become extremely successful in Vietnam, with the provision that in order to do so they must 
develop their ability to combine their capital, technological and asset advantages in order to 
acquire cultural affinity and develop and adapt to the business environment of Vietnam. This 
should be broken down into bespoke programmes for particular economic sectors and 
geographical regions in order attract investment in a more effective manner (Ha Anh, 2009). 
 Vietnam culture is not only deeply influential in the way business is conducted, but it varies 
across regions, particularly between the main regions of North, Middle and South of Vietnam. 
)RU H[DPSOH WKHUH DUH VLJQLILFDQW OLQJXLVWLF GLIIHUHQFHV WKH µVW\OH¶ RI FRQGXFWLQJ EXVLQHVV LV
different and the approach to how foreigners are treated varies according to region and the 
influence of politics and business practices in that region. For example, an often voiced 
comment is that Hanoi (the North) is focused on politics first and business second, while in Ho 
Chi Minh City (the South) it is business first and politics second. Although there is little actual 
evidence to support this perception, it is still an influence upon some IRUHLJQHUV¶ geographical 
choice of investment in Vietnam. Andrew Goddard noted µ,ILUVWZHQWWR+DQRLEXWUH-located to 
HCMC. The North seems too political and every business decision appears to always be 
required first to go through a political sensitivity test before acceptance. Here [HCMC] is more 
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like the West and just gets on with making a profit.¶ (Interview: Andrew Goddard, CEO of Red8 
Consulting Services, 15 June 2009). 
Although there are some significant cultural differences and perceptions in Vietnam, particularly 
between the North and the South, it still merges into a generic national identity that has a 
particular impact upon business and economic decision-making and operation. It is this cultural 
impact upon FDI that forms one of the basic platforms for this thesis, arguing that FDI success 
is culturally determined. The two case studies show how adaptation by ANZ and Honda to the 
9LHWQDPHVH µFRQWH[W¶ZDVVLJQLILFDQWDQG WKDWERWKRSHUDWLRQVZKLOVW LPSRUWLQJPDQ\RI WKHLU
µLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶SUDFWLFHVDQGV\VWHPVDOVRFUHDWHGQDWLRQDOO\EDVHGVWUDWHJLHVWKDWZHUe sensitive 
to the Vietnam culture. It is this ability to open up to the cultural and change business strategy to 
suit the local area that has helped both NZ and Honda become successful FDI operations in 
Vietnam.  
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Table 4.14: Foreign direct investment projects licensed in 2008 by kind of economic 
activity 
 Number of 
projects 
Registered capital 
(Mill. USD)(*) 
Total 1171 64011.0 
Agriculture and forestry 17 203.2 
Fishery 6 20.3 
Mining and quarrying 7 6840.8 
Manufacturing 455 28902.4 
Electricity, gas and water supply 1 3.7 
Construction 142 492.1 
Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles, 
motor cycles and personal and household goods  
29 54.8 
Hotels and restaurants 17 1350.2 
Transport; storage and communications 23 1882.1 
Financial intermediation 1 62.6 
Real estate, renting business activities  447 23702.8 
Education and training 12 86.7 
Health and social work 7 402.9 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 4 5.8 
Community, social and personal service activities 3 0.6 
 
Source: General Statistic Office, 2009. 
(*) Including supplementary capital of licensed projects in previous years.  
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Table 4.15: Foreign direct investment by provinces in 2008 
 
Number of Projects 
Registered Capital 
(Mil. USD) 
Total 1,171 64,011.0 
By localities 
  Red River Delta 382 5,336.3 
Ha Noi 218 3,150.9 
Vinh Phuc 18 154.3 
Bac Ninh 31 984.4 
Quang Ninh 11 180.6 
Hai Duong 40 366.7 
Hai Phong 31 310.9 
Hung Yen 24 94.0 
Ha Nam 2 30.0 
Nam Dinh 3 22.2 
Ninh Binh 4 39.3 
Northern Midlands and mountainous areas 25 216.9 
Cao Bang 1 4.1 
Tuyen Quang 1 19.8 
Lao Cai 3 11.2 
Yen Bai 1 3.2 
Lang Son 2 31.2 
Bac Giang 11 65.8 
Son La n/a n/a 
Hoa Binh 6 13.4 
North Central area and Central Coastal area 51 32,957.0 
Thanh Hoa 5 6,211.3 
Ha Tinh 1 7,879.1 
Thua Thien-Hue 12 1,096.0 
Da Nang 17 602.3 
Quang Ngai 1 2,406.0 
Binh Dinh 1 0.1 
Phu Yen 1 4,345.9 
Khanh Hoa 2 126.9 
Ninh Thuan 2 9,800.3 
Binh Thuan 9 435.1 
Central Highlands 19 105.5 
Kon Tum 1 67.0 
Lam Dong 18 83.5 
South East 611 21,515.8 
Binh Phuoc 1 1.0 
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Tay Ninh 16 112.6 
Binh Duong 127 1,026.1 
Dong Nai 45 1,928.6 
Ba Ria-Vung Tau 4 9,376.0 
TP. Ho Chi Minh 418 9,071.6 
Mekong River Delta 80 3,818.6 
Long An 65 929.2 
Tien Giang 2 14.0 
Ben Tre 2 7.5 
Tra Vinh 2 17.0 
An Giang 1 2.0 
Kien Giang 2 2,304.0 
Can Tho 4 540.1 
Soc Trang 1 4.7 
Ca Mau 1 0.1 
Oil and Gas Projects (East Sea) 3 16.0 
Source: General Statistics Office, 2008. 
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Table 4.16: Export performance FDI sector in Vietnam 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Export (inc. oil) 
(mil.USD) 
6810.3 6798.3 7871.8 10161.2 14487.0 18553.7 23061.3 27774.6 34529.2 
Annual growth rate  -0.2 15.8 29.1 42.6 28.1 24.3 20.4 24.3 
 
22.2 23.0 
Import (mil.USD) 4352.0 4984.6 6703.6 8815.0 11086.6 13640.1 16489.4 21712.4 27898.6 
Annual growth rate  14.5 34.5 31.5 25.8 23.0 20.9 31.7 28.5 
 
25.7 26.9 
Net Export 2458.3 1813.7 1168.2 1346.2 3400.4 4913.6 6571.9 6062.2 6630.6 
Per cent in total 
export  
47.0 45.2 47.1 50.4 54.7 57.2 57.9 57.2 55.1 
Source: General Statistics Office, 2008. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Each transition economy has its own way to undertake economic reform towards a market-
oriented economy from a history of central-planning and the world has witnessed significant 
changes in Russia, Eastern Europe and China since late 1980s. Vietnam followed its own 
direction with the Doi Moi policy and contributes a unique study to the knowledge pool on the 
transition of an economy from a controlled economy to a free market. 
Viet Nam embarked on the Doi Moi (reform) policy in 1986. Since then, the country has seen 
dramatic changes, first and foremost in the economic thinking. The centrally-planned economy 
was replaced by the socialist-oriented market economy; national industrialisation and 
modernisation were initiated together with the policy of multilateralisation and diversification of 
external economic relations, openness and international integration. The Doi Moi process helped 
Vietnam rapidly escape hunger and poverty and lay the initial foundation for an industrialised 
economy, as well as maintaining a high growth rate and a relatively equal society.  
The 1987 Foreign Investment Law was the first legal document that helped form the legal 
framework for the Vietnamese market economy. This was followed by the promulgation of a 
number of laws essential for the formation of the market economy, including Land Law, Tax 
Law, Bankruptcy Law, Environment Law, and Labour Code etc. Along with the law-making 
process, market economy institutions with economic management measures and establish an 
array of financial institutions, banks and basic markets for money, labour, goods and land, etc 
have also been established. The administrative reform was promoted so as to improve economic 
competitiveness and to help create a more favorable business environment and mobilise all 
resources for economic growth. Tremendous economic reforms taking place over nearly two 
decades of Doi Moi have yielded encouraging results. Vietnam has created an ever more 
competitive and dynamic economic environment.  
During 20 years of Doi Moi, Vietnam has changed in every aspect of socio-economic life. The 
GDP growth rate of 7 to 8 per cent has been sustained, along with stronger industrialisation and 
expanded integration with the world and regional economy. Vietnam has enjoyed a sharp rise in 
trade volume, especially exports, and an increase of foreign investment and income. The multi-
sector economy has been encouraged to develop, thus mobilising effectively all social resources 
for economic growth. With a view to raising the productivity of the state-owned sector, policies 
were formulated with concrete measures to adjust and reorganise SOEs. Vietnam has succeeded 
in translating economic achievements into social progress. Economic growth is combined with 
the improvement of life quality and development of health care and education.  
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The implementation of Doi Moi policy HIIHFWLYHO\KHOSVWRLQFUHDVH9LHWQDP¶VLPDJHXQGHUWhe 
eyes of international community. The judicious policy of the government has made Vietnam an 
appealing destination for FDI. Over the past years, Vietnam has drawn increasing inflows of 
FDI. However, Vietnam has yet to entirely take advantages to attract more FDI inflow as well as 
to optimise its benefits. The evidence for such claim is the up and down movements of FDI 
inflows to Vietnam, the small proportion of implemented FDI relative to registered FDI, the 
concentration of FDI in some industries and regions etc. Most FDI projects are small in scale, 
with moderate technology which originates mainly from Asia. This situation, together with 
increasing competition pressures from China and other regional countries in attracting FDI 
inflows, are posing considerable challenges to Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 5: LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FDI IN VIETNAM 
5.1 Introduction 
Through µDoi Moi¶ policy reform Vietnam has gradually been transformed from a centrally 
planned economy into a market economy and opened its doors to foreign investment. FDI has 
been considered to be an essential factor for the economic development in Vietnam. 
Simultaneously, the legal system in Vietnam has rapidly developed, with a new laws and 
regulations on foreign investment, especially in terms of foreign exchange rules, licensing 
procedures and tax incentives. However, frequently-made amendments and supplements to 
existing laws, together with inconsistent interpretation and application of these laws, still create 
difficulties for foreign investors.  
This chapter will discuss important changes in the legal framework for FDI in Vietnam and the 
reasons for these amendments and supplements.  
Foreign investment in Vietnam has been regulated by the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) in 
Vietnam which was first adopted in December 1987 and revised several times to become more 
favourable to foreign investors.  
5.1.1 Foreign Investment Law: Period 1988-1990 
When the Vietnamese National Assembly first approved the FIL in Vietnam in December 1987, 
the Law defined the following issues: 
x Foreign organisations and individuals were allowed to invest in Vietnam in sectors of its 
national economy, aimed at large national programs. Encouraged investment projects 
were given priority at different levels.  
x Foreigners could invest in Vietnam through three forms: business co-operation contracts; 
joint venture companies; and wholly foreign owned companies. 
x Foreign investors were allowed to transfer capital and profit out of Vietnam; their paid 
income tax would be returned if profits were re-invested into projects with over-3-year 
duration. Vietnamese government committed not to nationalise their properties.  
x Foreign enterprises were exempted from import duties imposed on machinery, 
equipment, and materials for production and business. (NAV, 1987) 
This was the legal foundation for FDI activities, which now attracted FDI inflows from the 
whole world rather than only from socialist countries. Vietnam attracted 213 FDI projects with 
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the total investment capital of about USD1.8 billion in the period 1988-1990 (General Statistics 
Office, 2004). 
However, the first Law on foreign investment faced many shortcomings, which became barriers 
to FDI activities. For example, many articles did not match the domestic situation to 
international rules and customs. Also, the Law only allowed foreign investors to establish a joint 
venture with state-owned or cooperative organisations but not the private sector (Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2003, 2006; Luu Van Dat, 1997; Seow and Ching, 2008). 
Vietnam's legal framework was inadequate as it lacked specific regulations and laws directly 
concerning FDI activities such as laws on wages, taxation, intellectual property and technology 
transfer. The State Committee of Cooperation and Investment was the government agency 
responsible for investment management and this newly-established committee had little 
experience in supervision and monitoring of FDI activities. Therefore, this was called the period 
of µlearning by doing¶ in management of FDI activities in Vietnam (Hayward and Lay, 1997; 
Pham Duy Nghia, 2006). 
5.1.2 Period 1991-1995 
Between 1991 and 1995, the Law was revised twice (NAV, 1990, 1992a). The amended 
versions allowed the private sector to:  
x Undertake business cooperation with foreign organisations and individuals directly 
x Expanded forms of joint venture companies from µtwo-party¶ into µthree-party¶ 
x Provided preferential tax rates for FDI in areas with given priority (e.g., FDI enterprises 
producing necessary goods for import substitution) 
x Corporate income tax of 10 per cent within 15 years of commencement of operation.  
x FDI enterprises were allowed to rent land for operation while Vietnamese local 
government was responsible for compensation, site clearance for foreign-invested 
projects.  
x The Government would guarantee foreign currency balance to FDI projects in 
infrastructure facilities and import substitution (Pham Duy Nghia, 1998). 
However: 
x Enterprises with wholly foreign-owned capital were still be restricted 
x The registration procedure was still time-consuming when FDI enterprises had to register 
their business even after being granted FDI license (which took 45 days).  
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x FDI enterprises were not allowed to act as dealers for imports ± exports 
x Import duties were calculated based on minimum import price applied for calculating tax 
x Except for FDI projects in infrastructure facilities and import substitution, FDI 
enterprises in other areas would have to arrange foreign exchange balance themselves 
(Pham Duy Nghia, 1998; 2001). 
In Vietnam's economic reforms of the early 1990s, the government made extensive efforts to 
attract outside investment through improvements in the Law on foreign investment. Thanks to 
that, major foreign firms set up shop in Vietnam to market their products and services. Gainfully 
employed Vietnamese benefited from increased purchasing power, and the quality of life in 
Vietnam's largest cities visibly increased (Luu Van Dat, 1997; Pham Duy Nghia, 2003; 2004; 
2006).  
5.1.3 Period 1996-1999 
FIL was modified comprehensively in November 1996 (NAV, 1996b), and FDI enterprises were 
now allowed to choose the form of investment, rate of capital contribution, investment location 
and Vietnamese partner; enterprises with export proportion of more than 80 per cent were given 
priority in granting license; FDI enterprises in export-oriented and hi-tech industries were 
encouraged (Pham Duy Nghia, 1998).  
The local People's Committee still helped foreign enterprises to clear the site when the projects 
were approved while the enterprises would make payment for site clearance to the People's 
Committee. In addition, FDI enterprises could rent out land in industrial zones and exporting 
processing zones to third parties. The regulation that the export plan of enterprise must be 
approved by authorities was entirely removed. FDI enterprises in prioritised industries and 
regions were exempted from import duties within five years of commencement of operation; the 
firms supplying inputs to export enterprises were exempted from import tax on raw materials, 
intermediate goods with corresponding proportions (Pham Duy Nghia, 1997; 2001; Seow and 
Ching, 2008). 
Under the 1996 FIL, foreign investors were entitled to select one of six following vehicles or 
forms for their investment in Vietnam:  
x Business Co-operation Contract (BCC);  
x Joint Venture Company (JVC);  
x Wholly Foreign Owned Company (FOC);  
x Build ± Operate ± Transfer (BOT);  
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x Build ± Transfer ± Operate (BTO);  
x Build ± Transfer (BT).  
The JVC has shown to be the most common vehicle in Vietnam so far, but in practice foreigners 
have most preferred FOC thanks to the decision-making independence and flexibility. BCC has 
been often chosen for projects in the oil and gas exploration and exploitation, erection and 
exploitation of telecommunication network, and advertisement. BOT, BTO and BT have been 
often selected for infrastructural construction and development. Policies on industrial zones, 
export processing zones were supplemented to the revised Law in 1996 (Pham Duy Nghia, 
2001; 2003; 2006). 
With policies on exchange rate and foreign currency, FDI enterprises had to guarantee foreign 
currency balances and restrictions remained on international remittances. The import-export 
procedures with regard to certification of origins were improved (Gillespie, 2006; 2007; Balme 
and Sidel, 2007). 
The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) was the official state agency responsible for 
management of foreign investment activities in Vietnam. Local Departments of Planning and 
Investment were UHVSRQVLEOHIRUKHOSLQJORFDO3HRSOH¶V&RPPLWWHHVWRPDnage FDI activities in 
each province (Gillespie, 2006; 2007) 
.Amendments and supplements to the FIL in 1996 improved the legal framework for FDI in 
Vietnam. However, according to international assessment, it seemed that µVietnamese 
authorities suddenly had second thoughts about the desirability of opening the economy and 
introduced various bureaucratic hurdles that blatantly discriminated against foreign interests¶ 
(John, 2006, p.8). Despite positive changes in the Law bureaucratic graft and extortion topped 
the list of foreign-investor complaints in Vietnam, with excessive red tape stifling business 
operations and contract negotiations and the Government inefficiently creating new ad hoc 
business laws (Moore, 2004). For example, in 1997, the import of various consumer goods such 
as shampoo, soap, toothpaste, televisions and radios was outlawed. This was the government's 
attempt to encourage the domestic industry and increase its labour force, but foreign investors 
saw it as command economy politics (Moore, 2004).  
Many foreign investors subsequently exited before the onset of the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crises. When the crisis hit, Vietnam suffered indirectly because thHFRXQWU\¶VELJJHVWLQYHVWRUV, 
such as Thailand, Japan and Taiwan - had less to invest as they propped up their own economies 
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from the effects of currency devaluations and capital flight. The country's key FDI problems 
were caused by the lack of a coherent government FDI policy (Scown, 1997). 
In 1998-1999, the Vietnamese Government introduced temporary solutions to improve the 
investment environment and the decline in FDI. New exemptions and reduction of taxes, land 
rents, goods prices and service fees were used to encourage investment. The most significant 
FDI policy step forward was to allow foreign joint-venture partners to buy out local partners, 
which marked a major policy turnaround from 1996, when the government allowed but 
discouraged wholly foreign-owned enterprises. However, these solutions were not enough to 
PHHW IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRUV¶ UHTXirement of more progressive investment laws and regulations. On 
WKHFRQWUDU\9LHWQDP¶VVWULFWFRQWUROVRQ WKHKROGLQJRI IRUHLJQFXUUHQF\ GXH WR WKH UHJLRQDO
crisis) made it difficult for investors to retain US dollars in order to pay salaries, loans and 
repatriate profits. Also, it was the difficult-to-interpret and ever-changing investment legal 
system that became the obstacle for FDI attraction in Vietnam in this period (Moore, 2004; 
Gillespie, 2006; Pham Duy Nghia, 1998; 2003; 2004).  
Consequently, the 1996 policy of FDI supplying Vietnam with 40 per cent of its investment 
needs by 2000 was not achieved. The resulting fallout hurt the Vietnamese economy and 
contributed to its unnecessary sluggish growth and poorly utilised resources and workforce 
(Nguyen Mai, 1997; Nicholson, 2003). 
5.1.4 Period 2000-2005 
The Government proposed numerous FDI legal reforms. The FIL was amended for the fourth 
time, in June 2000 (NAV, 2000b), attaching a series of decrees, decisions, and circulars, among 
of which was the Decree No.24/2000/ND-CP dated 31 July 2000 of the Government, providing 
detailed regulations on implementation of the FIL (NAV, 2000a; Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; 
Gillespie, 2007). 
The 2000 FIL continued to guarantee the authorised capital and assets of foreign investors, and 
allowed foreign investors to invest in most sectors of the economy, except for those relating to 
the national security, defense and public interests, and others of similar nature. It especially 
encouraged foreign investment in many new fields, such as in production and processing with at 
least 80 per cent export; cultivating and breeding in agricultural, forestry and aquatic sectors;  
application of new technology for production of telecommunication and information products; 
projects of high-tech level; projects in development research; production of waste treatment 
facilities/equipment; production of input materials for anti-biotic products (Balme and Sidel, 
2007; Gillespie, 2007).  
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The licensing process was substantially simplified and streamlined. Under the 2000 FIL, 
investment projects were divided into two categories, one of which required only registration for 
licensing and the other required appraisal for licensing. Previously, MPI served as the only µone-
stop¶ shop for licensing DSSOLFDWLRQV 1RZ QRW RQO\ 03, EXW DOVR SURYLQFLDO 3HRSOH¶V
Committees and industrial zone (IZ) authorities were delegated and authorised to evaluate and 
issue investment licenses. Investment licensing bodies were not allowed to refuse to grant 
investment licenses to projects qualified for registration for investment licenses. They had 15 
days from the date of receiving valid applications to grant licenses to investors. The maximum 
time limit for evaluation and issuance of an investment license was significantly shortened 
(AIBP, 2006). The official fee for a FDI license was abolished (Gillespie, 2006; 2007; Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2006; Balme and Sidel, 2007). 
In addition to basic forms of investment (BCC, JVC, FOC, BOT, BTO and BT), as a move to 
further liberalise investment and trade environment, the law allowed foreign companies 
engaging in trade to establish branches in the country and operate certain international and 
domestic trading activities. Representative offices were another option for companies with 
existing commercial ties with Vietnam. Investors were entitled to convert the form of 
investment, divide or separate, consolidate or merger, or equitise their companies in accordance 
with the law. Foreigners were allowed to buy stocks of domestic equitised state-owned 
enterprises (Nguyen Tan Dung, 2005; Le Viet Anh, 2004).  
The leasing of land and the evaluation of planning and architecture (of projects involving 
construction) were considered and approved during the course of project evaluation and the 
investment licensing process. After the technical design had been approved by the competent 
authority, the investor was entitled to commence construction work without any construction 
permit which was previously required before the commencement of construction. FDI 
enterprises also might use the construction attached to land and value of land use right as 
collateral for borrowing loan (Pham Duy Nghia, 2003; 2004; 2006; Gillespie, 2006; 2007; 
Balme and Sidel, 2007) 
Approval on capital transfer was no longer required and the fee on profit remittance abroad was  
reduced. Regulation that the FDI enterprise had to allocate their certain profit proportion to 
reserve fund was removed. Moreover, the tax system was further reformed to reduce the tax gap  
between domestic and foreign investment. Companies with foreign capital were autonomous in 
their operation. They could recruit local labour directly from the market, and sign and terminate 
labour contracts directly with employees in accordance with the Labour Law (Nicholson, 2003; 
McCargo, 2004). They could also directly handle the importation of equipment, machinery, 
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materials and other supplies for the construction and operation of their project, as well as the 
export and/or distribution of their products in Vietnam (i.e., FDI enterprises might act as dealers 
for import-export services). 
Nevertheless, the 2000 FIL did not see fruition until the 9th Party Congress in 2001 because 
many local administrative bodies hindered FDI via corruption and bureaucratic obstacles. It is 
the 9th Party Congress in spring 2001 that laid the groundwork for a new investment law that 
was published five years later. The resulting 9th Party Congress resolution came out, including 
improvements and transparency in the FIL; opened medical, travel and tourism sectors to 
foreign investment; declaration of the intention to change to a µcommon tax system¶; and 
granting foreign businesses the ability to hire local staff on their own accord and not via local 
hiring agencies (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001). Perhaps the most significant change at 
that time was a lower foreign-currency surrender rate of 40 per cent, down from 50 per  cent 
(Moore, 2004; Pham Duy Nghia, 2006).  
Since then, several past hindrances to FDI, such as myriad permits required by investment 
authorities, had by this point been removed (AIPB, 2004). Especially, numerous industrial zones 
around the country made it easy to set up a factory with a small degree of red tape and 
bureaucratic interference. In 2003, the Foreign Investment Agency belonging to the MPI was 
established, making management of foreign investment activities more concentrated, less 
overlapping and cumbersome. After that, the Prime Minister enacted the Instruction 
No.13/2005/CT-TTg dated 8 April 2005, which offered several solutions to boost foreign 
investment, made it easier to carry out licensed projects and attract more FDI sources (NAV, 
2005g). The decentralisation in licensing investment projecWV ZDV VKRZQ E\ *RYHUQPHQW¶V
approval of the Decree 92/2005/ND-CP, which provided detailed instructions on the 
implementation of the Hanoi Ordinance, etc (NAV, 2005e; Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Gillespie, 
2007). 
These changes, beginning a five-year FDI-reform movement, were a positive step in gaining 
LQYHVWRU FRQILGHQFH %DVHG RQ 9LHWQDP¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH $PHULFDQ %LODWHUDO 7UDGH
Agreement (BTA), a continually touted desire to join the WTO, and also the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations' Free Trade Area, Moody's upgraded Vietnam's creditworthiness from 
µstable¶ to µpositive¶ LQ  9LHWQDP¶V VORZ EXW WDQJLEOH )', OHJDO UHIRUPV SUREDEO\
contributed (Moore, 2004). The value of proposed FDI projects and disbursements both climbed 
gradually in spite of the global economic downturn (Gillespie, 2007). 
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In short, the government reformed FDI policy for the better by smaller steps. However, there 
remained gripes about FDI policy, such as a high top income tax of 30 per cent, high import 
tariffs for various product components that cost more than the final product, or forced purchase 
of locally produced parts for some products. For example, in September 2003, Vietnam instated 
a 25 per cent import tax on automotive parts kits for foreign manufactures with assembly plants 
in the country. The Government wanted to force FDI firms to purchase domestically made parts, 
partly due to the belief that it would decrease the number of cars on Vietnam's increasingly 
traffic choked roadways. Regardless, some auto makers declared to raise domestic prices per 
unit and to scale back investment until more optimal conditions evolved. Additionally, 
according to Ha Thu (2006), Vietnamese legal system still contained dozens of shortcomings 
which were hindering the development of economic sectors, not only FDI enterprises. 
Undeniably, the impacts of the FIL, the Law on Enterprises (LE), the Law on Domestic 
Investment Promotion (LDIP) and other rules that provided incompatible provisions on different 
economic sectors should be reconsidered.  
The divergence in establishment procedures and incentives was also in place, all of which 
reflected the fact that the business-related legal framework and law enforcement tended to be 
protectionism oriented, inconsistent, lacking in strategies for priorities, and discriminatory. It 
was commonly agreed that regardless of its source, domestic or overseas, because of its growth-
fuelling nature, investment indisputably needed to be encouraged. And creating a common legal 
framework promised to provide all investors with increased flexibility on an equal footing. 
Finally, there was also a need to set up a more transparent, stable and predictable legal 
framework for FDI (Pham Duy Nghia, 2007; Gillespie, 2006; 2007). 
5.1.5 Period after 2005 
Twenty years after the beginning of µDoi Moi¶, 2006 became an important year in Vietnam's 
development and integration in the world economy. Important developments could be seen from 
the establishment of a new investment legal framework. Under the former investment regime, 
foreign and domestic investors were subject to different regulations: foreign investors were 
governed by the FIL and domestic investors by the LE and the LDIP. In July 2006, a new 
investment regime comprising a unified Enterprise Law (UEL) for the management of both 
domestic and foreign enterprises, and a common Investment Law (CIL), regarding both foreign 
and domestic investment activities, has come into effect, granting a more level playing field than 
that found under the previous investment regime (NAV, 2005). This section will discuss some 
new features of the CIL and the UEL (for sources and further reading see: Le Van Triet, et.al, 
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1991; Le Xuan Dinh, 1999; Luu Van Dat, 1997; Nguyen Thi Anh, 1997; Pham Duy Nghia, 
1998; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2006, Gillespie, 2006; 2007; Nicholson, 2003). 
(1) One of the more encouraging clauses in the CIL, and a promising indication of the 
development of law in Vietnam, is an article stating: µInvestors shall be permitted to 
invest in all sectors and in all industries and trades which are not prohibited by law; and 
shall have the right to autonomy and to make decisions on investment activities in 
accordance with the law of Vietnam¶ (NAV, 2005j). This principle is a departure from the 
general principle, followed in the previous investment laws, allowing investments only in 
areas specified by law. However, investment projects must fall within the plans approved 
and provided by the Government. When a project does not fall into a stipulated master 
plan, the State administrative body for investment shall be responsible to act as 
coordinator with the State bodies responsible for master planning for the purpose of 
responding to investors (NAV, 2005j). This means that although the new Investment Law 
allows investments not prohibited by law, some of them are still subject to further 
regulation and State authority's decision (Pham Duy Nghia, 2006). 
(2) A new parallel system of registration and licensing for enterprises is also introduced in 
the CIL. Investors must follow different licensing and registration steps depending on the 
size and the sector of investment.  
Level 1 (Business Registration): Small domestic enterprises with invested capital below 
VND15 billion (USD 940,000), not falling in conditional sectors are only subject to business 
registration. However, they are subject to investment registration in the event they fall into a 
conditional sector, or if domestic investors want incentives for investment recorded in their 
license.  
Level 2 (Investment Registration): Foreign projects with invested capital under VND300 
billion (USD19 million) not falling in conditional sectors require investment registration, where 
the investor must submit an application for investment registration to the Licensing Authority, 
along with a µreport on the financial capacity of the investor¶ and the proposed constitutive 
documents for the enterprise (Decree No.108/2006/ND-CP dated 22 September 2006). The 
investment certificate also serves as business registration of a corporate entity. Domestic 
invested projects between VND15-300 billion (USD19 million) are also subject to this 
registration. Local investors may set up their corporate entity separately and then file for 
registration of any project without receiving an investment certificate. Enterprises can register 
additional investment projects subsequently without the need to create a separate entity.  
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Level 3 (Investment Evaluation): Any project with invested capital over VND300 billion 
(USD19 million) or projects in conditional sectors must undergo an investment evaluation by 
the Licensing Authority and other relevant authorities. For the evaluation of investment projects 
greater than VND300 billion, along with the application documents, the applicant must also 
submit an µecono-technical explanation¶ of the investment project. When assessing the 
certificate application, the Licensing Authority will liaise with other Ministries and authorities in 
evaluating the proposed investment project. For investment projects in conditional sectors, the 
investor must also demonstrate compliance with requirements specific to that conditional sector 
(Gillespies, 2007; Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
(3) The licensing of certain investment projects in µsensitive sectors¶ must be approved by the 
Prime Minister. These investment projects include those relating to air and seaports, 
mining, broadcasting, casinos, cigarette manufacturing, and foreign investment projects 
with an investment capital over VND1.500 billion (around USD94 million) in the 
industries of electricity generation; mineral processing; road and railway construction; 
alcohol production and trading; other sectors such as post, delivery, telecommunications 
networks and publishing. 
(4) Article 66 of the CIL grants government guarantees: µBased on the principles stipulated in 
this Law, the Government shall decide on important projects and provision of guarantees 
for loans, supply of raw materials, sale of products, payment and guarantee for 
performance of other contractual obligations to projects.¶ (NAV, 2005j). This gives 
investors a good basis to rely on guarantees for important projects in Vietnam even 
though the phrases µBased on the principles stipulated in this Law¶ and µimportant 
projects¶ are unclear.  
(5) Disputes between foreign invested enterprises (considered local entities) and state 
administrative bodies may be resolved not only through Vietnamese arbitration or a 
Vietnamese court, but by an international arbitration body in some cases. International 
arbitration must be written into a contract, or stipulated in an applicable trade treaty with 
Vietnam. This should give foreign investors greater confidence when doing business with 
Vietnamese partners, especially the government. 
(6) The UEL provides four main forms of business including a limited liability company 
(LLC), a joint stock company (JSC), an incorporated partnership, and a private enterprise 
(i.e., sole proprietorships). Foreign investors having chosen to set up a business in the 
form of a JVC will find that either a LLC or JSC would be the most appropriate 
structures. Moreover, it should be noted that previously, foreign investors were limited by 
the business models that were available to them, which in essence consisted of either 
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JVCs with state enterprises or BCCs that were heavily and at times arbitrarily regulated 
by the government. Now, foreign firms can diversify into other business models, most 
notably wholly foreign-owned businesses. 
(7) Neither the CIL nor the UEL set restrictions on the percentage of a company a foreigner 
may own. There are some exceptions to this general rule under regulations dealing with 
conditional sectors or WTO commitments. Foreigners can purchase shares in domestic 
companies, subject to the restrictions on conditional sectors mentioned above. In addition, 
there is currently a general 49 per cent cap on foreign equity ownership of companies 
listed on the Vietnamese stock market. Discussions within the legal community predict 
that changes in the near future will positively affect potential foreign shareholders. It is 
speculated that rather than have a list of sectors where foreigners may purchase shares of 
an enterprise, the government will list sectors which are either prohibited or restricted for 
foreigners (VILAF, 2007).  
(8) On managing issues, the FIL requires a quorum and a unanimous vote of the board of 
management in order to decide certain issues pertaining to JVC, which means neither 
party to a JVC can exercise absolute control over the board of management because a 
management board quorum requires a representative from each party be present at the 
meeting. Even where a quorum is present, a super-majority or consensus requirement 
applies to many decisions of the board. In practice, these strict requirements have caused 
problems to many JVCs as the minority shareholder is able to deadlocks board meetings. 
Constraints like these will be lifted from the CIL and the UEL, which is a positive sign. 
The UEL also creates management structures with built in mechanisms allowing future 
meetings with reduced or no quorums preventing manipulation of quorum in shareholder's 
meeting, and board meetings of a limited liability company.  
(9) LLC and a JSC both have distinct advantages and disadvantages that investors should be 
aware of before choosing an appropriate structure. 
(10) The distinct advantage of a JSC is that a foreign partner may always sell shares to raise 
capital. The foreign partner may allocate for himself enough shares to achieve quorum in 
a first meeting to enable them to control any voting.  
(11) The JSC structure may be preferable for a minority foreign partner interested in testing 
the market before fully establishing themselves in an unknown market. A JSC offers an 
easier method for a minority partner to increase his activity within the company by 
purchasing other shares, and potentially a majority share and also gives an easier exit to a 
partner wishing to sell his shares.  
(12) The LLC structure is likely to be the optimum structure for a fully foreign owned 
enterprise. The single owner has complete control of the company and is not subject to 
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rules governing business relationships with partners, quorums, and majority voting. The 
LLC structure may also be preferable for foreign investors entering into joint ventures 
with Vietnamese parties. In an LLC, the foreign investor may choose his partners, rather 
than in a JSC where the public has the rights to purchase shares. The foreign partner may 
also enter an agreement within an LLC that, in the event the local partner wants to sell his 
share in the company, the foreign partner has pre-emptive rights of purchase.  
(13) A good indication that Vietnam is developing rules for a market economy are articles 
prohibiting the Government from: forcing purchase, use of domestic goods and services; 
forcing export of a certain percentage of goods and services; limiting imports based on 
the quantity of goods exported; requiring a certain ratio of local content in manufacturing; 
requiring certain levels of domestic research and development; and forcing supply and 
location of goods and services or a head office in a certain location. Ensuring that foreign 
investors are protected from these unnecessary externalities will help keep business 
operations simple, efficient, and productive. Foreign entrepreneurs are more likely to 
invest in Vietnam if their operations can be based on market demands rather than 
Government dictations. This is an encouraging legal point and a critical market principle. 
(14) One of the hotly debated issues during the drafting process of the CIL was how to 
include and record investment incentives. The CIL grants that investors, established and 
new, will be entitled to incentives, including tax incentives. These incentives will be 
recorded in the investment certificate which records investment incentives, for all foreign 
projects as well as those domestic projects of VND300 billion or more or in conditional 
sectors. It is optional for other domestic projects to obtain an investment certificate. 
Foreign investors generally appreciate their incentives recorded on their investment 
licenses since many have experienced challenges when dealing with the tax office 
regarding entitled incentives.  
TKHVHQHZ/DZVDUHSDUWRI9LHWQDP¶VHIIRUWVWRIROORZ international investment practices as it 
ORRNV WR IXUWKHU LQWHJUDWH LQWR WKH JOREDO PDUNHW $OWKRXJK WKLV HIIRUW LQGLFDWHV 9LHWQDP¶V
seriousness regarding FDI attraction, the Laws have faults that alarm foreign investors. 
The UEL, which regulates all matters of corporate governance for both domestic and foreign 
enterprises, could significantly improve the corporate governance framework within Vietnamese 
enterprises. The CIL, on the other hand, no longer regulates corporate governance but regulates 
access and entrance to the market through licensing and registration requirements. While the 
UEL promises to grant a more level playing field than the earlier regime, the CIL holds onto 
some old restrictions with many ambiguous and vague clauses (Pham Duy Nghia, 2004; 2006). 
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The main provisions regarding licensing have not been changed dramatically for foreign 
investors and still resemble the old FIL in many ways. Perhaps one of the greatest problems of 
the CIL is the multi-tier, multi-step system of registration and licensing for enterprises. Investors 
must fulfill different procedures depending on the size and the sector of investment. Especially, 
projects over 300 billion VND or in conditional sectors must undergo an investment evaluation, 
but the evaluation criteria are rather vague focusing on a series of investment conditions and 
goals a project must fulfill (VILAF, 2007). Definitions of what the goals and conditions are, and 
clarifications of several other unclear provisions will be updated in future implementing 
regulations. As of now, the CIL does not provide much guidance on the criteria an investor must 
meet to pass evaluation. This type of market uncertainty, in relation to government licensing and 
registration, is not helpful. Also, conditional sectors of investment are rather broad and vague, 
and will require both further implementing legislation as well as lessons from practice to fully 
understand (Pham Duy Nghia, 2003; 2006; Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Bui Hai 
Thiem, 2009).  
Another worrisome creation of the CIL is the Investment Inspectorate. Some observers fear the 
creation of an Investment Inspectorate will cause more harm than good. One fear is that the 
Investment Inspectorate will be able to inspect different projects at their own discretion without 
justifying their investigation to another independent body. In other words, an investment project 
need not be suspected of wrongdoing to be inspected. The process of arbitrary inspection 
without cause may become a regular tool of corruption and extortion, as inspection activities 
will probably be intrusive, annoying, and slow down production. This powerful body with high 
potential for corruption may add to already existing problems of doing business in Vietnam 
(Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Seow and Ching, 2008).  
Vietnamese authorities still have work to do when drafting implementing decrees: filling in 
holes, clarifying ambiguities, and creating a more transparent investment system. But, the open 
dialogue and willingness of the government to engage problems indicates a strong possibility 
that future developments will continue positively. 
5.2 Other laws and regulations involved in FDI 
5.2.1 Investment Agreements  
Prior to joining the WTO, Vietnam entered into bilateral investment treaties with a number of 
partners, including the US, Japan, Singapore and the European Union. The provisions in these 
ELODWHUDOWUHDWLHVKDYHODUJHO\EHHQVXSHUVHGHGE\9LHWQDP¶VFRPPLWPHQWVXSRQDFFHGLQJWRWKH
WTO (Nguyen Quan, 2003; Nguyen Lory 2004, Kurtz, 2004). 
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Vietnam joined the WTO as its 150th member on 11 January 2007, concluding a 12 year 
negotiation process. Joining the WTO is seen as a significant step for Vietnam as it marks the 
FRXQWU\¶VHQWUDQFHWRWKHJOREDOFOXERIWUDGLQJQDWLRQV (Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Athukorala and 
Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
Two fundamental principles embodied in the WTO treaties are MFN (most-favored nation) and 
National Treatment (WTO, 2008). MFN requires each WTO member country to give other 
investors from other member countries treatment no less favourable than that accorded to any 
third country. MFN does not prevent countries from granting extra privileges to certain 
countries under separate agreements (e.g. ASEAN), as long as such agreements have substantial 
sectoral coverage and provide for the absence or elimination of trade discrimination between the 
parties to such an agreement. National Treatment requires each country give to nationals and 
companies of the other treatment no less favourable than that which is given to its own nationals 
and companies (Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
Under the WTO rules, Vietnam must extend national treatment to the projects of investors from 
WTO member countries. This means that Vietnamese and foreign invested projects should be 
treated equally. In fact, this principle has been reflected in the CIL and the Government is 
reviewing a range of legislation to ensure that national treatment extends to all business 
regulations.  
5.2.2 Trading and distribution rights 
The Vietnamese Commercial Law (2005) has been significantly amended, establishing a new 
legal framework for foreign participation in the import and distribution sector. While previously 
foreign investors could only conduct commercial activities from representative offices and 
branches, the new Commercial Law allows foreign invested enterprises to independently 
conduct commercial activities (NAV, 2005c). In accordance with market access commitments 
contained in international treaties to which Vietnam is a signatory, the Decree No. 23/2007/ND-
CP dated 12 February 2007 of the Government provides the legal basis for foreign-invested 
companies (FICs) to engage in trading and distribution activities (NAV, 2007a).  
The first cornerstone trade treaty with Vietnam is the BTA (UTR, 2001), by which, as of 10 
December 2004, an American company with up to a 49 per cent share in a JVC with a 
Vietnamese counterpart has the right to engage in trading activities. Import trading and 
distribution rights will still, however, be subject to Government approval regarding existing 
manufacturers. With effect from 10 December 2007, an American company may own up to 51 
per cent of a JVC; and from 10 December 2008, it may wholly own an enterprise in Vietnam. 
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Vietnam also gives MFN status to investors from Japan and the EU and they may also enjoy the 
same entitlement given to American investors. However, before enjoying BTA trading and 
distribution rights, an existing manufacturer must first amend its license through application 
subject to government approval. Thus, American enterprises would not automatically enjoy 
trading rights and distribution rights under BTA without going through further legal 
mechanisms of approval (Kurtz, 2004; Seow and Ching, 2008 p.1-30).  
%\IDUWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWWUHDW\LQWKLVDUHDLV9LHWQDP¶VSURWRFRORIDFFHVVLRQWRWKH:72$V
part of its WTO accession package, Vietnam has committed to granting trading rights (the right 
to import and export goods) for all goods to foreign individuals and organisations from WTO 
member states no later than 1 January 2007. Trading rights do not apply to various products 
reserved for µState-trading¶ enterprises (for example tobacco products, crude oil and petroleum 
products) and products for which rights are being phased in, for example import rights for 
pharmaceuticals will be phased in on 1 January 2009 and rights to export rice will be not be 
granted until 1 January 2011. Moreover, despite the WTO accession package, an importer is not 
permitted to directly distribute the imported goods in Vietnam without a distribution license, but 
Vietnam has committed to steadily increasing foreign participation in distribution services 
(Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009; Taussig, 2009; Bui Hai Thiem, 2009). 
It is still necessary to conduct some legal and regulatory reforms to enable Vietnam fully meet 
its commitments with regards to liberalising trading rights and distribution. However, trading 
DQGGLVWULEXWLRQULJKWVRI),&VKDYHXQGHQLDEO\EHHQEURDGHQHGLQFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWK9LHWQDP¶V
market access schedule in its international undertakings, which could help increase the 
efficiency and profitability of investment as forecasted by IMF (2007).  
5.2.3 Banking and Finance 
x Foreign Exchange 
While the Government is responsible for the macro-economic foreign exchange policies, the 
State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) is responsible for regulating and implementing those policies and 
for overseeing currency transactions to ensure that they comply with the relevant guidelines. A 
significant step in State management on foreign exchange is the birth of the Foreign Exchange 
Ordinance (NAV, 2005f), which was passed by the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly on 13 December 2005 with an expectation that this new legislation would regulate the 
high level foreign exchange market in Vietnam and satisfy the conditions for the country's 
integration into the WTO (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; Vu Bang Tam, 2008,).  
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x Bank Accounts 
Accounts in Vietnam: All FICs and foreign parties to BCCs must open a Capital Account with a 
bank located in Vietnam. The main purpose of the Capital Account is to monitor the flow of 
capital in foreign currency into and out of Vietnam. Therefore, certain transfers of capital (e.g. 
transfer of capital/equity, profits or off-shore loans) must be effected through this Capital 
Account. In addition to the Capital Account, FICs and foreign parties to BCCs can open other 
foreign currency and VND accounts at other banks in Vietnam.  
Accounts outside Vietnam: The opening and operation of off-shore accounts are under the strict 
control of, and must be approved by, the SBV. Normally, the SBV approves off-shore accounts 
for the purposes of disbursement and repayment of an off-shore loan provided that the loan 
principal must not be less than US$ 5million. Recent regulations have allowed FICs to open off-
shore accounts in certain special circumstances. In practice, SBV has approved several off-shore 
accounts opened by BOT companies in Vietnam for security purposes as required under 
financing agreements or for the remittance of equity (Taussig, 2009,). 
x Liberalisation of current transactions 
With the introduction of the Foreign Exchange Ordinance and the issuance of Decree No.160 
(NAV, 2006b), the payments and money transfers in relation to current transactions in Vietnam 
are said to be liberalised. This represents Vietnam's commitment to the liberalisation of current 
transactions in accordance with such conditions set out in Article VIII of the IMF Rules 
(VILAF, 2007). In particular, a foreign investor is now allowed to remit overseas his profits or 
invested capital without presenting the remitting bank a tax certificate from the tax office as 
evidence that it has fulfilled all tax obligations in Vietnam. 
x Foreign Currency Payments 
Foreign currency payments within Vietnam, except for certain limited circumstances, are strictly 
prohibited under the Foreign Exchange Ordinance and are subject to the strict control of the 
SBV. Except certain permissible circumstances provided by the Circular 01 of the SBV dated 16 
April 1999 or otherwise permitted by the Prime Minister, residents and non-residents are 
prohibited from making payments, granting loans and advertising of goods and services in a 
foreign currency (NAV, 1999). A breach of the above requirements may make the whole 
contract, to which the payment relates, invalid (Taussig, 2009). 
x Exchange Rate 
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In term of rates of exchange, each day the SBV announces, in the mass media, an average 
exchange rate in the Foreign Currency Interbank Market of VND against USD. This official 
exchange rate shall be used to calculate import/export duties; to consider bidding for national 
projects at the time of bidding openings; and to calculate the value of capital contributions made 
to a JVC or a BCC at the time of the capital contribution. Commercial banks (including foreign 
bank branches) shall determine and announce their buying/selling rates of VND against US$ 
within the range permitted by SBV (Taussig, 2009,) 
x Taxation 
Taxes that may affect foreign invested projects and foreigners working in Vietnam include 
Corporate Income Tax; Capital Transfer Tax; Value Added Tax; Special Consumption Tax; 
Import - Export Duties; so on. The backbone of the tax system is all the tax laws, for instance, 
the Law on Corporate Income Tax (2003), the Law on Value-Added Tax (1997), the Law on 
Special Sales Tax (1998), the Law on Import/Export Duty (2005), etc. There are also hundreds 
of decrees, circulars and other regulations being issued by the Government, various ministries 
and agencies, from time to time, with a view to guiding for the implementation of those laws 
(Seow and Ching, 2008). 
x Corporate Income Tax  
Before the CIL comes into effects, Corporate Income Tax (CIT) is levied on the taxable income 
of FICs and foreign parties to BCCs licensed to operate in Vietnam. The calculation of taxable 
income for CIT is revenues generated in their production and business less reasonable expenses 
in the relevant fiscal year. The reasonable expenses for the stated deduction purpose are strictly 
regulated by the tax authority and must be supported by valid invoices, vouchers and relevant 
documents. Limitations are applied to certain deductible expenses (Athukorala, 2006; Magennis, 
2006). 
With effect from 1 January 2004, the new Law on CIT (NAV, 2003b) introduces a standard CIT 
rate of 28 per cent (instead of 25 per cent previously applicable to FICs and foreign parties to 
BCCs) for both local enterprises operating under the UEL and FICs, including foreign parties to 
BCCs. Other than the standard rate, preferential rates of 10, 15 and 20 per cent apply to a 
number of investment projects which satisfy certain conditions such as investment in certain 
fields of business and/or encouraged geographical locations. 
In addition to preferential CIT rates, FICs and foreign parties to BCCs may enjoy CIT 
exemption from 2 to 4 years after the first profit-making year and reduction of 50 per cent CIT 
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from 2 to 9 years subsequently. However, the refund of CIT with respect to reinvested profits is 
no longer entitled by FICs and foreign parties to BCCs. (Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 
2009; Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007) 
During the operation, any losses incurred by FICs or foreign parties to BCCs in any tax year 
may be carried over to the following years. However, losses cannot be carried over for more 
than 5 years. Carrying - back of losses are not permitted. The registration of losses carried-
forward is strictly monitored by the tax authority. In principle, the tax authority will not accept 
losses carried-forward if they are not registered on time. 
From 1 January 2004, profits derived from foreign investments in Vietnam have not been 
subject to profit remittance tax when remitted out of Vietnam. (The rate of this tax before was, 
depending on the prescribed capital scale and other criteria, 3.5 or 7 per cent).  
x Capital Transfer Tax 
Capital transfer tax is in nature a form of CIT imposed on profits earned by foreign investors 
from the transfer of their interest in the legal capital of an FIC or in the capital of a BCC. The 
taxable profit is determined as the sales price less (i) the initial value of contributed capital and 
(ii) any transfer expenses. With regard to subsequent transfers, the initial value of the 
contributed capital shall be the price of the preceding transfer plus the amount of any additional 
contributed capital. The tax rate applied to capital transfer is 28 per cent of the taxable profit. 
Upon obtaining the amendment to the investment license, the transferor is required to register 
the transfer of capital and file tax returns with the tax authority. (VILAF, 2007) 
x Value Added Tax 
Value Added Tax (VAT) applies to supplies of goods and services for use in production, 
business or consumption in Vietnam (NAV, 1997). VAT is calculated on the sale/purchase price 
of the relevant goods or service before the addition of VAT. The applicable VAT rates are 0, 5 
and 10 per cent, of which the normal rate of 10 per cent is applicable to most goods and 
services; 5 per cent for a number of encouraged goods and services; and 0 per cent for exported 
ones. VAT payments to the tax authority are the difference between output VAT and input 
VAT. Foreign invested projects shall be exempt from VAT in respect to the certain imported 
items. 
x Special Consumption Tax 
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Special consumption tax (SCT) is applied to the production or import of certain goods and the 
provision of certain services, which are either luxury or discouraged for consumption. In 
addition to being subject to SCT with the rates ranging from 15 to 100 per cent, the above goods 
and services also are subject to VAT at 10 per cent. If they are imported, import duty at various 
rates will apply in addition. (NAV, 1998) 
x Import and Export Duties 
According to NAV (2005i), export duties are charged on a few items, primarily agricultural 
products (e.g. rice, forest products and fish) and natural minerals. Rates vary between 0 and 50 
per cent of the FOB price of exported goods.  
Import duty rates are now classified into three categories as follows: (1) preferential r ates vary 
between 0 and 150 per cent of the CIF price of imported goods. Preferential rates are applied to 
goods imported from one of some 60 countries which have MFN status with Vietnam; (2) 
ordinary rates apply to goods imported from other countries. These are up to 50 per cent above 
the preferential rates applicable to MFN countries; and (3) special preferential rates apply to 
goods imported from countries which have a special preferential agreement with Vietnam, e.g. 
the ASEAN member countries under the CEPT and EU member countries under the Textile-
Garment Treaty between Vietnam and EU. The dutiable value of imported goods is based on the 
invoice price (with penalties for fraudulent declarations), which is not available or 10 per cent 
lower than the minimum price, which is set by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) under Circular 
113 dated 15 December 2005 (NAV, 2005a). 
FICs and parties to BCCs shall be exempted from import duty imposed on some goods, 
provided that: (a) they are implementing a project in an encouraged field of business or in a 
geographical location set out in Decree No. 108 (NAV, 2006a); (b) such goods are imported to 
form the fixed assets of the enterprise; and (c) they are imported to expand the project's scale 
and to replace or remove the technology. 
With regard to materials and raw materials imported for producing exported goods, the payment 
of the import duty can be postponed for a certain period of time. If the enterprise fails to export 
its products within such a period, the import duty will be imposed. However, the import duty 
will be refunded when the products are eventually exported. This exemption may have to be 
DEROLVKHGDVSDUWRI9LHWQDP¶VFRPPLWPHQWVWRDEROLVKH[SRUWVXEVLGLHVZKHQMRLQLQJWKH:72 
,Q IDFW LQ9LHWQDP¶V OHJDO IUDPHZRUN import-export policies mainly reflected by the Law on 
import and export duties are considered one of important factors to raise the attractiveness  of 
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investment environment. However, despite many times of amendment and supplement, after 
years of implementation, the Law on import-export taxes has exposed several shortcomings that 
need revising in order to create clearer and more effective legal framework for not only 
DWWUDFWLQJ )', SURPRWLQJ H[SRUW LPSURYLQJ 9LHWQDPHVH JRRGV¶ FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV LQ ORFDO DQG
iQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHWV EXW DOVRKDUPRQL]LQJ9LHWQDP¶V UHJXODWLRQVZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV 
(Nguyen Ke Tuan, 1996, Pham Chi Dung, 1992; Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; 
Magennis, 2006). 
x Withholding Tax and Foreign contractor tax 
According to Circular 05 dated 11 January 2005 by the MOF, the amount of interests and fees 
payable under offshore loans is subject to withholding tax at a rate of 10 per cent. Loans 
obtained by a branch in Vietnam from its offshore parent companies also are subject to 
withholding tax (NAV, 2005b).  
Foreign contractor tax (FCT) applies to foreign organisations and individuals that have business 
incomes sourced in Vietnam, even though they do not have a physical presence in Vietnam. 
Services which are performed wholly overseas but provided to a project in Vietnam will also be 
subject to FCT. Under Circular 05, foreign contractors will have one of following options: (i) 
paying taxes by way of withholding by the relevant employer; (ii) registering with the 
Vietnamese accounting system for the direct payment of taxes; and (iii) with respect to foreign 
contractors having a µpermanent establishment¶ in Vietnam, paying taxes under the µhybrid¶ 
method, which combines elements of both other methods. 
x Personal Income Tax 
Tax payers include (1) Resident foreigners who stay in Vietnam for 183 days or more within a 
consecutive 12 month period are subject to Personal Income Tax (PIT) at progressive rates on 
worldwide-sourced regular income (regardless from where the income is paid) and Vietnam-
sourced irregular income; (2) Non-resident foreigners who stay in Vietnam for less than 183 
days in a consecutive 12 month period are subject to PIT on regular and irregular income 
sourced in Vietnam during their residence in Vietnam; and (3) Vietnamese citizens working in 
or outside Vietnam are subject to tax on worldwide-sourced regular income and irregular 
income. (VILAF, 2007) 
For resident foreigners and Vietnamese citizens working overseas, PIT rates change from 0 per 
cent (imposed on persons with monthly income below 8 million VND), to 10 per cent (from 8 to 
20 million VND); 20 per cent (from 20 to 50 million VND); 30 per cent (50 to 80 million 
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VND); 40 per cent (over 80 million VND). Non-resident foreigners are subject to a tax rate of 
25 per cent of incomes sourced in Vietnam during the relevant period of time. 
x Technology Transfer 
Following the Decree 11 detailing regulations on technology transfer dated 2 February 2005, 
technology transfer in Vietnam is currently regulated by the newly enacted Law on Technology 
Transfer on 1 July 2007 (NAV, 2005d; 2006d). 
Under the Law on Technology Transfer, µtechnology¶ is defined as µsolutions, processes and 
know-how, which may or may not be associated with tools and means, to turn resources into 
products.¶ This definition may prove difficult to implement in practice. 
The Law on Technology Transfer prohibits transfer of technologies which: (i) fail to satisfy the 
requirements stipulated by the laws on occupational safety, labour hygiene, protection of human 
health, and protection of natural resources and the environment; (ii) create products causing 
harm to socio-economic development and having an adverse impact on national defense and 
security or social order and safety; (iii) are not permitted to be transferred pursuant to a 
provision in an international treaty of which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a member; or 
(iv) are on the list of State secrets, unless a provision of law provides otherwise (Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2004). 
5.2.4 Land Law 
On the 6th November 2003, the National Assembly of Vietnam passed the Land Law, which 
commenced effect on 1 July 2004 (NAV, 2003a). The Government issued Decree 181 dated 29 
October 2004 (NAV, 2004b) for providing guidance on the Land Law, as amended by Decree 
17 dated 27 January 2006 (NAV, 2006c). These laws and guidance stipulate some main issues 
such as land use rights, real estate market and land price (Ton Gia Huyen and Tran Thi Minh 
Ha, 2009). 
Under the Law, private ownership of land is not permitted in Vietnam and the State/Government 
holds all ownership powers. The Land Use Right Certificate, unlike a deed, is not a certificate of 
ownership of the land, but a certificate of ownership of Land Use Right (LUR). While the Land 
Law allows domestic companies to purchase the LUR from others, foreign investors are not 
allowed to do so. Foreign investors in Vietnam however could obtain the LUR by way of (i) 
capital contribution in the form of the LUR value by the local partner to a JVC; or (ii) land lease 
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directly from certain permitWHGOHDVHUV¶, including the State (Ton Gia Huyen and Tran Thi Minh 
Ha, 2009).  
The new Land Law finally recognises the existence a real estate market and regulates what types 
of land that can be traded in the market. It specifically prohibits land users from putting land 
allocated/leased to them by the State to carry out investment projects into the market. It also 
recognises that the State must play a role in the development of this market and empowers the 
State body in charge of land to regulate the registration of real estate transactions; establishment 
of real estate investment funds; establishment of related-service providers and to take measures 
to avoid speculation and protect participant in the market (Ton Gia Huyen and Tran Thi Minh 
Ha, 2009).  
Land 3ULFHLVGHWHUPLQHGLQWKUHHZD\VLE\WKHUHOHYDQW3HRSOH¶V&RPPLWWHHLLYLDDXFWLRQ
or (iii) by land users upon transfer/lease, sublease of LURs or contribution of LURs as capital. 
The State determines land price based on actual value of land in normal circumstances, if there 
is a large discrepancy in their calculations compared to the market price the State must adjust 
the price (Ton Gia Huyen and Tran Thi Minh Ha, 2009).  
While private ownership of land is not permitted, Vietnamese law expressly recognises 
mortgages over LURs in favour of credit institutions in Vietnam, including foreign bank 
branches in Vietnam. Unfortunately, foreign investors may be disappointed to find that the right 
to mortgage LURs to offshore lenders is not provided for and they must still lease land from the 
State (Ton Gia Huyen and Tran Thi Minh Ha, 2009, p. 1-4). 
In general, compared to the previous 1993 Land Law, the current Law does contain some 
significant changes in respect of land administration formalities, recognition of the reality that 
land is a valuable commodity and the existence of a real estate market and pricing of land. 
However, during application of the Land Law, many shortcomings have come to light. Due to 
constraints remain in land clearance and compensation, as well as administrative formalities, the 
real estate market has not become transparent, making it difficult for foreign investors (Mai 
Thanh Hai, 2009). Moreover, as the law is not currently clear on a number of aspects, further 
implementing legislation need be issued (Ton Gia Huyen and Tran Thi Minh Ha, 2009). 
5.2.5 Employment 
Following the promulgation of the Labour Code in June 1994 (as amended), a series of 
implementing regulations have been issued to govern particular areas of labour law, including 
labour contracts, employment procedures, working hours and salary (NAV, 1994a, Nicholson, 
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2003; McCargo, 2004). The Labour Code is often said to be complex, and some foreign firms 
have found it difficult to comply with its requirements. (For further reading VHH µ9LHWQDPHVH
Labour Code 23-VLC, 1994 as Amended 2002, Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
- MOLISA)  
x Recruitment 
Under the Labour Code, FIEs are allowed to recruit Vietnamese employees directly or through a 
recruitment center. Before recruiting, FIEs are required to make a public announcement on 
either local or central mass media and post at their head office their recruitment requirements 
such as job description, qualifications, number of labourers to be recruited, contract term, salary 
and working conditions.  
Where highly technical, managerial or other qualifications are required for which Vietnamese 
personnel are not available, a FIE may recruit expatriates. However, there must be a training 
program to allow Vietnamese employees to eventually replace such expatriates. Vietnamese law 
recently imposed a cap on the total number of expatriate employees, which cannot now exceed 3 
per cent of the total workforce, but a FIE may employ more expatriates if it obtains approval 
from the Chairman of the provincial People's Committee (VLC-MOLISA, 2002).  
x Labour Contracts 
A labour contract must, with the exception of contracts with a term of less than 3 months, be in 
writing and signed directly between an employee and the legal representative of the employer. 
The contract must be made in the standard form issued by the MOLISA. The contents of a 
labour contract must be in compliance with the laws of Vietnam and the collective labour 
agreement of the relevant company if there is one (VLC-MOLISA, 2002). 
x Termination of Employment 
The Labour Code only allows unilateral termination of a labour contract in limited 
circumstances, irrespective of any mutual agreement or other circumstances. An employee who 
signs a non-fixed term labour contract is entitled to unilaterally terminate the contract whenever 
he/she wishes so, provided that a 45 day prior notice is duly given to the employer. However, 
during the term of a labour contract, unilateral termination by an employer is permitted only in 
the certain circumstances (VLC-MOLISA, 2002). 
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Dismissal is permitted only when the employee has committed one (or more) of the following 
acts: theft; embezzlement; disclosure of technological and business secrets; repeating a breach 
while a disciplinary sanction remains in place for an earlier breach; or absence for 5 working 
GD\VRUPRUHLQDPRQWKRUZRUNLQJGD\VLQD\HDUZLWKRXWMXVWLILDEOHUHDVRQV«+RZHYHU
companies should exercise caution when dismissing employees. The laws and practice of 
Vietnam differ from those in certain other countries. The concept of employee conflict of 
interests or employee loyalty is not well developed. 
A company may retrench its employees where there is an organisational restructuring or 
technological change resulting in the redundancy of an employee who has worked for the 
company for 12 months or more. The retrenchment must strictly follow procedural 
requirements, otherwise it would be deemed unlawful (VLC- MOLISA, 2002). 
x Wages, Overtime Payments, and Statutory Minimums 
The Government decides and publishes a minimum wage which varies, depending on 
geographical regions and types of work. In particular, FICs must not pay salaries to their 
employees lower than the statutory minimum wage levels applicable to untrained labourers. 
With respect to employees who have obtained vocational training (including vocational training 
conducted by the relevant FIC itself), FICs are required to pay a salary at least 7 per cent above 
the statutory minimum wage. 
An employee working for at least 12 months is entitled to annual leave of 12 days in addition to 
public holidays. Especially certain hazardous and toxic jobs are entitled to either 14 or 16 days 
annual leave as determined by the Government. An employee is entitled to paid leave for the 
following personal reasons: marriage (3 days' leave); marriage of son or daughter (1 day's 
leave); and death of parents, spouse's parents, spouse, son or daughter (3 days' leave). Female 
employees are entitled to maternity leave of at least 4 months, with an allowance equal to 100 
per cent of the salary to be paid by the Social Insurance Fund.  
In terms of other issues involved in work permits, collective labour agreement, working rules, 
trade unions, employment funds (funds for social insurance, health insurance, retrenchment 
allowances) and labour disputes, FICs must comply with the common Law Code articles in 
Vietnam (VLC-MOLISA, 2002). 
x Employment Funds 
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Contribution to the State Social Insurance Fund is a statutory obligation of both the employer 
and employee in all contractual employment relationships longer than three months. The Social 
Insurance Fund provides benefits such as pensions, salaries during sick days, salaries and 
treatment for labour-related accidents and occupational illnesses, maternity benefits, and death 
benefits. Employer pays 15 per cent of the monthly salary pool to the Social Insurance Fund. 
Employee pays 5 per cent of his/her monthly salary to the Social Insurance Fund. 
The Health Insurance Fund covers 100 per cent of medical expenses, except for cases where 
high value treatments are involved. In such cases, the Health Insurance Fund covers 100 per cent 
of medical expenses incurred by working employees provided that they are less than VND 7 
million and 60 per cent of such expenses if above VND 7 million (but not more than VND 20 
million in any event). An employer is obliged to pay 2 per cent of the monthly salary pool to the 
Health Insurance Fund. Each employee must also contribute by paying 1 per cent of his or her 
monthly salary to the Health Insurance Fund (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; 
Athukorala, 2006; Pham Duy Nghia, 2004; 2006). 
5.2.6 Dispute Resolution 
Although Vietnam is in the process of building a more internationally acceptable dispute 
resolution framework, such framework remains at an early stage. As such, in common with 
other developing countries, formal dispute resolution and enforcement will continue to be a 
concern for investors in the short term for the following reasons: 
the laws and regulations of Vietnam are still relatively unclear and undeveloped in many 
important areas, not only in relation to substantive matters such as the rights and obligations of 
parties to a contract but also in relation to procedural matters such as enforcement of rights;  
x there is no systematic publication of judgments or judicial decisions;  
x the Vietnamese courts and arbitration centres have only recently been legislated for and 
are still underdeveloped in many respects;  
x the independence of the judiciary is not guaranteed;  
x judges and arbitrators generally have little experience in dealing with or settling 
complicated disputes;  
x while the incorporation of foreign laws to govern contracts is permitted in certain 
circumstances under the laws of Vietnam, there is currently little practical possibility of 
such laws being applied in Vietnam;  
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x choice of foreign courts is of limited value as foreign court judgments are generally not 
enforceable in Vietnam; and  
x despite the enforceability of certain court judgments and arbitral awards, the actual 
enforcement process is uncertain, expensive and time-consuming (VLC-MOLISA, 2002; 
Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Gillespie, 2007).  
5.2.7 Competition Law 
The promulgation of the new Competition Law shows Vietnam's efforts in improving the legal 
environment in general and the economic legal framework in particular. This Law ensures 
international competition principles and brings about legal corridor relevant to foreign trade 
practices, process of free trade and investment. This can be considered as Vietnam's 
commitment to observe common rules of international community and create open, attractive 
environment for FDI (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; 2003; 2006). 
The new Competition Law (Law) governs two types of anti-competitive activities: activities in 
restraint of competition and unfair competition. While foreign companies familiar with Western 
antitrust laws and trade regulations will find that the Vietnamese Competition Law draws on 
common aspects of these laws, the Law is the first legislation of its type in Vietnam and has 
some significant differences with Western law. (NAV, 2004a; Gillespie, 2007) 
x Economic Concentration 
When a merger, consolidation, acquisition (with some exceptions), joint venture, or other type 
of µeconomic concentration¶ results in a market share of between 30 to 50 per cent, the 
Competition Commission must be notified, unless the concentration results in a small or 
medium enterprise. An economic concentration resulting in a market share of 50 per cent or 
above is prohibited, unless the concentration results in a small or medium sized enterprise or an 
exemption is granted. Exemptions are available when one of the parties is at risk of being 
dissolved or insolvent or where economic concentration enhances export, socio-economic 
development or technical progress. So far, enhancement of export, technical progress, and socio-
economic development interpretation remains at the discretion of the Competition Commission 
and the Ministry of Trade (MOT).  
5.2.8 Bankruptcy Law 
One of the many new laws reflecting developments in Vietnamese business law is the Law on 
Bankruptcy, which came into effect 15 October 2004 (NAV, 2004c). In the 10-year lifespan of 
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the old law only 63 out 150 bankruptcy cases were accepted and administered by the court 
system. The new Bankruptcy Law was designed in part to be a more user-friendly law.  
The Bankruptcy Law applies to all enterprises, including FICs and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). Exceptions exist for enterprises linked to national defense and security, and sectors of 
finance, banking and insurance, and other sectors directly supplying essential public utility 
products and services. Although no list setting out the industries falling under this exception 
currently exists under the Bankruptcy Law, it is envisaged that such a list is forthcoming (Pham 
Duy Nghia, 2006; Gillespie, 2006; 2007). 
The Vietnamese legal definition of the µstate of Bankruptcy¶ describes: businesses µwhich are 
incapable of repaying their due debts at creditors' request, shall be regarded as falling into the 
state of bankruptcy.¶This definition is clearer than the one it replaced, which referred to 
undefined terms such as µfinancial difficulties¶ and µfailure of all necessary financial measures.¶ 
In the past it has been very difficult for creditors to prove that the relevant company had faced 
financial difficulties and had completed all necessary financial measures and those issues make 
the bankruptcy proceedings a very cumbersome and time-consuming process for creditors of a 
bankrupt company (Pham Duy Nghia, 2004; 2006, Gillespie, 2006; 2007). 
To begin bankruptcy proceedings an application must be submitted and the court must agree to 
commence proceedings. After the court issues a commencement decision, an enterprise may 
continue conducting business but will be monitored and inspected by the court and an Asset 
Administration and Liquidation Team (AALT).  
One of the criticisms of the old law was that the bankruptcy process focused more on punishing 
debtors than recovering debts. The AALT shifts the focus towards recovery. The AALT is 
established when the judge commences bankruptcy proceedings. The team is comprised of an 
executor of the judgment-executing agency (a member of the executive branch) who acts as 
leader of the team; an officer of the court; a representative of the creditor; a representative of the 
enterprise subject to bankruptcy procedures; and representatives of labour when appropriate 
(Pham Duy Nghia, 2004; 2006).  
Business may continue as usual, however it is subject to supervision and inspection of the court 
and AALT. One significant change from the old law allows the court appoint a business 
administrator at creditors' request if the manager of the business lacks the ability to operate, or 
continues jeopardizing the business's assets. 
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5.3 Reasons for changes in the legal framework for FDI in Vietnam 
The changes in the legal framework for FDI sector come from various reasons. Along with the 
performance of FDI sector, those changes for the last 19 years were also derived from three 
other factors, namely: (1) Changes in awareness and viewpoint of the Communist Party and the 
Government toward foreign economic sector; (2) Competition pressures from other countries in 
the region, and in the world, with respect to FDI attraction; and (3) Vietnam's international 
commitments regarding foreign investment. The section below will discuss these factors, and 
indicate some challenges to the Government of Vietnam in improving FDI policies and 
regulations in the forthcoming years (Pham Duy Nghia, 2006, p.1-20). 
5.3.1 Changes in Vietnam's awareness and view point on FDI 
According to the $UWLFOHRI9LHWQDP¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQ LQ µthe State encourages foreign 
organisations and individuals to invest funds and technologies in Vietnam in conformity with 
Vietnamese law and international law and usage; it guarantees the right to lawful ownership of 
funds, property and other interests by foreign organisations and individuals. Enterprises with 
foreign investments shall not be nationalised. The State creates favourable conditions for 
Vietnamese residing abroad to invest in the country¶ 1$9E7KLV UHIOHFWHG9LHWQDP¶V
awareness of the role of FDI sector in the early period (Gillespie, 2006; 2007). 
Since then, there has been a number of changes so far in the views of the Communist Party and 
the Government on foreign economic in general and FDI in particular. This resulted from the 
actual situation of the economy, as well as the changes in regional and world economic settings. 
In fact, FDI enterprises were not considered as an independent entity before 2000. However, the 
9th Party Congress in 2001 marked an important change when FDI sector was officially 
recognised as one of the six sectors in the economy (Gillespie, 2006; 2007; Balme and Sidel, 
2007). The landmarks of significant changes in awareness and views of the Party and the 
Government of Vietnam, with respect to the role of FDI in the economy, are as follows: 
The 7th and 8th Party Congress, in 1991 and 1996 respectively, have recognised the cooperation 
and joint venture between State enterprise and foreign partner, and affirmed that FDI sector µhas 
a vital role in the mobilization of capital, technology, organisational and managerial skills.¶ 
(Communist Party of Vietnam, 1996) though they were yet to separate the FDI into an 
µeconomic sector¶ in Vietnam's multi-sector economy. From that viewpoint, the policies 
regarding FDI mainly focused on encouraging joint ventures between foreign investors and 
Vietnam's SOEs, with operations, in a number of economic industries, except for areas of 
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particular importance to the national economy, security and defense (Pham Duy Nghia, 2003; 
2004; 2006; Gillespie, 2006; 2007; Nguyen Dung, 2005). 
The year 2001 marked the first time the sector with foreign capital was recognised as an 
economic sector. Its contribution was emphasised as µexport orientation, construction of socio-
economic infrastructure facilities, as well as transfer of advance technology and creation of 
additional employment, etc.¶ (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001). Because of that great 
contribution, at the 9th Central Party Congress, the Communist Party of Vietnam had put 
forward the task of µgenerating fundamental changes in attracting foreign direct investment¶. 
Accordingly, FDI policy in the forthcoming years will focus on raising the quality of FDI 
inflows to Vietnam, by further attraction of FDI from multinationals involving with important 
industries and sectors of the economy, particularly industries that use hi-tech or source 
technology. The positive changes in awareness and viewpoint of the Party and the State become 
an essential foundation for the Government's amendment and improvement of legal documents 
and policy framework with respect to FDI attraction and operations of FDI enterprises in recent 
years (Magennis, 2006; Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; Athukorala, 2006;). 
Seemingly, the changed perceptions among Vietnam's top leadership about the future role 
foreign capital have fostered Vietnamese officials to display an unprecedented openness to 
foreign capital and commitment to liberal economics in recent years, which has been reflected in 
Communist Party of Vietnam (2006).  
5.3.2 Comparing current legal framework for FDI in Vietnam and some countries 
As presented in previous sections, Vietnam's legal framework for FDI has now been more 
relaxing, and more favorable to foreign investors than ever. Table 4.1 is the comparison of some 
recent key policies regarding preferential treatment to foreign investors in some regional and 
transitional economies.  
From the table, some remarks may be drawn accordingly, as follows: 
Firstly, in principle, Vietnam's priorities given to foreign investors are relatively competitive 
compared to some countries in investment form, licensing procedures. Nevertheless, in 
comparison with some transitional economies and regional countries like Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, such preferential treatment is still weak 
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Table 5.1: Comparing key FDI policies in Vietnam and some regional and transitional countries in 2006 
Country 
name 
Restriction on the form of 
enterprises and areas 
Regulation on the granting 
license 
Access to Land Exchange rate and foreign 
exchange 
Vietnam The enterprises are permitted to 
choose investment form; wholly 
foreign enterprise are allowed, 
except for some important and 
sensitive industries; The FDI 
enterprises may be converted to joint 
stock companies, and free to choose 
investment partners 
Investment in some industries only 
need to register with authority 
while others still have to obtain the 
investment license; Issuing license 
for small and medium projects is 
decentralised to the local 
government, and management 
board of industrial zones 
Land ownership is not 
permitted; allowing renting 
land in industrial zones or 
business premise; transfer 
and mortgage of land use 
right is permitted 
Controlling current account; 
imposing fees/tax on the 
transfer of money abroad; 
permission is required for 
money transfer abroad. 
China Wholly foreign enterprises must ask 
for license, and can operating only in 
export - oriented industries; some 
industries require minimum 
proportion of domestic investment; 
FDI enterprises may convert 
investment form, and are free to 
choose investment partners  
Investment license required; 
licensing for small and medium 
projects is decentralised to the 
local government 
Ownership on land and house 
is permitted; some difficulties 
for investors in terms of site, 
land; transfer and mortgage 
of land use rights are 
permitted 
No limit on transfer of 
foreign currency; current 
account is still under control; 
permission is required in 
transfer money abroad 
Philippines Wholly foreign enterprise is 
permitted operating in many 
industries; restriction on maximum 
License is required only if the 
project want to enjoy preferential 
policy (within 3 weeks); otherwise 
Enterprises with more than 40 
per cent foreign owned 
capital are not permitted to 
Flexible foreign exchange 
management; no restrictions 
on loans in foreign currencies 
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Country 
name 
Restriction on the form of 
enterprises and areas 
Regulation on the granting 
license 
Access to Land Exchange rate and foreign 
exchange 
capital contribution of FDI in some 
industries; investors are free to 
choose investment partners 
the investment procedures are 
similar to domestic investors (only 
require registration) 
own land; they have to lease 
from real estate agent. Other 
enterprise may lease land for 
50 years; transfer and 
mortgage of land use rights 
are permitted 
and transfer of foreign 
currencies abroad; No 
requirement on mandatory 
foreign exchange reserves in 
the enterprises account 
Thailand No restriction of FDI, and 
enterprises are permitted to choose 
investment form, except for some 
restricted industries 
License only required if the project 
want to enjoy preferential 
investment policy. The investors 
only have to register with the 
Ministry of Commerce and 
Department of Tax 
Enterprises may lease land 
for 50 years, with automatic 
extension when expire; the 
land leasing contract may be 
used to mortgage. 
Flexible foreign exchange, no 
restriction on loans, transfer 
or reserve of foreign 
currencies 
South 
Korea 
Very strict initially, but now 
changed. Basically no restriction on 
FDI except for some µsensitive 
industries¶. Investors may own up to 
33 per cent of SOE capital; free to 
choose investment partners 
Complicated procedures, has been 
improved much after the regional 
crisis 
Enterprises may lease land 
for 50 years; land mortgage is 
allowed; however, domestic 
firms still have better access 
to land 
Flexible foreign exchange, no 
restriction on loans, transfer 
or reserve of foreign 
currencies 
Indonesia Prohibition of wholly foreign 
enterprises in some sensitive 
Complicated procedures; prevalent 
corruption in investment licensing; 
Leasing land in industrial 
zones is permitted, but not 
No significant restrictions in 
foreign exchange policy 
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Country 
name 
Restriction on the form of 
enterprises and areas 
Regulation on the granting 
license 
Access to Land Exchange rate and foreign 
exchange 
industries. For the rest, foreign 
investors are free to choose 
investment form  
Approval of president is required if 
the project capital is greater than 
$100 million; a number of licenses 
required even after being granted 
investment license 
easy in reality; land lease for 
30 years is most popular. 
Transfer, mortgage of land 
use rights are permitted. 
Malaysia Enterprises with 100per cent foreign 
owned capital only permitted in 
export-oriented sectors, while 
restricted in others 
License is required for all FDI 
projects (granted within 6-8 weeks, 
may be longer for some projects) 
FDI enterprises may choose 
to lease or buy land in 99 
years; mortgage, transfer of 
land is permitted 
Tax levied on transfer of 
money abroad after financial 
crisis 
Hungary No restriction on the form of 
investment and the type of FDI 
enterprises 
No license required, except for a 
few areas 
Land purchase and land 
ownership permitted 
Flexible foreign exchange 
regime, converted currency 
Poland No restriction on the form of 
investment and the type of FDI 
enterprises 
No license required, except for a 
few areas 
Land purchase and land 
ownership permitted; 
however it requires the 
permission 
Flexible foreign exchange 
regime, convertible currency  
Czech 
Republic 
No restriction on the form of 
investment and the type of FDI 
enterprises 
No license required, except for a 
few areas 
Land purchase and land 
ownership permitted 
Flexible foreign exchange 
regime, convertible currency 
Source: Le Xuan Ba (2006). 
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Secondly, relative to other countries in the region as well as transition economies, foreign 
investors still encounter certain difficulties in Vietnam, particularly those related to land, site 
clearance to carry out the project after they receive the license (except when they are located in 
industrial zones, export processing zones). In many instances, as a result of these problems, it 
may take longer to prepare and construct necessary facilities, delaying the commencement of 
projects and the investors may miss the business opportunities. 
Thirdly, underdevelopment of banking sector, unconverted currency, monetary policy as well as 
regulations on foreign exchange management are currently unfavorable to the investors, and less 
competitive than countries in the region and transition economies. 
Fourthly, compared with the situation in a decade ago, the conditions regarding Vietnam's 
investment environment have become more favorable to foreign investors in Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, the legal system and policies related to FDI still lack consistency, transparency, 
predictability, and have been rather changeable, which could still cause unreasonable barriers 
and difficulties to investors. Specifically, restricting areas of operations, expanding the list of 
business with required conditions, imposing export proportion on FDI enterprises, raising the 
land price and compensation of site clearance are the sources to increasing instability in 
Vietnam's FDI policy. This also proves the weak competitiveness relative to other countries (Le 
Xuan Ba, 2006). 
In the situation where the competition to attract investment between countries is getting more 
DQGPRUH ILHUFH9LHWQDPFRXOGDQGPXVW OHDUQ IURPRWKHUFRXQWU\¶VH[SHULHQFHDQGH[DPLQH
how it improved its investment environment. Especially, Vietnam will have to compete more 
with China, what is referred to as µan overwhelming challenge¶ not just for Vietnam but for the 
rest of Southeast Asia as well. This will likely entail accelerating reform and developing niche 
sectors where FDI can both generate profits and benefit the country's labour force, foreign-
currency coffers and technology intake. Similarly, government FDI policy will have to continue 
to change to attract FDI in an ever-LQFUHDVLQJ FRPSHWLWLYH JOREDO PDUNHW %XW 9LHWQDP¶V
Government has realised this and seems to be making a real effort to meet investor demands (Vu 
Bang Tam, 2008, p.1165-1170).  
5.4 Vietnam's international commitment on foreign investment 
Together with the establishment and gradual improvement of the legal system on foreign 
investment, Vietnam has also signed some international bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
foreign investment. This is indispensable in Vietnam's international economic integration and in 
overall policy on investment encouragement and protection. And, as Vietnam increasingly 
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integrates with the global economy, the country cannot go against the commitments it has made 
QRU LQWHUQDWLRQDO SUDFWLFHV ZKLFK SDUWO\ XUJHV 9LHWQDP¶V *RYHUQPHQW WR LPSURYH WKH OHJDO
framework for FDI (Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009; McCargo, 2004; Bui Hai Thiem, 
2009). 
Up to now, Vietnam has had bilateral agreements on investment encouragement and protection 
with 45 countries and territories so far. Those agreements have wider scope of adjustment than 
that of current regulation as stipulated in Vietnam's Law on Foreign Investment. For example, 
these agreements specify the terms regarding various forms of investment: direct, indirect, 
contract rights, tangible and intangible assets, property rights, and other rights as stipulated in 
the laws. Notably, with the signing of the Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement, a separate 
chapter of which is devoted to the development of investment relations, Vietnam has committed 
to comply with the highest-ever investment treatment standard. Nonetheless, Vietnam has only 
committed to the MFN treatment as well as committed to encourage and protect investment in 
accordance with common standard and practices (Bui Hai Thiem, 2009; Iswaran, 2007; 
Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
Vietnam has also participated, since 1995, in some multilateral agreements and forums such as: 
(i) Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); (ii) Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum (APEC) with the action plan to liberalise investment in the region; (iii) Asia 
- European Summit, which includes the implementation of Investment Promotion Action Plan 
(IP AP). In particular, Vietnam has been admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 7 
November 2006 after eleven years of negotiation. The commitment with regard to the Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) has become an indispensable requirement in that 
negotiation process. It is said that the process of implementation and enforcement of the WTO 
commitments has shaped a more predictable and integrated legal framework on doing business 
in Vietnam. This process also helps improve the level playfield for foreign invested companies 
doing business in Vietnam (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; Vu Bang Tam, 2008; Kurtz, 
2004).  
9LHWQDP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPLWPHQWVRQIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWWKRXJKYDULHGLQIRUPVDQGOHYHOV
are all aimed at liberalising foreign investment activities through opening economic domains, 
not discriminating foreign investors, establishing a mechanism of investment promotion and 
protection and dispute settlement within a given duration in accordance with international 
practices. It is easy to see that Vietnam has been taking initiative in building and perfecting the 
FRXQWU\¶V OHJDO V\VWHP LQ RUGHU WR VWHS E\ step make it conform to international customs and 
SUDFWLFHV $ JUHDW H[DPSOH LV VXEVWDQWLDO LPSURYHPHQW LQ 9LHWQDP¶V )RUHLJQ ,QYHVWPHQW /DZ
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WKURXJK DPHQGPHQWV DQG VXSSOHPHQWV RYHU WKH ODVW  \HDUV 9LHWQDP¶V legal provisions, 
therefore, are becoming more perfect, conforming to the trend of international economic 
integration, contributing to creating an investment environment favorable, transparent and equal 
for enterprises of all economic sectors. It could be argued that foreign direct investment over 20 
year operations in Vietnam has become an integral part of the Vietnamese economy from not 
only business perspective and but also legal perspective (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 
2002; Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; Athukorala, 2006; Kurtz, 2004). 
5.5 Conclusion 
It seems that Vietnam's leaders have implemented reform at a low pace, but the quest for further 
international integration and fierce competition in FDI attraction has changed that. In the past, 
this was much to do with reluctance to relinquish power and also a lack of understanding about 
the needs of foreign investors. Although the leaders were well-intentioned, the middle and lower 
ranks of the bureaucracy were experienced in delay mechanisms.  
However, the execution of commitments on international economic integration in general, and 
LQYHVWPHQW LQWHJUDWLRQ LQ SDUWLFXODU LV FOHDUO\ QRW RQO\ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶V
requirement for Vietnam but also an urgent requirement for the Vietnamese Government to 
LPSURYHWKHFRXQWU\¶VLQYHVWPHQWHQYLUonment in order to raise its competitiveness and attract 
foreign investment.  
Moreover, the fierce competition in FDI attraction between developing countries, especially 
EHWZHHQ UHJLRQDODQG WUDQVLWLRQDOHFRQRPLHVPDNHV9LHWQDP¶V*RYHUQPHQW UHDOLse that if the 
country wants to continue attracting FDI over a long period of time Vietnam cannot rely on just 
traditional factors such as low labour cost, plentiful natural resources and large domestic market. 
There must be in place stable, consistent, appropriate and generous policies involved in FDI, and 
business costs could be lowered by reforming and defining the administrative management 
system, along with the lists of projects calling for FDI (Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009; 
Magennis, 2006; Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007).  
There have been several noteworthy reforms, many offering foreign investors greater  legal 
protection than ever before. Changes to the legal framework, specifically the Unified Enterprise 
Law (UEL) and the Common Investment Law (CIL), have promised to level the competitive 
playing field for foreign and domestic businesses. Major changes in FDI policy over time in 
accordance with each revision show that, in general, Vietnam tends to increase rights of foreign 
investors, to make investment environment more favorable, and narrow the policy gap between 
foreign and domestic investor. These changes have been highly appreciated by international 
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observers and brought about a new wave of FDI into Vietnam in recent years (Magennis, 2006; 
Vu Bang Tam, 2008). 
As a matter of course, there are still a lot of developments that Vietnam needs to do in this 
changing global environment. Vietnam needs further clarify powers and duties in investment 
approval and licensing, as well as improve certain state authorities' performance in investment 
approval and licensing or in dealing with investment-related problems. In addition, investment 
promotion activities need to be more effective while the Enterprise Law and the unified 
Investment Law must be taken seriously. However, the whole country are optimistic that 
progress on these measures will increase foreign investor satisfaction, making them find 
Vietnam to be an attractive investment environment, worthy of ranking fourth worldwide, after 
the US, China, and Thailand. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE ANZ CASE STUDY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how the establishment and development of ANZ banks in Vietnam 
demonstrates the successful penetration of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ventures into the 
economy. However, for optimum success in the political and economic climate of Vietnam, 
ANZ also shows how foreign ventures need to change their style of management and business, 
taking into account the culture of the people and the business world in order to ensure their own 
operations run smoothly and effectively. 'XQQLQJ¶V WKHRU\KDVEURXJKW WKHFXOWXUDO IDFWRU LQWR
the analysis of FDI, and a case study of ANZ in Vietnam shows how the actual culturalisation of 
a foreign enterprises operation occurs. The need to aclimatise to the local context not only alters 
the management style and branding of a foreign enterprise, but can also define the actual 
operation of the company. In the case of ANZ we see that the legal framework limits the scale 
and type of services ANZ can provide in Vietnam, but the culture also shapes how the company 
operates. An example in the early years of ANZ operations was a realisation that generally the 
Vietnamese people did not trust banks and were suspicious of placing their wealth in the hands 
RIZKDWDSSHDUHGDQ µRIILFLDO¶ LQVWLWXWLRQ7R WKH9LHWQDPHVH µRIILFLDO¶PHDQWJRYHUQPHQWDQG
SROLWLFVRUPRUHJHQHUDOO\µWKHV\VWHP¶DQGWKHFXOWXUHKDVDKLJKOHYHOdistrust of officialdom 
and the system when it comes to their personal income.  
In order to understand the effect of FDI on the Vietnam banking sector in particular, the growth 
of ANZ bank business is an ideal case study, with the Australian bank combining its financial 
power with a style of strategic management that entailed changing how it operated in the rest of 
the world in order to assimilate successfully to the Vietnam environment. One of the primary 
objectives of this thesis is to show that economic development cannot be isolated from its 
surrounding cultural climate and that penetration of Vietnam requires investors to combine its 
global financial VWUDWHJLHV WR FXOWXUDO VHQVLWLYLW\ WR WKH 9LHWQDP µZD\¶ RI OLYLQJ DQG KRZ WKDW
DOWHUV µKRZWRGREXVLQHVV¶ LQ9LHWQDP ,Qµ&DSLWDO WKHRU\¶ 0XQGHOORQHFRXld merely 
analyse the level of attraction of a foreign economy purely on the basis of its comparative 
difference between the rates of return on capital with neighbouring countries. Through the 
eclectic theory, Dunning (1973) GHYHORSV+\PHU¶VZRUNDQd shows that FDI requires not 
just a capital analysis but shows how FDI involves µthe transmission of factor inputs other than 
money capital, viz. entrepreneurship, technology, and management expertise, and is likely to be 
affected by the relative profitability of the use of these resources in different countries as that of 
money capital¶ (p.299). ,QPRGHUQEXVLQHVVDSULPDU\UROHLVJLYHQWRWKHFRQFHSWRIµULVN¶DQG
management and entrepreneurship require not only an understanding of the opportunities and 
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threats in the financial environment, but also assimilation, understanding and methods for 
tackling the challenges of the different political, social and cultural environments. These 
elements in Vietnam play a particularly important role in business success, as all foreign 
investors need to adapt operations significantly in order to optimise their capital rewards for 
investment into the country. This chapter will show how ANZ altered their business strategy in 
Vietnam and how analysis that is sensitive to political, cultural and social influences in a 
developing country is equally important as understanding the economic influences that make 
Vietnam appear to investors as having significant comparative advantages over other potential 
target countries for their investment (Magennis, 2006,).  
Dunning (1973, p.313) states that: µthere are two primary determinants of the amount of 
international production. The first is the extent of the market in each country and the second is 
the competitiveness of foreign DIILOLDWH¶V vis-à-vis indigenous and non-resident firms¶. As The 
Hymer-Kindleberger hypothesis proposes, the foreign firms have disadvantages in regard to 
domestic competitors (e.g., knowledge of the market, communication). FDI ventures need to 
counter-balance theses disadvantages and add them to their own advantages (such as the 
international transfer of proprietary and intangible assets - technology, business techniques, and 
skilled personnel, Hymer, 1960). The strategies of building up competitive advantages in the 
same areas of ability as the domestic firms¶ means that foreign ventures need to assimilate to the 
political and cultural environments and then learn how to turn the initial disadvantages into 
competitive assets of their own projects. ANZ and Honda demonstrate how an FDI venture can 
embed itself into an entirely different political and social culture to its base country and generate 
capital accumulating strategies that use the advantages of both domestic and foreign firms to the 
best effect. In this chapter we see how ANZ changed and adapted to Vietnam in such a way that 
it introduced new competitive policies to the Vietnam banking sector, whilst also changing its 
own mode of operation to become as equally acceptable to the domestic customers as its 
domestic rivals. In the later chapter on Honda we can see that they went even further than 
assimilation and can now been seen as not only able to be part of the economic and social 
culture of Vietnam, but have also now helped shaped and direct the present culture of Vietnam 
(Biallas and Nguyen Hanh Nam, 2006; Doan Anh Toan, 2005; Hansen and Diaz, 2008).  
These strategies of change are part of the µinternationalisation¶ of the FDI firm and is the µthe 
consequence of a process of incremental adjustments to changing conditions of the firm and its 
environment¶ (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977: p.35). Dunning recognised that eclectic theory 
required taking into account far more factors than for instance capital theory and considers the 
PHWKRGRORJ\ PRUH D µSDUDGLJP¶ WKDQ VLPSO\ D µWKHRU\ 'XQQLQJ  S 5DWKHU WKDQ D
focus alone on economics, the FDI success needs to be assessed on its ability to also assimilate 
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to the political system, the culture, the language and the levels of education and industrial 
development (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, p.33) 
Dunning and Bansal (1997), has addressed the lack of cultural analysis in economic theory, and 
DSSOLHGLWGLUHFWO\WRKLVRZQHFOHFWLFSDUDGLJP$V'XQQLQJQRWHGµ7KHUHLVDUHDOLJQPHQWRI
6XSHUSRZHUV DORQJ GLIIHUHQW LGHRORJLFDO SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLRORJLFDO YHFWRUV«FRPSHOOLQJ
scholars to give more attention to the role of culture in determining the ownership and locational 
SDWWHUQV RI EXVLQHVV DFWLYLW\¶ HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH ULVLQJ $VLDQ HFRQRPLHV 'XQQLQJ DQG %DQVDO
1997, p.2). Political science addressed this lack of cultural analysis with +XQWLQJWRQ¶V µ&ODVh of 
&LYLOL]DWLRQV¶ thesis. The hypothesis of this study of Vietnam is that rather than an economists 
SXUHO\VFLHQWLILFUHYLHZRIFRPSDQ\¶VSHQHWUDWLQJ9LHWQDPZLWK)',RQWKHEDVLVRIDFXOWXUH-
free strategy, the opposite is true, and successful operation of FDI enterprises is now dependent 
not oQO\ RQ FKRRVLQJ WKH ULJKW 2/$ IDFWRUV EXW VXEMHFW WR FXOWXUH ZKLFK LV µDQ LQIRUPDO
LQVWLWXWLRQ WKDWFRQVWUDLQVEHKDYLRXU DQGVWUXFWXUHVSROLWLFDO HFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQV¶
(Dunning and Bansal, 1997, p.3). Thus, this thesis moves onto the next level of analysis where 
WKH WKHRUHWLFDO PHUJLQJ RI 'XQQLQJ¶V HFOHFWLF SDUDGLJP DQG KLV GHYHORSPHQW RI LW WR WDNH
account of cultural influences is applied to two actual case studies (ANZ and Honda). 
Subsequently, the focus of the internalization and the eclectic paradigms methodology is on 
µUHOHYDQFHRIFXOWXUHLQLQIOXHQFLQJWKHORFDWLRQRIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\¶DQGRQµWKHPRGDOLW\E\
which the competitive advantages of ANZ are explored¶ (Dunning and Bansal, 1997, p.6). 
6.2 ANZ and Vietnam 
6.2.1 Establishment 
The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) was the first overseas bank entering 
Vietnam and is one of the leading foreign banks in Vietnam. ANZ is one of the top four banks 
and top ten listed companies in Australia. At 30 September 2008, its total assets reached 
AUD471 billion (USD301 billion). ANZ has operations in 26 key markets in the Asia Pacific 
region. Mr Phillip Patterson, Head of Corp, Vietnam-$1=VDLG µ WKH9LHWQDPPDUNHWZDVDQ
obvious choice for ANZ once the economy began to grow and the demands for all sectors 
included the development of an efficient, high quality banking sector¶. However, all senior 
management interviewees did recognise that Vietnam was a very different challenge and that the 
KLVWRU\RIWKHFRXQWU\KDGOHIWDµPDUNHW¶RIFXVWRPHUV who might not easily be inculcated into 
WKHµ:HVWHUQ¶DFFHSWDQFHDQGDSSUHFLDWLRQRIµEDQNLQJVHUYLFHV¶ (Hansen and Diaz, 2008; Doan 
Anh Toan, 2005; Le Mai Lan and Tran Nhu An, 2003). 
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ANZ was the first foreign bank to commence branches in Vietnam since the start of Doi Moi 
(1986). It officially opened in 1993 under the license 07/NH-GP granted on 15 June 1992 by the 
State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). ANZ fulfilled its banking activities in a single branch in Hanoi 
with a chartered capital of 20 million US dollar while its representative office in Ho Chi Minh 
City acted as an intermediation agent for the branch in Hanoi. In March 1996, that office was 
upgraded to be the second branch which could implement banking activities. However, growth 
of business was slow and it was 10 years operation before it expanded its network by launching 
another representative office in Can Tho province. The long gap demonstrating that the 
LQWHUQDOLVDWLRQ SURFHVV ZDV QRW VRPHWKLQJ WKDW GHYHORSHG TXLFNO\ DQG µOHDUQLQJ¶ KRZ WR GR
business in Vietnam was a process of trial and error where mistakes directly affected their 
ability to expand (Nguyen Dinh Trung, 1996; Pham Chi Dung, 1992; Pham Duy Nghia, 2006).  
6.2.2 Services 
Although banking products are similarly offered by all types of ownership banks ANZ aims at 
attracting customers by creating differentiation in service. Its retail banking has been recognised 
as the best, not only in Vietnam, but also in Asia by Asian Bankers (2004). 
ANZ offers a variety of products, including transactional banking, loan products, cash 
management, finance lease, trade finance, treasury business, small business and other services. 
x Transactional banking: comprise current and savings accounts, call deposit accounts, 
remittance service, etc.  
x Cash management: involves ANZ link (ANZ electronic banking service), fixed deposit 
account, etc. Clients enjoy higher interest rate with fixed deposit account than savings 
accounts and the convenience of electronic banking.  
x Loan products: include short term and medium term loans, syndicated loans and 
structured export finance. The two last products are just for corporate customers, 
especially large firms because these products are often used in case firms want to 
mobilise a large amount of loan capital. 
x Finance lease: In order to promote this service, ANZ established its subsidiary (by 
holding 90 per cent stake) in the leasing sector named ANZ/V-TRAC Leasing Company 
in 1999. In early 2009, this subsidiary has allowed it to raise its chartered capital from 84 
billion VND to 103 billion VND by the SBV.  
x ANZ V-TRAC purchases WKHJRRGVRIFOLHQW¶VFKRLFHLQH[FKDQJHIRUDVHULHVRIUHQWDO
payments over a period of 1 to 5 years.  
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x Trade finance: Import-export finance activities including import letters of credit, import 
trade finance, export collections, finance of export transactions, and bid and performance 
bonds. The trade finance will provide customers the safest method of payment for their 
international trade.  
x Treasury: This relates to derivatives including spot foreign exchange, forward exchange 
contracts, and foreign exchange swaps. Firms can decrease its risk relating to the 
exchange rate by using one of the best services in this field which are offered by ANZ.  
x Small business: focuses on a daily service for small firms including access flexi smart 
accounts, consumer accounts and the progress saver.  
x Other services: ATM night and day service, merchant card service, etc. which allows 
customers access the banking service at any time they want.  
$1=¶V SURGXFWV DUH GLYHUVLILHG DQG DLP DW VDWLVI\LQJ FXVWRPHUV¶ GHPDQGV DQG PD[LPLse the 
convenience and comforts for their clients. However, the services are altered to take account of 
the Vietnam culture and the constraints provided by the ideologically bound political system. 
For example, the actual operation of the Bank is chiefly restricted to domestic business with 
only limited international transactions compared to its operation in Australia or New Zealand. 
This is because Vietnam still remains isolated to some degree from the international financial 
market with strict controls on currency exchange, international payments, etc. For customers, 
WKH FKLHI FXOWXUDO SUREOHP LV WKH KLVWRULF DQG VRFLDO DYHUVLRQ WR µWUXVWLQJ¶ QDWLRQDO ILQDQFLDO
LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG JHQHUDOO\ SUHIHUULQJ WR µKLGH¶ WKHLU DVVHWV $V RQH PDQDJHU VDLG µPDQ\
Vietnamese would rather hide their money under the bed thaQWUXVWDEDQN¶Interview: details 
remain anonymous at the request of the interviewee, 5 October 2007). 
6.2.3 Clients 
x Institutional clients 
ANZ Vietnam offers the business banking services to 280 small businesses and corporations 
(ANZ Banking Group Ltd., 2008). They are using all types of services including derivatives 
(Petro Vietnam Transportation ± PVT), loan products (An Giang Fishery Import Export ± AGF), 
etc. In comparison with local banks, this number is very limited but it shows that ANZ has been 
successful in attracting corporate clients. 
x Individual clients 
In order to understand the classes as well as which kind of services that ANZ individual clients 
are using and their opinion about ANZ, 30 individual clients are interviewed. 
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Half of interviewed clients use the current account service because they often go abroad for 
business. In particular, they are students, government officers, tour guides. Others (26 percent) 
are accountants and managers of firms which are using ANZ services. They said that they 
decided to use ANZ current accounts following their firms¶ advice (Authors Customer survey, 
2007).  
However, besides ANZ, all of them are also using services from local commercial banks (BIDV, 
Vietcombank, and Agribank) because at that time withdrawing from these banks and their 
annual fee for account maintenance was free while ANZ charged a fee. Having too few ATMs, 
as well as the shortage of available branches of the bank, are further problems. The problems are 
limited as all local banks are charging ATM withdrawal fees as well as collecting an annual 
account fee. 
Interviewees pointed out advantages and disadvantages of ANZ and all agreed that ANZ is the 
best bank in Vietnam in term of services. Their opinion again confirms that ANZ aims to create 
differentiation in service as the primary mechanism for capturing a large market share in 
Vietnam.  
6.2.4 Staff 
In line with the development of ANZ in Vietnam, its employees increased sharply from 28 to 
350 (ANZ Vietnam, 2008). They are educated in national professional universities or overseas. 
Senior positions require finance skills including credit analysis, and ANZ always recruit those 
who have past experience and a high level of education. Their strict requirements is one of the 
reasons leading to the success of ANZ in Vietnam, as it reduces the risks in the operation of its 
activities, especially in loan products and investment banking.  
Interviews with the ANZ staffs pointed to a general satisfaction with their employment in the 
bank and they all stated that they have been really satisfied with the working environment in 
ANZ. One bank employee said: µI love working in ANZ. They reward my loyalty and hard work 
by being loyal and supportive to me, while all my colleagues are very kind and enthusiastic¶ 
(Interview: Staffs, ANZ, 12 May 2009). 
Interviewees generally confirm that they have no intention to seek work with another employer. 
They often expressed a lifelong commitment to ANZ and its development in Vietnam. This is 
borne out when looking at the profiles of ANZ lHDGHUV¶ LQ 9LHWQDP LQFOXGLQJ 0V Dam Bich 
Thuy (Country Head and General Manager, ANZ Vietnam), Quynh Vu (Chief Manager, ANZ 
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Hanoi and General Manager, ANZ V-Trac Leasing). They have all already devoted nearly two 
decades of loyal work to ANZ. 
6.2.5 Business awards, prizes and honours 
Business awards and prizes presented by host country agencies can be seen as a general 
indication of the growing acceptance into the country of an FDI. All competitive awards that 
involve both domestic and foreign candidates demonstrate that the winner has in some way 
impressed the judges to an extent that they stand out from the competition, and ANZ 
presentations in Vietnam demonstrate that they have made significant grounds in gaining 
acceptance from both the business community and the public. ANZ is renowned in Vietnam for 
its differentiation in service quality and this is recognised by its receipt of a number of awards 
and prizes for business excellence. In particular, the Asian Banker complimented ANZ as the 
Best Retail Bank in Vietnam for 2007 and 2004. The Asian Banker is a renowned research and 
intelligence company in the financial services industry. The award recognised the excellence of 
ANZ in dealing directly with customers. Moreover, local magazines and newspapers also 
appreciated ANZ as the Best Service Bank for 2007, the Saigon Tiep Thi magazine award 2007, 
the Best Customer Oriented Bank award five times to ANZ in 2002 to 2007 and with the Golden 
Dragon Award granted by the Vietnam Economic Times and the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, awarded IRU$1=¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI)',LQ9LHWQDPThe awards 
demonstrate WKDW$1=µbrand¶ LPDJHLVILUPO\HVWDEOLVKHGLQWKH Vietnam banking sector. The 
continual accolades won either from the general public or the government; indicate how well 
ANZ has also merged into the culture (Hansen and Diaz, 2008; Businessweek, 2005; Le Mai 
Lan and Tran Nhu An, 2003). 
6.2.6 ANZ¶V perspectives 
Australian Foreign Minister 6WHSKHQ6PLWKRQKLVWRXUWR9LHWQDPVDLGµANZ's proposed 
growth strategy in Vietnam represents a welcome expansion of the bilateral investment 
relationship and also sends a clear signal to investors thDW 9LHWQDP LV RSHQ IRU EXVLQHVV¶ 
(Gluyas, 2008). In addition, ANZ International places Vietnam as its priority in Asia, according 
to Mr Michael Smith, General Manager of ANZ Group (ANZ-media release, 2007). 
Recently, ANZ International chose Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Cambodia for the 
investment tour of its Australian analysts, with them focusing on the success of the current 
investment environment in Vietnam. Vietnam has attracted more FDI and in increasing fields. In 
2008 when the world economy was in turmoil, the FDI still reached USD64 billion, double that 
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of 2007. Foreign investors recognise that Vietnam is one of the best places for strong investment 
(Hansen and Diaz, 2008).  
But even at the highest level of the bank they are aware of the constraints of the culture as 
demonstrated by an ANZ manager, who said µWKH9LHWQDPVLWXDWLRQZDVRQHZKHUHLWZDVDFDVK
culture. People did not fully trust µauthorities¶ or official declaration of their actual incomes. 
7KH\SUHIHUUHGWRµKLGH¶WKHLUPRQH\DQGEDQNVZRXOGDWILUVWDSSHDUWRJRWRWDOO\DJDLQVW this 
culture¶Interview: details remain anonymous at the request of the interview, 4 August 2007). 
But ANZ believed that the modernisation and growth of Vietnam would progressively lead to a 
change in these attitudes. ANZ had to develop a mutual trust between them and the customer. A 
IHHOLQJWKDWWKHLUPRQH\ZDVVWLOODµSULYDWH¶PDWWHUDQGWKDWWKHLUSULYDF\ZDVQRWWKUHDWHQHGE\
having a bank account or conducting business through banks. Thus, we see that the domestic 
culture of the customers in Vietnam was actually a barrier to the prospective success of FDI 
investment. Unlike their operations outside of Vietnam, ANZ needed to focus some attention on 
DFWXDOO\µVHOOLQJ¶WKHLGHDRIEDQNLQJDnd its benefits to a population who viewed banking itself 
as undesirable. Internationalisation of the FDI required a degree of promoting banking as a 
VHFXUHDQGSULYDWHVHUYLFHWRFXVWRPHUVZKLFKGHPRQVWUDWHVDGHJUHHRIµLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶RI
the customer market. The culture of Vietnam was naturally averse to banking itself and 
understanding that, whilst also trying to change it was necessary for ANZ to penetrate 
successfully the market place (Le Mai Lan and Tran Nhu An, 2003; Doan Anh Toan, 2005; 
Hansen and Diaz, 2008). 
In the future, ANZ Vietnam face many challenges from fiercer competition with local 
commercial banks (BIDV, Vietcombank, etc), especially in terms of fees and number of 
branches and other foreign banks in terms of services (HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, etc.) . 
Although controls are still largely in place, their gradual reduction is an inevitable consequence 
of signing agreements such as the WTO, and ANZ has positioned itself in the market quite 
effectively as it has addressed challenges with a view to assimilating to both the economic and 
cultural demands whilst also finding effective ways to bring about change that educates the 
Vietnam customer and makes banking in Vietnam more acceptable. 
6.3 The strategies of ANZ in the development of Vietnam FDI framework 
The more open to the world economy, the more FKDQJH9LHWQDP¶VOHJDOIUDPHZRUNUHTXLUHV,Q
FDI for the banking sector, the legal framework has developed significantly. Reacting to these 
changes, ANZ has also adjusted its strategies to promote its business in Vietnam. 
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6.3.1 Foreign banks coming to Vietnam 
Before Doi Moi, The Vietnam banking sector had relied on its economic relationship with the 
Communism bloc. With the changes in the Party viewpoint shown in the National Party 
Congress 6th (1986), other countries outside the Capitalism bloc were welcomed (Nguyen Dinh 
Trung, 1996; Pham Chi Dung, 1992).  
A realisation of the need for a change in strategy was seen with the establishment of the first FIL 
in 1987, which welcomed foreign investment by allowing the establishment of 100 percent 
foreign firms in specific sectors.  
The banking sector was opened up to the world, but this came some years later. In particular, 
foreign banks could operate their business in Vietnam by creating joint-venture banks, according 
to the Decree 38-LCT/HDNN8 on May 23, 1990 by the Government Council. Through this 
regulation, the first joint-venture commercial bank, µIndoVina Bank¶ was established, 
demonstrating the governments realisation that opening up to the global economy would 
inevitably limit the protection the authorities could give to the domestic banking sector (Nguyen 
Dinh Trung, 1996; Pham Chi Dung, 1992). 
The 7th National Party Congress (1991) welcomed foreign banks to operate in Vietnam and 
declared they were needed in order to establish the right foreign exchange structures to create an 
advantage for foreign currency trading via banks and in line with the market rate. The Party also 
required the Government to promote reform in the banking system and develop policies to 
establish a modern insurance organisation, and establish joint-stock companies in order to build 
a stock market function (Polevoy, 1998; Nguyen Ke Tuan, 1996; Hansen and Diaz, 2008).  
Two years afterwards, Vietnam officially welcomed foreign banks and financial companies by 
allowing them to set up representative offices or create joint-venture banks in Vietnam by 
issuing the Decision 188/QD-NH8 on October 2, 1993 by the SBV, and officially sanctioning 
the establishment of operations for foreign banks and financial firms in Vietnam (Nguyen Dinh 
Trung, 1996). More foreign banks decided to invest in Vietnam in this period, with ANZ Bank 
Limited as one of the first banks registered to operate in Vietnam. 
6.3.2  Strategic Alliance with a domestic joint-stock commercial banks 
3RUWHU
VSµGHWHUPLQDQWVRIQDWLRQDODGYDQWDJHLQFOXGHWKHFRXQWU\VSHFLILFFRQGLWLRQV
governing how companies are created, organised and managed, related supplier networks, factor 
conditions, and the presence of sophisticatHGDQGGLVFHUQLQJFXVWRPHUV¶(VVHQWLDOLQWKLVVHFWLRQ
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is understanding the success of A1=WRPHUJHZLWKWKHEXVLQHVVµFXOWXUH¶RI9LHWQDPZKLFKLV
described by Mr Tran Thang, head of the Hong IT Group as µGHSHQGHQW ILUVWDQGIRUHPRVWRQ
relationships. All successful businessmen know that LW LVEHVW WREHµIULHQGV¶ILUVWDQGSDUWQHUV
second, but development can only come then by creating high level alliances that provide major 
EHQHILWV¶ Interview: Tran Thang, Hong IT Group, 1 May 2008). Vietnam would be placed in 
WKH FDWHJRU\ RI D FRXQWU\ ZKLFK ZRXOGEH LGHQWLILHGE\'XQQLQJDVKDYLQJD µKLJKGHJUHHRI
VRFLDO LQWHUUHODWHGQHVV DQG FRKHVLRQ¶ DQG VRPHZKHUH WKDW SODFHV µJUHDW VWRUH RQ LQWHUSHUVRQDO
UHODWLRQVKLSV¶ DQG µZLOO LQYHVW LQ WKHLUKXPDQUHVRXUFHVDQG VXSSOLHUQHWZRUNV¶ 'XQQLQJDQG
Bansal, 1997, p7). Thus, the strategic alliances ANZ agreed in Vietnam were vital to helping it 
assimilate to the business culture (Business Week, 2005). 
According to Decision 228/QD-NH5 - December 12, 1993 - Governor of the SBV, all domestic 
credit organisations, included banks, could call for foreign capital contribution up to 30 per cent. 
However, this regulation was not brought into effect because at that time the words µshares¶ and 
µholding stakes¶ were unfamiliar in Vietnam. Understanding of what these terms really meant 
only came with the establishment of the stock market and the first real steps to modernizing the 
Vietnam financial system. However, the Government regulations left FDI enterprises with little 
option to actually initiate business ventures in the financial sector through partnerships and 
alliances with domestic hosts (Nguyen Dinh Trung, 1996). 
$ PDMRU DGYDQFH ZDV LQ DWWUDFWLQJ IRUHLJQ EDQNV WR SXUFKDVH D µKROGLQJ VWDNH¶ LQ MRLQW-stock 
commercial banks and the complementary decision to require the issue of annual financial 
reports. Joint-stock commercial banks were now required to openly state their financial position 
and thus allow investors access to the knowledge to fully understand the financial status of joint-
stock banks before deciding to invest in them (decision 1407/2004/QD-NHNN by the SBV on 1 
November 2004). 
The new regulations strengthened foreign banks confidence in the Vietnam banking system by 
providing more transparency in their operation. As a result, in 2005, foreign banks (ANZ and 
HSBC) decided to hold 10 per cent stakes in Sacombank and Techcombank respectively, valued 
at USD27 and 17.3 million (Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Hansen and Diaz, 2008).  
ANZ Vietnam is still the strategic shareholder of Sacombank with 10 per cent shares ownership. 
As strategic shareholders, ANZ and Sacombank can cooperate with each other in banking 
activities, thus allowing ANZ to expand its market share.  
However, ANZ seems still to have a number of difficulties in comparison to its main fellow 
foreign competitors (HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank) as these banks have already raised 
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their holdings to 20 and 15 percent respectively in their strategic joint-stock banks after the 
Government released the Decree 69/2007/ND-CP which stipulates strategic foreign partners can 
hold 15 to 20 percent (in special cases) of a joint-VWRFNEDQN¶VKDUHV 
6.3.3 Holding stakes in public companies 
According to the decision 238/2005/QD-TTg on 29 September 2005, every public company can 
currently attract 49 per cent of its capital contribution from foreign investors while that rate 
before was just 30 per cent (decision 36/2003/QD-TTg on 11 March 2003 by the Prime 
Minister). It is obvious that the Vietnam Government has tried to treat foreign investors more 
equally in comparison with domestic investors. However, it will take time for the equality 
process to embed itself because the Vietnam Government wants to ensure that the domestic 
economy will integrate with the world, but still have a domestic advantage or safeguard against 
stronger foreign competitors (Nguyen Ke Tuan, 1996; Le Minh Toan and Walker, 2006).  
It is a difficult situation for the Vietnamese government as the globalization of the banking 
system means that domestic companies must develop stronger, more efficient and competitive 
operations, but their human resource and technological abilities are still very weak in 
comparison to foreign competitors. Many of the banks do not have the liquidity or technical 
skills to compete oQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO PDUNHW DQG \HW 9LHWQDP¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR DJUHHPHQWV
such as the WTO entry, allows little opportunity to provide the protectionism that Vietnam 
banks still need. However, the aim was to promote development of Vietnam banks by allowing 
the foreign banks enter the market through strategic alliances that were believed to offer not 
only new capital sources, but also be a route to transfer of the human resource knowledge and 
technological skills of international banks, that the Vietnam banks so desperately needed if they 
ZHUHWREHFRPHFRPSHWLWLYHLQWKHµRSHQGRRU¶HQYLURQPHQW (Bui Xuan Hai and Walker, 2005; 
Bui Xuan Hai, 2006).  
The new regulations allowed the speedy development of a Vietnamese stock market, and foreign 
traders could now become actively involved in Vietnam shares trading. ANZ strongly 
participated in the stock market by acquiring shares of Saigon Securities joint-stock company 
(SSI). ANZ aims to expand its expertise in banking and finance sectors via its strategic 
relationships with large companies in this field. 
6.3.4 Foreign bank establishment approvals 
As with its commitments under the WTO agreement, Vietnam has allowed the establishment of 
wholly-foreign banks in Vietnam since March 2006 (Decree 22/2006/ND-CP on 28 February 
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2006). In order to establish a subsidiary bank, foreign banks must have at least USD10 billion in 
total assets in the year prior to registering for a license. In addition, their branches in Vietnam 
must meet a certain financial criteria including having enjoyed profits in three consecutive 
years, a bad loan rate of less than 3 per cent and having no legal disputes with the Vietnamese 
Government (Hansen and Diaz, 2008; Le Mai Lan and Tran Nhu An, 2003).  
Up to now, there are currently three foreign banks granted that license, including HSBC, 
Standard Chartered Bank and ANZ.  
6.3.5 ATM installation 
ANZ, with its advantage of having access to the latest ATM technology in Australia was 
allowed to launch the first ATM in Vietnam in 2000. However, as regulated by the law, all 
foreign banks or branches of foreign banks cannot install ATMs outside its branch office, except 
in cases where the SBV approves. Even in the commitment of joining WTO, Vietnam still 
requires this condition in the roadmap for banking liberalisation.  
As a result, ANZ, as well as branches of other foreign banks will face disadvantages in 
competing with local banks in attracting individual clients to use banking, including ATM 
services. 
6.3.6 Derivatives instruments 
Derivatives have been well known and widely used in developed countries for decades. 
However, it was not until 2003 that derivatives-interest rate swaps were promulgated in Vietnam 
by SBV, according to Decision no 1133/2003/QD-NHNN. However, that decision was only 
applicable for firms with overseas loans under the decree 90/1998/ND-CP on 7 November 1998 
and banks who offered this service were required to have a chartered capital of at least 200 
billion VND. Other derivatives relating to foreign exchange rates, including cross currency 
swaps, forward start swaps, options and futures were regulated in Decision 62/2006/QD-NHNN 
on 29 December 2006 by the SBV. They offered these to all type of firms and by local and 
foreign banks with a chartered capital of equal or more than 1 trillion VND. ANZ has positioned 
itself as the leading bank in providing this service in Vietnam.  
6.3.7 Community involvements 
The Communist Party in 9LHWQDPDLPVDWLPSURYLQJSHRSOH¶VOLYLQJVWDQGDUGVHVSHFLDOO\WKRVH
who live in rural and mountainous areas, and banks are thus instructed to address both economic 
and community needs. 
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ANZ, an FDI bank, not only contributes in the economic aspects of development, but also in the 
social aspect by building schools for rural children or helping rural women improve their 
livelihoods. This strategy not only helps poor people but also promotes ANZ Vietnam position 
as a µ9LHWQDPHVH¶V Bank¶ ZKLFK LV µRI WKH 9LHWQDPHVH IRU WKH 9LHWQDPHVH DQG E\ WKH
9LHWQDPHVH¶ (Biallas and Nguyen Hanh Nam, 2006; Hansen and Diaz, 2008). 
6.4 The development of ANZ Vietnam 
For each strategy, ANZ has implemented a series of activities to promote its business in 
Vietnam. In addition, ANZ also has expanded its business by launching new products following 
WKHFKDQJHVLQ9LHWQDP¶VVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQ7KHIROORZLQJSDrt will take a deeper 
analysis of ANZ development in Vietnam over time and through its different strategies (Hansen 
and Diaz, 2008; Businessweek, 2005; Le Mai Lan and Tran Nhu An, 2003). 
6.4.1 Expanding activities  
In 2008, ANZ opened two trading counters in Noi Bai Airport to bring convenience for those 
entering or leaving Vietnam. This is an appropriate move as the clients who uses banking 
services at the airport often are middle class or higher, and hence they enjoy the convenience 
and satisfaction gained from using ANZ services. As Ms Vu Thuy Quynh, General Manager of 
ANZ-Vietnam said, µZHQHHGDVDEDQNWRFRQWLQXDOO\H[SDQGRXUDYDLODELOLW\WR WKHFXVWRPHU
and expand our operations, both in our types of services and in our accessibility to as many 
SHRSOHDQGDUHDVDVSRVVLEOHDQGWKLVLVDPDMRUVWUDWHJLFQHFHVVLW\¶Interview: Vu Thuy Quynh, 
ANZ, 3 July 2008) 
Thus, ANZ short-term strategy is to open more branches (from 10 to 12) in many of the large 
cities (according to Mr Alex Thursby, operating director of ANZ in Asia Pacific area). In the 
longer term, the ANZ Vietnam intends to establish more than 50 branches and attracts 1400 
institutional clients (compared to 280 in 2008) with a major focus on Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City, and facilities developed in Da Nang, Hai Phong, Mekong Delta and Vung Tau (Dam Bich 
Thuy, 2008) 
In addition, the prospective establishment of its wholly-owned subsidiary under license 268/GP-
NHNN granted on 9 October by the State Bank Governor will help ANZ take an even greater 
market share in Vietnam and become more popular with local Vietnamese. Thus, confirming the 
statement by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd that µVietnam has been given a high 
priority for growth of all the countries LQ$1=¶V$VLDVWUDWHJ\¶ (Adelaide Now, 2008 p.7). 
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7KHH[SDQVLRQLVXQGHUVWDQGDEOHDIWHU$1=¶VVXFFHVVIXORSHUDWLRQLQ9LHWQDPRYHU\HDUVRI
operations and further recognised by the granting of a license to establish a subsidiary, with the 
blessing of the SBV.  
$OWKRXJK QRUPDOO\ LW LV LPSRVVLEOH WR DFFHVV WKH ILQDQFLDO UHSRUWV RI $1=¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LQ
9LHWQDPDVZHOODVWKRVHRIRWKHUIRUHLJQEDQNV¶EUDQFKHVDVWKHUHLVQRVWDWXWRU\UHTXLUHPHQW
for them to publish their reports), it is clear that ANZ have met all the necessary requirements of 
the SBV, including a record of profit in three recent consecutive years. 
Other foreign banks are reluctant to follow the lead of ANZ and establish a subsidiary. This 
reluctance was explained by the Vice Chairman of Commezbank of Germany, Mr Peter Born 
who declared that few banks are planning on establishing their own subsidiaries in Vietnam 
(ANZ, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and Standard Chartered are the 
exceptions) because of the large capital investments required and the costs in other resources, in 
a contemporary atmosphere of severe competition and a belief that the most profitable 
advantages are found in concentrating on retail banking. Ms Vu Thuy 4X\QK H[SODLQV µWKH
strategy of further involvement and commitment to business in Vietnam means that the 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDVXEVLGLDU\LVDQDWXUDOFRQVHTXHQFHRIRXUGHYHORSPHQW¶Interview: Vu Thuy 
Quynh, ANZ, 3 July 2008). 
As a result, ANZ business performance may increase through its subsidiary strategy as the only 
likely competitors are the local banks and HSBC and the Standard Chartered Bank. The lack of 
a strong foreign competition element in this area of business could provide ANZ with a 
significant market advantage (Biallas and Nguyen Hanh Nam, 2006; Businessweek, 2005).  
6.4.2 Investing activities 
ANZ has invested in firms operating in banking and financial sector, or essential commodity 
producing, etc. Not only is ANZ the investor, but it is also an essential improvement in the 
framework of investors new to the country, providing a service and access that foreign 
customers are familiar with and giving them a sense of security. General Manager ANZ ± 
9LHWQDP0U3KLO&URXFKH[SODLQVWKDWµANZ is bringing a quality and familiarity of operation 
that helps foreign investors feel safer when conducting new business in Vietnam. We are part of 
the Vietnam banking system but hope to set ourselves as a level above those of the domestic 
banks, whilst also working within the banking and finance system in general in order to raise the 
standards and reputDWLRQ RI WKH VHFWRU DV D ZKROH¶ (Interview: Phil Crouch, ANZ, 15 April 
2009). This strategy is captured in the new slogan for ANZ in Vietnam- - µForeign standard with 
a local approach¶'DP Huy, 2008, p.10). Thus, ANZ continually emphasises that it is building 
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XSRQ LWV ORFDO LPDJH DQGFRQWLQXDOO\ VWULYLQJ WREH DFFHSWHGDVQRW DV D µIRUHLJQ¶EDQNEXW D
µORFDO¶EDQNZKRVHLQYHVWPHQWLVIRUHLJQDQGWKHUHIRUHPRUHUHOLDEOHDQGVHFXUH (Businessweek, 
2005, Doan Anh Toan, 2005; Biallas and Nguyen Hanh Nam, 2006). 
x Saigon Thuong Tin Bank (Sacombank ± STB) 
In 2005, ANZ became the strategic shareholder of Sacombank, the second largest joint stock 
bank in Vietnam, by buying 10 percent of its shares valued at 27 million US dollar and has had a 
seat on Sacombank Board of Directors. Sacombank is also the largest commercial publicly listed 
bank in Vietnam in terms of chartered capital and branch networks. Sacombank has raised its 
chartered capital from 1,125 billion VND (or 71 million US dollar) at the same time as ANZ 
investing more than 5,100 billion VND (or 310 million US dollar) in Sacombank. Table 1 shows 
ANZ investment progress in Sacombank. It can be seen that ANZ has been willing to pay much 
higher than the market price because its objective has not been to gain an immediate profit from 
the investment, but instead take an advantage of a strategic alliance to gain a strong market 
position.  
That is the reason why in June 2006, ANZ signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 
development of a credit card joint venture with Sacombank. This arrangement will position the 
joint venture to enter the first developing credit card market in Vietnam. This strategic 
relationship brings benefits for both of them. STB receives supports from ANZ Vietnam in 
terms of technology, consultancy, etc while ANZ Vietnam can expand its banking activities via 
the cooperation with STB. In 2007 ANZ Bank Ltd. ANZ Vietnam and Sacombank continued to 
corporate in overseas remittance payments, in which AZN Bank Ltd. clients can withdraw their 
remittance at all branches of ANZ in Vietnam and Sacombank (Vietbao, 2007a). ANZ Vietnam, 
Sacombank and Phuong Nam Bank coordinated with each other to link their ATMs in 2003 
(Vietnam Net, 2003).  
However, the proportion of shares that ANZ kept has still been left at 10 percent while 
according to the Decree 69/2007/ND-CP, strategic foreign credit institutions can own 20 per 
cent of shares (out of 30 per cent foreign ownership) of a joint-stock commercial bank, if the 
Prime Minister allows this, as in the case of HSBC and Techcombank. An explanation for ANZ 
reluctance to increase its share is the actual present structure of foreign share ownership in 
Sacombank. ANZ is the third largest foreign institution investing in Sacombank, coming after 
Dragon Financial Holdings (DC) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) which currently 
account for more than more than 15 percent of Sacombank shares. In addition, foreign 
ownership in Sacombank has already reached 30 percent- the maximum proportion promulgated 
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by the current decree. Therefore, ANZ are in some ways constrained by the present foreign 
shareholding structures of Sacombank and limited in the opportunity to alter its share proportion 
in Sacombank by the strong possibility that any change would also need a change in Vietnam 
law. 
It should be noted here that the still developing legal system and economic policies of Vietnam 
are thus still leaving certain disadvantages to efficient promotion of Vietnam as an FDI 
destination. Restrictions are still in place that deter overseas banks from venturing further into 
Vietnam and constrain their ability to expand operations. However, WTO entry is definitely 
going to alter the present conditions and will lead to numerous new policies that will further 
open the door to new foreign and already established international banks. 
However, in this particular case, at the moment, the only alternative is to actually acquire 
existing foreign owned shares and the opportunity did arise for this on 17 December 2008 when 
the IFC announced the decision to reduce by half its shares in STB despite it having helped 
Sacombank become one of the best joint-stock banks in Vietnam. On 17 and 18 December 2008, 
5.285 million STB shares were transferred by negotiations among foreign shareholders. 
However, the actual purchasers of these shares are still a commercial secret and there is merely 
speculation on whether ANZ was one of the main purchasers. Nevertheless, interviews with 
ANZ did point to a strong desire in the company to raise its proportion of shares in Sacombank, 
and such a purchase would be in line with the general commitment ANZ has already made to 
continually promote development of its strategic relationship with Sacombank. However, a 
formal statement is claimed to have been made by ANZ that the new strategy is actually aimed 
at a future withdrawal of ANZ capital from Sacombank. An interview with Sacombank 
chairman did reveal that they have not received any formal request from ANZ for withdrawal 
from Sacombank, but he did indicate a high concern that withdrawal was an option being 
considered by ANZ. The following table shows details of ANZ investment on STB: 
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Table 6.1: ANZ Investments on Saigon Thuong Tin Bank 
Date 
Chartered Capital in ANZ holding ANZ Investment in 
Note 
bil. VND US. mil. $ Added Total per cent bil. VND US. mil. $* 
8-Aug-05 1,125 71.0 11,250,000 11,250,000 10.00 427.63 27  
28-Sep-05 1,250 78.8 1,250,000 12,500,000 10.00   Dividend of 10 per cent by shares 
31-Mar-06 1,899 119.4 6,250,000 18,750,000 9.87 62.5 3.93 Buy at face value 
Q4 - 06 2,089 130.2 1,875,000 20,625,000 9.87   Dividend of 10 per cent by shares 
23-Aug-07 4,449 275.2 
2,475,000 23,100,000 
9.84 
37.125 2.30 Dividend of 12 per cent by shares 
20,684,970 43,784,970 310.27 19.2 15,000 VND per share 
Dec 07 4,449 275.2 703,122 44,488,092 10.00 40.08 2.5 Market price 
Aug 08 5,116 310 6,670,167 51,158,258 10.00   Dividend of 15 per cent by share 
 
      54.93 Total 
 
      47.8 Profit (market price) 
* calculated by using exchange rate quoted by the SBV. 
Source: Combined sources from ATPVietnam, Sacombank and State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) website from 2005 to 2008. 
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x Saigon Securities Incorporation (SSI) 
In middle of 2007, ANZ was willing to pay 170,000 VND per SSI share in SSI private 
placement for its strategic shareholders while the market price at that time was only around 
110,000 VND (or equivalent to more than USD6). Totally, ANZ paid approximately 88USD 
million to own a 10 percent stake. Currently, ANZ has invested approximately USD117 million 
on SSI to possess 17.66 percent of SSI stake (see Table 2). There are a number of reasons for 
ANZ motivations for overvaluing SSI. 
First, as stated by Bob Edgar, ANZ General Manager, the investment on SSI is an ANZ strategy 
to expand its role in Vietnam banking (ANZ Media Release, 2007). Under the coordination with 
SSI, ANZ expects to gain more clients in the finance sector. According to Mr Gilles Plante, the 
MRLQWPDQDJLQJ'LUHFWRU RI$1=¶VPDUNHWVEXVLQHVV WKH VWURQJ VWUDWHJLF UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKH
SSI Board of Directors provides a means to greater access to this market for ANZ (Saigon 
Security Incorporation, 2007).  
Second, ANZ believes that it will receive high dividends from investment in SSI as they have 
already shown an amazing profit of USD15 million in 2006 and estimated figures of USD50 
million in 2007. Its average Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) in these two 
years were very high at 20 and 10 respectively (Saigon Security Incorporation, 2007). These 
figures were understandable when Vietnam stock market was booming at that time and while 
SSI was the largest securities firm in Vietnam. It has successfully positioned itself as one of the 
leading providers of securities services in Vietnam, holding the largest market share in 
brokerage (StoxPlus, 2011) 
However, in line with the downtrend of VN and the current world financial crisis, it seems that 
ANZ might not increase its ownership in SSI if looking at present profit aspects. SSI is currently 
facing a huge drop in profit to just 280 billion VND (Saigon Security Incorporation, 2008) due 
to the strong decrease in the whole Vietnam stock market and a strong fall in securities 
transactions. But that figure is still a positive sign when returns are compared to almost all other 
securities firms, which have shown major losses and even appear on the verge of bankruptcy 
(Bao Viet Securities BVS, etc.).  
In comparison with the early years of investment by ANZ into SSI, the SSI share price has 
slipped by a significantly worrying 70 percent, mirroring the same fall generally in the VN 
Index. Therefore, SSI shareholders are all unconfident and distrustful of any possibility of high 
dividend in the immediate future. 
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However, an alternative argument is that ANZ might take advantage of such a low price to 
increase its share ownership in SSI. Actually, ANZ showed that it intends to promote its 
strategic alliance with SSI by registering to buy 1.3 millions SSI shares from November 2008 to 
January 2009 and raise its stakes from 18.35 per cent to 19.35 per cent. It is said that this move 
is reasonable as SSI has taken a large market share in consulting for listed firms such as Ben Tre 
Fishery Import-Export JSC (ABT), An Giang Fishery Import-Export JSC (AGF), Petroleum 
Technical Services Corporation (PVS), Vinashin Petroleum Investment and Transport JSC 
(VSP), etc. and we saw that some of them (AGF, etc.) have moved towards using ANZ services 
in such areas as accessing corporate loans, etc. Although this does not mean that firms consulted 
by SSI will always consider utilizing ANZ services, there is grounds to believe that the strategic 
alliance between ANZ and SSI is helping ANZ expand its services in the Vietnam market. 
189 
 
Table 6.2: ANZ Investments on Saigon Securities Incorporation 
Date 
Chartered Capital in ANZ holding ANZ Investment in 
Note 
bil. VND US. mil. $ Added Total per cent bil. VND US. mil. $ 
To Aug-07 
800 50 8,000,000 8,000,000 10% 
1,422 88 
Private placement 
   1,111,200  Convertible bonds 
2007    555,600  55.56 3.43 
Convertible bonds ± Private 
placement 
Dec-07 1,200 74 4,000,000 12,000,000 10%   Bonus shares  
Dec-07 1,366 83 1,666,800 13,666,800 10%   Convertible bonds to shares 
Apr - May 08 1,366 83 1,900,000 15,566,800 11.39% 87.50 5.47 Market Price 
Jul-08 1,366 83 3,416,700 18,983,500 13.89% 93.89 5.71 Market Price 
3 Jul 08      (31.13) (1.90) Dividend of 20 per cent by cash 
Jun ± Aug 08 1,366 83 5,147,160 24,130,660 17.66% 220.37 13.38 Market Price 
Aug ± Oct 08 1,366 83 947,350 25,078,010 18.35% 55.4 3.36 Market Price 
Nov - Jan 09 1,366 83 1,366,667     Registering to buy 
 
      117.4 Total 
 
      (102.1) Profit (market price) 
* calculated by using exchange rate quoted by the SBV. 
Source: Combined sources from ATPVietnam, SSI and SBV website from 2007 to 2008.  
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x Diversification 
ANZ is also one of three strategic shareholders of Traphaco Joint Stock Company, operating in 
the pharmaceutical sector and recently listed on Ho Chi Minh stock exchange center under the 
code TRA. ANZ owns 250,000 TRA shares (or 3.13 percent).  
The company has a vision of developing into a large firm trading in products and services 
UHODWLQJWRKHDOWKFDUHDVZHOODVLQVWXG\LQJDQGGHYHORSLQJµQDWXUDO-RULJLQ¶SURGXFWVLQ
In addition, it is forecast to continue to return 30 ± 35 per cent annual growth over the next few 
years.  
In regard to pharmaceuticals, this sector still has significant growth potential, and is an area 
where Vietnam is still dependent on imported drugs and medical equipment, with present costs 
of this to the economy already valued at more than half of billion USD per year (General 
Statistics Office, 2008 ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKLV VHFWRU¶V SURILWDELOLW\ KDV EHHQ TXLWH DWWUDFWLYH VHH
Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3: Average profitability in pharmaceutical sector 
Indicator 2006 2007 2008  
ROE 14.9 15.2 16.0 
ROA 9.9 11.7 12.5 
Source: Combined sources from financial reports of Hau Giang Pharmaceutical JSC (DHG), 
Imexpharm Pharmaceutical JSC (IMP) and Traphaco JSC (TRA) from 2006 to 2008. 
In conclusion, ANZ has invested in key sectors including finance and pharmacy. The ANZ 
portfolio has been quite selective and potentials in both profit and non-finance aspects are high 
as Vietnam, while still a developing country, has returned impressive growth in its finance 
sector and the pharmaceutical industry. This progress has been constantly maintained through 
Vietnam government support for development and ANZ has strategically placed itself to take 
advantage of both the market opportunities and the benefits of strong strategic partnership with 
domestic actors. 
6.4.3 Banking activities 
With the strengths and experiences of being one of the four leading banks in Australia, ANZ has 
played an important role in developing the Vietnam banking, especially with the adoption of 
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new technology, as well as the introduction of well-known banking products from around the 
world. In the following part, typical services will be mentioned in order to emphasise how ANZ 
has developed, especially in comparison with other banks. 
x Standard services 
First ATM 
Not only being the first English-speaking bank in Vietnam, ANZ launched the first ATM in 
Vietnam in 2000. This was very much as a result of advantages in technology ANZ possessed in 
comparison to the Vietnam state-owned and other join stock banks. The first ATM launch 
helped ANZ attract lots of clients who often worked overseas, especially in Australia. 
Afterwards, ANZ continued satisfying local clients by integrating with Sacombank and Phuong 
Nam bank in ATM services in 2003. That move is considered as the very first efficient step in 
integration of a payment card system in Vietnam banking. Up to now, ANZ has more than 60 
ATMs throughout Vietnam. However, ANZ seems to be losing its market dominance as HSBC 
has recently installed its 108th ATM. In the long-term strategy, ANZ will open more ATMs in 
Vietnam in order to saWLVI\FOLHQWV¶GHPDQGXuan Ha, 2008).  
x Debit visa card 
In October 2006, ANZ introduced its first debit visa card. However, two years before that, 7 
local banks already offered this services including Asian Commercial Bank, Vietcombank, etc. 
It is said that ANZ launched the service later than other big local banks because in comparison 
with these banks, ANZ has had limited number of individual clients. As a result, ANZ can be 
seen as providing this service to give client satisfaction, rather than in pursuit of a new profit 
source.  
x E-Biz 
Although E-Biz is very well-known in western countries, it is unfamiliar in Vietnam. Just in late 
January 2007, ANZ introduced the new service, called µE-Biz¶ which allows the clients not only 
keep track of their transaction online but also bank online including transferring, paying, etc. At 
that time, none of local banks can offer this service due to their limitation on technology. Only 
HSBC, a very large bank in the world, also can introduce this service in Vietnam. Even now, 
clients can only enjoy this service in two local banks including Tien Phong Bank, a member of 
FPT group, and Techcombank. Others banks such as BIDV, Vietcombank, etc. only allow 
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clients to keep track of their transactions online. Other services relating to E-biz have not been 
introduced because Banks appear to not enough strength to ensure their systems safety.  
x Services for students 
Besides other banking activities, ANZ understands that overseas students are an important 
source of potential customers. As a result, ANZ has coordinated with the Royal Melbourne 
Institute of Technology University (RMIT) Vietnam to offer loans for students since September 
2007 (Hanoimoionline, 2007). Before that, in March 2006, ANZ Vietnam started providing free 
ISIC card (International Student Identify Card) and an international ANZ card to overseas 
students.  
The education market in Vietnam offered great opportunities for foreign education institutions 
and this was a market that ANZ Vietnam could not neglect to capture. By end of 2008, there 
were approximately 75,000 Vietnamese students studying overseas in total and just in the year 
2008 alone, there were 25,000 Vietnamese granted student visas to study abroad. Canadian 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2009) estimated that this number would grow by about 
25 per cent per year over the coming years as continuous economic development of the country 
and personal income levels rise. The demand for overseas education will rise because affluent 
Vietnamese parents look for quality education for their children. When more foreign invested 
enterprises come to the country, the demand for skilled professionals conforming to Western 
working standards will also increase. And as 60 per cent of 88 million Vietnameses are young 
population under 30 year old and most of them are eager to acquire knowledge and skills that 
lead to high-paying jobs. 
Table 6.4: Number of Student visas issued for select countries (2005-2008) 
Country 
Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
US 2,655 4,093 7,303 9,600 
Australia 1,712 2,512 3,779 5,650 
United Kingdom 1,312 1,396 1,735 1,930 
Canada 332 214 263 589 
 
Source: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2009. 
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The table above shows that many Vietnamese students chose Australia for their higher 
education, especially in 2008. The reasons for this are the more reasonable living costs and 
tuition fees in Australia, while its education quality is still considered to be of a high standard.  
As a result, ANZ has significant potential as the primary choice of Vietnam students studying 
overseas and requiring various services in transactional banking, loan products, etc.  
x Home Loans 
In this area, ANZ has been much slower to develop than local banks. Only in September 2007, 
could individuals access this service from ANZ. ANZ Vietnam launched its mortgage products 
on 3rd September 2007 and offered Vietnamese customers convenient access to Home Loan 
Services. ANZ mortgage is considered the most competitive package set against the normal 
Home Loan service with it offering in 2007 a 1-1.4 per cent interest rate per month, over 15-20 
years term and providing up to 70 per cent of the house value, with the whole process made 
even more attractive by it requiring only a simple procedure to acquire the loan (ANZ, 2007a).  
One reason for the initial slowness in developing this product was a belief that the Vietnamese 
preferred to choose loans from local banks as they believed that foreign banks usually offered 
higher interest rates than local banks.  
Understanding this issue, ANZ aimed at offering an µimpressive and competitive¶ interest rate, 
with a simplified application procedure for loans and the service also aligned to the bank giving 
free consultancy on making the loan part of a wider financial plan. In fact, by introducing this 
product, ANZ has shown its intention to directly compete with local banks in a major financial 
area.  
x Services for corporate clients 
¾ Derivatives 
ANZ has been one of leading banks in offering derivatives. In 2007 ANZ has perfected its 
interest rate swap in VND which allows clients to enjoy interest rate constant in comparison 
with the Vietnam Inter Bank Offered Rate (VNIBOR). As we have known, interest rate swap in 
VND has been quite new in Vietnam banking and only few banks can offer this service. Cross 
currency swap is also another rates derivative offered by ANZ. 
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The most noticeable client of ANZ in this service is Petro Vietnam Transportation (PVT). They 
signed an interest rate swap deal with duration of 5.5 years on the 5 th June 2008. PVT is one of 
the top firms operating in petrol transportation to overseas in Vietnam.  
¾ Bond underwriting 
ANZ is the first foreign bank in Vietnam to implement underwriting of Corporate Bonds in 
Vietnam dong. In July 2006, ANZ was the book runner for the first ever local currency 
corporate bond issued for the Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) 900 billion VND (60 million US 
dollar equivalent) with a 5 years Bond. In October 2008, ANZ has coordinated with BIDV to 
underwrite 1 trillion billion VND corporate bonds for Vincom JSC (VIC) to local and overseas 
firms. Vinashin (the Vietnam leading ship-building company) was also one of large ANZ clients 
in this field. Both of these clients are blue-chips on the Vietnam stock exchange market. 
Moreover, ANZ acted as the underwriters for the Government bond issue.  
It can be seen that ANZ has underwritten for large corporations, and not just small firms. And 
these firms have often involved in major foreign operations. In particular, both EVN and VIC 
are often working with oversea firms and their bond issues are aimed at attracting foreign firms. 
This shows that ANZ has not only tried to advance its domestic role in the Vietnam market, but 
also ventured into links between the Vietnam and overseas financial markets.  
¾ Strategic loans 
,Q 6HS  $1= ZDV WKH OHDGLQJ µDUUDQJHU¶ IRU ORQJ WHUP ILQDQFLDO VHUYLFHV LQFOXGLQJ
arranging export finance services to China and trade financing, valued at USD120 million with 
13 years tenure for Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Corporation to promote its production capacity. 
With regard to steel production, it is obvious that this sector has played an important role in the 
development of Vietnam and there is a huge demand for infrastructure construction projects that 
require significant inputs from the financial sector. Thai Nguyen Corporation is a well-known 
State-owned firm involved in many of the largest operations and the demand for financial 
services is thus significant and long-term. The capture of Thai Nguyen as a client is a major 
success for the continued growth of ANZ business in Vietnam (ANZ, 2007b). 
Also in 2007, ANZ was one of the arrangers to the Ministry of Finance to finance the Dung 
Quat oil refinery requiring USD300 million of investment. Moreover, a series of Hydropower 
Plants for EVN, including at Vuong in Quang Nam, Dong Nai 3 and Dong Nai 4, An Khe Ka 
Nak and Srepok 3 plants brought a need of loans reaching a total of USD161 million.  
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In late December 2007, ANZ, along with BNP Paribas, Natixis and Petrol Vietnam Finance 
Corporation (PVF) signed credit contracts with Petro Vietnam valued at USD 270 million over 
eight years in order to construct the Nhon Trach 1 thermal power project in Dong Nai province. 
7KLVSURMHFW LV RQHRI WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V VWUDWHJLHV DLPHGDW VWDELOL]LQJ WKHQDWLRQDO HOHFWULFLW\
supply.  
It can be seen that ANZ has focused on large loans for trusted entities which are often related to 
the Government. Throughout these loans, we also see that Vietnamese government has 
confirmed its confidence in ANZ service and recognised its expertise and financial capacity. 
The ability of a foreign bank to successfully operate in Vietnam and build up strategic 
relationships with Vietnamese clients and the Government cannot be lightly considered. 
Vietnam is a country where the business, governmental and societal culture is often a source of 
misunderstanding and confusion between foreign and domestic partners. Thus, the ANZ 
progress in successfully negotiating a trusted and profitable position in the market cannot be 
under-estimated.  
x Import-Export Support 
ANZ, as the No.1 provider of trade finance in Australia, has committed to support importers and 
exporters, especially exporters by offering short loans in foreign currency with term of less than 
180 days. Thanks to this service, business clients¶ working capital is ensured to meet their 
production schedules, especially through periods when there is a slow payment by clients. 
In 2008, the workshop µStrengthening seafood material import for processing and exporting¶ 
given by the Vietnam Association of Sea Food Export, ANZ introduced a new financial 
package; the µinventory support for buyers¶, and aimed at solving particular difficulties in 
working capital problems for seafood exporters (Interview: Ms Dam Thuy, ANZ, 10 June 2009). 
That package includes two parts: 1) inventory support for buyers to help in importing and 2) 
pre-export trade support to help processing and exporting trades. Fishery firms will use its 
imported seafood materials to support mortgage loaning to pay for the imports. This product is 
very helpful for these firms because it is suitable to the typical characteristics of fishery 
companies, which include needing large working capital bases on a short term arrangement that 
allows the processing of imported material into finished products for export. An advantage of 
the new product is that the loaning procedure is quite simple, especially in mortgaging terms. 
This again indicates a strong strategic ANZ strategy of avoiding providing new products that fail 
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due to complicated application procedures and shows that simplicity is often the key to 
providing satisfaction and achieving customer loyalty in the Vietnamese market. 
ANZ has provided this service to a series of fishery firms, including two listed companies, Ben 
Tre Import-Export Fishery joint-stock company (FBT) and An Giang Import-Export Fishery 
joint-stock company (AGF). These firms are the leading firms in the sector and listed in the Ho 
Chi Minh Stock Exchange Center. 
It is predicted that the package will be very popular in the fishery sector especially since ANZ 
declared itself during the workshop as a major supporter for Vietnamese seafood exporters. 
x Financial Advisor  
ANZ has provided financial advisor services for a series of large projects. ANZ has provided 
significant financial packages these projects through bond issuance, bank loans and calls for 
more partners. And in Thu Duc Water Treatment project, ANZ directly participated as a µco-
arranger¶. 
It is recognised that large clients often look to ANZ to use this service, and it is not merely 
reliant on the small to medium sized clients. A major reason for this is that the existing 
availability of sophisticated financial advisory services in Vietnam is very low and the problem 
with acquiring a service that has the necessary technical and knowledge based ability to manage 
very large projects is very limited. In this aspect, ANZ has often co-operated with other banks 
including BIDV and Sacombank, to provide the necessary inputs and shown that the weaknesses 
in the Vietnam financial sector have actually provided ANZ opportunities to advance its own 
market share and overall reputation for quality services. 
x Perspectives 
In EDQNLQJPDUNHWVIRULQVWLWXWLRQV$1=¶VJRDOLVWREHFRPHWKHFRUHEDQNWRSDQGLQWHQGV
targeting major clients, such as leading agri-EDQN¶VDQGµQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV¶EDQN,QWKHUHWDLOLQJ
banking market, ANZ is trying to expand to be in the top 4 by NPAT and achieve 10-20per cent 
share of targeted segments. 
7R DFKLHYH LWV WDUJHWV $1=µV VWUDWHJLHV DUH IRFXVHG RQ GHYHORSLQJ WKH UHWDLO VHFWRU XVLQJ
SDUWQHUVKLSVWRFRPSOLPHQW$1=¶VRIIHUV,WVWUDFNUHFRUGLQUHWDLOEDQNLQJGHPRQVWUDWHVVWURQJ
institutional capabilities in delivering retail banking services. 
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,Q UHWDLOLQJ EDQN PDUNHW $1=µV VWUDWHJ\ LV WR ZLGHQ WKH DWWUDFWLRQ WR customers bank and 
emphasis its understanding of the culture, while also winning points for its service convenience 
and standards, thus ensuring the banks position as a market leader. ANZ heavily invests in 
training programs to create the ideal human resource advantages. It aims to increase the quality 
of the services with the slogans like µANZ has great staff¶, µOpen when and where you want¶ or 
µwe come to you¶. The Bank is striving to achieve a competitive advantage through quality of 
human resources and efficient, friendly and available services. ANZ is complimenting its 
existing advantages by introducing increasingly more competitive and convenient ways to bank, 
such as ATMs, internet, call centre and mobile phone offerings.  
Obviously ANZ has great potential to develop, especially in individual banking services, and its 
existing disadvantages, such as the high fee in ATM withdrawal (in x-times depending on 
account package) will be lessened when the SBV allows accounting fees to be applied for all 
ATM transactions. 
6.5 ANZ contribution to the development of Vietnam  
ANZ in Vietnam has become an important and respected contributor to the economic 
development of the country, especially in the reform of the banking system and its impact upon 
both economic and social aspects of Vietnamese society. However, the social aspect should be 
examined in detail as it is vital factor in the development of the profitability of ANZ in Vietnam 
(Hansen and Diaz, 2008). 
6.5.1 Community development 
ANZ Vietnam has contributed significantly towards community development in Vietnam and 
takes its social responsibility very seriously. It, along with Youth Newspaper co-sponsored the 
building of a primary school in Ca Mau with the fund of 200 millions Dong in 2005 (Vietbao, 
2005). It also supported the µRural Development for a Future without Poverty¶ project to provide 
women in Tuyen Quang province additional micro-credit, and training in small business 
establishment (ANZ, 2007c). ANZ Bank Ltd. (International) also contributed to the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO :RPHQ¶V 'HYHORSPHQW $JHQF\ ,:'$ FKDULWy with USD 100,000 to build a 
school. Its staff also mobilised to donate USD 160,000 to provide credit loans and support for 
women in Tay Bac area in the program µANZ- overcome threats for the community¶. The 
Vietnamese culture is one that sees the business community as having a social responsibility to 
provide a percentage of its profits as charitable donations. The connection between the 
reputation of a business and its standing in the society as a whole is strongly dependent on the 
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company demonstrating openly its commitment to local communities and its willingness to help 
GHYHORSPHQWJHQHUDOO\)LUPVWKDWIRFXVPHUHO\RQJDLQLQJPDUNHWVKDUHVDQGDUHUXQµSXUHO\IRU
SURILW¶ VRRQ ORVH WKH OR\DOW\ DQG FXVWRP RI WKHLU FOLHQWV $1= KDV VKRZQ LWV DZDUHQHVV RI D
responsibility to the community and demonstrated that it is willing to share the rewards of its 
business with some of the less fortunate in Vietnam society. This directly enhances its position 
in Vietnam, especially with its development of fruitful relations with the government and the 
business community.  
6.5.2 Comments on laws 
Having expertise in finance and banking, ANZ has often contributed valuable advice to aid 
reform of the Law, including Personal Income Law and Securities Law. It suggested that 
foreigners who work in Vietnam less than 30 days should not be applied tax because they are 
often expert and during their short-term visit to Vietnam, they might find opportunities to invest. 
As a result, taxing them will not only discourage them to come to Vietnam but also lessen 
opportunities to attract FDI. As regards to Securities Law, ANZ recommended that the rate tax 
of 25percent is too high and cannot stimulate the stock market (Vietbao, 2007b). That statement 
is correct because the draft as well as the official law has played an important role in pulling VN 
Index down since early September 2009 (Le Minh Toan and Walker, 2009). 
6.5.3 (FRQRPLF5HVHDUFKRI9LHWQDP¶VHFRQRP\ 
ANZ International and Morgan Stanley both still consider Vietnam economy as stable and one 
RIWKHZRUOG¶VEHWWHUGHYHORSLQJPDFURHFRQRP\¶V¶$1=H[SHUWVWKLQNWKDWWKHUHFHQWLQIODWLRQ
control package of the Vietnam Government has followed the right track (Le Huong, 2008). 
ANZ Vietnam has made significant contributions to the development of the control package, 
including providing astute recommendations and helping to ensure that the correct data was used 
WRFRPSLOH WKHVWUDWHJ\7KHIROORZLQJILJXUHVVKRZWKHPRYHPHQWRI9LHWQDP¶V LQIODWLRQDQG
the prediction of ANZ on inflation trend. 
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Figure 6.19LHWQDP¶V&3,LQ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: General Statistics Office (2008) 
(1): Alex Thursby, ANZ General Manager in Asia- Pacific, stated that µI do not think Vietnam is in crisis¶ and inflation might be in controlled. 
$1=DORQJZLWK0RUJDQ6WDQOH\FRQVLGHUHGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VDQWL-LQIODWLRQSDFNDJHDVµWKHULJKWZD\¶IRUZDUG 
200 
 
7KH EDQN¶V HFRQRPLFV DQG PDUNHW UHVHDUFK WHDP KDV EHHQ DFWLYHO\ ZDWFKLQJ WKH PDrket and 
SURGXFLQJ UHSRUWV HYDOXDWLQJ DQG IRUHFDVWLQJ DERXW 9LHWQDP¶V HFRQRP\ RQ D UHJXODU EDVLV
ANZ¶V IRUHFDVWLQJ UHSRUWV DUH XVXDOO\ FORVH WR WKH UHDOLW\, even when the economy was 
considered to be in crisis (very high inflation in May ± time (1)). Morgan Stanley believed that 
Vietnam was in financial crisis. The drop in CPI proved how correct the statement of ANZ, not 
Morgan Stanley was. 
In general, ANZ Vietnam has devoted significant efforts in helping the development of Vietnam 
in both economic and social aspects. Its viewpoint has helped investors understand more about 
Vietnam economy, and hence they have made more appropriate investment decisions.  
6.6 Recommendation and Conclusion 
The case study has shown that the law is very important in attracting FDI as it creates 
opportunities for foreign investors to gain their achievements. However, in order to become a 
successful FDI firm in Vietnam, the firm also needs to have appropriate strategies as well as 
activities to create differentiation in order to gain sustainable development. Thus, specific 
recommendations will be made for ANZ, based on its strengths and weaknesses.  
6.6.1 Viewpoint of the Government and the Party as well as politic stability 
It cannot be denied that the point of view of the Government plays an important role in 
attracting FDI. Before Doi Moi, FDI in Vietnam was at a dangerously low level. Since Doi Moi 
began, FDI increased gradually and focused in other sectors which could advantage of cheap 
labour and/ or natural resource costs. 
An example of practical policies issued by the Vietnam Government to support the development 
RIDµEDQNLQJFXOWXUH¶ZDV'LUHFWLRQ1R&7-TTg on the system for salary payment of 
civil servants and later developed further with Decree 21/2010/ND-CP of March 8th, on the 
Management of civil servants payrolls. Although also designed as strategies for promoting and 
securing anti-corruption policies in the government administration system, the new regulations 
provided a direct boost to the growth of a banking culture with many government employees 
now forced to open and sustain bank accounts in order to receive their pay and benefits from 
their employer. Further supportive regulations for FDI included Decision No.12,2011/QD-TTg 
on Favourable Policies for Supporting Industries which included the Vietnam Ministry of 
industry and Trade allowing foreign enterprises to advertise free of charge on the government 
website; prioritising supporting industries for receiving funds; the allocation of land and low 
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rental rates for new ventures and direct assistance from the government in job recruitment and 
training; export/import duty incentives 
Like other countries in the Asian area, FDI into the banking sector came later than in many other 
sectors. For instances, ANZ Bank Ltd. decided to invest in Vietnam in 1993, seven years later 
than the start of Doi Moi. Meanwhile, it already had a presence in Mainland China in 1986, 
eight \HDUV ODWHU WKDQ&KLQD¶V UHQRYDWLRQ ,W VHHPV WKDW IRUHLJQHUVRQO\ LQYHVWHG LQ WKLV VHFWRU
when they recognised absolutely positive signals being given by the Government. Their thinking 
is reasonable because this sector requires a large amount of capital risk and Governmental 
cooperation is vital to limiting the risk. That early suspicion of the Governmental commitment 
to reform explains ANZ initial reluctance to enter the Vietnam market and is reflected also in its 
present avoidance of investing Myanmar which is still considered relatively unstable in term of 
politics (Hansen and Diaz, 2008; Doan Anh Toan, 2005; Mai; 2003; Biallas and Nguyen Hanh 
Nam, 2006). 
Obviously, the Vietnamese Government and the Party have been consistently active in 
promoting the openness of the Vietnam economy to foreign partners and as a result, FDI firms 
have become more comfortable in deciding to operate in Vietnam (such as ANZ, HSBC, etc.). 
The Vietnam Government still retains a number of negative aspects that concern the FDI 
investor, such as the need for more reform of the bureaucratic system and further development 
of business law, but they have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and encourage the 
necessary reforms, which has convinced FDI investors to increasingly focus on entering the 
Vietnam market (Hansen and Diaz, 2008) 
6.6.2 Potential markets 
Vietnam has significant potential as a market for banking activities. According to ANZ (2008), 
only 10 percent of Vietnamese and 35 per cent of urban residents presently have bank accounts. 
And the urban middle class have demonstrated a fresh willingness to actually use credit services. 
In addition, Vietnam has had stable growth rates. This demonstrates that demand for banking 
services is likely to only increase and that the profit potential of the Vietnam market is one of 
the most positive in the global banking market. 
This is especially so with the requirement from the Government in August 2007 that all state 
agencies and firms must pay staff salaries via bank account, thus ending the culture of cash 
payments and forcing many people to become bank customers. This measure was evaluated as 
an advance in technology application as well as a new restriction on corruption. In the future, all 
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firms in the private sector will also be required to implement this measure. Therefore, almost 
overnight, the potential size of the market for banking services will grow to new heights, with a 
present population of over 88 million people promising both domestic banks and foreign banks 
exciting opportunities to capture invaluable new market shares.  
ANZ bank has been implementing the right strategy in marketing and banking, as they have 
created a brand-name of a µfor the customers¶ bank. More Vietnamese, especially the medium 
and high classes in urban areas are looking for confidential and quality services from foreign 
banks like ANZ. For example, they feel confidence is assured when their individual banking 
needs can be discussed in a private room, and not over the counter, as is the general practice 
with existing local banks. ANZ has implemented mobile-banking to save time for customers. 
Customers also record high levels of satisfaction with the ANZ services, especially in even 
simple terms, such as always being presented with cordial and smiling attitude towards them by 
Bank staff, including from the levels of tellers to managers. These are differential competitive 
advantages provided by ANZ when compared to the services of many of the local banks, where 
customer service and the quality of human resources are relatively low. The faults of the local 
banks are only compounded by the low levels of service quality also being joined by the 
introductions of new charges that include the collection of an annual banking account fee and 
withdrawal fees for transactional banking (introduced in $1=¶VDGYDQWDJHVDUHOLNHO\WR
increase further when the fees are eventually abolished and the major competitive advantages 
between local and foreign banks will rest solely on the quality of customer service. 
6.6.3 Labour 
Average salary for an employee with bachelor or master degree (even overseas) in banking and 
finance sector (both State-owned, joint-stock and foreign firms/banks) was USD450 per month 
(Navigos Group, 2008), just equal to the figure of a banking customer service officer in 
Indonesia, according to Indonesia Salary Guideline 2007. These figures show that labour in 
Vietnam is quite cheap in comparison with other countries. And that will be a factor to attract 
more FDI into the financial sector. 
In addition, foreign banks have advantages in attracting experienced and highly educated 
employees from domestic banks, even the SBV, due to their attractive salaries and their better 
working environments. For instance, ANZ is proud to be creating a positive environment for its 
staff. It listens and values its employees, and hence promotes good working effectiveness. That 
is reflected in the comments of some of its current staff with µOur working environment is very 
professional¶. µ:HHQMR\ZKDWZHFDQGHYRWHWRRXUEDQN¶¶µOur working life is secure at ANZ¶ 
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and µWorking at the Bank is fun¶ (Interview: Staffs, ANZ, 12 May 2009). In contrast, the staff 
of competitors are sources of concern for their working environments and subsequently become 
targets for ANZ to attract to employment in their own bank. 
6.6.4 Transparent information/ Investors protection 
Transparency still is an issue, as evaluated by Transparency International (2006). There has been 
no official data on banking market shares. Bank financial reports are limited. Only joint-stock 
commercial bank must disclose their financial report as regulated by decision 1407/2004/QD-
NHNN on 1 November 2004. The lack of information will cause concerns for investors and 
hence lessen the attractiveness and well as effectiveness of FDI. 
,QYHVWRUV¶ SURWHFWLRQ FRYHUV UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU LPPHGLDWH GLVFORVXUH RI DQQRXQFHPHQWV DQG
financial reports of public firms. To evaluate this index, World Bank also considers the liability 
of the board of directors for damages or even the availability of documents which can be used 
GXULQJDWULDOHWF7KHIROORZLQJILJXUHVKRZVKRZ:RUOG%DQNHYDOXDWHVWKHOHYHORI9LHWQDP¶V
LQYHVWRUV¶SURWHFWLRQLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKFRXQWULHVLQWKHDUHDV7KHVFDOHLVIURPWR 
Table 6.5: Protecting Investors 
Protecting Investor Data 
2007 2008 2009 
VN VN VN Malay Thai Indo Laos 
Rank  168 170 4 11 53 180 
Investor Protection Index 1.7 2.7 2.7 8.7 7.7 5.7 1.7 
Source: World Bank, 2008 
Based on this index, it can be seen that Vietnam needs to improve its regulation on the 
disclosure requirements and transparency. In comparison with Indonesia and Thailand which 
have economic conditions just a little higher than Vietnam, Vietnam is evaluated much lower in 
protection. Regulatory protection should not only be adopted for joint-stock banks but also for 
all types of banks in order to help investors and taxpayers have a full understanding about the 
banking system. Currently branches of foreign banks and state-owned have not published their 
financial reports. Therefore, it is very difficult to understand the effectiveness of these banks 
(Hansen and Diaz, 2008; Biallas and Nguyen Hanh Nam, 2006).  
ANZ also faces this problem. It is very difficult to DFTXLUH DFFXUDWH $1=¶ ILQDQFLDO GDWD LQ
Vietnam as illustrated by the comment of an ANZ executive who said in reply to requests for 
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data µour policy on financial information release is confidential, except to that for export to 
SBV¶. Looking at other foreign banks including HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank, the same 
policy has been applied.  
As a result, ANZ, as well as other banks and FDI firms in financial sector, should disclose more 
financial information in order to help investors and their clients understand more about the 
effectiveness of that bank, and therefore they might feel more confident in its services. What is 
worrying is that instead of foreign firms becoming the vanguard in positive changes of the levels 
of transparency, the banks such as ANZ have virtually adopted all the same negative practices as 
the domestic banks and seem to find more advantages in being more opaque rather than open. 
Much of the reform in Vietnam has been aided by foreign concerns setting a new example and 
their lack of constructive reform in this area of business is a mistake that can only compound the 
present difficulties. 
6.6.5 Access to Credit  
According to World Bank (2008), µGetting credit index¶ is determined by evaluating legal right, 
credit information, public registry coverage and private bureau coverage.  
Table 6.6: Getting Credit 
Getting Credit 
2008 2009 
VN VN Malay Thai Indo Philip Laos 
Rank 51 43 1 68 109 123 145 
Source: World Bank, 2008 
This index reflects the effectiveness of banking system. Although the Government is currently 
adopting strict monetary policy, great efforts have been made in granting credit and protecting 
both lenders and borrowers. Valuation for a credit grant is stricter to prevent bad loans while 
more information is released by credit institutions.  
However, Vietnam still needs to improve more in this field in order to follow Malaysia which is 
DOVR DQ $6($1 PHPEHU EXW DOZD\V HYDOXDWHG DV EHLQJ µYHU\ JRRG¶ LQ WKLV DUHD More 
information should be offered by credit bodies and the law also should be more clarified to 
protect partners. 
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6.6.6 Legal documents and regulations 
The following figure shows that for specific years, FDI in banking and finance sector rose. 
Looking at the laws and regulations in this period, there is a link between them. 
Table 6.7: FDI in Banking and Finance from 2000 to 2007 (using 1994 price) 
(In billions Dong) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Banking and 
Finance 
489 388 160 865 487 535 619 698 
 per cent/ Total FDI 0.72 0.50 0.18 0.91 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.51 
Total FDI 
68,08
9 
77,42
6 
86,67
7 
95,47
1 
105,08
2 
115,19
6 
126,60
1 
135,86
0 
Source: SBV, 2007. 
2003 witnessed record FDI in this field. In the same year, State Bank Law was amended on 17 
June. In addition, Law on Corporate Tax, Law on Value Added Tax, and Law on Accounting 
were also adjusted in order to concretise these aspects. These amendments might have positive 
effect on FDI as foreign investors realised that Vietnamese Government had tried to create a 
more convenient investment environment. 
In 2005, the banking and finance sector made significant advances with the raising from 30 to 
49 percent of foreign ownership in public firms. This is an effective lever in attracting FDI in 
banking and financial sectors. Afterwards, the booming of the Vietnamese stock market, as well 
as the participation into the World Trade Organisation (2006) played an important role in 
exposing the Vietnam market to the world. The acceptance of a 100 per cent foreign bank in 
LVDPDMRUVWHSWRIXOILOOLQJ9LHWQDP¶VFRPPLWPHQWVZKHQMRLQLQJWKH:72$VDUHVXOW
ANZ and other current foreign banks will face more competition from future players. 
One of regulations which will restrict the development of foreign banks in Vietnam is ATM 
installation. ANZ and other foreign banks face many difficulties in competing with local banks 
in attracting individuals as the Vietnamese still often pay by cash, not by credit as with many 
GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV 7KHUHIRUH $70V SOD\ D YHU\ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ VDWLVI\LQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶
demand. This issue is very difficult to solve, except if SBV treats foreign banks the same as 
local banks (Pham Duy Nghia, 2006; Gillespie, 2006, 2007; Balme and Sidel, 2007) 
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6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how ANZ has established a successful FDI venture in Vietnam and 
considered the extent to which its ability to find affinity with the culture has contributed to that 
success. For Dunning and Bansal, this should be complemented by a study of the Australian and 
1HZ=HDODQGFXOWXUHV µDQG WKHSURSHQVity of a nation to engage in FDI«DQGGRHV WKHFXOWXUH
affect the locational and modal choices? In other words, does culture affect the competitiveness 
RIILUPVDQGWKHLUSHUFHSWLRQRIWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWVDQGPDUNHWIDLOXUH¶S+RZHYHUWKH
focus here is on Vietnam and the thesis does not extend to studying the ANZ home cultures.  
Vietnam and the banking sector in particular, need to improve its management quality to exploit 
FDI effectively. However, it cannot be denied that Vietnam has gained many achievements as 
foreign investors are increasingly willing to disburse in Vietnam. In the banking sector, ANZ 
can be a seen as a typical example of how the sector can develop. ANZ has ambitions to µexpand 
the services we provide in the country¶ as stated by Ms Dam Thuy, its country manager. That 
LQWHQWLRQPLJKWPHHWFXVWRPHUV¶GHPDQGVDVDOPRVWRI them think ANZ is the best at services, 
however it has limitations on ATMs and branch numbers (,QWHUYLHZ $1=¶V clients, 12 May 
2009).  
The analysis of ANZ shows that there has been a fulfillment of many of Dunning and Bansal 
criteria for assessing a successful FDI enterprise. They instruct the scholar to focus on the 
µ01(VLPSDFWRQKRVWFRXQWU\FXOWXUHV¶$1=KDYHKHOSHGFUHDWHGHPDQGZKHUHQRQHH[LVWHG
and raised the standards of demand by providing a variety of new banking products and 
services, while also demonstrating to the home banks new levels of efficiency and standards 
(Dunning and Bansal, 1997, p.5). ANZ have worked with their Vietnam business customers to 
KHOSDQGDGYLFHWKHPRQKRZWRµLQMHFWDVSLULWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLSDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶DPRQJ their 
business community. The surveys of the workforce show that the Vietnamese employees 
constantly display a development of their ability to work through teamwork and provide higher 
OHYHOVRIFXVWRPHUVHUYLFH7KH\KDYHKHOSHGµFKDQJHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVbetween themselves and 
WKHLU VXSSOLHUV¶ DQG LPSURYHG µTXDOLW\ VWDQGDUGV RI SURGXFWLRQ ZKLFK¶ KDV UHVXOWHG LQ D µVSLOO
RYHU¶HIIHFWWKDWKDVVHHQWKHµquality of other related products¶improve (Dunning and Bansal, 
1997, p.5) 
The banking sector has been a relatively new area of investment where changes and 
opportunities are still in their infancy. Nevertheless, the ANZ study demonstrates how they 
experienced a process of learning by doing, and rather than arriving with a complete system in 
place within which to establish their operations, they have been actively involved in the ongoing 
207 
 
process of change. Their operations, advice, and sometimes resistance has been instrumental in 
actually changing the determinants of FDI in Vietnam, and in the process gradually developed 
the structures of investment to meet more and more needs of the foreign investor. However, the 
NH\ ZRUG LV µFKDQJH¶ DV LW LV HYLGHQW LQ WKLV WKHVLV WKDW WKH ODVW WZR GHFDGHV KDYH UHTXLUHG
extensive and thorough changes of the political policies, legal frameworks and economic 
conditions in Vietnam in order to attract and retain foreign direct investment. As Nguyen Mai 
explained the future prospects for continuing to attract and retain foreign investment means that 
the process of change must continue and probably needs to accelerate. Doi Moi was the initial 
change that made the attraction of international funds on a satisfactory scale possible, but it was 
just the beginning of a long and difficult process in which even more revolutionary change in 
policy may be required (Nguyen Mai, 2011).  
A1= KDV PDQDJHG WR µSHQHWUDWH¶ WKH 9LHWQDPHVH PDUNHW DQG XVH LWV IRUHLJQ LQYHVWPHQW
technology and know-how to become a major competitor. The success may also have come at 
VRPHFRVWDVRQHFRXOGEHOLHYH WKDW LWKDV LQVRPHZD\VµJRQHQDWLYH¶DVVXPLQJPDQ\ of the 
traits of domestic banking operations, such as a far more opaque financial disclosure process 
than it demonstrates in its own home operations. This may have helped it assimilate to the 
Vietnam environment, but could also carry with it some of the weaknesses of the domestic 
banks and when Vietnam fully opens to foreign competition, may put it at a disadvantage to new 
foreign bank entrants into the market. Nevertheless, present evidence is that ANZ is a successful 
example of FDI operation in Vietnam, a claim that can be made for the next case study- Honda. 
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CHAPTER 7: HONDA COMPANY IN VIETNAM CASE STUDY 
7.1 Introduction 
The case study of Honda in Vietnam is an examination of the cultural specific variables evident 
LQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFSDUDGLJPDQGWKe impact of internalisation theory. As early 
as 1997, Dunning and Bansal realised WKDWLWZDVµDQRSSRUWXQHWLPHIRUPRUHLQ-GHSWKUHVHDUFK¶
RQ µFXOWXUDO VSHFLILF YDULDEOHV¶ LQ )', YHQWXUHV S 7KH FKDSWHU KHUH IRUPV D VWXG\ RI WKH
application of the eclectic paradigm to Honda-Vietnam by examining how its entry mode and 
subsequent management system of operation provides clear indication that a culturally specific 
strategy for FDI is the optimum method of ensuring the maximum capital return on any foreign 
investment. 
Dunning (2008, p.274-276) examines the impact of informal institutions upon MNEs activity 
DQG LGHQWLILHV WKHVH DV FXOWXUDO SDFNDJHV FRQVLVWLQJ RI D KRPH FRXQWULHV µQRUPV YDOXHV
conventions, practices and artefacts derived from the national FXOWXUH¶+HUHZHVKRXOGQRWHWKDW
the study accepts the consequent impact on the home culture of the foreign venture and the case 
study here of Honda demonstrates that although the Honda (Vietnam) venture demonstrated 
clear conscious strategies for assimilation to the Vietnam culture, the reverse impact went 
beyond even an effect  on just the business partners, but extended into actually contributing to 
dramatic changes in the Vietnam national culture. The motorbike is now seen as much a 
reflection of the FXOWXUHDVHDWLJULFHRUWDNLQJDµVLHVWD¶DWPLGGD\'XQQLQJODUJHO\IRFXVHGRQ
the impact of a national culture upon foreign investment activity, yet, clearly the study of the 
reciprocal impact of a foreign culture upon a home countries culture is as relevant. 
The criterion given by Dunning and Bansal (1997, p.12) for assessment of the degree to which a 
FDI strategy is culturally specific has the following main dimensions: 
(1) µThe motives¶ IRU WKH µDFWLYLW\¶- in the case of Honda-Vietnam it was dominated by a 
market seeking strategy that could take advantage of the 88 million population of 
Vietnam while benefiting from the export into Vietnam of Japanese efficiency and 
strategic assets. 
(2) µ7KHVSHFLILFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIERWKWKHLQYHVWLQJDQGWKHLQYHVWHG¶HQWities- For Honda-
Vietnam, the massive potential demand for modern transport methods and a new sense 
of need for public mobility meant the market was primed for Honda, while the 
Vietnamese reputation for adaptability meant Honda could hope to easily transfer their 
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productivity and management advantages into Vietnam in a style that would work for the 
Vietnamese. 
(3) µ7KH NLQG RI DFWLYLW\ HQJDJHG LQ¶- which in the case of Honda-Vietnam involved the 
transfer of technology and capital, while concentrating on the specific advantages of the 
growing domestic market for motorbikes. 
(4) µ6WUDWHJ\ DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKH ILUPV LQFOXGLQJ WKHLU FRUSRUDWH FXOWXUH¶ ± Honda 
brought a Japanese corporate culture of discipline and efficiency, but did not slavishly 
adhere to it in Vietnam. Instead, they incrementally harmonised the Japanese discipline 
WRWKH9LHWQDPHVHµFDVXDOQHVV¶ and used their Asian cultural empathy and understanding 
of cultures, values and approaches to provide dual benefits to Vietnamese and Japanese 
stakeholders. 
Honda-Vietnam has successfully established a high returning capital investment into Vietnam 
that shows the relevance of cultural understanding in the eclectic paradigm. Presently, the policy 
towards FDI attraction by the Vietnamese Communist Party has provided a strong engine for 
economic growth. The Honda Company has launched its µjust-in-time¶ campaign and focused on 
LWVµSK\VLFDODVVHWV¶LQWRWKH9LHWQDPHVHeconomy, with a view to expanding their hold over the 
Vietnamese market. They are seeking to pursue fresh market and resource opportunities, and 
after 12 years operating in the Vietnamese market, Honda has proved they have a successful 
business strategy that includes diversification into the motorbike market and delivering its own 
set of corporate values based on a philosophy of management called the µpower of the dream¶ 
(Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002).  
7KH DFTXLVLWLRQ RI D µORFDO UHVSRQVLYHQHVV¶ LV WKH PDLQ IRFXV RI +RQGD¶V SHQHWUDWLRQ VWUDWHJ\
into Vietnam and has helped Honda become the motorbike market leader. In the context of 
proactive integration of Vietnam into the world economy, Honda has kept their philosophy in 
step with the development of Vietnam and sees that as a critical factor in its success. From point 
RI YLHZ RI D PDUNHWLQJ VWUDWHJ\ DQG LJQRULQJ WKH LQIOXHQFH RI µOXFN¶ WKH +RQGD Vietnam 
Company has acquired significant core competencies that new entrants to the market cannot 
easily attain. Furthermore, these core competencies are designed to be adaptive to the fast 
FKDQJHV RI WKH HQYLURQPHQW DQG DUH GHYHORSHG LQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI D µSUDFWLFDO DQG UHDO¶
approach to how to operate in Vietnam. The Vietnam motorbike market has demonstrated a 
close affinity to the philosophy of Honda and the development of both the market and Honda 
has been rapid and profitable (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002; Lee, 2004; Nguyen Duc 
Tiep, 2007).  
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Honda Group is a multinational corporation in the list of µ500¶ corporations. Honda¶VUHFRUG is 
RQHRI WUHPHQGRXVVXFFHVVDQGEDVHGRQDQDHVWKHWLF µORYHRI OLIH¶DQGD UHIOHFWLRQRIDEDVLF
FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ D SKLORVRSK\ RI µKDUG ZRUN¶ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR µPDQNLQG¶ DQG WKH
FRPPLWPHQWWRSURPRWLQJDµEHWWHUIXWXUH¶0U6DWRVKL7oshida, managing director Honda Asia 
Oceania noted: µ$VLDQ FXOWXUH LV EDVHG RQ D FRPPXQLW\ VSLULW DQG REOLJDWLRQ 2XU FXOWXUDO
affinity to the Vietnamese was a reason for our confidence in making our investment into 
9LHWQDPDVXFFHVV¶ (Interview: Satoshi Toshida, Honda Vietnam Company, 17 April 2008).  
Mr Hiroaki Funami, General Director Honda explained how this social responsibility policy 
fitted not only with the culture of Vietnam, but also aligned perfectly with the political ideology 
of the Vietnamese Government: µWKH9LHWQDPHVHDUHDVHQVLWLYHDQGproud people who see the 
pursuit of the capitalist profit as one that can be easily accepted if it is accompanied by the 
demonstration of a sense of a duty to the community. We felt the philosophy of Honda fitted 
ZHOO ZLWK WKH FXOWXUH RI 9LHWQDP¶ Interview: Hiroaki Funami, Honda Vietnam Company, 19 
April, 2008). 
 The story of Honda has attracted significant interest from business analysts and its venture into 
Vietnam as the Honda Group and Honda Vietnam Company is documented in a number of 
publications, including the now the famous book µMy Life Record¶ (2007) written by Honda 
Soichiro, which has been translated into English and later into Vietnamese by the Liberalisation 
Saigon Newspaper Publisher and Saigon Cultural Publisher. It is a typical work dealing with the 
VWRU\RIWKHIRXQGHURI+RQGDWKH&RPSDQ\¶VKLVWRU\RIGHYHORSPHQWDQGSURPRWHVWKHLGHDRI
Dµ+RQGDSKLORVRSK\¶ 
Research done by Kohei Mishima (2005) µThe Supplier System of the Motorcycle Industry in 
Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia: Localization, Procurement and Cost Reduction Process¶, 
SURYLGHVFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQDO\VLVRI+RQGDLQFOXGLQJDIRFXVRQWKH+RQGDµVXSSOLHUV\VWHP¶RI
the motorbike industry and examines clearly how a Vietnam specific system was established. It 
also made comparisons between other supplier systems, with a focus on three countries- 
Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. Its analysis includes 3 interactive dimensions of the 
motorbike industry including the localization, procurement and cost reduction processes. The 
three supplier systems of the different countries can be supplementary and substituted for each 
other in the regional production chain of motorbike industry. The recommendations and 
suggestions proposed by the research are a pointer to how the governments of all three countries 
should develop a favorable environment and realise the effective supporting activities for 
motorbike manufacturers to attract and utilise effectively FDI.  
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Pham Truong Hoang (2004) examined the products and organisation of the Vietnamese 
motorcycle market. The research concentrated on the evolution of the production organisation of 
any entities as the foundation of the business ties in the modern era. The research has also made 
clear the architecture of supplier systems of Honda Company especially the dynamic evolution 
of business architecture in response to agglomeration and modularization. However, these 
researchers mainly approached the business of Honda from technical aspects or the business 
architecture. The business of Honda has been constructed though a very comprehensive system 
of activities and functions that are not only focused on the business architecture (Pham Truong 
Hoang, 2004; Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007) 
7.2 The first step of Honda in Vietnam 
Honda motorbikes first appeared in Vietnam in 1967, in the Southern part of Vietnam under the 
former - Republic of Vietnam administration. Initially shipments of Honda motorcycles arrived 
LQ9LHWQDPZHUHDSDUWRIPDVVLYH86¶V$LGSURJUDPVIRUWKH6Ruth Vietnamese Government. 
At that time, people in the South Vietnam were impressed by the economy and reliability of 
Honda motorbikes. After the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975, Honda 
motorbike took the chance to expand its brand into the Northern part and then all over the 
Vietnamese territory. Even during the time of the command controlled and closed economy of 
Vietnam, the brand of Honda has had significant influence over the growing brand choices of 
Vietnamese customers, and facilitated that through the importation of re-conditioned Models 78, 
81, 84, etc motorbikes. This was in competition with the other models of motorbikes imported 
from the former socialist countries such as the Simpson, made in East Germany, or the Minsk, 
made in former Soviet Union (Mishima, 2005, Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Ministry of Industry, 
2007).  
By continuously undertaking the innovation of policy of FDI since 1986 with the controlling 
guidelines noted in the Preamble of the Law of Investment of Vietnam µto protect and encourage 
foreign investors on the basic of mutual treatment and law pursuance¶, Vietnam has been 
considered as the prime destination for foreign investors.  
The estimation of Vietnamese policy makers (MPI, 2004), of the investment needed to meet the 
demands generated by movement towards industrialisation and modernisation is in the region of 
200-250 billion USD of investment. Simultaneously, Vietnam also needs modern technology, 
management expertise and job creation to effectively exploit the resources and to modernise the 
economy towards a basically industrialised country by the year 2020. Therefore, FDI source, 
especially that of Transnational Corporations, is the most important resource to serve these 
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development objectives of Vietnam. The Vietnamese government commits not to nationalise all 
kinds of assets that belong to the lawful ownership of foreign investors. In addition to that, the 
Rate of Effective Protection (REP) of Vietnamese economy as a whole at this time is about 
1.300 per cent (Athukorala, 2002) and as a result, while the higher REP of Vietnamese economy 
exists, there is an opportunity to attract larger amounts of FDI inflows.  
7.2.1 Entry Mode of Honda 
Among the modes of entry into the foreign markets, Honda Group, headquartered in Japan, 
chose the joint venture model as the main approach to the Vietnamese market (Lee, 2004; 
Nam2007; Nagatani, 1995). This allowed them to gain valuable knowledge on the Vietnamese 
local market and to exploit the cooperation from the local partner in terms of solving the very 
complicated procedures of Vietnam, especially as for such issues as acquiring land use and 
dealing with the complexity of administrative formalities during its operation. As Mr Pham Van 
Nang, Deputy Director- Honda-Vietnam, explained: µ7KH PLVWDNH WKDW PDQ\ SURVSHFWLYH
investors making in entering the Vietnam economy is that they underestimate the value and 
maybe even necessity of having a Vietnamese partner. The system here is a mixture of the open 
and the hidden, where outsiders often become confused in how to actually get things done. A 
Vietnamese partner helps foreigners quickly acclimatise to the uniqueness of the Vietnam 
HFRQRP\¶ (Interview: Pham Van Nang, Honda Vietnam Company, 30 January 2009). 
Kindleberger (1969) and Hymer (1976) present the monopolistic advantage theory as an 
example of why firms undertake international expansion and argue that a µIRUHLJQ ILUP KDV D 
knowledge disadvantage of the QHZ PDUNHW FRPSDUHG WR LWV ORFDO FRPSHWLWRUV¶ )ULEHUJ DQG
Loven, 2007, p.4). Here Honda had capital, knowledge and resource advantages that gave them 
DQDGYDQWDJHRIORFDOFRPSHWLWRUV'XQQLQJ¶V; 1988) eclectic theory uses the monopolistic 
advantage WKHRU\DQGµVWLSXODWHV WKDW WKHFKRLFHRIHQWU\PRGH LV LQIOXHQFHGE\ WKUHH W\SHVRI
determinant factors: ownership advantages, location advantages of a market, and internalization 
DGYDQWDJHVRILQWHJUDWLQJWUDQVDFWLRQVZLWKLQWKHILUP¶7KXVWKHEDVLFSremise is that the FDI 
YHQWXUHFDQRQO\EHVXFFHVVIXOLILWKDVµDGYDQWDJHVVXIILFLHQWWRFRPSHQVDWHIRUFRVWVRIVHWWLQJ
XSDQGRSHUDWLQJDIRUHLJQVXEVLGLDU\¶)ULEHUJDQG/RYHQS+RZHYHU+RQGDFKRVH
an entry mode that attempted to combine both the comparative advantages of its own firm and 
the domestic advantages of a domestic partner, and evidence to date is that this strategy was, and 
is still, successful. 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) examined the impact of culture on FDI and show that local 
partnership through joint ventures helps overcome many of the negative domestic influences on 
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VXFFHVVIXORSHUDWLRQRIDQ)',YHQWXUH8VLQJ+RIVWHGH¶VDQG%RQG¶VµILYHGLPHQVLRQV¶
LQFOXGLQJ WKH µ&RQIXFLDQ G\QDPLVP¶ DVSHFW, we see that Honda- VietnDP¶V VXFFHVV ZDV
contributed to in so degree by the cultural affinity built up between Honda and its local partners. 
However, this also depended on the willingness of Honda and the local partner to negotiate 
through the differences between the Japanese and Vietnamese cultures. The key here for Honda-
Japan was its selection of a suitable local partner for its mode of entry. It also depended on its 
willingness to surrender Headquarters hegemony to a bartered negotiation between the made 
Honda base and its local Vietnamese partners. 
Japanese FDI ventures are usually managed in a process where they empower domestic 
decision-making, whereas, for example, US FDI ventures tend to remain subject to central 
control from the source country (Kriger and Solomon, 1992; Schneider and DeMeyer, 1991; 
Dunning and Bansal, 1997). This case study of Honda supports much of these findings, 
especially as a building on the conclusions of Kriger and Solomon (1992). There hypothesis of 
Japanese domestic empowerment in FDI ventures and the application of an incremental process 
of building up local independence in decision-making of the subsidiary were borne out from the 
analysis of Honda-9LHWQDP¶V PDQDJHPHQW VWUDWHJ\ (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Pham Truong 
Hoang, 2004; Do Duc Dinh, 1994; Poapongsakorn, 1995). 
7.2.2 Investment Conditions 
The investment conditions were favourable due to the external situation, where the impacts of 
the revaluation of Japanese Yen against the US Dollar and other hard currencies under the 
arrangements of Plaza Cord of G6 since 1986 became a strong motivation for Honda to make 
investment and even reinvestment abroad, including in Vietnam. By revaluating the exchange 
rate of Japanese yen against US dollar from 340 JPY/USD to 140 JPY/USD in 1990s, the value 
of Japanese assets abroad increased around 2.5 times (Kim, 2004).  
In March of 1996, Honda acquired the Investment License (Reference Number 1521/GP dated 
March 22, 1996) from the Vietnamese state agency responsible for foreign investment (MPI) 
and was thus able to produce and assemble all types of motorbike under the Honda trademark, 
and distribute into the Vietnamese market. They started actual operations in December 1997. 
The Honda Vietnam Company had also acquired the right to distribute the components of 
motorbike and other maintenance and repair services for motorbikes in Vietnam. However, 
according to the Investment Licence, since the first year of operation, Honda was restricted to 
using µmade in Vietnam¶ components and accessories for at least 10 per cent of the total value of 
the motorbike and such a portion of local content requirement would be yearly increased to at 
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least 64 per cent in the 6th year of operation. Honda established its main plant in Vinh Phuc 
province, 40 km North-West of the capital city, Hanoi. Although quite near to Hanoi the land 
fees were relatively low priced, but the area itself was a quite prosperous location and provided 
easy access to the main city. Mr Asoko Suzuki, Deputy Director- Honda ±Vietnam: µ:HZHUH
placed close enough to Hanoi for us to be seen as central to the countries plan of developing the 
economy. Whilst much of the South is seen as the centre of business, Hanoi is the political 
capital and the policy of Doi Moi needed to be seen as both a political and economic change that 
would transform the Vietnamese economy. By positioning ourselves in Hanoi we identified 
Honda as a key to the futuUH VXFFHVV RI WKH QHZ SROLFLHV¶ (Interview: Asoko Suzuki, Honda 
Vietnam Company, 5 December 2008).  
7.2.3 Entry Mode, Partnership and Honda  
'XQQLQJDQG%DQVDO  LGHQWLI\ WKDW µFHUWDLQEXVLQHVV FXVWRPVDQGDWWLWXGHV e.g. towards 
EULEHU\DQGFRUUXSWLRQQHJRWLDWLQJSURFHGXUHVWKHVDQFWLW\RIFRQWUDFWVWUXVWDQGOR\DOW\«DUH
DOPRVWHQWLUHO\FXOWXUHVSHFLILFS,Q9LHWQDPDµUHODWLRQVKLSV¶FXOWXUHLQWKHJHQHUDOSDWWHUQ
of the process of conducting daily business means optimum success is borne from a combination 
of formal and informal processes. Honda showed their awareness of Vietnamese business 
culture by their willing to conduct business with and through a local partner. For example, there 
more disciplined Japanese management style was adapted to suit the more hybrid management 
process of formal and informal rules and practices, and this was undertaken through a 
willingness to listen to the advice of the local partner (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
An alternative approach to contrast this is the many attempts by US FDI ventures to penetrate 
the market in a mode of entry based on an almost culturally specific distrust by Americans of the 
Vietnamese and subsequently a constant tendency to prefer 100 per cent foreign owned 
enterprise for US investment, which then tend to be dominated by all senior personnel being 
either American or American source Viet Kieu (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 
2008).  
The Honda Vietnam Company is a joint venture between the Honda Group (Honda Motor Co., 
Ltd which contributes 42 per cent of the legal capital and Asian Honda Motor Co., Ltd which 
contributes 28 per cent) and Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation, a 
Vietnamese machinery company that contributes 30 per cent of the legal capital, although this is 
actually achieved through its possession of the land use rights and the value stemming from that. 
The registered total capital of Honda Vietnam Company is USD 104,003,000 in which the legal 
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capital is USD 31,200,000. The duration of Honda Vietnam joint venture is 40 years (Mishima, 
2005; Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Pham Truong Hoang, 2004).  
Honda had established its initial business model in Vietnam by opting for an operation that was 
closely linked with Vietnamese domestic partners and demonstrated a commitment to not only 
pursuing its own interests, but also supporting and strengthening domestic partners. Honda 
management was aware that Vietnam had a few peculiar differences, based on such issues as the 
culture and traditional business practices that needed to be addressed through an understanding 
and cooperation with local business entities. Rather than investing into Vietnam as a separate 
entity, with Honda focusing on operating as an independent foreign investor, Honda was 
demonstrating a willingness and enthusiasm for actually working with domestic partners and 
sharing the benefits of a growing and increasingly profitable motor vehicle market (Pham 
Truong Hoang, 2004). Mr Hiroaki Funami, Honda General Director explained: µDOWKRXJKQRZ
taking an outward view of the future of the economy, the attraction of foreign investors and 
companies was a risk, as many Communist conservatives feared that domestic companies would 
not be able to compete and would quickly go out of business. Honda wanted from the start to 
demonstrate that they were here to help, not only to profit from its penetration of the Vietnam 
PDUNHW¶ (Interview: Hiroaki Funami, Honda Vietnam Company, 19 April, 2008) 
7.2.4 Vietnam Motorcycle Market 
The booming Vietnam economy, which was matched by the rising incomes of a vast section of 
Vietnamese residents and the new ability to purchase luxury items with excess income, meant 
the demand for motorbikes consistently increased over the last few years. The Transportation 
Police Bureau-Vietnam declared the number of registered motorbikes in the whole country 
increased by about 12 per cent annually in the period of 1995-1999. By the end of 1999, in the 
77-million population there were approximately 20 million bicycles and 5.6 million motorbikes. 
In the year 2000, total number of motorbikes sold by all motorbike assemblers over the country 
reached 1.4 million sets. Annual sales of bicycles in recent years is estimated as of from 700.000 
to 1 million units (Le Anh Tuan, 2001; Ministry of Industry, 2007). 
Vietnamese customers wanted a flexible and easy to use form of transport that was also easily 
maintained through the access to components. Whilst the high income levels preferred to 
regularly buy a new bike, the vast majority of the population would make a single purchase 
which they then focused on repairing themselves or at any local motorbike repair shop (Nguyen 
Duc Tiep, 2007; Mishima, 2005). To sustain the market for Honda bikes and to establish a 
dominant competitive advantage, the new Honda project needed to ensure that it not only 
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provided the complete bike, but also provided a constant and readily accessible supply of 
components for repairing and maintaining all models.  
The influx of other brands to compete with Honda meant that this competitive advantage was 
even more important over time, as many other competing models were made less attractive 
purchases as the time lag for importing the components and the actual difficulties in obtaining 
them meant the buyers were reluctant to switch from the reliability of the Honda models 
(Ministry of Industry, 2007). Mr Do Viet Dung, Deputy Manager, Honda Vietnam VDLG µ7KH
Vietnamese like to get the maximum benefit from their purchases and most anyway, in the early 
years of our operation were not in a position to make regular purchases of our bikes. Unlike 
Western economies the access to loans and debt was extremely limited, and for most, 
impossible. A Honda was often a cash purchase that involved families combining incomes and 
saving over long periods. To expect them to make regular purchases was not sensible. So Honda 
gave as much planning to how to support the repair and maintenance aspects of their business in 
9LHWQDP DV WKH\ GLG WR WKH SXUFKDVH RI WKH ELNH LWVHOI¶ Interview: Do Viet Dung, Honda 
Vietnam Company, 7 December 2008). 
Each family of Vietnam has an average number of 2-3 motorbikes (General Statistics Office, 
Vietnam). In comparison with other motorbike producers such as VMEP (Taiwan motorbike 
producer), Suzuki and Yamaha, Honda has some distinct advantages in terms of low prices, 
more reliability and the quality and the availability of spare parts for repair and maintenance 
became a central strategy of Honda in Vietnam. Motorbikes were now replacing the bicycle as 
the mass mode of transport in Vietnam (Ministry of Industry, 2007). This was an ideal 
opportunity for Honda to expand its market share in the ensuing motorbike market boom 
(Mishima, 2005).  
However, the bike was not to become simply a mode of transport as the Vietnamese quickly 
adopted it as a symbol of thH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH HFRQRP\ DQG WKH LQGLFDWLRQ RI VRPHRQH¶V
VWDWXVDVDµQHZPRGHUQ¶LQGLYLGXDO,WVVWDWXVEHFDPHDIRFXVLQWKHDUWVDQGFXOWXUHRI9LHWQDP
Honda has managed to gain a unique level of creditability as the motorbike dominant brand of 
choice in Vietnam (Ministry of Industry, 2007).  
7.3 Marketing of the Honda motorbike in Vietnam 
For many years the bicycle was treated as the one of the most valuable assets for families of the 
working class in Vietnam and its role as an essential item in the budget of all families was 
widely accepted. With improvement of standards of living of the Vietnamese people, the 
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demand for a more modern mode of transportation increased, but it needed to be suitable to the 
Vietnamese transportation conditions, with its narrow streets, often very crowded pavements 
DQGURDGVQXPHURXVVPDOOµRQWKHVWUHHW¶WUDGHUVORZLQFRPHVDQGDZHDNPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHP
for transportation (Mishima, 2005). Within a few years, Honda has been accepted in Vietnamese 
society as the typical indicator of the rise of mass production, mass consumption and modernity. 
The Vietnam economy was previously stagnated into a continuance of its agriculturally based 
existence, with poor access to manufactured goods and a transportation system more suited to a 
lifestyle of the past (Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002). The movement into a modern and 
open society based upon rising incomes and consumer demand meant that the industrialisation 
and modernisation of Vietnam went hand in hand with a change in the culture. Central to that 
cultural change has been a transformation of the role and acceptability of the motorbike as an 
HVVHQWLDO LWHP LQ HYHU\ IDPLO\¶V¶ EXGJHW 7KH PRWRUELNH KDV DOVR EHFRPH WKH LQGLFDWRU RI D
SHUVRQ¶V VWDWXV DQG LQ DQ increasingly wealthy society the motorbike is VHHQDV D µPXVWKDYH¶
product (Kim, 2004).  
$VDµEODFNPDUNHW¶IRUPRISXEOLFWUDQVSRUWWKHPRWRUELNHRIIHUVDUHDGLO\DYDLODEOHVRXUFHRI
LQFRPHIURPWKHµUHJXODU¶PRWRUELNHWD[LVHUYLFHZDLWLQJIRUSDVVHQJHUVRQHYHU\VWUHHWcorner, 
to the worker transiting to and from work who can also be often found soliciting for casual 
µIDUHV¶IURPWKHSDVVHUVE\$VDFRPPHUFLDOWUDQVSRUWV\VWHPWKHPRWRUELNHSOD\VDQLPSRUWDQW
role in communications and transport of goods, from the transit of mail to even the carrying of 
large construction materials. For the farmer it is an essential form of transport to and from the 
market, with bikes often seen laden down with the carcasses of two or three pigs to the 
dangerously overloaded multiple cages of chickens (Mishima, 2005; Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; 
Pham Truong Hoang, 2004). The motorbike market is a vast opportunity for FDI and Honda 
arrived at the perfect time to establish market dominance and coupled their FDI potential with a 
business acumen that focused on working in partnership with the Vietnamese. The increasing 
demand means that the number of motorbikes on circulation in 2008 14.3 times greater than 
1990 (General Statistics Office, 2008).  
7.4 Honda Production Strategy 
Honda has changed its normal business architecture in Vietnam by converting the integral-based 
style to a modular-based one to quickly meet the demand for mass consumption of motorbikes 
by Vietnamese residents (Mishima, 2005). 
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Table 7.1: Business Architectures 
 Modular manufacturing Integral manufacturing 
Parts interface Parts are common and can be 
used for any model 
Each product has unique parts, 
specifically designed 
Merits Quick results and flexibility Endless pursuit of quality 
Demerits No differentiation, excess 
entry, low profit, lack of R&D 
It takes much energy and time 
to achieve results 
Institutional requirement Openness, quick decision 
making, flexible outsourcing 
Long-term relations, building 
internal skills and knowledge 
Source: Fujimoto (2005). 
By making comparisons between a modular-based style and an integral-based one mentioned in 
the Table 1, it is possible to say that the modular-based style is the best way for producers to 
improve their global production network and to flexibly respond to the fast changes in the local 
market demand for motorbikes, especially in terms of the need for availability of spare parts, 
their durability, a low price of inputs, particularly with those bikes manufactured in Vietnam and 
a need for convenience in collecting the spare parts from different suppliers in different 
countries. This system of production and business was also supported by the integration of the 
Vietnam operation with the Honda spare parts produced in neighbouring China. The Honda 
Vietnam Company developed its own guidelines through the proverb µact locally, think 
globally¶ and when Honda Group mainly operated in Japan it established the µthink globally, act 
locally¶ strategy as a cornerstone of its internationalization and globalization (Mishima, 2005; 
Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
7.5 Motorbike prohibition and adaptability of Honda to the Vietnamese business 
environment 
Since 2003, in order to solve the increasingly heavy traffic jams in some major cities in 
Vietnam, like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the Vietnam National Assembly passed a decision 
that stipulated one Vietnamese citizen in the big cities above has only the exclusive right to own 
just one motorbike (Pham Duy Nghia, 2004; 2006). The decision was based on the argument 
that via the limitation of the number of motorbikes owned by each citizen, the quantity of 
motorbikes circulated on the streets would be reduced, therefore, eliminating traffic jams. With 
the sudden implementation of the decision, ordered by National Assembly, the demand for 
motorbikes generally and for Honda motorbikes in particular dramatically decreased. In 
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additions, some of Chinese motorbike manufacturers jumped into Vietnamese market, such as 
Lifan and Loncin. They were intent on seizing a larger portion of the Vietnamese motorbike 
market, with cheaper models and a concerted marketing campaign. In order to adapt to the 
disadvantageous changes in policy, Honda shifted the market focus from selling its products in 
the big cities to expansion of sales in the rural areas. However, the new decision on motorbike 
ownership has met with almost universal rejection by the citizens; with many feeling it was a 
direct violation of the property rights of the citizen as regulated in the Vietnamese Constitution.  
Although the Honda Vietnam Company has taken a practical approach to how it reacts to the 
decision, by taking this as an opportunity to expand its market in the remote rural areas, the 
decision does point to an important part of governmental control of the structural conditions 
needed to promote safe FDI environments. Virtually overnight, the Government dramatically 
altered the conditions in which Honda FDI would operate and managed to negatively change the 
prospects for profitable business (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Mishima, 2005; Pham Truong 
Hoang, 2004).  
The logic behind this decision is worth closer attention as the impact on FDI development in this 
and many other industries can be very severely affected. Whilst the Government wanted to 
encourage the expansion of the motorbike industry and the profitability of FDI in this area, the 
unforeseen consequences was almost daily traffic chaos in many of the major cities. Rising 
numbers of fatal casualties in traffic accidents, and increasing complaints from the business 
community at the regular logjams being created in transport logistics meant the Government felt 
compelled to find a way to control the expansion of the industry and bring some much needed 
order to the road systems. The control of the motor vehicle industry was already very much in 
hand with the imposition of tax rates as high as 100 per cent on imported cars, but motorbike 
sales were outstripping the ability of local authorities to control the increasing number of riders 
on the city roads (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
Left with a choice between supporting FDI growth or what appeared the increase in chaos on the 
road, the Government chose public safety and order instead of economic development. 
However, a universal feeling of rejection by citizens of the new rules showed that the purchase 
and possession of motorbikes was probably beyond the ability of the Government to easily 
control. It also indicated that a Government decision, although logically taken could have very 
adverse impacts upon the FDI environment, and may even have discouraged prospective 
investors in other economic areas to decline opportunities for FDI investment in Vietnam, their 
decision fuelled by the reality of seeing a government decree adversely affecting overnight the 
220 
 
conditions within which that investment would operate (Ministry of Industry, 2007). Koji 
Onishi, General Director, Honda Vietnam explained µWKHGHFLVLRQWROLPLWELNHRZQHUVKLSFRXOG
be seen as a logical and simple answer to the growing problem of traffic in the main urban 
centres, but it demonstrated the lack of knowledge in the power centres to see the interlinking 
relationship of political and social decisions on the profitability of the economy. The Assembly 
had not properly assessed the unforeseen consequences of a decision that had many foreign 
investors asking if the rhetoric of reform was actually matched by the policies of the Party. The 
decision met severe criticism and opposition from both the people and the foreign investor 
(Interview: Koji Onishi, Honda Vietnam Company, 16 November 2008). 
The decision on limiting the ownership of motorbikes demonstrated the relative lack of business 
knowledge of the Assembly and their inability to foresee that this seemingly practical decision 
could have far wider implications for the economy. As John Clark, Director, Janus Consultancy 
Hanoi noted, µDWWKHWLPHZHZHUHUHTXLUHGE\PDQ\LQWHUHVWHGLQYHVWRUVIURPWKH86DQG8.WR
explain why this decision was made. Their immediate appraisal was that it indicated proof of 
their main fear, that central single party government control meant that in an instant the 
government could negate all possibility of profitability for an investment. Some investors even 
decided that Vietnam was not for them, fearing that an investment might suddenly be 
nationalised, or land allocated overnight taken back by the government, or money transfers 
VWRSSHG¶Interview: John Clark, Janus Consultancy Hanoi, 12 June 2007).  
However, popular opposition and to some extent the Vietnam culture came to the rescue. As Mr 
Pham Van Dung, Deputy Director, Honda Vietnam recalled µ<HV 9LHWQDP LV D &RPPXQLVW
country with single Party central control, but even that is sometimes not enough to control the 
Vietnamese people. If they generally dislike and do not see the sense of a ruling or new law then 
they will smile, agree and appear compliant, but then do exactly what they want, and they are 
experts at µgoing around¶ D UXOH¶ Interview: Pham Van Dung, Honda Vietnam, 25 November 
2008). 
7.6 State Policy and Honda Vietnam 
The policy towards the attraction of foreign direct investment into Vietnam has changed in order 
to match the achievements of other countries in the region like China and Thailand (Pham Duy 
Nghia, 2006; Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008). The two basic pillars of the policy on foreign direct 
investment in Vietnam are to protect and to encourage the foreign investors. For the first pillar, 
all of the assets of foreign investors have been strictly protected in Vietnamese territory 
(Ministry of Industry, 2007; Le Viet Anh, 2004; Dapice, 2003).  
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The Vietnamese government is committed to never nationalise the assets of the foreign investors 
and behave towards both domestic and foreign investors on an equal basis (NAV, 2005j). The 
foreign investors have the right to transfer their lawful capital and assets abroad after completion 
of all financial rights for the Vietnamese government. Since issuing the Law on Foreign 
Investment in 1988 to 2008, such a Law has been supplemented and amended several times in 
1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005 (Pham Duy Nghia, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2006). The main 
direction of these amendments is to create the attractive environment for foreign investors and to 
enhance the competitiveness of investment environment in Vietnam with the other regional 
countries. For that to happen there was a need for positive changes in the legal environment, 
plus the pursuit of entrance into WTO membership of Vietnam on January 11, 2007 (Athukorala 
and Tran Quang Tien, 2009). The outcome has been that the stock of FDI in Vietnam has 
increased rapidly and stood at nearly 100 billion USD at the end of 2008 (Magennis, 2006; 
Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009). 
In contrast to foreign investors from other countries and territories, all Japanese investors in 
general felt safe investing in Vietnam and the Honda Vietnam Company in particular has 
enjoyed the rights of asset protection laid down in the Treaty for Vietnam- Japan Investment 
Protection, Promotion and Freedom, officially approved by both governments in 2003. Besides 
this, the Vietnam-Japan Co-operation Initiative has also provided Honda the opportunities to 
expand their market due to a commitment for long term development of both sides. The 
regulations on protection of intellectual property of foreign investors have been addressed 
seriously and every effort made to execute it successfully (Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008; Lee, 2004).  
For the second pillar, the foreign investors have been allowed to take many incentives from 
investment policies for their investment in Vietnam in terms of land clearance, tax refunds and 
exemptions. The Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam stipulated the highest level of 
corporate income tax at 25 per cent and then to increase this to 28 per cent in the following 
years, in order to harmonise with the tax levied on the domestic enterprises of 30 per cent (Pham 
Duy Nghia, 2006). However, from 2007, the tax was again decreased to the 25 per cent level 
µ7D[ UHIRUP¶ 9LHWQDP 1HZV Dec. 2007). The withholding tax levied on foreign invested 
enterprises for their profit transfer out of Vietnam to home countries has been reduced from the 
7 per cent level to zero. According to the Investment License granted by MPI, the Honda 
Vietnam Company must pay the corporate income tax at the level of 15 per cent of total profits 
in 5 years from the date of investment licensing and of 25 per cent in the following years. When 
transferring the profit abroad, Honda Vietnam Company must pay the withholding tax of 5 per 
cent of transferred profit. For the amendment of the legal regulation, Honda pays zero for 
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withholding tax (Nguyen Ngoc Son, 2008; Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; Kokko 
et.al, 2003; Chang, 2007). 
The foreign investors have been also treated as the same to that of domestic investors in 
accordance with WTO principles. The corporate income tax stipulated for all investors in 
Vietnam stood at 28 per cent and then decreased to 25 per cent from 2007. Additionally, Honda 
can take some advantages from a friendly relationship between Vietnamese and Japanese 
governments, especially as Japan is the main donor of ODA for Vietnam. In fact, the majority of 
ODA of Japan provided to Vietnam flows in the improvement of infrastructure for smooth 
circulation of the transportation and means it thus directly impacts on the future prosperity of 
Honda motorbikes. The amount of ODA provided by Japanese government flowed into Vietnam 
gets the new record of more than USD 2 billion by the year 2009 (Vietnamese National 
Assembly, 2009). The strategic economic partnership built by high-ranking officers of Vietnam 
and Japan is a politically favorable environment for long- term investment of Honda in Vietnam 
(Ohno, 2003).  
The institutional environment for Honda Vietnam Company has also been surrounded by 
comprehensive interactions of several supranational Japanese agencies such as JICA, JBIC and 
other intelligent economic units of the motorbike manufacturers. These agencies become the 
µantennas¶ to provide Honda µjust-in-time¶ and all-around sources of information in the 
motorbike market, thus enabling Honda to remain ahead of the competition. Therefore, Honda 
can understand and respond promptly to the fast changes of demand for Honda motorbikes to 
Vietnamese customers. For example, JICA has established a permanent branch in Vietnam that 
attracts many young and talented researchers of Vietnam and Japan and has led to significant 
cooperative bi-lateral research outcomes. The focus of the research has paid much attention to 
the macroeconomic issues and the policy options for the motorbike industry and for the 
manufacturing industry in general in Vietnam (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Pham Truong Hoang, 
2004).  
This methodology has also been supported by the regular organising of scientific seminars in the 
VDF, JICA and has helped achieve targets for growth in both FDI and the motorbike industry in 
particular. On the one hand, JICA has fully mobilised all research capacity of both Vietnamese 
and Japanese researchers, especially the young and elite researchers of Vietnam, to settle the 
critical issues in Vietnamese policies; JICA also helps understand in detail the important 
information and the relationships between state bodies and business world in Vietnam, not only 
for policy building but also for future decision making of Japanese- related enterprises. All 
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companies of Japan, including Honda, have ideal opportunities to take advantage of utilization 
of all sources of information from JICA and other Japanese investors in Vietnam to offer the 
best solutions for each specific investment case (Onho, 2003; Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Lee, 
2004).  
The representative branch of the mass media of Japan in Vietnam - Kyodo Broadcasting 
Company always maintains close attention to changes of policies of the Vietnamese government 
that may have a major influence on the operations of Honda-Vietnam. Negative changes in the 
policies that impact on Japanese investors are immediately transmitted to the investors. Equally 
important is the transmitting back to the Vietnam Government and public the adverse reactions 
of the foreign investor to changes in policies and the ability to exert some degree of foreign 
business and governmental pressure on the Vietnamese is an important mechanism for 
regulating change and avoiding negative options (Onho, 2003; Lee, 2004).  
An example of this is the case involving the decision by the Vietnamese government to levy a 
restricted import quota on CKD components for assembling motorbikes. The actual 
consequences of the decision would have been the need for the motorbike companies to lay off 
hundreds of Vietnamese employees. A general public and investor protest against this decision 
meant that the Vietnamese government was forced to withdraw its original quota restrictions. 
This reaction deserves closer attention as is indicates the presence of a wholly new force of 
influence on Vietnamese government decision-making. For many years following the Vietnam 
(American) War the Government enjoyed an uncontested dominance over decision-making. Its 
central control and absolute authority meant all decisions were often adopted without question 
or protest. But the open door policy means that while the economy can develop, its progress is 
also dependent on the Government system allowing it to be sensitive to adverse or contrary 
reaction to its own authority. In the case of the quota decision, that sensitivity had to extend to 
foreign actors, whose interest in Vietnam was focused on investment returns and were 
demanding a reversal of a decision, that in former years would have been adopted and applied 
nationally without question. However, the reversal also demonstrated the degree to which the 
Government was willing to pay attention to both public and international reaction and the 
willingness on their part to reverse decisions that were not in their interests of all parties 
involved. Its success in adopting a more friendly and cooperative attitude to the needs of FDI 
investors demonstrated the leap forward in openness that Doi Moi has achieved (Chang, 2007).  
In parallel, Honda has worked together with other motorbike manufacturers in Vietnam such as 
Suzuki and VMEP to send recommendations to the Vietnamese government about the policy 
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adjustment and the prevention of barriers to the development of the motorbike industry in 
Vietnam. This demonstrating how the FDI investors themselves can work together to actually 
affect the Governmental decision-making process in the first instance, and avoid later mistakes 
(Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007). As Mr Asako Suzuki, 2nd Deputy General, Honda Vietnam said, the 
decision on Doi Moi could not just simply be a law change that attracted investment. The policy 
change required a chaQJHDOVRLQWKHµVW\OH¶RIWKH3arty and its governance of Vietnam. Honda 
actively encouraged this by trying to provide pressure politically in a sensitive but informed 
manner. By co-operating with the government and helping to explain the full consequences of 
any decision or ruling, or by indicating the level of adverse reaction to a decision already made, 
Honda could safeguard its investment without becoming oppositional to the Party and 
*RYHUQPHQW¶Interview: Asako Suzuki, Honda Vietnam, 10 November 2008). 
In order to develop the domestic motorbike industry, the Vietnamese government has 
implemented a µORFDOLsation SROLF\¶WKDWIRFXVHVRQGHYHORSLQJDGRPHVWLFVSDUHSDUWVRSHUDWLRQ
that will allow Vietnam to move away from a reliance on foreign imports The types of the spare 
parts of motorbike have been categorised into 3 main groups and the standards of quality have 
been adopted from similar countries like Thailand, Malaysia and etc. Spare parts are classified 
as Semi-Knocked Down (SKD), Completely Knocked Down (CKD) and Incomplete Knocked 
Down (IKD) DQG LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKLV FODVVLILFDWLRQ WKH UXOHV RQ WKH µORFDO FRQWHQW¶
requirement have been coordinated with the regulations on import duty levies. The types of 
components such as SKD, CKD and IKD are commonly used in Vietnam, and the aim has been 
to introduce a modular architecture in motorbike assembly in Vietnam. The greater the 
proportion of the local content used, the lower the import duties levied on the spare parts of 
motorbike. In other words, the local content requirement has been one of the most important 
criteria to enjoy preferential treatment from the government (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
This policy, although obviously favouring the development of a domestic motorbike assembly 
industry and not the interests of the foreign investor, has been the very foundation of the success 
for the Vietnamese motorbike industry and opened numerous opportunities to develop the 
supporting industries, as well as creating many more jobs for Vietnamese employees. 
Furthermore, many endowed resources of Vietnam like plentiful labour force and a variety of 
natural resources have been effectively exploited to serve the course of industrialisation and 
modernisation. By doing this way, Vietnamese policy makers expected to establish a cluster of 
motorbike manufacturers in Vietnam and eventually to widen its potential as not only serving 
the domestic market, but developing a strong export business in motorbike sales. Unfortunately, 
the localization strategy of Vietnamese government has not been totally successful and after 
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nearly 12 years of encouragement to create the domestic motorbike production premises 
problems still remain. Consequently, in light of the need to avoid protectionist elements in FDI 
policies, the compulsory regulations upon local content requirement set by Vietnamese 
Government on foreign invested motorbike manufacturers have been eliminated under the strict 
commitments of Vietnam in TRIMs of WTO since January 11, 2007 (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; 
Kokko et. al., 2003; Onho, 2003).  
To respond to the localization policy, Honda organised a network of production of spare parts 
into 6 plant branches in Vietnam. These 6 plant branches have utilised the domestic materials to 
produce the simple parts like steel baskets, plastic covers, rubber parts, etc. By nature, the local 
content requirement made in Vietnam has been mainly provided by Japanese producers other 
than Vietnamese producers. Some of the components of Honda that are produced in Vietnam 
have a cheap price and serve the localization of Honda to attain the preferential treatment from 
the Vietnamese Government. The solution to effectively responding to pressure of localization is 
the application of a modular manufacturing architecture as mentioned above. Other foreign 
motorbike companies also have done the same way as Honda. As result, in only in 4 years from 
the date of establishment the percentage of localization of Honda motorbike achieved stands at 
45 per cent and meanwhile Suzuki is 36 per cent, VMEP 50 per cent and GMN 31 per cent 
(Ministry of Industry, 2003). 
7.6.1 Substitutes and sliding maturity 
The Honda motorbike is facing increasing competition from several firms. The strongest 
competition for Honda is from Suzuki, Yamaha, Spring, VMEP, Daelim, Sunfat, Loncin, Lifan. 
By skillful techniques of product differentiation, competitive price setting, sharp advertising 
campaigns and imitation of the trademark of Honda, competitors are challenging Honda as the 
motorbike of first choice. There is also a growing import of motorbikes from new manufacturers 
in Thailand, Japan and China. In the face of multiple choices of motorbike in the market, the 
density of demand for Honda motorbike seems to be weakening (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
A further change in the market is due to the changing society of Vietnam. Whilst generally 
shifting from an agricultural economy towards an industrial one, the number of people in the 
high income bracket is increasing and the demand for motorbikes from this sector is switching 
to cars. +HUHZH FDQ VHH WKDW WKHGHYHORSPHQW RI)', LWV µVSLOORYHU¶ LQ WKHHFRQRP\ DQG WKH
general assistance to economic growth that it has given, is interlinked with the changing 
financial status of the Vietnam population. Whilst supply has been expanded and improved 
through FDI, the demands and thus the profitability of investment have been continually 
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improving in the domestic market. This has given FDI investors a double benefit, in that 
investment has seen now able to access both profitable domestic and foreign markets (Nguyen 
Ngoc Son, 2008).  
Mr Satoshi Toshida, Senior Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer, Asian-Oceania 
Region declared in his speech on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Honda Vietnam in 
2006: µHonda are committed to a long-term partnership with the people and nation of Vietnam¶ 
(Toshida, 2006).  
A remarkable growth in people replacing their bikes with cars is dramatically altering the shape 
and value of the transport market. Despite the high cost of living and unusually dense traffic 
jams, high import duties on cars and a poorly regulated road system, and an only newly 
developing transport infrastructure that at rush hours in the narrow streets makes large vehicle 
movement almost impossible, and leads to heavy violation of traffic rules, the vehicle of first 
choice is becoming the car, rather than the motorbike (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007). 
 Honda has µjust-in-time¶ supplied the Civic car model as its own alternative to the motorbike, 
hoping in the process to retain Honda customers, even when they have chosen to no longer own 
a motorbike. 
As a consequence of the growing traffic problems the demand for better public transport is 
promoted by the government and demanded by many of the citizens. The city and inter-city 
network of public transportation modes such as that of the bus service and taxi has been 
improved in term of providing a very low cost, convenience and time saving for the passengers 
that compete directly with motorbikes. In additions, the traffic regulations on environmental 
pollution control, as mentioned above, have been slowly coming into effect and intend 
eliminating many of the environmental problems of exhaust fumes. The regulations themselves 
are designed to generally force a decline in motorbike demand and encourage a greater 
movement towards using public transport All of these factors lead to the sliding maturity of 
Honda motorbike in the near future in Vietnam. The technology of motorbike manufacturing, in 
fact, has been out of date for some time in developed countries and the motorbike (especially the 
motorbikes of high capacity) have become prime sources of environmental concern. However, 
the profits in motorbike sales still continue to be impressive, even with the decline in individual 
sales prices. However, the concerns for this movement are mitigated by the feeling that 
9LHWQDP¶Vmotorbike production industry is ready and able in profit and quality terms to further 
enter the export market (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Ohno, 2003; Ministry of Industry, 2007). For 
example, Mr Trinh Quang Dung, 1st Deputy General Director, Honda-Vietnam notes µWKH
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production quality and efficiency makes the development of a Honda export operation a 
profitable outcome of our investment into Vietnam. With growing neighbouring markets such as 
Laos and Cambodia, the potential for still further expansion of our venture into Vietnam may 
QRWEH WRRDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWHGE\ WKHVKULQNLQJRI WKHGRPHVWLFPDUNHWKHUH¶ Interview: Trinh 
Quang Dung, 19 August, 2008)  
7.7 Distribution network and Vietnamese selling style 
To accelerate the selling of Honda products in the highly competitive market of motorbikes in 
Vietnam, the aim has been for Honda to use its long term accumulated experience of business in 
Vietnam as a foundation for development. It has adopted its globalization strategy to the 
demands of the Vietnamese market. Honda Vietnam Company has based its corporate identity 
on the guideline of being µthe most convenient service for customers¶ and it has also taken this 
as the guiding tenet of its distribution network. Firstly, Honda has created a huge network of 
distribution in almost every populated area of Vietnam. At present, there are over 300 selling 
agents of Honda in Vietnam and these points of selling are connected with many stores that sell 
a variety of other types of motorbikes.  
The distribution system has been designed into different levels. Honda Motorbikes after 
production will be delivered to the network of dealers with the unified price in the nationwide 
level. These dealers have been operating under the management of selling direct from Honda 
and they have the exclusive selling power in terms of distribution, discount rate pricing to 
intermediate and final buyers. Besides, they also have offered the best maintenance and repair 
services to the customers at the lowest price. The discount rate applied to each dealer is very 
flexible and set at the level of 10 per cent of the selling price of unit. The price level used for 
buyers, however, has been stipulated in certain bands by Honda headquarters in Vietnam. The 
buyers can bargain with the salesman in the selling point to have the appropriate price.  
The Vietnamese buyers are accustomed to the bargaining style and to greater extent they are 
more interested in purchasing after a series of bargaining rounds with the seller. However, the 
negative aspect of the distribution network is that it is widely dispersed and only lightly 
controlled, making it possible for sellers to subsWLWXWH µRIILFLDO¶ FRPSRQHQWV IRU ORZHU TXDOLW\
µIDNHV¶DQGFUHDWHDVLWXDWLRQZKHUH+RQGDTXDOLW\LVFRPSURPLVHGE\GHIHFWLYHIDNHVOHDYLQJ
Honda with the negative impact on its reputation and the customer with a false idea on the 
quality of Honda products (Ministry of Industry, 2007; Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Lee, 2004).  
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Most Vietnamese motorbike consumers pay attention to not only buying the right motorbike but 
also to the availability of spare parts to repair the broken motorbikes. Vietnam with the 
complicated terrain and tropical climate is generally not suitable to continued use of motorbikes 
and all realise that readily available spare parts are an absolute necessity. Secondly, Honda 
Company has introduced an installment payment scheme for selling its bikes to low - income 
consumers. Such a way of distribution has also helped Honda to also solve its inventory stock 
problems and reduce the costs of inventory fees (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
Thirdly, Honda has systematically organised a major national advertisement campaign with the 
title µI Love Vietnam¶ on the one of the main official Vietnamese Television channels and in 
support of the movement µweek and month for nationwide safety transportation¶ promoted by 
the Vietnamese government. The campaign has achieved a good involvement of many 
Vietnamese people, and that fact can be considered as the direct success of local responsiveness 
to Honda being in the Vietnamese market.  
Fourthly, Honda has a number of assistance funds for charity activities and philanthropic 
movements for the poor.  
Fifthly, in the favor of the compulsory regulation on wearing helmet when riding motorbikes in 
Vietnam set by Vietnamese government, Honda promptly launched the program of helmet 
µJLIWV¶ IRU +RQGD PRWRUELNH EX\HUV $GGLWLRQDOO\ +RQGD KDV RIIHUHG µWKH SDFNDJH RI
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH VHUYLFHV¶ LQFOXGLQJ KHOS LQ JDLQLQJ WKH PRWRUELNH FHUWLILFDWH DQG PDNLQJ WD[
SD\PHQWV IRU PRWRUELNH µFRQVXPSWLRQ¶ ZKLFK DPRXQWV WR D IHH RI DERXW USD15 per unit). 
Moreover, Honda also granted scholarships to many students of universities in Vietnam, such as 
the Hanoi University of Technology, and funded campaigns such as the µVoluntary Summer¶ 
work project undertaken by the Students¶ Union of the Vietnam National Economics University 
(Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
In parallel, Honda has organised a global journey for the famous robot, Asima, the most well-
known invention of Honda. By using socially-based programmes, Honda Vietnam Company 
took up their advertisement activities in the most appropriate way to respond to the restrictive 
regulations on advertisement fees, which allows companies to spend only 8 per cent of total 
revenue on advertising and is set by the Vietnamese government. Clearly, in the competitive 
market, the effort to advertise the image of business plays a very important role for maintaining 
and expanding the influence of the business.  
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In the economic and financial situation of the year 2008, Honda differed from other motorbike 
manufacturers facing the drop in volume sales, as well as some of them standing on the edge of 
bankruptcy. Honda Vietnam Company has gained the loyalty and respect of Vietnamese 
customers and a good reputation for its own locally produced Honda brand. Despite a down turn 
in the financial markets and stiff competition in the transport market in Vietnam, Honda remains 
the brand of choice for most Vietnamese bike owners.  
The important factors to note here are that Honda did not merely enter the Vietnam market with 
a set strategy. Their style was one that involved a high level of cooperation with the Vietnamese 
partners, a willingness to listen and act on their advice and a sHQVLWLYLW\WRKRZWKLQJVVKRXOGµEH
GRQHGLIIHUHQWO\¶LQ9LHWQDP7KLVLVDQHVVHQWLDOGHWHUPLQDQWRIWKHVXFFHVVRI)',LQ9LHWQDP
in that the investor needs to be adaptable and cooperative, with a strong incentive to alter 
strategy and policies to suit the domestic environment. Honda has found it profitable to be 
flexible and also willing to venture into a multitude of areas as active partners, such as 
cooperating with the local community, contributing towards education and training and 
supporting the cultural and social life of Vietnam, rather than trying to resist or change it (Lee, 
2004).  
According to Koji Onishi, General Director of Honda Vietnam, µWKHFRXQWU\¶VELJJHVWPRWRUELNH
manufacturer Motorbike makers have been battered by a weak economy, rising petrol prices and 
the ailing Vietnamese dong to US dollar rate, which depleted the market for motorbikes. Most of 
motorbike retailers reported their worst sales ever, with sales volume reduced by 50 per cent 
compared to the same period last year. Retailers in Hanoi have experienced a 70 per cent sales 
drop in the last several weeks. This time last year, Honda sold an average of at least 300 units 
per month, which is now down to 100 units, even after considerable discount for some models 
(Koji Onishi, Honda Vietnam Company, 16 November 2008). 
According to vice chairman of Vietnam Motorbike and Bicycles Association Le Anh Tuan, the 
number of motorbike manufacturers in Vietnam has reduced to 10 from over 30 two years ago. 
While most of the motorbike makers have not reported their overall sales in 2008, Honda 
Vietnam reported it has sold 1.25 million motorbikes this year, an increase of 9 per cent over 
2007, accounting for some 75 per cent of the market share (Interview: Le Anh Tuan, Vietnam 
Motorbike and Bicycles Association, 3 August 2008) 
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7.7.1 Intellectual property protection 
The protection of intellectual property is vital to sustaining the loyalty of FDI investors (Wu, 
2001a). The legal enforcement on protection of intellectual property right in Vietnam has not 
been serious enough to eliminate all of the violation actions against the intellectual property. 
The situation of violation of the intellectual property right becomes a critical issue for both 
policy makers and for business world in Vietnam (Vietnam Department of Intellectual 
Property).  
For Honda Vietnam Company, up to the year 2008, about 80 trademarks and 64 industrial 
designs of Honda Vietnam Company have been protected in Vietnam. (Department of Industrial 
Properties, 2008) However, for the complicated and hidden actions of the violation against the 
industrial property right in Vietnam, especially the violators who produce off- brand 
components, Honda has required the authorised agencies to protect Honda, not only for the 
entire industrial design of motorbike but also for each specific important component of each 
motorbike. Many ad hoc inter-ministerial delegations of inspectors in charge of industrial 
property have been established to carry out the monitoring and evaluation activities 
investigating the violations by individuals and other entities against Honda trademarks. 
Additionally, several agencies related to industrial intellectual property rights in Vietnam, such 
as the Economic Police Force, trade ombudsman and the courts have been mobilised to help 
protect the intellectual property rights of Honda industrial designs in Vietnam (Vietnam 
Intellectual Property Department).  
For protection of trademark, Honda has registered a number of trademarks with the Department 
of Industrial Properties of Vietnam; not only the trademarks of motorbike but also the 
trademarks for HEADs of Honda are registered. However, in the Vietnam business environment, 
registering the objectives of industrial properties is still the necessary condition for protecting 
them and enforcing the regulations on them is sufficient (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Pham Truong 
Hoang, 2004).  
Some administrative solutions like administrative sanctions against the violations have been 
applied to the entities copying Honda industrial designs. To a greater extent, Honda has also 
utilised the Forum of the Vietnam- Japan Cooperation Initiative to deliver its opinions to high- 
ranking officers on the violations of its industrial designs by other businesses and individuals in 
Vietnam, with the hope to galvanise the authorised agencies to protect Honda from these illegal 
actions. Such an issue, on the one hand, does have a positive impact for the value of Honda in 
Vietnamese market, because day by day, Honda remains firmly in the public eye. Nevertheless it 
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also delivers a negative message in that the public are aware of the high rates of profitability of 
Honda motorbikes and their components, and the ability of copyright violators to make them far 
cheaper. Despite this, the legal framework controlling property rights protection in Vietnam has 
not been enough sufficiently improved to guarantee against further violations and the ability of 
criminal elements to produce and sell copies of Honda motorbikes and parts remains a serious 
threat to the FRPSDQ\¶V profitability in Vietnam (Ministry of Industry, 2007, p.20-30). As Mr 
Satoshi Toshida said, µWKH TXHVWLRQ RI SURSHUW\ ULJKWV DQG WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI EUDQGV LV D YLWDO
concern in Vietnam, not only for Honda but also for all existing and potential investors unless 
companies feel safe bring their technology, production techniques, software, etc into Vietnam 
then they will choose alternative markets where they do feel protected. Fortunately the Party and 
the Government appear aware of this and are making concerted efforts to deal with the problem. 
But the main problem here is that it is not enough to have the rules and sanctions against 
violations, the investor must feel confident that the enforcement procedures are as equally 
efficient and stringent¶Interview: Satoshi Toshida, Honda Vietnam Company, 17 April 2008). 
7.7.2 Financial issues 
Honda Vietnam Company continuously improves its financial performance in different aspects. 
The annual revenue of Honda Vietnam Company increased rapidly from the year 1997 to the 
year 2008 (See Table 7.2). In 1997, the revenue of Honda Vietnam Company stood at 4.5 
million USD but in 2008, the revenue of Honda gained 1,398 million USD. The revenue of 
Honda Vietnam Company in 2008 is greater than that in 1997 by about 300 times. It is a new 
record in the motorbike market in Vietnam (Honda Vietnam Company (2008). 
Table 7.2: The annual revenue of Honda Vietnam Company in the period 1997-2008 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 
Revenue 4.5 158 169 277 250 304 358 455 568 734 1,151 1,398 
Unit: Mil. USD 
Source: Honda Vietnam Company, 2008 (2008* preliminary) 
According to the tax payments including domestic tax and import duty, Honda Vietnam 
Company has paid tax amounting to 14 million USD and the accumulated tax payments from 
1996 to 2008 reached to about 57 million USD. Honda Vietnam Company has been one of the 
enterprises that have made the largest tax contributions to the Vietnamese state budget. In Vinh 
Phuc province of Vietnam, Honda Vietnam Company became the top enterprise in term of tax 
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payments to the Provincial budget. This was officially recognised when Honda were presented 
with the µAward of Gold Star of the Vietnamese Land¶ organised annually by the Association of 
Vietnamese Enterprises (Honda Financial Report, 2008). 
In terms of the change and adjustment of the capital investment to respond to the market boom 
in motorbikes, Honda Vietnam Company has needed to annually increase the capital investment 
needed to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by the rapid market expansion for 
motorbikes. In 1996, Honda began to contribute more capitDOWRWKHµWRWDOLQYHVWHGFDSLWDO¶RIWKH
joint venture. In 2002, Honda increased its capital to become the largest motorbike investor in 
Vietnam and in line with that fact the scope of influence of Honda over Vietnamese market also 
increased. Honda chiefly financed its capital injections by making contributions from its 
retained profits after tax (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2006; 2007).  
Honda also has also enjoyed the significantly preferential treatments granted by Vietnamese 
government in term of tax reduction and refunds. This is an important financial source for 
Honda, and the preferential treatment has acted as a form of subsidization of the Honda 
operation through government incentives. However, the financially preferential treatments must 
be minimised now under the international commitments made by Vietnam in the WTO 
framework. The Government has long used the preferential treatment it could award to foreign 
companies through tax reductions, limited land fees, etc, as a means to attract and retain FDI. 
Under the conditions of WTO membership, many of these preferential incentives may need to 
be eliminated, and alternative forms of attraction of FDI be looked at. For the future of 
companies in Vietnam, like Honda, the changing economic environment brought about by WTO 
membership may mean that they are encouraged to re-evaluate the benefits of placing 
production in Vietnam, and could even lead to establishment of production activities in 
neighboring countries that are not constrained by commitments made under WTO membership 
(Onho, 2003; Lee, 2004; Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009).  
7.8 Honda Management 
Honda lowered their governance costs by transference of their organisational culture that 
socialised and acculturated the Honda-Vietnam employees to the international standards and 
modes of management of Honda-Japan (Dunning and Bansal, 1997, p.8). The goal here was to 
limit the internal costs of administration and management through efficiency improvements by 
transference of Honda-Japan systems, structure and knowledge, yet, adapt these to the host 
country and gradually empower Vietnam employees to take independent control of the 
processes of production and management, but remain true to the operating principles and 
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general style of the Honda Company, creating an international organisational management 
framework with a localised style. 
 In examining Honda-Vietnam staff management strategies and their contribution to the success 
RI+RQGDZHFDQUHWXUQWR+RIVWHGHDQG%RQG¶V (1988) five dimensions and see a vital change in 
how Honda operated in comparison to local competitors and its own domestic style in Japan. 
Japanese companies are renowned for how disciplined and structured their workforces are. In 
Vietnam, although the superficial impression of the workforce is one of strict discipline and a 
µ&RQIXFLDQ¶EDVHGGHPDQGIRUOR\DOW\DQGREHGLHQFHWRWKHHPSOR\HUDGHHSHUDQDO\VLVVKRZV
that rather than rigid rules and hierarchy, the Vietnamese workers are actually more flexible and 
ad-hoc, which creates room fRU µLPSURYLVDWLRQ DQG QHJRWLDWLRQ¶ %DUNHPD DQG 9HUPHXOHQ
9LHWQDP¶VLGHQWLW\DVDµFRPPXQLVW¶FRXQWU\DGGVWR WKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWDORQJVLGHWKH
Confucian based values of obedience, all Vietnam workers will react positively to an 
expectation they wiOOZRUNWRDKLJKVWDQGDUGSXUHO\DVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUµGXW\¶WRWKHHPSOR\HU
However, Honda-Japan worked with the local partner to establish various levels of incentives 
DQGUHZDUGVIRUZRUNHUVLPSURYHGHIIRUWV$VRQHHPSOR\HHQRWHGµ$W+RQGD,JHWDQDward for 
reaching targets and a bonus for exceeding them. The harder I work the more opportunities I get 
IRUSURPRWLRQ,QMREVEHIRUH,QHYHUJRWUHFRJQLWLRQ7KDWLVWKHZD\ZLWK9LHWQDPHPSOR\HUV¶ 
To exploit the advantages of the low labour cost and plentiful supply of Vietnamese workers, 
Honda has recruited large numbers of Vietnam employees and trained them to operate an entire 
assembly line for motorbikes (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007). According to µ7KH$nnual Report of 
Honda¶, the total number of employees in Honda Vietnam Company is 5,057 in the year 2008. 
To keep the qualified personnel to work for Honda Vietnam Company, the performance- pay 
system has been applied to. The high profitability of Vietnamese Honda Company is the most 
critical factor for Honda to keep and to develop the key personnel in the strongly competitive 
market of labour in Vietnam by increasing their wage step by step. The average monthly salary 
of employees in Honda Vietnam Company is about USD200 and that of the managers is USD 
3000 plus. 
To have the high capacity in human resources, Honda has provided the training service for 
employees and managers in the form of short- training courses or by the way of a process of 
µlearning by doing¶. Many Honda experts from their Headquarters have been sent to Vietnam to 
train the assembly skills of Vietnamese employees. In fact, Vietnamese employees are often 
endowed with good technical skills and are able to quickly learn the necessary assembly skills 
and this is also aided by the relatively simple production methods used by Honda. Vietnamese 
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workers were able to become skilled substitutes for the Japanese experts, and become 
strategically valuable assets for successful performance of the Honda motorbike assembly line 
in Vietnamese market. Although quickly achieving the same levels of expertise as their Japanese 
counterparts, the Vietnamese worker still commanded only a fraction of the Japanese workers 
wage, ensuring that the Honda Company could still produce to the same high quality, but at a far 
lower cost ratio. The compensation within Honda Company has been structured in accordance 
with the grade level of the job (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007).  
To maintain the sound position of a major market share and to increase the high rate of 
profitability of Honda Vietnam Company, the incomes of both managers and employees have 
been kept stable, although always also focused on a steady rise that encouraged employee 
loyalty, but helped maintain a profitable operation. The working conditions are built on a theme 
RI µWUXVW¶DQGDLPHGDWHQFRXUDJLQJ ORQJ-term commitment to the Honda by all managers and 
workers within Honda. All of the labour regulations are in accordance with Vietnamese Labour 
Code and Honda has an impressive record of strictly following national legislation on employee 
protection. The Trade Union has been established to protect the rights of employees in Honda 
and all employees have signed full labour contracts with the employers and the employers are 
diligent in paying the necessary social insurance. The Honda Vietnam Company has team work 
spirit and good labour principles. So far, there have not been any major strikes and any long 
layoffs have not occurred in Honda plants (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007). 
The issue of pay and working conditions in Vietnam needs careful analysis as it is a vital aspect 
of maintaining the profitability of FDI ventures. Foreign investors establishing ventures in 
Vietnam should understand that the pay and working conditions of some Vietnamese employees 
is a highly controversial issue, and that although there is strict legislation on how workers 
should be treated, its actual effective regulation can often be questioned. Non-payment of 
wages, the failure to provide adequate social welfare schemes, dangerous or unhealthy working 
conditions, lack of training and promotion through nepotism or familial connections rather than 
on merit are all issues that often make Vietnam employees lack of commitment to companies a 
serious concern. This is further aggravated by the Vietnamese fascination with the credibility of 
µUXPRXUV¶ than the actual fact and many Vietnamese workers loyalty and efforts are negatively 
affected by stories of employer bad practices. With the almost generic lack of official 
enforcement of worker regulations, unofficial strikes and worker apathy in the workplace can 
become a serious concern that eventually affects the running costs of a business venture. On the 
other hand, a company such as Honda, that rests its reputation on providing extremely good 
levels of pay and working conditions can find it soon possessing a vital competitive advantage. 
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The attraction is not confined just to its own workers and the skilled personnel from its 
competitors can soon find themselves valuable employees of Honda (Ministry of Industry, 2007; 
Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Lee, 2004).  
Honda also has a good record on following regulations on environmental protection. All of the 
waste products of Honda Vietnam Company are generated from the industrial production and 
assembly lines and Honda has ensured that they have been carefully filtered before entering the 
environment. The communes surrounding Honda Vietnam Company particularly and customers 
generally are pleased with the presence of Honda Vietnam Company and by its high standards 
of care, not only for the workers, but for the local community and the environment in general. 
Honda has concentrated not only on building its reputation as the provider of high quality 
motorbikes cat a competitive price, but also on winning accolades as a good employer, a trusted 
and benevolent member of the local community and a benefit to the Vietnam society as a whole. 
,W LV+RQGD¶VUHSXWDWLRQDQGIRFXVRQVRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WKDWKDVKHOSHGZLQ WKH OR\DOW\DQG
trust of its customers. Honda has aimed at positively positioning itself into the Vietnam culture 
and society, and been rewarded by achieving a brand loyalty not matched by any of its 
competitors (Ministry of Industry, 2007). 
7.8.1 +RQGD9LHWQDP¶VCorporate Culture 
The management apparatus of Honda Vietnam Company has been organised according to the 
regulations of Vietnamese legal framework. The Board of Management is the highest level of 
power in the management system of Honda. The most important working principle of the Board 
of Management is consensus. The lower level of management is the Executive Section, which is 
responsible for tactic and daily running activities. The different departments under the CEO are 
the product and technology, purchasing, marketing, human resource, financial and accounting 
sections. The lowest level is the production and assembly lines with not so many direct workers. 
In a working shift (8 hours of assembly line construction), nearly 600 motorbikes are assembled 
per day. Full automation is utilised on the assembly lines, and this increases productivity and 
efficiency. The internal information network of Honda has been organised in a professional 
manner that ensures constant two-way communication. The overall system of operating in 
Vietnam is effective at moving some distance from the traditional hierarchical Japanese 
management style, and establishing a corporate culture suited to the Vietnamese style of 
working. The system of values of Honda is very comprehensive and can be expressed in 
different dimensions. They convey the sense of development of loyalty, trust building and 
respect for rules and regulations. These values create the Honda cultural identity and the core 
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competencies to strongly develop under the threat of strong competition and the accelerated 
globalization of Vietnam (Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007; Mishima, 2005; Pham Truong Hoang, 
2004).  
A number of FDI joint ventures in Vietnam have suffered from a record of conflict between 
personnel, but the conciliatory and consensual style of the Board of Management of Honda 
Vietnam &RPSDQ\KDVKHOSHGUHGXFHFRQIOLFWWRWKHPLQLPXP+RQGD¶VVW\OHKDVEHHQVWULFWO\
regulated to abide by the very letter of Vietnamese Law on Investment and helped further its 
reputation as a perfect FDI investor in Vietnam. This may be explained to some extent by the 
many corporate cultural similarities between Japan and Vietnam, with both rooted firmly in the 
Eastern culture and still affected to some extent by a Confucius type philosophy (Nguyen Duc 
Tiep, 2007).  
7.9 Recommendations and Conclusion 
Honda Vietnam Company has undertaken a successful local responsiveness strategy in Vietnam 
in several dimensions. The main philosophy of Honda Vietnam Company in Vietnam is to serve 
the customers to the best possible degree and that has proved the right choice in Vietnam. To 
respond to each problem that arises in the changeable business environment in the transitional 
period of becoming WTO member, Honda tries to look for the most appropriate way to solve 
issues in a calm and conciliatory atmosphere. 
The Vietnamese people have become familiar and loyal to the Honda brand and this has led to a 
highly profitable and durable venture for Japanese FDI in Vietnam. Honda Motorbike Company 
in Vietnam has become an essential part of the life for the majority of Vietnamese people, and 
provided them with the perfect complement to the fast moving lifestyle of a modern 
industrializing economy. The demand for a quick and easy form of transport that is of high 
quality and at an affordable price has allowed Honda to situate itself at the very pinnacle of the 
market and create a unique position in the market that competitors will find extremely difficult 
to challenge (Ministry of Industry, 2007). 
The Vietnamese market is one of the most rewarding places for Vietnamese Honda Company to 
invest capital, technology and management expertise. There remain further opportunities to 
expand its market share and to improve its competitiveness (Ministry of Industry, 2007). The 
philosophy of Honda Vietnam Company is µconverting the dream into the power of going 
ahead¶. This is a special kind of invisible asset that differentiates Honda from other motorbike 
companies.  
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In building scenarios for growth of Honda Vietnam Company in Vietnam in the financial crisis 
and attempting to go further in Vietnamese market, Honda has three options for its annual 
growth rate of revenue in the next period: low, medium and high with the rate of 5, 15 and 25 
per cent respectively. From the optimistic point of view, Honda can achieve the high annual 
growth rate of 25 per cent of revenue for next five years because the potential for the motorbike 
market is still huge in Vietnam, although there is the highly competitive density from other 
modes of transportation and competitors.  
The Vietnamese policy toward FDI attraction has offered many preferential treatments for 
foreign investors entering the market and these have become strong motivations for foreign 
investors, including Honda Company, to move huge amounts of assets into Vietnam. Under the 
pressures of WTO commitments, this policy has some contradictions to international rules and 
customs, and the former incentives to invest now need to be re-designed. Some barriers to 
foreign investment in Vietnam such as the regulations on local content requirements of 
motorbike assembly and others in line with TRIMs have had to be removed. This is a new 
favorable condition for Honda Vietnam Company and has opened up new opportunities for the 
further long-term operation of Honda in Vietnam. Clearly, both Vietnamese policy and Honda 
Vietnam Company have found mutually beneficial rewards to cooperation.  
In the more competitive market of motorbikes in Vietnam, and under the strong pressures of 
international commitments of WTO and the pressure of the global financial crisis , and to 
continue to be successful over the long term, Honda should take into consideration the following 
issues: 
* The need for diversification of the range of products to meet the diversified demands of the 
motorbike in Vietnam, whilst also taking advantage of the low labour cost and policy 
preferences of bilateral trade and investment of both countries. 
x Applying the appropriate strategy to reduce the price of motorbike to make longer the 
product life cycle of the motorbike.  
x Developing new products, especially in the luxury class, as the growing demand for cars and 
the increase in prosperity means more people now looking not only for high quality, but also 
for comfort and opulence regardless of price. The main mass of the people wanted easily 
affordable and effective forms of personal transport. But the new developing Vietnam has a 
growing middle and higher income class that look for the expensive and extravagant symbols 
of wealth that indicate their new standing in the economic hierarchy, and Honda need to 
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address this demand by also providing the luxury bike options found in many of the 
showrooms of Western competitors.  
x Taking effective advantage of the strategic co-operation relationships at the governmental 
level between Vietnam and Japan and to continue to build these as a framework for Honda 
Vietnam Company in terms of protection of its market share and its reputation in Vietnam.  
x Developing the flexible strategy of local responsiveness to react to the fast changes of the 
business environment of Vietnam in several aspects such as the quality, price and after- sale 
services. The sophisticated terrain and weak infrastructure of Vietnam require good quality 
motorbikes. The low income of majority of Vietnamese residents sets the demand for 
motorbikes assembled in Vietnam at as low a price as possible. The bad and unsystematic 
after-sales services for a long time offered by small and medium sized enterprises of 
Vietnam, cannot fully meet the high demand for improvements of the service. Honda has a 
lot of advantages and has used these to accumulate a large amount of experience on 
providing a good after-sales service and the Vietnamese motorbike user is beginning to pay 
as much attention to this as they always did to price and quality.  
x They need to keep close attention to the evolution of change in the business strategies of their 
competitors in the motorbike market, and to promptly launch the appropriate strategies to 
meet changes in the market in the context of deeper international integration. Therefore, a 
better economic intelligence unit responsible for monitoring the market for Honda 
motorbikes should be established, and used to gather and analyse all necessary information 
needed to support a strategy of expansion of Honda in Vietnam. Additionally, there is a need 
to focus on production activities in order to produce comprehensive solutions for Honda in 
terms of the designs, technical qualifications, price and the environmental protections.  
x Honda needs to be willing to carefully learn from both the successes and failures of other 
motorbike producers in Vietnam in order to prepare the way for the next phases of 
development in the Vietnamese market. The most important lesson in Vietnamese market for 
all businessmen who want to be successful in the market is to build the sound base of 
customers and Honda is not an exception. Perhaps, the simple philosophy µthink globally, act 
locally¶ should continue to be the basic guideline for Honda in Vietnam. Honda has not only 
showed a deep understanding of Vietnam and demonstrated its affection and social 
responsibility towards the culture and people, it has also created a highly profitable FDI 
venture that has been supported through the growing mutual affection of the Vietnamese 
towards Honda. 
However, we cannot examine Honda and its impact on FDI without also considering the general 
interaction between the whole motorcycle industry, the government and FDI.  
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In 2007 the Government issued a report on the motorcycle industry that clearly stated the 
ideological approach of the Party to economic development. The report Nam et.al, (2007), 
declared that: 
In an increasingly integrated market with a large presence of foreign producers, such as the 
motorcycle market in Vietnam, the basic role of the government should be to support the 
healthy growth of the industry by understanding and responding to its needs instead of dictating 
it. Private business enterprises are the primary decision-makers and executors of industrial 
dynamism, but the government also has an important role of providing supportive visions, rules 
and measures to ensure that the industrial playground is predictable, fair, and in line with the 
general interest of the nation (Ministry of Industry, 2007). 
A central aspect of the hypothesis of this thesis is that the Government has following an 
increasingly free market policy towards FDI, despite the country being politically identified as 
communist. The above Ministry of Industry statement shows that Vietnam is making 
government policy a direct positive determinant of FDI, rather than an ideologically based 
barrier. The subsequent policymaking decisions are focused on supporting the general economic 
principles of industry being the decision-maker and government facilitating the right 
environment for profitable business. For example, the following are the government action plans 
for the future of the motorcycle industry:  
x Target 1: A new mechanism should be set up in Vietnam to coordinate demand and 
supply of foreign expert dispatch services. 
x Target 2: Establish a mechanism to receive retired Japanese managers and engineers 
with high skills in manufacturing to level up Vietnamese factories (this may coincide 
with the mechanism mentioned in Target 2-1 above). 
One measure is strategic FDI marketing in order to strengthen supporting industries. Draw up 
and effectively implement a strategy to absorb narrowly targeted foreign enterprises to 
VWUHQJWKHQ 9LHWQDP¶V VXSSRUWLQJ LQGXVWU\ EDVH 7KH VWUDWHJ\ VKRXOG LQFOXGH LPSURYHPHQWV LQ
procedure, focused vision and targets, better FDI marketing and production-related 
infrastructure and services. 
Thus, there is a clear indication through examination of the case of Honda and the motorcycle 
industry in Vietnam that a major positive determinant is the overall transformation of how the 
Government manages economic policy in contemporary Vietnam. The chapter also shows that 
the FDI investor should seek maximum capital return on their investment by taking into account 
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and adjusting their strategic management strategy to take in account the impact of culture in 
Vietnam upon foreign enterprises. Dunning and Bansal, 1997), encouraged economic theorists 
to move beyond the constraints of the disciplines focus on traditional economic theory and draw 
in the lessons of political science with its move towards critical realism, and international 
relations theories move towards constructivism, by developing economic theories that included 
finding the relationship of the theory to its cultural environment. In this case study, the 
impressive success of Honda in Vietnam is partly to it developing cultural affinity to the 
Vietnamese. 
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the determinants of FDI in Vietnam over the period of 1986 to 2009, 
and provided a political, economic and socio-cultural analysis of the growth of the economy and 
the impact of foreign direct investment upon it. However, although the concentration is on the 
period immediately following Doi Moi and covering the next two decades, the thesis has also 
briefly considered what the determinants impact will be on the future economic growth and its 
dependency on attracting greater sums of foreign investment. The majority of existing studies on 
FDI in Vietnam have involved a focus only on the political and economic factors involved in 
development of FDI and this thesis has presented this as a weakness in the methodologies of the 
studies. This thesis contends that the cultural environment and unique social network, built upon 
a foundation of Confucianism, Buddhism and Soviet style µVRFLDOLVation¶KDVHLWKHUVLJQLILFDQWO\
constrained or facilitated aspects of the impact of political and economic policies underpinning 
the national strategy for development and inclusion into the global economy. 
In order to provide a full DQDO\VLVWKHWKHVLVKDVUHOLHGRQ'XQQLQJ¶VHFOHFWLFWKHRU\HVSHFLDOO\
with its concern to the local advantages and combined this with support to the collection of 
quantitative data sources by the use of qualitative research accrued from extensive elite 
interviewing of a number of politicians, business leaders, workers, government officials and 
economic analysts from both Vietnam and around the world. 
In the first chapters the introduction of a policy change that shifted Vietnam from a centrally 
planned economy to a free market model was analysed. This analysis was then directed into 
explaining how political policies were changed through legal and administrative reform and how 
development, the growth of the economy and reform of the economic infrastructure was vitally 
assisted by the attraction and utilisation of FDI. 
To provide research that supported the basic hypothesis of the thesis, including the linkage of 
determinants of FDI with economic growth, extensive research was carried out on two particular 
case studies. In the chapter on ANZ Bank it was demonstrated how a Western style business 
model was strategically re-positioned within the Vietnamese economy. This included evidence 
that the ANZ venture involved a reform of its own Western business model in order to create a 
synergy with the Vietnamese culture, in order to facilitate a penetration of the Vietnam financial 
markets and gain market share by becoming domesticated to the Vietnamese style of living and 
earning. Whilst the inadequacies of the law, and the constraints of the political system and its 
sometimes relatively slow reform did limit the size, style and variety of financial products and 
services ANZ could provide, the ability to adapt to the local culture did directly impact upon its 
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continued growth and success in the Vietnam market. In the case of Honda, the Vietnam 
business model was also a hybrid of its Japanese parent company and the Vietnamese operation. 
This manufactured model of operation was developed to not only take account of the political 
and economic constraints of Vietnam, but to also accommodate the cultural style of Vietnam. 
For Honda, the similarities between the Japanese and Vietnamese cultures, allowed the company 
to quickly position itself as the dominant market leader in the Vietnam motorbike trade. So 
effective were Honda in their penetration and acclimatisation to the Vietnam system, they 
actually have become as much a participant and sometimes leader in the nature and development 
of the culture, as they were once a foreigQµLQYDGHU¶ (i.e. the occupying force in World War II). 
The Honda Company generated aspects of cultural change that altered the style of life and 
contributed to the social and economic status of their customers, with Honda also finding its 
image and brand reflected in art, music and lifestyle. The Asian mindset of Vietnam was one 
that the Japanese easily understood and catered for, as their own culture was already deeply 
embedded in the Asian traditions and values. The mixture of Confucianism, Asiatic based 
religions and ethnic similarities meant the Japanese were less uncomfortable than Westerners in 
adjusting to the culture of Vietnam. 
Equally clear is that the ANZ Bank was equally successful at adapting and actually developed a 
competitive advantage based on their willingness to work with the cultural constraints of 
Vietnam. The significance of the case studies was that both Asian and Western culturally based 
investors could effectively adapt their business and national cultural styles to the Vietnamese 
µZD\¶$QGWKXV optimise the full potential of their foreign investment. As Ms Vu Thuy Quynh, 
General Manager of ANZ explained, µthe culture of Vietnam has a significant impact on 
business in Vietnam. Not being aware of its influence and failing to adjust corporate strategies 
to take account of it is a recipe for failure. This is not only the case when dealing with 
customers, but also when conducting negotiations, formulating partnerships and business in 
general¶ (Interview: Vu Thuy Quynh, ANZ, 3 July 2008). 
In addition to the interviews, this thesis has relied on published data sources. However, a fault in 
the analysis is immediately clear as Vietnam has, and to some extent still suffers from a lack of 
reliable data reporting. In past history the political and economic systems of Vietnam have 
demonstrated a certain degree of fragmentation and obscuration when it comes to the provinces 
reporting to the Central Government. This is chiefly due to a form of natural decentralization, 
where the provinces enjoy a certain level of independence from the diktat of the Central 
Government by failing to accurately report statistics in a regulated and timely fashion. This was 
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explained by one former Communist Party official as µD FXOWXUHRI UHVLVWDQFHZKHUH DFKDRWLF
and inaccurate reporting of statistics is a way for Provincial officials to undermine Central 
control and make monitoring them extremely difficult¶ (Interview: details remain anonymous at 
the request of the interviewee, 20 October 2008). Obviously, this is also a worry for the 
economy in general as a lack of reliable data makes informed and accurate economic planning 
and strategy difficult, if not sometimes impossible to carry out. 
However, as this thesis progresses through the years of reform, it has become clear that this 
problem of availability of reliable data, although still prevalent in places, has become less of a 
concern. For example, data from the General Statistics Office of the Vietnam Government 
Office (General Statistics Office ±Viet Nam) is now more widely accepted for its accuracy by 
such international organisations as the World Bank and the IMF. Nevertheless, all data for the 
last three decades, especially during the controlled economy period should be treated with some 
level of caution. 
Two issues present themselves as consequences of this thesis. In the first place the thesis has 
analysed the period from 1986/7 to 2009, but it is clear that a full understanding for decision-
makers of the future requires an equally concise analysis of the present conditions. The period 
from 1986/7 to 2009 can stand alone as the initial foundation period of FDI development in 
Vietnam. The period following this is equally important and in order to fulfill Nguyen 0DL¶V
(Chairman of the State Commission on WTO entry) request for a full analysis that can precede 
the efficient reform of the FDI environment, future research needs to concentrate on the latest 
period of development. 
Secondly, the thesis has also been overtaken by global events as a critical juncture in FDI 
development has occurred with the onset of the global financial crisis in November 2008. The 
impact of the crisis is still not fully understood, but even now it is clear it will have a deep and 
possibly long-term impact on the future success of FDI in the Asian World. One consequence is 
that a popular concept in Europe now is the social market economy, which appears to be a 
middle medium between the Communists centrally controlled command economy and the 
capitalist free market system. The concept of a social market economy discards some of the 
strict tenets of the free market, such as an almost religious allegiance to the self-regulating 
mechanism of pure capitalism which sees government interference with the free market 
principle as its chief threat to working effectively. However, the economic theory of the social 
market economy requires further academic research in the light of the impact of the global 
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financial crisis, before it can properly be used as a structural background in which the 
determinants of FDI can be examined.  
+RZHYHU9LHWQDP¶V)',JURZWKKDVSURYHQWREHUDSLGDQGLPSUHVVLYHZKLOVWWKHOLQNEHWZHHQ
FDI development and the general growth of the economy has been demonstrated in this thesis. 
The analysis of the Vietnam economy can be divided into three main periods. 1) 1975-1985, 
when immediately following the war and re-unification of North and South Vietnam, the 
HFRQRP\ZDVUXQRQDFHQWUDOO\SODQQHGVWUDWHJ\ WKDW UHSOLFDWHG WKH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VPRGHO
1986/7-2003, which marked the building of the foundations of a free market model that relied 
on development of FDI. 3) 2003 to the present. 
Bui Tat 7KDQJQRWHVKRZWKHILUVWSHULRGZDVVKDSHGE\µDKHDY\OHJDF\RIZDUGDPDJH
and an extremely impoverished economy, but also institutional structures that were to have a 
SURIRXQGLQIOXHQFHRQHFRQRPLFSROLF\¶p. 21). Bui Tat Thang criticises the economic policies 
of the early years as ones intent on a concentration on prioritizing heavy industry and founding 
WKHµUHYROXWLRQRI WKHUHODWLRQVRISURGXFWLRQ¶ Bui Tat Thang 2000, 21). By 1975, The North 
had already established a centrally planned economy and it now desired an extension of this to 
all of Vietnam. Economic development was immediately curtailed as the Government focused 
on centralization and nationalization. GNP became half the rate of population growth and 
national income grew at only one-fifth. A recession in the latter half of the 1970s and a 
domination of the economy by the agricultural sector pushed the Vietnamese economy to the 
point of near total economic collapse. Even with vast sums of foreign aid from allied 
Communist states, such as the Soviet Union and China, the majority of the population still 
suffered severe famines and shortages of all essential goods. By the 1980s national debt equaled 
annual national income. Gross foreign trade turnover was only USD1.7 billion per year, and 
entirely focused on the Communist bloc. Overspending of the state budget was 45 per cent of 
revenues in the last half of the decade of post war recovery. 
As explained in the thesis chapter on Doi Moi LW ZDV WKH VKLIW WR DQ µRSHQ GRRU¶ SROLF\ RI
renovation that clearly saved Vietnam from total economic disaster. It is important to note that 
this collapse of the economy has allowed this study to examine a country where FDI was of 
virtually no importance and then track its successful growth from a virtual scenario of nil 
influence to being one of the major contributors to its successful inclusion into the global 
economic system. 
:KLOH9LHWQDP¶VFORVHst Communist partner (the Soviet Union) was also transforming its own 
economic model from a centrally planned economy to a free market, the Vietnam case was very 
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GLIIHUHQWWRWKDWRIWKH6RYLHW¶V7KHHPSKDVLVLQ9LHWQDPZDVRQµVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOVWDELOLW\
that went hand in hand with macro-HFRQRPLFDOVWDELOL]DWLRQDQGFRQWURORIVWDWHUHVRXUFHV¶ (Bui 
Tat Thang, 2000, p. 23). Doi Moi aimed to address the relevant issues with: 
(1) Fundamental elimination of state-subsidised mechanisms 
(2) Diversification of publically owned assets 
(3) Encouragement and stimulation of development of private organisations 
(4) Maximisation of the use of potential resources for development of production and 
commodity exchange 
(5) Enactment of policies for the integration of Vietnam into the world and regional 
economies 
(6) Speeding up of foreign trade activities 
(7) Encouragement of foreign direct investment 
(8) Combining administrative reform with the renovation of economic policies 
(9) Strengthening of state management and macro-regulation 
(10) Combining economic growth with general social development to stabilise politics and 
maintain social targets. 
The point to note here is that Doi Moi was not merely a change in political strategy and 
economic policies, but also linked directly to the social and cultural aspects of the Vietnam 
society. FDI was a central aspect of the policy reform and whilst it also denoted a movement 
from isolation to integration into the global economic and political structures, it also involved a 
degree of accommodation of the culture of Vietnam to the outside world. However, the case 
studies in this thesis, ANZ and Honda, show that whilst the political, economic and cultural 
V\VWHPVRI9LHWQDP¶VµUHQRYDWLRQ¶KDYHUHIRUPHGWKHVXFFHVVIXOIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWHQWHUSULVHV 
have involved foreign investors also acclimatizing and merging their different value systems and 
practices to fit with the less changeable aspects of Vietnam. The thesis thus shows that 
economic theory concerning global patterns of growth and development of investment needs an 
analysis and methodology that includes the assessment of the impact of culture, as well as an 
analysis of the political and economic factors involved in determinants of foreign direct 
investment. Understanding how a domestic environment adapts in order to facilitate the 
successful development of foreign direct investment, entails some degree of holistic analysis of 
the domestic structures and influences, and the degree of change to which they are susceptible. 
Avoiding FDI failures also involves a certain level of adaptability of local conditions and a 
partnership of change between the domestic environment and the foreign investor. 
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However, the revolutionary change was initially with the Vietnamese in the early years of 
reform. In the first five years from 1986, following the introduction of Doi Moi policies by the 
9LHWQDPHVH *RYHUQPHQW WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ GHOLYHUHG D µVHULHV RI PDUNHW-oriented shock 
treatments to the economy with: 
(1) Liberalisation of the prices of consumer goods 
(2) Elimination of state subsidies for goods 
(3) Formulating and implementing the policy of positive effective interest rates 
(4) Floating the exchange rate 
(5) Selling the state-owned enterprises (Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Thang, 2007; 
Athukorala and Tran Quang Tien, 2009, Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002) 
An initial level of slow growth was eventually ended in the next period of development in 1992 
to 1996, and showed increases in GDP across most sectors, while inflation was also brought 
under control. Infrastructure, media and communications sectors development underpinned the 
recovery, and even the Asian financial crisis failed to end the pace of reform, as within a few 
years of stagnation there was a return to the record rates of growth (Bui Tat Thang, 2000, 26). 
 Nevertheless, despite the obvious successes of FDI in Vietnam, serious faults still threaten the 
future development. The pace of reform needs speeding up in the capital, monetary and labour 
markets, whilst the lack of sufficiently trained and qualified human resources is still a serious 
concern. 
The central challenge for Vietnam is the need to solve the problem of a lack of quality human 
resources in some key industries, such as Information Technologies and petroleum. However, as 
pointed out in this thesLV WKH ODFN RI D µVSLOORYHU¶ RI KXPDQ UHVRXUFH WDOHQW LQWR GRPHVWLF
enterprises from FDI projects is also a serious concern. For example, the transfer of human 
resource talent from FDI projects in the electronics industry to the domestic sector is virtually 
zero. For the effective and widespread benefits of FDI to be replicated in the domestic economy 
there needs to be a strengthening nationally of the pool of quality human resources. As Nguyen 
Thi Xuan Thuy and Mori warns there is a need for a supply of domestic labour that can carry out 
middle management roles and equally available pool of high-skilled technicians (Nguyen Thi 
Xuan Thuy and Mori, 2008). With this in mind the Vietnamese Government has focused its 
attention on developing programmes of vocational training at all levels, and advance the quality 
and content of education, especially at the University level. 
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In the Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2001-2005 the target for the ratio of the 
workforce possessing professional qualifications was 30 per cent, rising to 40 per cent by 2010 
in the Socio-Economic Plan for 2006-2010. In addition, the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and 
Social Affairs (02/,6$KDYHDOVR LQWURGXFHGD µ0DVWHU3ODQ¶ for development of vocational 
training in professional schools, colleges and universities. MOLISA aims to achieve an annual 
increase of 11-12 per cent of industrial trainees (Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy and Mori, 2008). 
However, even though the training of skilled workers is recognised as an essential need for 
future economic growth, the actual quality of the training remains a crucial concern for both 
domestic and foreign businesses in Vietnam. The programs of training, although more readily 
available suffer from outdated training equipment, a shortage of skilled instructors and an 
unclear division of responsibility between the Ministry of Education and Training and the 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs, and a general public and business community 
attitude that questions the utility and quality of training. 
A further problem is the cultural as well as business attitude to training of workers. A majority 
of the business community have traditionally seen the benefits of training as firstly a direct 
advantage to the worker, and secondly to the business in the form of future greater efficiency 
and productivity gains. Thus, business leaders see the payment for training as the responsibility 
of the worker alone, and most CEOs refuse to actually fund training. As one CEO of a major 
business gURXSLQ9LHWQDPVDLGµwe do not pay for training. The employee pays for the training. 
It is their responsibility. Why would we pay for the training only for them to leave afterwards 
and work maybe for a competitor? Also, if we pay the workers training fees they will not value 
the training and not put their full efforts into attending the courses and learning from them. 
µWhen they pay it makes sure they are dedicated to succeeding in the training¶ (Interview: 
details remain anonymous at request of the interviewees, 15 September 2009).  
Further discussions with business leaders revealed that the attitude to training is also influenced 
E\WKH9LHWQDPHVHµZD\¶DQGDWWLWXGHVJXLGHGE\&RQIXFLDQWKLQNLQJ7KHZRUNHULVEHOLHYHGWR
KDYHDµGXW\¶WRWKHµERVV¶DQGSURYLGHDVKLJKTXDOLW\ work as possible. Thus training is part of 
the responsibility of the worker and he benefits in the long run as better work performance may 
lead to improved pay and/or position. Generally, the leaders in business saw the long term 
benefits of training as an unnecessary burden on the short term profit margins, with often no 
guarantee that the benefits will in the long term accrue to the business. This attitude was also 
encouraged by the high rates of attrition in workforces. The basis of nearly all relationships 
between workers and bosses with concern to promotion and higher salaries was often seen as 
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GHSHQGLQJ RQ µUHODWLRQVKLSV¶ EDVHG RQ IULHQGVKLS DQGRU IDPLO\ FRQQHFWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ RQ
merit. On the one hand this meant that workers relied on advancement through the relationship 
and did not see the need for training. Workers also saw that the levels of salaries in the same 
offices/workplaces varied greatly, even for workers doing exactly the same job, and the levels 
GHSHQGHGDOPRVWHQWLUHO\RQ WKH µUHODWLRQVKLS¶ZLWK WKHµERVV¶DQGQRWRQPHULWDQG WKHDFWXDO
quality, efficiency and productivity of the worker, thus, even providing a logic for not 
undertaking training. Workers who did pay for training often did so in order to improve their 
opportunities by raising the profile of their CVs in order to find jobs in competitors businesses 
or to actually start up their own business.  
Extensive interviews were carried out privately with a number of employees in different sectors, 
but virtually all requested their identities to be kept secret, thus demonstrating how sensitive this 
issue is in the workplace. To some degree the problem was a self fulfilling prophesy as the 
workers believed they should pay for training in order to find work elsewhere, while the 
µERVVHV¶ZRXOGQRWSD\IRUWUDLQLQJDVWKH\EHOLHYHGWKHZRUNHUVZRXOGRQO\OHDYHRQFHWUDLQHG 
$JJUDYDWLQJ WKH SUREOHP ZDV WKH &RQIXFLDQ SKLORVRSK\ EHKLQG WKH FRQFHSW RI µGXW\¶ WR WKH
employer, which was used by the employers as reasoning for justifying the costs of training 
O\LQJZLWKWKHHPSOR\HH7KLVDOVRPD\EHDFRQWULEXWLQJUHDVRQWRWKHODFNRIµVSLOORYHU¶IURP
FDI projects to domestic firms of quality human resources. FDI led enterprises are more likely 
to accept the long-term benefits of training and thus ready to make the financial investment in 
training, as the foreign management come from national systems that have already accepted the 
ORJLF RI WKH µLQYHVWPHQW¶ LQ LPSURYLQJ SURGXFWLYLW\ DQG HIILFLHQF\ WKURXJK WUDLQLQJ DQG
education of human resources.  
Culture of earning promotion or pay increases through nepotism and relationships, rather than 
on merit is a serious challenge to the future of FDI. It is clearly becoming a negative 
determinant of FDI, but could also be difficult to overcome as the cultural logic constantly 
countermands the business logic, and whilst it can be a simple process to change the business 
system, it may be far more difficult, expensive and time consuming to change the cultural 
philosophy (Dunning and Bansal, 1997; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). 
A further problem is that the future of training of human resources can only be ensured through 
greater financial resource inputs and knowledge investment by business leaders and private 
enterprises. At the moment the private sector directly competes with the training and education 
sector and is not only often refusing to make the long-term financial investments into the sector, 
but are contributing towards a brain drain scenario, where private enterprise is overcoming its 
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skill shortage problems by using high salaries and additional benefits to attract the trainers, 
lecturers, experts and professionals away from the training sector and into the private sector 
(Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy and Mori, 2008). 
A recommendation stemming from the research in this thesis is that further research needs to be 
carried out on the human resource problems and issues in Vietnam. The gap in the literature that 
this thesis fills is focused on the success of particular FDI enterprises, but it also presents 
evidence of an additional gap in the literature that concerns the training, quality and efficiency 
of human resources. Research on Honda and ANZ showed that these two FDI supported 
ventures were ensuring their success by conducting extensive and on-going human resource 
training programmes. The subsequent benefits in their quality of work and level of service to the 
customer significantly contributed to their gain in market share through a competitive 
advantage. One of their core competitive advantages is their quality of human resources and the 
advantage is magnified by the lack of similar programmes in their domestic competitors. Thus, 
for the enterprises focused on in this thesis, the human resource issues can be seen as positive 
determinants of FDI growth, but for the Vietnam economy as a whole the long-term 
implications may seriously limit future economic growth for the nation. 
The problem of human resources is also an indication of the stage of development that Vietnam 
is in with concern to the overall pathway from a less developed, to developing, to a developed 
economy. The road to becoming a fully developed and industrialised economy through 
economic growth and attraction of FDI has been identified as a series of four stages (VDF 
Report, 2008) 
The first stage is based on the input of foreign investors in design, technology, production and 
PDUNHWLQJZKHUHNH\PDWHULDOVDQGUHVRXUFHVDUH LPSRUWHGDQG WKHKRVWFRXQWU\¶V IRFXV LVRQ
providing cheap labour. The main benefits to the host country, besides increased employment 
for many of its poor, are limited and the economic value is mostly in favour of the foreign 
investor. 
In the second stage of development, the benefits of increased production are seen as the growth 
in the demand for domestic resources. Domestic industries are now able to also begin to 
compete on a quality level and the demand for domestic labour is now increasingly enhanced by 
the demand for local parts, resources, etc. The economy is boosted by demand for physical and 
human inputs, but the management and control of the industries involved still largely remains 
with the foreign investor. 
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The third phase requires a universal change in the capabilities of the domestic economy, with 
human resources now able to take on the challenges of development, including be able to carry 
out unassisted the responsibilities of management, the development of technology and the 
efficient operation of manufacturing, logistical and marketing needs. This new found level of 
independence directly contributes towards increased domestic value. 
In the final stage the country is not only a producer, but also becomes an innovator. The 
principles of production are high quality products/services at a low cost, and this is now 
universally applied across all sectors.  
The stages of development can been thus clarified as  
(1) Agglomeration: simple manufacturing under foreign guidance 
(2) Technology Absorption: Having supporting industries, but still under foreign guidance 
(3) Creativity: with technology and management mastered, and can produce high quality 
goods. 
(4) Full Capability in Innovation: innovation and product design capabilities at a global 
leader level (Ministry of Industry, 2007). 
As the VDF Report (2008) notes, several particular aspects of Vietnam directly affect the 
development of FDI. ThHVH LQFOXGH WKDW WKH µFXUUHQW LQGXVWULDO G\QDPLVP LV ILQDQFHG FKLHIO\
through private investment and consumption and private demand is mostly financed through 
Viet Kieu remittances, ODA, FDI, tourism and security investments. The main advantages of 
Vietnam are its good location and good workers, who if properly managed and technically 
trained ± GHPRQVWUDWHKLJKOHYHOVRIVNLOODQGDXQLYHUVDOGHGLFDWLRQWRGLOLJHQWZRUN¶ (p.6). 
However, only though increased reform of policies and institutions can Vietnam continue to 
achieve high records of growth. The strengths required to promote further growth are: 
(1) Good workers 
(2) Political stability 
(3) Rapidly improving FDI climate 
(4) A good location 
(5) A large population.  
These are essential needs for attracting and retaining FDI while the weaknesses that threaten the 
economic growth and development of FDI are: 
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(1) Unstable policy and law 
(2) A poor infrastructure 
(3) Irregular business practices 
(4) Corruption 
(5) Lack of supporting industries 
(6) Shortage of skilled engineers and middle level managers 
(7) The possible negative impact of integration. 
Vietnam can be seen to clearly score highly on the needs for development, but unfortunately 
suffers as equally high levels in the seven areas of weaknesses. 
From the research of this thesis it is clear that Vietnam as an economy lies chiefly in the first 
phase of development with aspects of the second phase also prevalent in some geographical 
regions and particular sectors. However, in the case of FDI enterprises it is clear that Honda and 
ANZ have successfully negotiated their business progress through the first three phases and are 
actually on the brink of moving into the final phase of development. The aim of the Vietnam 
*RYHUQPHQWLVWKDWVXFKDQH[DPSOHRIGHYHORSPHQWµVSLOOVRYHU¶WRWKHHQWLUHHFRQRP\ 
Nevertheless, with analysis of the evidence of research it is clear that the Vietnam economy still 
suffers from a certain level of still slow reform of the legal administration. Despite the obvious 
evidence of major changes to attract and retain high levels of FDI, problems persist in the legal 
administration. For example, Pham Thi Thuy Dung of PriceWaterHouseCoopers heavily 
criticises the legal system, where despite reform, the investors seeking to advance education 
projects still require an applicant to apply for a general license and twelve different sub-licenses 
at local and Provincial level. Besides the legal obligations the structure of the government 
management of FDI needs reform to ensure new levels of transparency and clarity in investment 
policies and procedures. Pham Thuy Dung recommends that carrying the whole process onto the 
Net would speed up the integration of Vietnam into the world economy (Interview: Pham Thuy 
Dung, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 7 April 2009) 
Despite the problems that still persist in the Vietnam economy, the attraction of high quality FDI 
investment still continues. After the successful attraction of Berjaya Malaysia Land, Berham to 
build an 880 hectare university township in Vietnam at a cost of USD3.5 billion, Pham Huu 
Thang chairmaQ RI WKH 9LHWQDP )RUHLJQ ,QYHVWPHQW $JHQF\ VDLG µWKH )', LQFUHDVH LQ WKH
FRQWH[WRI9LHWQDP¶VVXSSRVHGHFRQRPLFGLIILFXOWLHVSURYHVIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVJUHDWFRQILGHQFH
iQWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW¶9LHWQDP1HW, 2008). 
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The impressive growth of FDI from the virtually non-existent levels of 1987 contributed to the 
economy in general and directly influenced the rate of growth. It has also revolutionised the 
structures of the economy; taking Vietnam to a point where the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) of 2008 declared that Vietnam has undergone an impressive process 
of transformation from an isolated, poor and collectivised agriculturally based economy into a 
booming nation with a dynamic and diversified private sector co-existing with a large public 
sector, fully integrated into the world economy (UNCTAD, 2008). 
Data from the Vietnam General Statistics Office (working closely with the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment) demonstrates the basic tenets and analysis of this research, underpinning the 
international opinions, such as from UNCTAD, applauding the policies and outcomes of the last 
two decades of economic reform. The original problems with collection of reliable data 
experienced in the first period of this thesis research is an issue that is being tackled by the 
Vietnam General Statistics Office and the latest data summaries are an attempt to demonstrate 
its improvements in effectively provided the vital statistics needed for planning future economic 
policy reforms. The data also clearly re-enforces many of the major findings of this research. 
For example, the latest data on the period of 1988-2005 shows that FDI has steadily transformed 
the Vietnam economy with improvements in FDI licensing and implementation. In 1996-2000 
there were 1,724 new FDI projects with a further 825 existing FDI ventures increasing their 
capital investment (General Statistics Office, Vietnam; MPI Report, 2008). 
The constant contributions to the speed of industrial growth and the steady improvement in the 
levels of labour creation in FDI projects shows how the international investment has impacted 
on the Vietnam economy. However, the distribution of FDI across sectors demonstrates a 
continuing over-concentration of investment into certain areas and a need for two areas (health 
and education) to attract significantly more foreign investment. The Vietnamese government is 
DWWHPSWLQJWRIDFLOLWDWHWKLVLQFUHDVHLQLQYHVWPHQWWRKHDOWKDQGHGXFDWLRQWKURXJKDµFUHHSLQJ¶
strategy of privatisation. Private and independent hospitals and schools are being actively 
promoted and new legislation is attempting to improve the overall environment for attracting 
foreign investment to these vital areas of social development. Health and education can provide 
lucrative opportunities for future FDI projects and the improvement of these sectors will 
inevitably contribute further to the overall quality of the FDI environment in Vietnam, for 
example, in helping to further advance the levels and quality of human resources (Athukorala 
and Tran Quang Tien, 2009, Nguyen Nhu Binh and Haughton, 2002, Nguyen Duc Tiep, 2007). 
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The origins of investment are now taken to a global level as the countries now taking an interest 
in investing in Vietnam are extremely diverse DQGµSDUWQHUV¶DUHQRZVSUHDGDFURVV$VLD(XURSH
and America. Nevertheless, there is significant untapped potential for further investment from 
many countries in Europe and the Arab World. At the moment the Middle East has only recently 
focused on Vietnam as a potential investment target. The oil rich investors from countries like 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are notable for their absence from any major FDI project, although the 
UAE is an exception to this trend and may act as a vanguard of future Arab investment into 
Vietnam (General Statistics Office, Vietnam). 
Despite the international diversity of the investment, a similar diversity in domestic location of 
investment is still not apparent. A select and limited number of provinces still dominate the FDI 
environment and many areas of Vietnam enjoy only minimal benefits from the FDI inflows. The 
FRQFHQWUDWLRQLQWRVSHFLILFDUHDVULVNVPDQ\SDUWVRI9LHWQDPEHLQJµSDVVHGE\¶LQWKHTXHVWIRU
economic development, thus demonstrating that the Vietnam government needs to improve is 
regional policies and offer international investors further reasons to spread their financial 
support across the whole of Vietnam. 
The contribution of FDI to the economy has come in the form of major investments into the 
energy, telecommunications, and transport and finance sectors. Vast opportunities still offer 
themselves in areas such as insurance, where the almost total concentration has been on Life 
insurance, some forms of business and trade insurance and motor vehicle policies. The non-life 
insurance market is almost non-existent outside of the vehicle sector (Interview: Andrew 
Goddard, CEO of Red8 Consulting Services, 15 June 2009) and the potential for investments in 
trade support policies such as Import/Export Credit insurance schemes is ready for a number of 
new FDI investments. 
From the research carried out in this thesis the determinants of FDI in Vietnam have shown a 
relatively speedy and impressive support for further development. The latest data issued 
demonstrates that the record on FDI and its impact on the general economic growth of the 
country has helped move the Vietnam economy from stagnation and starvation to a period of 
stability and growth with significant potential for further attraction of FDI.  
The contribution of FDI to the economy has come in the form of wealth creation, the generation 
of employment and economic diversification and the building of a stable and growing export 
VHFWRU(FRQRPLFH[SHUWVSRLQW WR WKHFUHDWLRQRI µHIIHFWLYHDQG IOH[LEOH VROXWLRQV¶ WRHDVH the 
DIIHFWVRI WKHJOREDOHFRQRPLF µVORZGRZQ¶DQG IRUZDUG WKLQNLQJSODQQLQJ WKDWQRZKDV D IXOO
portfolio of medium and long-term strategies. 
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The Vietnam Government realises that pro-FDI policies of the future must deal with the 
continued reform of legal and administrative systems, including on the ownership of land, the 
reform of the tax and customs procedures and even more focus on ensuring equity in the 
treatment between domestic and foreign investors. 
Thus, this thesis presents two case studies of successful FDI projects that illustrate how the 
determinants of FDI have affected the investment. It is clear that these problems, such as the 
lack of quality human resources, the piecemeal benefits of spillover from FDI to domestic 
enterprises, and difficulties with the legal and administrative systems still provide major 
challenges. But overall, the policy to shift from a centrally controlled command economy and 
attain economic growth through transition to a free market economy has been successful; and 
this Doi Moi policy focused on attraction and retention of FDI as its core methodology. Future 
growth depends on understanding, reforming and improving the determinants of FDI growth in 
Vietnam.
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